# BIT AFF – 2AC BLOCKS & BACKLINES– HSS - version 1.0

# \*\*\*\*A-TO OFFCASE + OFFENSIVE ARGS START HERE

## A-to Topicality

Note: some versions of the plan are quid-pro-quos…. Some are not… adjust accordingly.

Also – be careful to not pull the wrong block here.

### A-to “Plan can’t be a QPQ”

#### We meet their definition – their card only say we need to include “positive” action. We do.

#### Counter-interpretation – Affs can be QPQ.

Kahler and Kastner 6 — Miles Kahler, Rohr Professor of Pacific International Relations at the school of International Relations and Pacific Studies and Distinguished Professor of Political Science at the University of California-San Diego, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Harvard University, and Scott L. Kastner, Associate Professor of International Relations at the University of Maryland, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California-San Diego, 2006 (“Strategic Uses of Economic Interdependence: Engagement Policies on the Korean Peninsula and Across the Taiwan Strait,” *Journal of Peace Research*, Volume 43, Number 5, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via SAGE Publications Online, p. 524-525)

Economic engagement – a policy of deliberately expanding economic ties with an adversary in order to change the behavior of the target state and improve bilateral political relations – is a subject of growing interest in international relations. Most research on economic statecraft emphasizes coercive policies such as economic sanctions. This emphasis on negative forms of economic statecraft is not without justification: the use of economic sanctions is widespread and well documented, and several quantitative studies have shown that adversarial relations between countries tend to correspond to reduced, rather than enhanced, levels of trade (Gowa, 1994; Pollins, 1989). At the same time, however, relatively little is known about how often strategies of economic engagement are deployed: scholars disagree on this point, in part because no database cataloging instances of positive economic statecraft exists (Mastanduno, 2003). Beginning with the classic work of Hirschman (1945), most studies of economic engagement have been limited to the policies of great powers (Mastanduno, 1992; Davis, 1999; Skalnes, 2000; Papayoanou & Kastner, 1999/2000; Copeland, 1999/2000; Abdelal & Kirshner, 1999/2000). However, engagement policies adopted by South Korea and one other state examined in this study, Taiwan, demonstrate that engagement is not a strategy limited to the domain of great power politics and that it may be more widespread than previously recognized.

We begin by developing a theoretical approach to strategies of economic engagement. Based on the existing literature, our framework distinguishes different forms of economic engagement and identifies the factors likely to facilitate or undermine the implementation of these strategies. We then evaluate our hypotheses by examining the use of economic engagement on the Korean Peninsula and across the Taiwan Strait. Because our conclusions are derived from a small number of cases, we are cautious in making claims that our findings can be generalized. The narratives that we provide and the conclusions that we draw from them may, however, spur further research on this interesting and important feature of security policy and international politics.

Economic Engagement: Strategies and Expectations

Scholars have usefully distinguished between two types of economic engagement: conditional policies that require an explicit quid pro quo on the part of the target country and policies that are unconditional.1 Conditional policies, sometimes labeled linkage or economic ‘carrots’, are the inverse of economic sanctions. Instead of threatening a target country with economic loss (sanction) in the absence of policy change, conditional engagement policies promise increased economic benefits in return for desired policy change. Drezner (1999/2000) has proposed several plausible predictions regarding the employment of conditional [end page 524] strategies and the conditions of their success. He argues that the successful use of economic engagement is most likely between democracies (because democracies are better able to make credible commitments than non-democracies), within the context of international regimes (because regimes reduce the transactions costs of market exchange), and, among adversaries, only after coercive threats are first used.

The success of a conditional engagement strategy should also be contingent on a state’s influence over domestic firms. If those firms find market-based transactions with the target state unappealing, a government pursuing a conditional strategy must convince them to deal with the target when desired change occurs. On the other hand, if domestic firms have strong economic incentives to conduct economic transactions with the target state, a successful conditional strategy must prevent them from pursuing their economic exchange in the absence of the desired change in a target state’s behavior. In this regard, democracies may have a harder time pursuing a conditional strategy: in a democratic setting, firms are likely to be openly critical of politicians who try to restrict their commercial activities and will support candidates who do not place such demands on them. Our first hypothesis (H1), therefore, is that conditional engagement strategies will be less likely to succeed if the initiating state is a democracy, especially when underlying economic incentives to trade with or invest in the target state are strong.2

Unconditional engagement strategies are more passive than conditional variants in that they do not include a specific quid pro quo. Rather, countries deploy economic links with an adversary in the hopes that economic interdependence itself will, over time, change the target’s foreign policy behavior and yield a reduced threat of military conflict. How increased economic integration at the bilateral level might produce an improved bilateral political environment is not obvious. While most empirical studies on the subject find that increased economic ties tend to be associated with a reduced likelihood of military violence, no consensus explanation exists (e.g. Russett & Oneal, 2001; Oneal & Russett, 1999; for less sanguine results, see Barbieri, 1996). At a minimum, state leaders might seek to exploit two causal pathways by pursuing a policy of unconditional engagement: economic interdependence can act as a constraint on the foreign policy behavior of the target state, and economic interdependence can act as a transforming agent that reshapes the goals of the target state.

#### Reasons to Prefer:

#### Their interpretation is contrived. Their ev doesn’t support an exclusive understandings of “engagement”. Contrived interpretations are bad – aff would always lose because the neg will always invent an understanding that excludes the Aff.

#### They create poor education. The topic includes diplomatic education – which obviously includes diplomatic horse-trading. To artificially remove this from the topic overvalues fairness at the expense of eduction.

#### Their ev draws no bright line. It admits that “engagement is a term of confusion”. Means we meet or nothing does.

#### ( ) Their interpretation doesn’t solve their offense – a unilateral concession can serve as a de facto QPQ. Concessions can be a reaction to a Chinese negotiating request. We will be debating the QPQ literature either way – it’s better to have it in the plan text. It makes it more explicit and – unlike an advantage – the Aff can’t kick the negotiation portion of the advantage.

#### ( ) No unique abuse or delimits – we’ve run an Aff at the heart of the topic – and not one their ridiculous examples.

#### ( ) Put Reasonability before competing interpretations – any other stance causes a race to the bottom that incentivizes technicalities over case debating.

### A-to “Plan must be a QPQ”

#### We reasonably meet their definition – their card only says it’s important to include “positive” action. We do.

#### Counter-interpretation. Only unconditional engagement is topical.

Smith ‘5

Karen E. Smith, Professor of International Relations and Director of the European Foreign Policy Unit at the London School of Economics, 2005 (“Engagement and conditionality: incompatible or mutually reinforcing?,” *Global Europe: New Terms of Engagement*, May, Available Online at http://mercury.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/24863/ichaptersection\_singledocument/273de787-0ede-4c7e-a001-94d09f793f1b/en/03\_Conditionality.pdf, Accessed 07-25-2013, p. 23)

First, a few definitions. ‘Engagement’ is a foreign policy strategy of building close ties with the government and/or civil society and/or business community of another state. The intention of this strategy is to undermine illiberal political and economic practices, and socialise government and other domestic actors into more liberal ways. Most cases of engagement entail primarily building economic links, and encouraging trade and investment in particular. Some observers have variously labelled this strategy one of interdependence, or of ‘oxygen’: economic activity leads to positive political consequences.19

‘Conditionality’, in contrast, is the linking, by a state or international organisation, of perceived benefits to another state (such as aid or trade concessions) to the fulfilment of economic and/or political conditions. ‘Positive conditionality’ entails promising benefits to a state if it fulfils the conditions; ‘negative conditionality’ involves reducing, suspending, or terminating those benefits if the state violates the conditions (in other words, applying sanctions, or a strategy of ‘asphyxiation’).20 To put it simply, engagement implies ties, but with no strings attached; conditionality attaches the strings. In another way of looking at it, engagement is more of a bottom-up strategy to induce change in another country, conditionality more of a top-down strategy.

#### Reasons to Prefer:

#### Their interpretation is contrived. Their ev doesn’t support an exclusive understandings of “engagement”. Contrived interpretations are bad – aff would always lose because the neg will always invent an understanding that excludes the Aff.

#### QPQ Aff are worse for education and for Neg ground. They go down the path of “say no” Aff, reverse conditions, and Affs that abuse the “diplomacy” part of the topic to horse trade for military or human rights conditions. We set a better bright line and avoid multi-directionality.

#### ( ) Our interpretation doesn’t exclude the education that they seek – a unilateral concession can serve as a de facto QPQ. Concessions can be a reaction to a Chinese negotiating request. There’s no reason this education must be fiated in the plan text - as opposed to argued as a disad or advantage.

#### ( ) No unique abuse or delimits – we’ve run an Aff at the heart of the topic, they have plenty of ground.

#### ( ) Put Reasonability before competing interpretations – any other stance causes a race to the bottom that incentivizes technicalities over case debating.

## A-to Pressure Cplan – David Dollar

### A-to Pressure Cplan

#### ( ) Perm – do both

#### ( ) Cplan solves none of the case – it obviously doesn’t solve protectionism because it increase use of CFIUS. And, there’s no ev that china would cave to the cplan – meaning it wouldn’t actualize a BIT and wouldn’t solve relations.

#### The Cplan sends a bad global signal and doesn’t boost investment ties. Plan’s comparatively better.

Dougherty ‘16

Internally quoting Nathan Sheets, the undersecretary of the Treasury for international affairs. Carter Dougherty has been a journalist for over 20 years, former editor at the Washington Times, and holds an MA from The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill – “China Investment Push Draws American Ire As Once-Silent Companies Complain About Closed Chinese Market – International Business Times - 06/03/16 - http://www.ibtimes.com/china-investment-push-draws-american-ire-once-silent-companies-complain-about-closed-2377599

Dollar, the Brookings Institution scholar and former official at the U.S. Treasury Department, has suggested using the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, known as CFIUS, as a stick to prod China to open up to U.S. and other firms. CFIUS is charged with reviewing foreign investments that might affect U.S. national security, such as a bid by a Chinese firm to buy a sensitive piece of technology that has military applications. Dollar’s proposal would expand the committee’s remit to include reviews of investments by state-owned companies that haven’t signed a bilateral agreement with the United States. Nathan Sheets, the undersecretary of the Treasury for international affairs, rejected the idea in a recent panel discussion with Dollar. Sheets argued new rules allowing restrictions on foreign investment would send the wrong signal to potential investors in the United States. “I think CFIUS is rightly focused narrowly on the issue of national security and [whether] a transaction [would] have an implication for U.S. national security,” Sheets said. “And I think that’s where it should stay,” he added. “I think that if we were to broaden that mandate, that would create ambiguities about our openness to investment.” Better, Sheets said, would be to conclude a credible bilateral investment treaty with China, a pact that’s designed to break down barriers.

#### ( ) Conditionality is a voter. Creates time and strategy skews that create for less educational debates.

#### QPQ’s and prior conditions fail to build US-Sino ties.

Paulson & Rubin ‘15

Henry M. Paulson Jr. is the chair of the Paulson Institute at the University of Chicago and served as the secretary of the Treasury in the Bush administration (2006–09). Robert E. Rubin is a co-chair of the Council on Foreign Relations and served as the secretary of the Treasury in the Clinton administration (1995–99) – “Why the U.S. Needs to Listen to China” - The Atlantic - June 2015 - http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/06/the-blame-trap/392081/

Discussions of the U.S.-China economic relationship too often begin with a recital of each country’s grievances against the other. The usual litany of American criticisms includes China’s management of its exchange rate, subsidies that benefit state-owned enterprises, and barriers to American companies seeking to operate in China. Another prominent critique involves Chinese cyber-hacking of U.S. businesses’ intellectual property, and China’s failure to protect intellectual property more generally. For its part, China castigates the U.S. for its irresponsible fiscal trajectory, its political opposition to Chinese investment in American companies and infrastructure, and its export-control laws, especially those restricting the export of technologies with potential military applications. We believe it’s time to turn the typical exchange of economic critiques on its head. The two countries have largely been engaged in a dialogue of the deaf, each blaming the other for its own failings, exerting pressure on the other to accede to its demands, and too often waiting for the other to act first. In fact, it is in each country’s self-interest to meaningfully address the criticisms made by the other.

### A-to Hardline Cplans

#### Hardline Approach fails and hampers US global influence.

Bader ‘15

JEFFREY BADER is the John C. Whitehead Senior Fellow in International Diplomacy at the Brookings Institution. From 2009 until 2011. Bader was special assistant to the president of the United States for national security affairs at the National Security Council. In that capacity, he was the principal advisor to President Obama on Asia. Bader served from 2005 to 2009 as the director of the China Initiative and, subsequently, as the first director of the John L. Thornton China Center at Brookings. During his three decade career with the U.S. government, Bader was principally involved in U.S.-China relations at the State Department, the National Security Council, and the Office of the United States Trade Representative. In 2001, as assistant U.S. trade representative, he led the United States delegation in completing negotiations on the accession of China and Taiwan into the World Trade Organization. Bader served as a Foreign Service officer in the People's Republic of China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Namibia, Zambia, Congo, and the United States Mission to the United Nations. During the 1990s, he was deputy assistant secretary of state responsible for China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Southeast Asia; director of Asian affairs at the National Security Council; and director of the State Department's Office of Chinese Affairs. He served as U.S. ambassador to Namibia from 1999 to 2001. “Changing China policy: Are we in search of enemies?” – Brookings Report - STRATEGY PAPER # 1 - JUNE 2015 - http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2015/06/22-changing-china-policy-bader/changing-china-policy--are-we-in-search-of-enemies.pdf

China is thoroughly integrated into the global economy. Our Fortune 500 companies see China as a market critical to their growth. In this respect China bears no resemblance to the former Soviet Union, whose economy operated behind an Iron Curtain with client states and little serious interaction with foreign companies or countries. China is now expanding its multilateral economic footprint through the creation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, which groups 57 members despite misguided U.S. efforts to constrain its establishment. So as a practical matter, it is hard to envisage how a relationship predicated on across-the-board rivalry will either be successful in a world where China is so embedded or serve U.S. interests in a world where we need to, and sometimes do, cooperate on critical issues.

#### US allies will reject US hardline strategy.

Bader ‘15

JEFFREY BADER is the John C. Whitehead Senior Fellow in International Diplomacy at the Brookings Institution. From 2009 until 2011. Bader was special assistant to the president of the United States for national security affairs at the National Security Council. In that capacity, he was the principal advisor to President Obama on Asia. Bader served from 2005 to 2009 as the director of the China Initiative and, subsequently, as the first director of the John L. Thornton China Center at Brookings. During his three decade career with the U.S. government, Bader was principally involved in U.S.-China relations at the State Department, the National Security Council, and the Office of the United States Trade Representative. In 2001, as assistant U.S. trade representative, he led the United States delegation in completing negotiations on the accession of China and Taiwan into the World Trade Organization. Bader served as a Foreign Service officer in the People's Republic of China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Namibia, Zambia, Congo, and the United States Mission to the United Nations. During the 1990s, he was deputy assistant secretary of state responsible for China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Southeast Asia; director of Asian affairs at the National Security Council; and director of the State Department's Office of Chinese Affairs. He served as U.S. ambassador to Namibia from 1999 to 2001. “Changing China policy: Are we in search of enemies?” – Brookings Report - STRATEGY PAPER # 1 - JUNE 2015 - http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2015/06/22-changing-china-policy-bader/changing-china-policy--are-we-in-search-of-enemies.pdf

Our security, and that of our partners, will not be aided, however, by a strategy that suggests we have decided that China is, or inevitably will be, an adversary. Our allies and partners in Asia certainly welcome our presence, security and otherwise, in the face of a rising and more assertive China, but they do not welcome hostility toward China. They want to see us work out or at least manage our differences, and to do so in a way that promotes continued economic dynamism and lowers tensions in the region. That will require us sometimes to resist unwelcome Chinese behavior that threatens to destabilize the region. It does not require that we make dubious pessimistic assumptions about China's future behavior and set up a hostile dynamic leading to a downward spiral.

## A-to Chinese Econ Growth bad

Note: the frontline assumes the neg ran the primacy impact module. If they did not, adjust accordingly.

The Aff can also impact turn – which will be an option (in time) as we begin to develop our Chinese Econ Growth Good impacts.

### 2AC Frontline

#### *Empirically false* and *No link* – China’s econ has recently dipped from record highs. The plan avoids a collapse of China’s economy – but doesn’t go beyond record highs. When China had record highs the disad never happened.

Chinese economic growth won’t translate into attempts to displace the US.

Mark Beeson and Fujian Li, 2015 – professor of international politics at the University of Western Australia, Fujian Li is a research fellow of the East Asian Studies Center at China Foreign Affairs, "What consensus? Geopolitics and policy paradigms in China and the United States", www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/field/field\_publication\_docs/INTA91\_1\_06\_Beeson\_Li.pdf

This article considers the emergence of the China model in the context of the growing competition between China and the United States. The key issue is whether—notwithstanding problems with the concept itself 4 —the influence of a Chinese model of development is likely to grow as the country’s material power and importance continue to expand. Our provisional answer to this question is that while China’s increased material leverage will enhance its importance and its potential policy options, its ability or even willingness to realize such opportunities is far from clear. America’s decline and China’s renaissance may present opportunities, **but the possibility**, much less the inevitability, **of** some sort of ‘**hegemonic transition’** remains remote.5 Equally importantly, perhaps, as our exploration of Chinese thinking on this topic demonstrates, there is no clear, unified consensus on how to understand either its development or its international significance among scholars or policy-makers in China itself. As a consequence, **the prospects for** some form of continuing, albeit diminished, ‘**American hegemony’**, even including elements of the so-called Washington Consensus, **may not be as poor as some predict**, at least in the immediate future.

#### Not unique and No internal link. *Chinese SOE investment is up now* and *BIT is not the only way to make profits*.

Miner ‘15

et al; SEAN MINER is China program manager and research associate at the Peterson Institute for International Economics. The Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE; Peterson Institute) is a private and non-profit think tank focused on international economics, based in Washington, D.C. According to the 2014 Global Go To Think Tank Index Report (Think Tanks and Civil Societies Program, University of Pennsylvania), Peterson is number 15 (of 150) in the "Top Think Tanks Worldwide" - From the Chapter “ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED AND THE US-CHINA BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY: CHALLENGES IN MEETING CHINA'S DEMANDS” – From the paper “TOWARD A US-CHINA INVESTMENT TREATY” - PIIE Briefing 15-1 - February 2015 -https://piie.com/publications/briefings/piieb15-1.pdf

The perception is that China's SOEs have not invested much in the United States, or that investments from China's SOEs are not welcome. Evidence does not support these statements. Of the total of 896 investments from China in the United States, 249 were by Chinese SOEs, about 27 percent of the total. The SOE deals were generally larger than the deals of private Chinese investors, accounting for 42 percent, or over $18 billion, of total investments from China. Of the 249 SOE investments, 177 were greenfield investments, investments in new facilities and factories rather than purchases of existing companies, worth $2.5 billion, while the other 72 were acquisitions, accounting for $15.5 billion." Acquisitions in the energy industry accounted for more than half the value of SOE investments. 1 lowever SOEs invested across a wide variety of sectors, including aviation, information technology, health and biotech, basic materials, and real estate. The Rhodium Group broadly defines "government-owned" to include any firm with more than 20 percent government ownership. Even so, plenty of big name-brand Chinese SOEs have successfully invested in the United States. State-owned China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) is a prominent example. Although it failed in its bid for Unocal in 2005 because of political opposition from members of the US Congress, CNOOC now has investments worth over $3 billion in the United States. CNOOC changed strategy and began investing in minority share positions and entering into joint ventures with US firms. In another case, TPCO America, a subsidiary of state-owned Tianjin Pipe Corporation made a greenfield investment in Texas of more than $1 billion. TPCO is building a massive plant for processing steel into pipes, creating more than a 1,000 jobs in the process. State-owned AV1C Automobile Industry Holding Company is a majority owner of US-based Nexteer and helped it become a powerful supplier to US auto manufacturers. Dozens of Chinese state-owned firms have invested in the United States, and each has adopted a strategy backed by experience and flexibility.

China doesn’t want to displace the US, just ensure regional security – engagement solves

Swaine, ‘15

(Michael D., Ph.D., senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, former senior policy analyst at the RAND Corporation, The Real Challenge in the Pacific: A Response to “How to  Deter China,” Foreign Affairs, May/June)

This development should not be surprising to anyone who understands modern Chinese history and great-power transitions. Beijing has an ongoing incentive to work with Washington and the West to sustain continued economic growth and to address a growing array of common global and regional concerns, from pandemics to climate change to terrorism. At the same time, it understandably wishes to **reduce its vulnerability to potential future threats from the United States** and other nations while increasing its overall influence along its strategically important maritime periphery. As its overseas power and influence grow, its foreign interests expand, and its domestic nationalist backers become more assertive, Beijing will naturally become **less willing** to accept unconditionally military, political, and economic relationships and structures that it believes disproportionately and unjustly favor Western powers. **And it will** increasingly worry **that Washington might** resort to pressure or force to try to undermine Chinese security moves in the western Pacific and head off the United States’ impending relative decline. Many Chinese observers now believe that Beijing’s past weakness and its need to cooperate with the United States and the West in general have made it too accommodating or passive in dealing with perceived challenges  to China’s vital national interests, from U.S. support for Taiwan and Asian disputants over maritime claims to close-up U.S. surveillance and other intelligence-gathering activities along the Chinese coast. The more extreme variants of this nationalist viewpoint threaten to transform China’s long-standing “peaceful development” policy, which focuses on the maintenance of amicable relations with the United States and other powers, **into a more hard-edged approach aimed at more actively undermining U.S. influence in Asia**. The so-called bottom-line concept of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s foreign policy **is an apparent step in this direction**, stressing in an unprecedented manner the need for China to stand resolute in managing territorial and sovereignty issues in the East China and South China Seas. Observing these stirrings, meanwhile, many American and other foreign observers see the beginnings of a larger effort to eject the United States from Asia and eventually replace it as the regional, and possibly even global, superpower. China’s greater assertiveness regarding maritime territorial disputes and U.S. and Japanese intelligence and surveillance activities along its coastline are interpreted as tests of U.S. and allied resolve, a prelude to the creation of no-go zones essential for the establishment of Chinese control over the western Pacific. In this view, the proper course of action for Washington is to decisively disabuse Beijing of its aspirations by enhancing U.S. predominance, increasing Chinese vulnerability in the western Pacific, and making clear who is boss, right up to China’s 12-nautical-mile territorial waters. The problem with this outlook—implicit in the concept of Archipelagic Defense that Krepinevich proposes—is that it misdiagnoses China’s motivations and thus exacerbates, rather than mitigates, the underlying problem. Beijing’s de facto attempts to limit or end U.S. predominance along its maritime periphery are motivated by uncertainty, insecurity, **and opportunism rather than a grand strategic vision** **of Chinese predominance**. **Chinese leaders today are not trying to carve out an exclusionary sphere of influence**, especially in hard-power terms; **they are trying to reduce their considerable vulnerability** and increase their political, diplomatic, and economic leverage in their own backyard. This is a much less ambitious and in many ways more understandable goal for a continental great power. It does not necessarily threaten vital U.S. or allied interests, and it can and should be met with **understanding rather than defensive aggressiveness.**

**U.S. primacy isn’t key to peace – their data is flawed**

**Preble 10** – Christopher Preble, director of Foreign Policy Studies at the CATO Institute, August 3, 2010, “U.S. Military Power: Preeminence for What Purpose?,” online: <http://www.cato-at-liberty.org/u-s-military-power-preeminence-for-what-purpose/>

Most in Washington still embraces the notion that America is, and forever will be, the world’s indispensable nation. Some scholars, however, **questioned the logic of hegemonic stability theory** from the very beginning. A number continue to do so today. They advance arguments diametrically at odds with the primacist consensus. Trade routes need not be policed by a single dominant power; the international economy is complex and **resilient**. Supply disruptions are likely to be temporary, and the costs of mitigating their effects should be borne by those who stand to lose — or gain — the most. Islamic extremists are scary, but hardly comparable to the threat posed by a globe-straddling Soviet Union armed with thousands of nuclear weapons. It is frankly absurd that we spend more today to fight Osama bin Laden and his tiny band of murderous thugs than we spent to face down Joseph Stalin and Chairman Mao. **Many factors** have contributed to the dramatic decline in the number of wars between nation-states; it is **unrealistic** to expect that a new **spasm of global conflict** would erupt if the United States were to modestly refocus its efforts, **draw down its military power**, and call on other countries to play a larger role in their own defense, and in the security of their respective regions. But while there are **credible alternatives** to the United States serving in its current dual role as world policeman / armed social worker, the foreign policy establishment in Washington has no interest in exploring them. The people here have grown accustomed to living at the center of the earth, and indeed, of the universe. The tangible benefits of all this military spending flow disproportionately to this tiny corner of the United States while the schlubs in fly-over country pick up the tab.

**Extensions - Heg---No Impact**

**Hegemony isn’t key to peace**

**Fettweis 11** – Christopher Fettweis, Department of Political Science, Tulane University, 9/26/11, Free Riding or Restraint? Examining European Grand Strategy, Comparative Strategy, 30:316–332, EBSCO

It is perhaps worth noting that there is **no evidence** to support a direct relationship between the relative level of U.S. activism and **international stability**. In fact, the limited data we do have suggest the opposite may be true. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on its defense spending fairly substantially. By 1998, the United States was spending $100 billion less on defense in real terms than it had in 1990.51 To internationalists, defense hawks and believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible “peace dividend” endangered both national and global security. “No serious analyst of American military capabilities,” argued Kristol and Kagan, “doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America’s responsibilities to itself and to world peace.”52 On the other hand, if the pacific trends were not based upon U.S. hegemony but a strengthening norm against interstate war, one would not have expected an increase in global instability and violence. The verdict from the past two decades is fairly plain: The world grew more peaceful while the U**nited** S**tates** cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable United States military, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. **No militaries were enhanced** to address power vacuums, **no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races**, and **no regional balancing occurred** once the stabilizing presence of the U.S. military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in U.S. capabilities. Most of all, the United States and its allies were no less safe. The **incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined** while the United States cut its military spending under President Clinton, and kept declining as the Bush Administration ramped the spending back up. No complex statistical analysis should be necessary to reach the conclusion that the two are unrelated. Military spending figures by themselves are insufficient to disprove a connection between overall U.S. actions and international stability. Once again, one could presumably argue that spending is not the only or even the best indication of hegemony, and that it is instead U.S. foreign political and security commitments that maintain stability. Since neither was significantly altered during this period, instability should not have been expected. Alternately, advocates of hegemonic stability could believe that relative rather than absolute spending is decisive in bringing peace. Although the United States cut back on its spending during the 1990s, its relative advantage never wavered. However, even if it is true that either U.S. commitments or relative spending account for global pacific trends, then at the very least stability can evidently be maintained at drastically lower levels of both. In other words, even if one can be allowed to argue in the alternative for a moment and suppose that there is in fact a level of engagement below which the United States cannot drop without increasing international disorder, a rational grand strategist would still recommend cutting back on engagement and spending until that level is determined. Grand strategic decisions are never final; continual adjustments can and must be made as time goes on. Basic logic suggests that the United States ought to spend the minimum amount of its blood and treasure while seeking the maximum return on its investment. And if the current era of stability is as stable as many believe it to be, no increase in conflict would ever occur irrespective of U.S. spending, which would save untold trillions for an increasingly debt-ridden nation. It is also perhaps worth noting that if opposite trends had unfolded, if other states had reacted to news of cuts in U.S. defense spending with more aggressive or insecure behavior, then internationalists would surely argue that their expectations had been fulfilled. If increases in conflict would have been interpreted as proof of the wisdom of internationalist strategies, then logical consistency demands that the lack thereof should at least pose a problem. As it stands, the only evidence we have regarding the likely systemic reaction to a more restrained United States suggests that the current peaceful trends are unrelated to U.S. military spending. Evidently the rest of the world can operate quite effectively without the presence of a global policeman. Those who think otherwise base their view on faith alone.

**No data suggests a causal link between unipolarity and peace**

**Fettweis 10** – Christopher Fettweis, Professor of Political Science at Tulane University, 2010, Dangerous Times? The International Politics of Great Power Peace, p. 172-174

The primary attack on restraint, or justification for internationalism, posits that **if the U**nited **S**tates **were to withdraw** from the world, a variety of ills would sweep over key regions and eventually pose threats to U.S. security and/or prosperity. These problems might take three forms (besides the obvious, if remarkably unlikely, direct threats to the homeland): generalized chaos, hostile imbalances in Eurasia, and/or failed states. Historian Arthur Schlesinger was typical when he worried that restraint would mean "a chaotic, violent, and ever more dangerous planet."69 All of these concerns either implicitly or explicitly assume that the presence of the United States is the primary reason for international stability, and if that presence were withdrawn chaos would ensue. In other words, they depend upon hegemonic-stability logic. Simply stated, the hegemonic stability theory proposes that international peace is only possible when there is one country strong enough to make and enforce a set of rules. At the height of Pax Romana between 27 BC and 180 AD, for example, Rome was able to bring unprecedented peace and security to the Mediterranean. The Pax Britannica of the nineteenth century brought a level of stability to the high seas. Perhaps the current era is peaceful because the United States has established a de facto Pax Americana where no power is strong enough to challenge its dominance, and because it has established a set of rules that are generally in the interests of all countries to follow. Without a benevolent hegemon, some strategists fear, instability may break out around the globe.70 Unchecked conflicts could cause humanitarian disaster and, in today's interconnected world, economic turmoil that would ripple throughout global financial markets. If the United States were to abandon its commitments abroad, argued Art, the world would "become a more dangerous place" and, sooner or later, that would "redound to Americas detriment."71 If the massive spending that the United States engages in actually provides stability in the international political and economic systems, then perhaps internationalism is worthwhile. There are good theoretical and empirical reasons, however, to believe that **U.S hegemony is not the primary cause of** the current era of **stability**. First of all, the hegemonic-stability argument **overstates** the role that the United States plays in the system. No country is strong enough to police the world on its own. **The only way there can be stability** in the community of great powers is if **self-policing occurs**, if states have decided that their interests are served by peace. If no pacific normative shift had occurred among the great powers that was filtering down through the system, then **no amount of international constabulary work** by the United States could maintain stability. Likewise, if it is true that such a shift has occurred, then most of what the hegemon spends to bring stability would be **wasted**. The 5 percent of the worlds population that live in the United States simply could not force peace upon an unwilling 95. At the risk of beating the metaphor to death, the United States maybe patrolling a neighborhood that has already rid itself of crime. **Stability and unipolarity may be simply coincidental**. In order for U.S. hegemony to be the reason for global stability, the rest of the world would have to expect reward for good behavior and fear punishment for bad. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has not always proven to be especially eager to engage in humanitarian interventions abroad. Even rather incontrovertible evidence of genocide has not been sufficient to inspire action. Hegemonic stability can **only take credit** for influencing those decisions that **would have ended in war without the presence**, whether physical or psychological, **of the U**nited **S**tates. Ethiopia and Eritrea are hardly the only states that could go to war without the slightest threat of U.S. intervention. Since most of the world today is **free to fight without U.S. involvement**, something else must be at work. Stability exists in many places **where no hegemony is present**. Second, the limited **empirical evidence** we have suggests that there is **little connection between the relative level of U.S. activism and international stability**. During the 1990s the United States cut back on its defense spending fairly substantially. By 1998 the United States was spending $100 billion less on defense in real terms than it had in I990.72 To internationalists, defense hawks, and other believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible "peace dividend" endangered both national and global security. "No serious analyst of American military capabilities," argued Kristol and Kagan, "doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America's responsibilities to itself and to world peace."7' If the pacific trends were due not to U.S. hegemony but a strengthening norm against interstate war, however, one would not have expected an increase in global instability and violence.

**Unipolarity causes policy failure – they can’t access any impact**

Charles L. **Glaser 11**, professor in the Elliott School of International Affairs and the Department of Political Science at the George Washington University and the director of the Elliott School’s Institute for Security and Conﬂict Studies, June 2011, “Why unipolarity doesn’t matter (much),” Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol. 24, No. 2, p. 135-147

A still different type of argument holds that unipolar powers tend to adopt expanded interests and associated goals that unipolarity then enables them to achieve. To the extent that these goals are actually in the unipole’s true interest, unipolarity is good for the unipole. In broad terms, this argument follows the claim that states’ interests and goals grow with their power. 19 These expanded goals can be attributed to three different types of factors. 20 The ﬁrst is a permissive structure, which allows the state to pursue more ambitious goals. The state’s interests do not change, but its increased ability to pursue them results in a redeﬁnition of its goals. A state could have goals that were previously unachievable at acceptable cost; by lowering the costs, unipolarity places these goals within reach, enabling the state to make itself better off. A unipole’s desire for a higher degree of security can be an example of this type of expanded goal, reﬂecting the means that it can wield. Second, the state can acquire new interests, which are generated by the unipole’s greater territorial and institutional reach. For example, a state that controls more territory may face new threats and, as a result, conclude that it needs to control still more territory, acquire still more power, and/or restructure international institutions to further protect its interests. Third, the unipole’s goals can be inﬂuenced by what is commonly described as human nature and by psychology. A unipolar state will be inclined to lose track of how secure it is and consequently **pursue inappropriate policies** that are **designed to increase its security** but **turn out to be too costly** and/or to **have a high probability of backﬁring.** One variant of this type of argument expects unipolar powers to conclude that **they need to spread their type of governance** or political ideology to be secure. These dangers can be reinforced by a tendency for a unipolar power to see its new interests, which are optional, as necessary ones. The ﬁrst two types of expanded interests and goals can make the unipole better off. The question here is whether the interests the United States might ﬁnd within its reach due to its unipolar position are very valuable. With respect to security, **the answer is ‘no’**. For the reasons summarized above, the United States can be very secure in bipolarity, and unipolarity is important only in an extreme and unlikely case. Other US goals, for example, spreading democracy and free markets, **do not depend on unipolarity**, at least not its military dimension. Instead, whether these liberal systems spread will depend most heavily on their own effectiveness. Regarding the down side, there does not appear to be an overwhelming reason that the United States cannot avoid the dangers of unipolar overreach. The Bush administration certainly proved itself vulnerable to these dangers and the United States is continuing to pay for its ﬂawed judgments. Arguably, strands of overreach can be traced back to the Clinton administration’s emphasis on democratic enlargement, although the means that it chose were much more in line with US interests. 21 And the Obama administration’s decision to escalate the war in Afghanistan may well be an example of striving for too much security. Nevertheless, none of the basic arguments about unipolarity explain why these errors are unavoidable. The overreach claim is more an observation about the past than a well-supported prediction about the future. We do not have strong reasons for concluding that the United States will be unable to beneﬁt from analyses of its grand strategy options, learning to both appreciate how very secure it is and at the same time to respect the limits of its power. In sum, then, under current conditions, unipolarity does little to enable the United States to increase its security. **Given the limited beneﬁts of unipolarity** and the not insigniﬁcant **dangers of unipolar overreach**, the United States will have to choose its policies wisely if it is going to be better off in a unipolar world than a bipolar one.

**Extensions - Heg---No Impact---A2: Quick Collapse**

**Our evidence assumes a massive, short-term internal link**

Paul K. **MacDonald 11**, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College, and Joseph M. Parent, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami, Spring 2011, “Graceful Decline?: The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment,” International Security, Vol. 35, No. 4, p. 7-44

In theory, states should retrench whenever they experience declines in their relative power. In practice, some periods of relative decline are of more analytical interest than others. For the purposes of this article, we focus on periods of what we call "**acute relative decline**." These are periods characterized by two features. First, a great power suffers a decline in relative power that **decreases its ordinal ranking** among the great powers. Second, this decrease in relative power **remains evident** for at least a five-year period. In making this argument, we are assuming that states are most likely to retrench when they have **lost their position** in the rank order and **that loss does not appear to be temporary**.

### Extensions - “China doesn’t seek to displace US primacy”

China isn’t seeking to displace the US – consensus among planers is a cooperative relationship

Goldstein, associate professor in the Strategic Research Department at the US Naval War College, founding director of the China Maritime Studies Institute, at the U.S. Naval War College, ‘15

(Lyle J., *Meeting China Halfway: How to Defuse the Emerging U.S.-China Rivalry*)

Conversely, the balance of opinion among Chinese scholars and strategists in China **is that China has no alternative but to try to seek a more** positive **and** constructive **relationship** with the United States. For example, Liu Jianfei’s analysis mentioned above argues emphatically against revising China’s foreign policy doctrine to counter the US “rebalancing to Asia.” He suggests that the threat to China **should not be exaggerated**—noting, for example, that the nature of the US-Japan Alliance has not changed substantially from its earlier form and, moreover, that **China’s fundamental security can still be assured**.30 Another influential foreign policy thinker, Cui Liru, similarly argued in late 2011 that the probability of China getting into a war with a major power had significantly decreased in the new century.31 Senior Chinese foreign policymakers, such as Cui Tiankai, have attempted to improve the climate of USChina relations. In a speech in July 2012, Cui identified maintaining peace and stability in Asia as a top priority for US-China relations and stated that China rejects “枝独秀” (a single branch blooms alone) and thus **would not pursue prosperity or security at the expense of others.3**2 Contrary to the concerns of some Western analysts that China’s rapid rise would lead to overconfidence, Chinese strategists, including military strategists, do not see a favorable military balance, and they generally appear to see “US decline” as overhyped.33 Some academic Chinese writings have even broached concepts of a greater fusion between Chinese and US strategic interests. For example, the lead article in the prestigious Chinese academic journal 当代亚太 (Journal of Contemporary Asia-Pacific Studies) made the unconventional argument that strong security ties between the United States and various countries in the Asia-Pacific region allow them to be more relaxed regarding close economic relations with China.34 In an even more unusual line of argumentation in China, the Peking University scholar Wang Yizhou argues that China can learn some lessons from the experience of other great powers, especially that of Great Britain and also the United States. In a somewhat remarkable passage, he argues that “England’s rise was accompanied by a high degree of navigational exploration and market-oriented trade—the ocean became the British Empire’s ‘high frontier’; when American power came to the fore, [it] promoted . . . the building of the United Nations and such international organizations.” He calls upon China’s leaders to correct the unflattering image abroad of China as a “跛足巨人” (lame giant) by turning in earnest to the provision of global “public goods.”35 In 2014 the well-known Chinese strategist Jin Canrong published a comprehensive study of “new type major power relations” that concluded, based on a number of prevailing conditions, that Washington and Beijing **would not ultimately go down the well-worn path of great power rivalry**.36 In sum, this brief survey of selected Chinese writings on US-China relations reveals that there is **very ample suspicion regarding US policies toward China**, and yet there remains a very substantial segment of informed opinion in China that wants to work constructively with Washington to **build a more peaceful and prosperous world order.**

Countries poised towards cooperation

Swaine, Ph.D., senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, former senior policy analyst at the RAND Corporation, ‘15

(Michael, “Conflict and Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region: A Strategic Net Assessment,” April 2015)

Powers are unlikely to adopt expansionist or aggressive grand strategies and military doctrines. No countries in the Asia-Pacific currently hold national objectives or military doctrines based on the seizure of foreign territories undisputedly controlled by others, a notion of inherent superiority over other peoples, or other basic beliefs that could generate aggressive or militaristic conduct toward outsiders. Although plagued by some historical animosities, contests over relatively small, disputed territories, and differences in development levels and political systems, nations (other than North and South Korea) **are not locked into mutually hostile, zero-sum sets of national objectives** or military doctrines. Most nations would prefer to further peaceful contacts with the outside world and peacefully manage differences over resource and sovereignty claims. Moreover, although the military doctrines of some important states (notably China and the United States) involve notions of offensive and (sometimes) preemptive power projection, such operational concepts do not imply that national security policies also exhibit a preference for aggressive military actions, especially against major powers. However contentious individual disputes may be, all major Asian states recognize the presence of regional and global trends **in favor of cooperation** **and the peaceful resolution of issues**. Unfortunately, the aforementioned positive trends coexist with several negative—at best neutral—factors influencing national objectives, military doctrines, and approaches to the use of force.

### A-to Chinese Environment scenario – link defense and turns

No link – the aff effects FDI flows which increase environmental efficiency

Yue, School of Economics & Management, Southeast University, ‘16

(Shujing, “Does Foreign Direct Investment Affect Green Growth? Evidence from China’s Experience” Sustainability 2016, 8, 158)

5. Conclusions and Recommendations

Taking 104 cities in China as the research objectives, based on the SBMDDF model, this paper

makes the green growth efficiency the comprehensive index of China’s green growth. After dividing

the green growth efficiency into economic efficiency and environmental efficiency, this paper discusses

the effects of FDI on the green growth efficiency, economic efficiency and environmental efficiency of

China’s urban green growth, respectively. The main conclusions are as follows.

**FDI has a positive correlation with the urban green growth efficiency.** **FDI is helpful for China’s**

**green economic growth, and plays an** active role **in China’s green economic growth**. When the

green growth efficiency is broken into economic efficiency and environmental efficiency, we can

see that FDI promotes China’s green economic growth through the promotion of environmental

effects and economic effects. The analysis of FDI in different sectors shows that FDI’s promotion of

environmental efficiency in China is largely due to FDI flowing into low-polluting and low-emission sectors. However, FDI’s promotion of environmental efficiency by clean technology transfer and

environmental technology spillover may be not obvious.

Large-scale emissions reduction is compatible with growth

Jonathan Chait, award winning columnist, NYT Magazine, September 7, 2015, The Sunniest Climate-Change Story You've Ever Read, nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2015/09/sunniest-climate-change-story-ever-read.html

When the Chinese government announced its participation in the bilateral agreement, American conservatives rolled their eyes. Their skepticism that China would curtail its emissions rested upon the premise that maintaining its prosperity required it to burn ever-increasing amounts of dirty energy, forever. “China almost certainly won’t take significant steps to reduce carbon emission,” explained National Review. “That’s because the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist party’s government rests squarely on economic development. Energy — often produced by dirty coal — allows that economic development to occur, lifting millions out of hand-to-mouth poverty.” This analysis relied upon a fatally flawed assumption: **that producing more energy required producing more carbon emissions. China is finding ways to produce more energy with less carbon.** The ratio of carbon emissions to energy produced is called “carbon intensity,” and China’s carbon-intensity ratio has dropped precipitously. In 2009, China promised to reduce its carbon intensity by 45 percent from its 2005 level by 2020. **It is well on track to achieve this** (it’s already down 34 percent), and is now promising to deepen the cut to 60 or 65 percent — evidence that China has begun thinking seriously and practically about what it will mean to steward the majority of the world’s future population.

The energy revolution in China has **laid the groundwork for a future scarcely anybody could have imagined** just a few years ago. For most of the 1.3 billion people globally without access to electricity, building new solar power is already cheaper than fossil-fuel generation. And so, the possibility has come into view that, just as the developing world is skipping landlines and moving straight into cellular communication, it will forgo the dirty-energy path and follow a clean one. The global poor can create a future of economic growth for themselves without burning the world.

### A-to Chinese Environment scenario – engagement solves

US-China engagement solves environmental destruction

Hairan, Deputy Director and Assistant Professor, National Center for Climate Change Strategy and International Cooperation (NCSC), focuses on China-U.S. relations on climate change and South-South cooperation on climate change, ‘14

(Gao, “How China and the United States Can Work Together to Tackle Global Climate Change”, The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, March 17, 2014, <http://www.fletcherforum.org/2014/03/17/hairan/>)

Climate change is one of the most severe environmental and socioeconomic challenges faced by human beings today. It is also a key issue of sustainable development and closely related to biodiversity, poverty alleviation, and the transformation to a low-carbon development path. As the world’s largest economies and emitters of greenhouse gas emissions, China and the United States must work together more cooperatively and with other countries to combat climate change and to help the globe build a low-carbon future.

Anthropogenic GHGs emissions have had a huge impact on global warming since the Industrial Revolution. As such, curbing global climate change requires coordinated and coherent global action, as well as an overarching system that includes all major greenhouse gas emitters (GHGs) in the world. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and its Kyoto Protocol have been the cornerstone of international cooperation on tackling climate change since the 1990s.

Still, major political differences remain between developed and developing countries. Developed countries believe that the current international climate framework should evolve over time and be dynamic enough to reflect economic and geopolitical changes. Developing countries, on the other hand, insist that developed countries should continue to take the lead in GHGs emission reduction beyond 2020, and developing countries should make efforts to cut their GHGs emissions according to their capabilities. Furthermore, from the developing countries’ perspective, abandoning the UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol and redefining the principle of common but different responsibilities (CBDR) is not acceptable.

The current international political dilemma on combating climate change is twofold: first, how should we allocate valuable and limited GHGs emission space to various countries? And second, is this burden-sharing best accomplished through a top-down or a bottom-up approach? The former might accomplish this through an international, legally-binding agreement such as the UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol, and the latter through nationally determined, voluntary actions that may be related but not limited to countries’ QELROs, renewable energy development targets, poverty alleviation, and energy intensity.

Therefore, finding a common denominator is crucial to mobilizing global consensus and action to curb climate change. As negotiations continue, one possibility in 2015 would be a general agreement that combines both the top-down and bottom-up approaches. This could be facilitated through a robust international measurable, reportable, and verifiable (MRV) system with common accounting rules to ensure transparency and real emissions reductions by countries involved without undermining their long-term socioeconomic development or infringing upon national sovereignty. In addition, enhancing financial, technological, and capacity building support will also be key elements of any agreement, as they are of significant importance to help developing countries address climate change.

As the two top GHGs emitters, economies, and energy users in the world, the actions taken by China and the United States are crucial to the realization of the ultimate objective of the UNFCCC and sustainable development on a global scale. In 2013, the total fossil CO2 emissions of China and the United States accounted for more than forty percent of world fossil CO2 emissions. Therefore, any successful effort to tackle climate change will need these two countries to work towards a solution either through the UNFCCC process or on a bilateral basis. Meanwhile, it also must be noted that China is different from the United States in various aspects, and should thus bear different responsibilities in tackling climate change. Recognizing the differences between the two countries politically will be helpful for effectively managing those differences, building a constructive partnership, and finding mutually acceptable approaches to cooperation without undermining their respective core national climate-related interests.

### A-to Chinese Environment scenario – No Try or Die

No try or die – emissions are dropping per unit of GDP – data doesn’t support pessimism

Smulders, Tilburg Sustainability Center @ Tilburg University, Toman, Development Research Group @ the World Bank, and Withagen, VU University Amsterdam, February 2014

(Sjak, Michael, and Cees, “Growth Theory and ‘Green Growth,’” <http://www.oxcarre.ox.ac.uk/files/OxCarreRP2014135.pdf>)

We start from a simple operational definition of green growth: GDP growth without emission growth. This requires that the ratio of emissions per unit of GDP falls at a rate (at least) equal to GDP growth. This is referred to as “absolute decoupling”, with relative decoupling meaning decreases in the emissions-GDP ratio but at a slower pace than GDP growth. Calculating historical rates of decoupling as GDP growth minus emissions growth, we find relatively small numbers for CO2. IPCC (2014) concludes that worldwide since 1970 CO2 emissions per unit of GDP have declined at about the same rate as population growth, so that per capita emissions have been constant on average. Hence, there has been relative but not absolute decoupling.

It would be overly pessimistic to conclude that CO2 decoupling is not feasible, however, since the observed worldwide development has been the result of market forces without that much in the way of explicit environmental policies for CO2 limitation. The theory suggests that once policies are in place, more decoupling could be expected. How effective these policies can be in reducing emissions and simultaneously maintain growth depends on the possibilities for technical change (which seem to be abundant), substitution possibilities (which seem to be limited) and rebound effects (which tend to often offset technical emissions savings, see Sorrell 2010).

One way to quantify the effect of emissions reduction, in particular through energy reductions, on growth is through growth accounting. In a competitive economy the output elasticity of energy equals the cost share of energy in production, which is typically small at the aggregate level. Hence a back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that a ten percent reduction in energy use reduces output at most by 1 percent. This type of growth drag calculation (see also Brock and Taylor, 2005) are optimistic, as indicated by our theoretical discussions. The calculations are often based on comparison of the steady states of a resource-dependent economy and a non-resource dependent economy. However, the relevant calculation compares a brown growth path with increasing emissions to a green growth path with substantially lower and nongrowing emission levels. Moreover, the growth drag calculation typically assumes a given cost share for energy, which effectively implies Cobb-Douglas production with good substitution 26 while in reality substitution is more difficult. Lower levels of energy and emissions go together with a higher cost share of energy, which magnifies the growth drag.

The Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) literature has looked for evidence of an inverted U-shaped relationship between GDP and pollution levels. According to this hypothesis, the development path of the economy might display a deterioration in the quality of nature in the early stages of economic development, but with increasing income the quality of nature would improve again. Copeland and Taylor (2003) make a distinction between the scale effect (more production leads to more pollution), the composition effect (growth leads to changing, cleaner, consumption patterns), and technology effects (the need for cleaner technologies induced by preferences giving higher weight to a clean environment).

Mechanisms from growth theory may generate this type of path, in particular the fact that a low capital stock triggers both high investment and growth with growing demand for polluting inputs in production, while low income and consumption can imply that demand for environmental quality also is limited. Nevertheless, once endogenous technology is brought into the picture, an inverted-U-shaped pattern is no longer the natural outcome. Process innovations could increase the demand for polluting inputs and product innovations may shift consumption to energy-intensive sectors (Smulders et al 2011).

The empirical literature on the EKC (starting with Grossman and Krueger (1995)) is huge and far from unambiguous. It typically looks at how levels of income and pollution are related across countries, which makes it difficult to deal with technical change and growth issues as well as with linkages across countries. From the perspective of growth theory it seems better to think in terms of growth rates of pollution and income (cf. Wagner, 2008). For some pollutants or patterns of natural resource degradation no inverted U-shape is found, while for others the turning points differ across countries. The only thing that might be concluded is that the EKC provides some support for the claim “that environmental degradation is not an inevitable consequence of economic growth” (Levinson, 2008).

## A-to “US-Sino Ties Bad – War scenario”

### A-to Relations Bad – war scenario

Closer relations won’t cause war – lack of means and motive

Neilson 15

Genevieve Neilson, Master’s in International Affairs from George Washington University, board member for the Australian and New Zealand Studies Association of North America, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS REVIEW, VOLUME XXIII, NUMBER 3, SUMMER 2015, “In Response: Reframing “Major Country Relations” in Pursuit of Partnership and Accountability”, http://iar-gwu.org/sites/default/files/articlepdfs/China%20Special%20Issue%20DOC%20C%20-%2010%20Reframing%20Major%20Country%20Relations%20-%20Neilson.pdf

Skeptics believe the concept of a “new type of great-power relations” is a trap designed to give China the ability to establish new rules of international affairs. They argue that it allows China to select areas in which it seeks to cooperate with the United States while avoiding other issues. This view assumes that China will catch up to the development level of the United States. For example, Andrew Erickson and Adam Liff wrote in Foreign Affairs that U.S. accession to China’s definition “offers ammunition for those in Beijing and beyond who promote a false narrative of the United States’ weakness and China’s inevitable rise…[it] grants China great-power status without placing any conditions on its behavior.”1 Chen expands upon this criticism by arguing that Washington should define and shape the concept in a way that favors the United States. Otherwise, she writes, a commitment to China’s version of the framework could tie Washington to a lopsided cooperative agreement that might drift away from areas of U.S. interest, such as human rights and democratization.

Such arguments ignore that China is what David Shambaugh calls a “partial power.”2 While China may catch up to the United States economically within the next several decades, it currently lacks the military capability, alliance networks, and soft power outreach needed to attain its aspirational status as a leader in international affairs. Beijing’s increased international economic and security leadership, as evidenced by the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and Shanghai Cooperation Organization, demonstrate its willingness to contribute to the international architecture rather than pursue a wholly unilateral foreign policy. Yet Shambaugh recently predicted that the “endgame of Chinese communist rule has now begun,”3 identifying the frailty of the political system as a significant domestic hurdle to further expansion of Chinese global influence.

Risks of engaging China are overstated

Neilson 15

Genevieve Neilson, Master’s in International Affairs from George Washington University, board member for the Australian and New Zealand Studies Association of North America, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS REVIEW, VOLUME XXIII, NUMBER 3, SUMMER 2015, “In Response: Reframing “Major Country Relations” in Pursuit of Partnership and Accountability”, http://iar-gwu.org/sites/default/files/articlepdfs/China%20Special%20Issue%20DOC%20C%20-%2010%20Reframing%20Major%20Country%20Relations%20-%20Neilson.pdf

The article also falls short in addressing the recent change in terminology to “new type of major country relations” and President Obama’s subsequent silence on the topic. In November 2014, President Xi articulated new terminology and outlined priority areas for the relationship that place more responsibility on Beijing to become an active stakeholder in the international order.12 Yet Xi remained stalwart on his requirement that each side “not act against each other’s core interests.” While the United States never vacated the Pacific, its “rebalancing” to the region was a direct response to China’s increased international influence and assertiveness. Washington can still nurture China’s leadership ambitions and support China as a responsible stakeholder. The concept initiated by China is not an act of caution to avoid confrontation, as the author posits, but it is a proactive method for China to equalize itself with the United States and create a framework for accountability. For the United States, pursuing a “new type of major country relations” with China can be a constructive way to challenge traditional thinking by envisioning Beijing as a true partner.

### A-to Relations bad – Japan scenario

Japan won’t proliferate

Lewis, director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, ‘14

(Jeffrey, “If Japan Wanted to Build a Nuclear Bomb It’d Be Awesome at It,” Foreign Policy, June 26)

That’s because the Japanese would not jury-rig a tiny arsenal out of civil plutonium. **They could do it, sure, but why?** Why completely alter the structure of Japanese security policy for a handful of makeshift bombs that might not work? If Japan goes nuclear, it will do so only as part of a fundamental change in how the Japanese look at their security environment. In that case, Japan would build nuclear weapons like they do everything else, down to the beer machine at Narita — with meticulous care. Japan would construct dedicated plutonium production reactors and facilities to separate weapons-grade plutonium, probably conduct nuclear tests, and deploy modern delivery systems, such as missiles.

This is, I would argue, the most important point to understanding U.S.-Japan relations, and extended deterrence. We often talk about nuclear weapons in Japan **like a thermostat** — **if U.S. credibility declines in Tokyo, Japan will build a nuclear arsenal to compensate**. It’s almost as if we cut 10 bombs, the Japanese will want 10 of their own to make up the difference. That’s not right at all. For Japan, becoming a nuclear weapons power would require a dramatic break in a foreign and security policy that has historically centered on the U.S. alliance. **So would unarmed neutrality.** It is Japan’s lack of such strategic options that account for the most interesting Japanese behaviors in foreign and security policy.

As one Japanese observer pointed out to me, neither alternative — nuclear-armed independence nor unarmed neutrality — **has a mainstream constituency in Japan**. That means the only practical approach for Japanese policymakers is an alliance with the United States. Tokyo has little choice but to accept whatever level of security Washington can provide at the moment. Another colleague compared it to riding on the back of a motorcycle — you can see the bumps and twists in the road, but you can’t do anything about it. That’s scary. The result, of course, is a lot of whining from Japan about the credibility of the U.S. guarantee. What else can they do? And it accounts for the tendency of the country’s politicos to fixate on symbols of Washington’s commitment, **just as Max Weber observed that Protestants tended to obsess about material success as a sign of predestination**.

Alliance is resilient – incentives for integration overcome disputes

James Schoff, Carnegie Endowment SENIOR ASSOCIATE ASIA PROGRAM, 7/16/15, Strengthening U.S. Alliances in Northeast Asia, carnegieendowment.org/2015/07/16/strengthening-u.s.-alliances-in-northeast-asia/idhr

Overall, the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-ROK alliances are in good shape today, thanks in part to consistent bipartisan support from the U.S. government over the years and careful attention paid most recently by both the Bush and Obama administrations. Polls show broad support on each side of these two alliances, and political change (back and forth) in all three countries over the last two decades has not disrupted their relationships.1 In fact, the alliances are arguably as strong as they have ever been.

Quick and robust U.S. support for Japan in the aftermath of its 2011 tsunami and nuclear crisis was the right thing to do not only from a humanitarian perspective, but also from a U.S. strategic standpoint and as a close friend. Although current Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe often remarks that his party’s return to power in late 2012 helped “repair” U.S.-Japan relations, the fact is that alliance cooperation was solid during the last two years the Democratic Party of Japan was in power, and this emerging “bipartisan” support for the relationship in Japan should be celebrated. It is a long-term asset for the alliance.

Acrimonious trade battles are largely a thing of the past (though not extinct), which has strengthened a sense of partnership. U.S.-Japan cooperation initiatives in a variety of fields— including energy, the environment, health, science and technology, and development aid (including the recently established U.S.-Japan Development Dialogue2)— have been a staple of the post-Cold War period and deliver value to the allies and to the world. Bilateral defense cooperation continues to broaden and deepen in an evolutionary manner, amidst a deteriorating security environment.

### Extensions – Japan won’t Proliferate and get nuclear weapons

It’ll never happen even under the worst conditions

Kulacki, China Project Manager in the UCS Global Security Program, ‘15

(Gregory, “Japan Calls for United States to End Hair-Trigger Alert,” April, Union of Concerned Scientists)

But our interviews with U.S. and Japanese participants in the EDD confirmed that that did not happen. **The EDD does not focus on nuclear deterrence but on deterrence in general**. A senior U.S. Department of Defense official involved in the talks told us that the United States tries to downplay the role of nuclear issues in the EDD. That means that today’s U.S.-Japanese dialogue on extended deterrence follows in the footsteps of the one led by Wolfowitz on the INF Treaty 30 years earlier. Now, **as then, the U.S. gov-ernment continues to affirm that the credibility of the U.S. defense commitment to Japan** does not depend on U.S. nuclear weapons.

Why Japan Is Not a Proliferation Risk

The most difficult question confronting outside ob-servers today is whether the contradiction between Japanese government support for nuclear disarmament and the pro-nuclear preferences of some Japa-nese officials reflects U.S. pressure on Japan, Japanese pressure on the United States, or mutual consent. U.S. officials who argue that the United States cannot reduce the role of nuclear weapons in the alliance because Japan might develop nuclear weapons obvi-ously believe Japanese officials are exerting pressure on the United States. Yet all the Japanese officials we recently interviewed—including the lead political officer who testified in 2009 in support of redeploy-ing U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in Asia—argue that Japan has no leverage on the U.S. nuclear posture.

The opinions expressed in these interviews are consistent with those in a confidential Japanese De-fense Agency (JDA) **study of Japan’s nuclear options** conducted by some of the country’s most conserva-tive defense analysts. The study was commissioned by Japanese elected leaders to inform their decision on whether to back a permanent extension of the NPT in 1995. At the time, North Korea had embarked on a program to develop nuclear weapons, and the Chinese Communist Party, which had recently crushed stu-dent-led protests with lethal military force, was threatening Taiwan with missile launches. The study also considered the possibility that China might use nuclear intimidation to reinforce its claims to the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands, a focus of tensions be-tween Japan and China.

**The study found** no imaginable scenario **where a decision to develop nuclear weapons would be in Ja-pan’s national security interests**. Even in a worst-case scenario **positing a “break-up of the U.S.- Japan alli-ance, a** **collapse of the nonproliferation regime,** and an inclination of various countries to go nuclear,” the study concludes:

**Even in such a case**, it is questionable whether there is any value for a trading nation that de-pends on the stability of international society to try to secure its survival and protect its interests with its own nuclear weapons. **It would more like-ly undermine the basis of its own survival**. Only in a case where destitution reaches a stage where the exchange of damage with an opponent is not a concern anymore, would the geopolitical vul-nerability of Japan make the nuclear option a possibility. **This, however, is a case where a con-dition becomes its own goal, and is** not worthy of consideration” (JDA 1995).

If Japan’s most conservative defense analysts believe that a collapse of both the NPT and the U.S.-Japan alliance are not cause to develop nuclear weap-ons, modest changes to U.S. nuclear weapons poli-cy—such as taking all U.S. land-based ICBMs off hair-trigger alert—**should not raise fears that Japan might respond by withdrawing from the NPT and starting a nuclear weapons program.**

### A-to Chinese nationalism args

No risk of nationalism – China’s rise is pragmatic and restrained

Malone and Mukherjee, 10

[David M. Malone, a former Canadian Ambassador to the UN and High Commissioner to India, is president of Canada's International Development Research Centre. He is completing a survey of Indian foreign policy called Does the Elephant Dance? (forthcoming in 2011 from Oxford University Press). Rohan Mukherjee is a senior research specialist at Princeton University. He has also worked with the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi, and the National Knowledge Commission, Government of India. “India and China: Conflict and Cooperation” Survival, Volume 52, Issue 1 February 2010 , pages 137 – 158]

It would be easy, however, to overestimate how much China's and India's claims to more international clout could contribute to regional conflict. Although China has essentially achieved great-power status, its foreign policy is notably and pointedly oriented towards maintaining regional stability and creating conditions for China's 'peaceful rise'. Analysts have characterised China's new diplomacy as 'less confrontational, more sophisticated, more confident, and, at times, more constructive' in its approach to regional and international affairs than it has been in the past.50 At the domestic level, modern Chinese nationalism has been called 'pragmatic': it is instrumental and reactive, preoccupied with holding the nation together, in part through a strategy of rapidly accelerating growth, rather than with hostility to others.51 China's leaders are acutely aware of the dangers that await should the patriotism of their citizens become 'virulent ultranationalism'.52

## A-to “US-Sino Ties Bad – india relations scenario”

### 2ac

No tradeoff – relations aren’t zero sum

Maini 16

Tridivesh Maini is a Visiting Fellow at the Stimson Center, Washington, D.C. and a Senior Research Associate with the Jindal School of International Affairs, OP Jindal Global University, Sonipat, The Diplomat, March 13, 2016, “What the US Gets Wrong About India's Relationship With China”, http://thediplomat.com/2016/03/what-the-us-gets-wrong-about-indias-relationship-with-china/

Meanwhile, New Delhi and Washington have found common ground on both strategic and economic issues. However, this does not necessitate a skeptical view of the New Delhi-Beijing relationship’s potential. Beijing and Washington have dissonance on many strategic issues, but still share a robust economic relationship.

Neither India nor the United States should look at Sino-Indian relations as a zero-sum game. Former Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao wisely stated that the world is big enough for both India and China to grow. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has emphasized that India and China will need to work jointly in the 21st century. China and India both understand the need for connectivity. In this context, both countries seem to have made some progress on the Bangladesh, China, India, Myanmar (BCIM) Corridor, an important component of China’s One Belt, One Road project. A number of U.S. analysts told me that India should focus on the BCIM Corridor instead of worrying over China’s investment in Pakistan through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Efforts are also being made to increase connectivity between both countries by increasing the number of flights.

In the economic sphere, there is much room for improvement between New Delhi and Beijing. The balance of trade is presently skewed in favor of China. For the period April 2015-January 2016, India’s trade deficit was $44.7 billion, with India’s exports to China standing at a mere $7.56 billion while imports stood at $52.26 billion. For 2014-2015, the trade deficit for New Delhi was estimated at $48.48 billion. However, Chinese investments in India are increasing.

India-China relations are no longer restricted to New Delhi and Beijing; interactions between the two countries’ states and provinces are also increasing. India is seeking to reach out to Chinese provinces with whom it did not have links previously. Increasing ties between Indian states and Chinese provinces enriches and supports high-level diplomatic ties. Already, a number of Indian chief ministers have visited China. During Modi’s visit last year to China, an annual State and Provincial Leaders forum was inaugurated. Speaking at the launch, the Indian prime minister made a significant point:

A number of decisions can be taken quickly by the State governments. These interactions also make the State governments more sensitive and aware of the international dynamics and requirements.

Liberalizing visa regimes will also help strengthen people-to-people contacts and trade. India has bolstered the relationship by beginning an e-visa facility for Chinese citizens. This improvement is evident in the increase in number of tourists arriving in India on e-visas, which has gone from a little over 2,700 in October 2014 to 56,477 in October 2015.

It is important for members of the strategic community and the government in the United States who study India to interact with analysts outside Delhi. It is also critical to understand the increasing links between a number of state governments in India and China. Finally, U.S. and Indian analysts alike will benefit from realizing that there is no contradiction between India strengthening its ties with the United States while also keeping a reasonable and open relationship with China.

No impact to India-US relations

Mazumdaru 6/6/16

Srinivas Mazumdaru, staff, Deutsche Welle, June 6, 2016, “Buttressing India-U.S. Relations”, http://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2016/06/06/obama\_modi\_india-us\_relations\_111894.html

An array of challenges

But observers say there are limitations to how far both India and the US are willing to go to forge closer defense ties, despite their mutual interest in ensuring China's peaceful rise.

While the US has been pushing for pacts such as a military logistics sharing agreement - which will allow the two militaries to use each other's bases - India has expressed a raft of concerns over these deals, experts point out.

"One issue being expressed by Indian policy makers is that the signing of these agreements would lock the country in an irreversible strategic partnership with the US," says Vindu Mai, adding that, "India does not wish to be seen as a strategic ally of the US against China."

Furthermore, the US relationship with Pakistan continues to loom large over India-US ties, with New Delhi looking warily at Washington's supplies of aid and armaments - such as F-16 fighter jets - to Islamabad.

In the US, meanwhile, there is growing criticism over rising religious intolerance in the South Asian nation and increased restrictions on civil society organizations such as the environmental NGO Greenpeace and the US-based Ford Foundation.

Discord over human rights

"In the case of US-India relations, the hopeful rhetoric has far exceeded actual, tangible achievements," Bob Corker, Republican Senator and chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, told a hearing last month.

And in a speech in New Delhi recently, Senator Benjamin L. Cardin called on India to step up its efforts to tackle discrimination in society and address issues such as human trafficking, gender violence and religious intolerance.

India, however, rejects US criticism of the country's human rights record, and the Indian government recently refused visas for a delegation from the US government agency charged with monitoring international religious freedom.

Even Modi's personal relationship with the US has been a mixed bag, with the Indian leader barred from setting foot on US soil for a decade prior to his becoming prime minister.

Washington revoked Modi's visa in 2005 arguing that he had not done enough to stop communal violence in 2002 when he was chief minister of the state of Gujarat. Over a 1,000 people lost their lives during the riots.

### Extensions – Relations are not zero sum

Zero sum lens is bad

Madan 15

Tanvi Madan, Fellow, Foreign Policy, Director, The India Project, The Brookings Institution, January 2015, “The U.S.-India Relationship and China”, http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2015/01/20-us-india-relationship-and-china-madan

When it comes to China, however, India and the U.S. must have realistic expectations about the other. Every decision each country makes vis-à-vis China should not be seen as a zero-sum game. India shouldn’t expect to be treated as an ally (with all the assurances that come with that) if it isn’t one. And the U.S. has to recognize that India is likely to maintain other partnerships in its attempt to balance China—including one with Russia—that Washington might not like. Finally, it is important for policymakers and analysts in both countries to keep in mind that an India-U.S. strategic partnership solely based on China is neither desirable nor sustainable.

### Extensions – no impact to relations

Disagreements undermine cooperation

Sen 16

Ashish Kumar Sen is a staff writer at the Atlantic Council, Atlantic Council, April 26, 2016, “US-India Relationship: Playing Defense”, http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/us-india-relationship-playing-defense

The US-India relationship has its share of challenges. One such challenge frequently cited by US officials and analysts is the fact that US firms have yet to benefit from a civilian nuclear deal the George W. Bush administration negotiated with India in 2008. The deal had become mired in contentious liability and insurance issues. Following a political agreement to address these concerns, Indian officials now say the ball is in the US companies’ court.

Another irritant is continuing US military support for Pakistan—a country with which India has fought three wars and from where terrorists attacked the Indian city of Mumbai in 2008. The Obama administration’s decision to supply F-16 fighter jets to Pakistan, over India’s objections, prompted an angry response from New Delhi in February.

Cornyn, who voted against a recent resolution from Sen. Rand Paul (R-KY) to block the sale of weapons to Pakistan, said it is important for the United States to have a relationship with that country. “I don’t think the United States is going to be asked to choose between [India and Pakistan], we need to be actively engaged in pursuit of our national interests with both,” he said. Warner voted for the resolution.

Warner acknowledged that there are other “bumps” in the US-India relationship. A key question for him was whether Modi will be able to convince the Indian Parliament to meet his ambitious agenda.

Another stumbling block is the Indian government’s caps on foreign direct investment, he added.

Cooperation will stay limited and ineffective

Boggs 15

ROBERT BOGGS is Professor of South Asia Studies at the Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies, in Washington, D.C., former US diplomat in South Asia for 19 years, Foreign Affairs, January/February 2015, “Friends Without Benefits”, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/142486/robert-boggs%E2%80%A8-nicholas-burns/friends-without-benefits

In his critique of U.S. President Barack Obama’s India policy, Nicholas Burns (“Passage to India,” September/October 2014) correctly identifies the issues that have bedeviled U.S.-Indian relations, such as differences over international agreements on climate change and trade. But he overestimates both India’s desire to improve the relationship and the benefits doing so would bring.

Like many advocates of stronger U.S.-Indian ties, Burns fails to recognize that two countries with the same system of government do not necessarily develop similar interests or policies. In the case of India, the burdens of colonialism and economic underdevelopment have led it to oppose much of the U.S. agenda. Like China, India continues to view the United States as a presumptuous superpower and competitor. And if India realizes its goal of becoming an economic powerhouse with global influence, New Delhi’s rivalry with Washington, particularly in South Asia, will likely intensify.

Although Burns writes that “the United States and India should continue to strengthen their defense and political coordination in the Asia-Pacific region,” he neglects to mention that India appears uninterested in cooperating on this front. The United States has included India in multilateral strategic discussions on the Asia-Pacific region, such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, with Australia and Japan, which sought to respond to increased Chinese power, but India has not made such meetings a priority. New Delhi has also been conspicuously absent from the two combined naval task forces the United States assembled to combat terrorism and piracy in the Indian Ocean. And despite providing development assistance to Afghanistan, India has refused to participate in the International Security Assistance Force, NATO’s security mission in Afghanistan.

When India does participate in multilateral organizations, it routinely opposes initiatives proposed by the United States and other Western powers. India’s opposition to interfering in other countries’ domestic affairs has led New Delhi to vote against human rights resolutions in the UN General Assembly and to openly criticize UN involvement in such crises as the civil wars in Libya and Syria. New Delhi has also opposed the West on many economic issues, working with the other so-called BRICS nations—Brazil, Russia, China, and South Africa—to create alternatives to the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and other Bretton Woods institutions.

Still, Burns holds out hope that Obama and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi will “work together to promote stability in India’s South Asian neighborhood.” If India’s actions are anything to go on, however, it appears that the country prefers to work alone to maintain its regional dominance—and it views the United States as a threat. As a U.S. diplomat serving in South Asia from 1985 to 2004, I watched Indian officials repeatedly pressure neighboring countries not to cooperate with Washington, often because New Delhi believed, erroneously, that such cooperation would raise the U.S. military’s profile in South Asia. In early 2014, India protested U.S. calls for fair and inclusive elections in Bangladesh because it feared that voters would not elect a pro-India party. To gain leverage over its neighbors, India has had its foreign intelligence agency provide financial support to antigovernment insurgencies in Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka. Two of the insurgent groups India has backed—Maoist militants in Nepal and Tamil separatists in Sri Lanka—have killed thousands of civilians and been designated as terrorists by the U.S. government.

Burns suggests that an increasingly powerful China may spur a stronger U.S.-Indian nexus in Asia. But even though border clashes with China have aggravated security concerns in New Delhi, Modi openly admires China’s development model and may prefer to engage China diplomatically and economically rather than try to contain it. And many Indian analysts do not believe that the United States would come to India’s defense if a U.S.-Indian military partnership provoked Chinese aggression.

Modi still remains a mystery to U.S. policymakers. He appears to want the United States to help revitalize India’s economy, but it is unclear if he wants the longer-term political and defense partnership that the United States seeks in South Asia. A staunch Hindu nationalist, Modi likely wants to continue India’s quest for regional dominance, a move that would not endear him to the United States. His endorsement of his party’s vision of Akhand Bharat, or “undivided India,” which sees most of South Asia as belonging to India, does not bode well for a more accommodative regional foreign policy.

Of course, India is firmly within its rights to define its own interests and chart its own strategies. But U.S.-Indian relations—and U.S. strategic interests—would be best served by a realistic appraisal of Indian values and goals, which Burns fails to provide. Contrary to Burns’ assertions, India is unlikely to become a “critical partner” to the United States anytime soon. New Delhi will strengthen its ties with Washington only if doing so serves its interests; Washington should do the same.

US-Indian relations low but will never collapse

**Padukone 12** (Neil Padukone is the Felow for geopolitics at the Takshashila Institution, 6/19/2012, "Natural Allies?", pragati.nationalinterest.in/2012/06/natural-allies/)

In the late 1990s, the United States and India embarked on a partnership based largely on three strategic issues: markets, counter-terrorism, and balancing China. With the opening of India’s economy in 1991, the United States saw India’s billion-strong population as a massive market for its businesses. In the wake of 9/11, Washington came to see India’s travails against Islamist militants in Kashmir and Afghanistan through the lens of its War on Terror and increased counter-terrorism cooperation with New Delhi. And as India’s and China’s strategic spaces began to overlap, managing China’s rise became a common concern for both New Delhi and Washington. With that in mind, the United States and India reversed decades of enmity and, through the 2006 nuclear deal, embarked upon a symbolic commitment to what heads of state of both countries have called a “natural alliance.” Yet with all the fanfare- particularly after U.S. President Barack Obama voiced his support for a permanent Indian seat on the UN Security Council in his 2010 Lok Sabha speech- bilateral ties have recently been marked by considerable drift: India has not fallen in line on the issue of Iran, Washington is only slowly coming around on Pakistani militancy, the countries’ UN voting records do not mesh, and trade disagreements abound. Questions have been raised over why U.S.-India relations have cooled, or whether they were over hyped in the first place. The U.S. Department of Defense’s “strategic pivot” toward Asia is one way to shore up relations and realign the Indo-U.S. partnership. India’s geostrategic location at the centre of the Indian Ocean- along with its naval expansion toward the southern Indian Ocean and its Port Blair naval base at the Andaman Islands- enable New Delhi to manage China’s presence in the region. Indeed, India and America’s navies have been more coordinated than any other bureaucracy since 2000. But the implications of this shared Beijing-centric orientation will only come about in the medium-term. One dimension of these ties, the sale of defence technologies, is another place where India has not yet delivered: the recent Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) competition failed to award contracts to American companies. And in the middle of a global recession in which all countries are hunkering down, and domestic inflation and unemployment- not to mention concerns over doing business in India, such as retroactive taxation and tax avoidance measures- have grown, economic reforms that would further open India’s markets have slowed. U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s recent visit to Kolkata was largely an effort to encourage India to increase the speed of its market liberalisation, particularly in the retail sector. This may be a prospect for the future, but is doubtful today given India’s economic slowdown and the attendant drop in employment. Yet perhaps the main reason for this strategic drift is that America’s key concern in South Asia these days is Afghanistan. President Obama delivered on his campaign promise to refocus efforts on the war in that country, and from 2009, his administration’s “AfPak” strategy took a regional perspective that originally sought to bring India into the equation. The thinking behind this, as Amitai Etzioni writes, is that “for Pakistanis, conflict (with India) poses an ominous existential challenge that drives their behaviour on all things,” including “their approach to the West and the war in Afghanistan… If the India-Pakistan confrontation could be settled, chances for progress on other fronts would be greatly enhanced.” The implication was that Washington ought to hyphenate India and Pakistan, to see the two as part of the same regional tussle, and try to settle the Kashmir dispute in order to make progress in Afghanistan. This was something New Delhi vehemently opposed and in fact, it sought de-hyphenation from Pakistan – engagement with New Delhi and Islamabad on separate and unconnected tracks. So when the office of the late US Special Adviser on Pakistan and Afghanistan Richard Holbrooke sought to include India and Kashmir in its purview, New Delhi successfully lobbied against it. This effort served one of India’s aims, insofar as it keeps Kashmir out of America’s area of direct intervention. Yet it also takes India, its assets, and its clout out of the broader Afghan resolution. Among these assets is the Indian-constructed Chabahar Road that connects Iran’s eastern Chabahar Port on the Gulf of Oman to western Afghanistan. The road ends Pakistan’s monopoly on seaborne trade to Afghanistan, which has long allowed Islamabad’s pernicious dominance of Kabul’s economic and political life. In light of America’s confrontation with Iran and efforts to sanction the latter’s energy sector, however, Washington opposes India’s use of Chabahar, particularly to import Iranian oil and natural gas. Indeed another goal of Secretary Clinton’s visit was to try to shore up India’s support for sanctions against Iran- to which end India is reducing its dependence on Iranian energy as it awaits an exemption on sanctions from the US State Department. But when New Delhi recently used its Chabahar road to send 100,000 tons of wheat to Kabul, its full potential vis-à-vis Afghanistan became evident. And this food aid was on top of India’s additional commitments to Afghanistan: constructing the Zaranj-Delaram highway in western Afghanistan that connects Chabahar to the Afghan ring road, the development of the Ayni Air base in Tajikistan (originally designed to treat wounded Afghan soldiers), building Afghanistan’s parliament building, exploring the Hajigak iron mine, and even commitments to train the Afghan National Police and Army- all of which amount to pledges of over $1 billion since 2001. Washington has been wary of encouraging India’s presence in Afghanistan citing Islamabad’s fear of encirclement. But, even without American attention, a refutation of Pakistan’s “India Threat” narrative is already underway. In order to remain focused on strategic horizons beyond South Asia, India is reorienting its defence apparatus away from Pakistan and towards China and the southern Indian Ocean; even the Ayni Base and Chabahar Road can be seen as elements of this strategic shift beyond the subcontinent. Together with Pakistan’s focus on the Durand Line and events within its own borders, political breathing space between Islamabad and New Delhi has opened up. India-Pakistan talks have already produced a number of important breakthroughs that portend better bilateral days to come: the granting of Most-Favoured Nation status, enhanced trade measures, as well as discussions on the specific parameters of a Kashmir peace based on economic integration. Specifically regarding the Indo-Pak dynamic in Afghanistan, things are less zero-sum than they appear. Important as the Chabahar route is, the combination of road, sea, and even rail links still comes with massive transport costs for India-Afghanistan trade. As S Verma, chairman of Steel Authority of India and the head of a consortium of Indian industries engaged in Afghanistan’s Hajigak iron mine, put it, “over the longer term,” transporting Afghan minerals over Pakistani territory “will be a productive investment. Not just for us, but others in the region including Pakistan. There are license fees, logistics, and so forth.” Meanwhile, Kaustav Chakrabarti of the Observer Research Foundation has suggested “deploying joint Indo-Pak nation building teams” in Afghanistan that include advisors, military trainers, bureaucrats, developments experts, medical crews and NGOs. These teams would “provide additional resources, bridge political polarities, foster cooperation between India and Pakistan and devise means to verify each other’s role, and ultimately, present a long-term mechanism,” guaranteed by India and Pakistan’s geographic proximity, “to ensure Afghanistan’s neutrality.” He cites as a precedent the collaboration between Indian and Pakistani armed forces in “UN peacekeeping missions in hot spots like Somalia.” Full realisation of any Indo-Pak promise will require more space, and time, between the two countries. The interim period, meanwhile, may indeed take a cooling period between the United States and India, who are unlikely to become allies in the fullest sense due to differing tactical approaches. But the strategic fundamentals of the Indo-American rapport- balancing China, expanding trade, and stabilising South Asia- remain intact.

Relations are resilient

Michael J. **Green**, IR Prof at Georgetown, September 2, 20**10** “China the Aggressor?” The National Interest <http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/china-the-aggressor-4017>

India has become a larger factor in China’s foreign policy strategy. We assess that the U.S.-India alignment started under Bush is irreversible, though we take some comfort from the Obama administration’s dilution of the strategic rationale for U.S.-India relations. The November U.S.-China joint statement was a particularly useful signal to India that Washington looks to Beijing first and Delhi second in global politics. Nevertheless, the United States now exercises more with India than any other bilateral partner, including NATO countries, Japan and Australia, and Japan and Australia have both signed a series of cooperative agreements with the Indian Navy. Indian propaganda about the “China threat” to Aksai Chin, Arunachal Pradesh and the “string of pearls” from Burma to Sri Lanka and Gwadar in Pakistan must be countered. Fortunately, India is more concerned about economic development than strategic issues and it will be possible to affect Indian policy through trade and peaceful development. We will also build on the “Spirit of Copenhagen” to obstruct Indian alignment with the United States and Japan and to form counter-coalitions among developing countries. Indian leaders have been trumpeting the supposed advantages of the “world’s largest democracy,” but democracy is an obstacle to Indian development compared with our more successful model of socialism with Chinese characteristics. Indian efforts to counterbalance us in Myanmar must be watched, but we are in a stronger position in that country overall and can gain some advantage if Indian engagement complicates American efforts to form a united democratic front against the SPDC. We also have one enormous advantage over India. Other than the Tibetan plateau, India is removed from our critical centers of strategic gravity. However, we can easily exploit Indian vulnerability in South Asia through our relationship with Pakistan (where we will transfer nuclear power technology and build railroads and ports) and through our new relationships with Sri Lanka and the Maldives. This will allow us to keep India off-guard if Delhi’s strategies become too ambitious in East Asia. Ultimately, however, much will depend on the pace of Indian alignment with the United States, Japan and the other maritime powers in Asia.

## A-to “US-Sino Ties Bad – internet censorship scenario”

### 2AC vs. Internet Censorship

Censorship is ineffective and even counterproductive

Custer 12

C. Custer, Chinese cultural expert, degree in East Asian studies, Tech In Asia, December 18, 2012, "Web of Failure: How China’s Internet Policies Have Doomed Chinese Soft Power", http://www.techinasia.com/failure-china-internet-policies-doomed-chinese-soft-power/

When it comes to the web, China has continually struggled to choose between its impulse to control things as tightly as possible and its recognition of web platforms as a powerful way to broadcast its propaganda both at home and abroad. In the past few years, its apparent strategy has been to attempt to have its cake and eat it too: to broadcast its own message using all the Western web channels at its disposal while blocking those channels for domestic web users. Unfortunately for the government, having your cake and eating it is impossible, and this policy — if it is continued — will prove to be an utter failure.

Domestic Stability

China’s censorship of Western web platforms like Facebook and Twitter is predicated on the idea that those platforms, because they are uncensored, threaten China’s domestic stability. In the wake of the 2009 Urumqi riots, numerous Western social media sites (including the aforementioned Twitter and Facebook) were blamed for facilitating the organization of protests and the spread of “harmful information,” and were subsequently blocked.

Blocking websites does increase stability in the short term, because people with dissenting messages have fewer ways to spread them. In the long-term, though, this kind of stability is unsustainable. Censorship, after all, does not eliminate dissent; it merely silences it, or more often pushes it into different channels. And while China’s Great Firewall (GFW) makes organizing dissent more difficult, it also foments dissent by frustrating people who are trying to do normal internet things but can’t because of the blockages.

Moreover, it encourages creative ways to circumvent the blocks both technologically and ideologically (China’s net users may be the world’s most creative when it comes to using puns and homophones to discuss sensitive issues without setting off keyword blocks). The Great Firewall also effectively moves many dissenters from foreign sites (where most of the audience can’t understand them) onto domestic services like Sina Weibo. And while Sina Weibo and other Chinese social services are monitored and censored, they’re often not monitored and censored quickly and efficiently enough to stop so-called “harmful information” from spreading.

The harder China cracks down on VPNs and other GFW-circumventing technology, the worse this is going to get. If Ai Weiwei and his followers (for example) are prevented from using Twitter, does the government really think they’re just going to stop expressing themselves and give up? No, they will turn to domestic sites, and while domestic censors will block their accounts and delete their messages, some of those messages will get through. And in a country where strident dissent is often illegal, its impact and its spread are intensified.

To put it another way, if the Chinese internet was uncensored, the dramatic statements of Ai Weiwei and other dissidents probably wouldn’t be considered remarkable. And if everyone had the freedom to express themselves without fear of censorship and reprisals, Ai Weiwei’s fearlessness wouldn’t be particularly important. Honestly, if the government really wants to effectively silence Ai Weiwei, they should dismantle the Great Firewall tomorrow.

China won’t loosen internet censorship

Elisabetta Meconcelli, Int'l Center for Southern Europe, 10/22/14, Political Impact of Censorship in China, www.icse-co.org/political-impact-of-censorship-in-china/

China Daily reported that prosecutors are now obliged to open investigations if “defamatory” comments were “viewed by at least 5,000 Internet users or re-tweeted 500 or more times”. Those cases have drawn increased widespread criticism and international attention to media censorship in the country: the home of the World’s largest One-Party-State was third to Iran and Turkey for most jailed journalists. The international political impact of censorship in China, unlike the internal one, is very much more highly perceived, for example: in the early 2011 Secretary Hillary Clinton pledged to continue U.S. efforts to weaken censorship in countries with repressive governments like China and Iran. Later China warned the United States to not interfere into internal affairs of other countries. The important thing is that criticism coming from outside China Mainland has very little effect on its policy. In September 2002, the Chinese government’s control over Internet became tighter: Google.com – who collects information with web engines through pure technology and not human editors – was blocked as well as other similar useful and well-known search engine websites, such as CNN.com, BBC.com and VOA.com. In 2010 another very important controversy arose between China and Google Company, who withdrew its services from Chinese market, not related to the restrictions imposed by the local government but because of a hacker attack to Google archives. This dispute is part of largest repartee and political arm wrestling between Chinese and U.S. governments who are fighting a cybernetic-battle: China blames Google for having “intricate ties” with the US government and Google complains China because of the hacker attack to its archive.

China is now aligned with those countries, including Russia, in a global dispute with Western democracies over how the Internet should be governed, and set an example for other repressive regimes in this new way to exercise a better control of its own society and the widespread availability of information of the Web.

The CCP is durable and will maintain hardline stance on protest movements

William Wan, WaPo, interview with Jeff Bader, Former Obama admin adviser to Asia, 10/2/2014, Ex-Obama adviser on Hong Kong: ‘We have to focus on reality’, www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2014/10/02/ex-obama-adviser-on-hong-kong-we-have-to-focus-on-reality/

As the Obama administration’s former top adviser on Asia, Jeff Bader is an expert on all three fronts. We asked him to unpack the implications of Hong Kong’s protests in an interview Thursday: WorldViews: How are China’s leaders likely viewing these protests? Jeff Bader: I have strong sympathy for the cause of the demonstrators, but I also think, when talking about where this is headed, we have to focus on reality, not purely idealism. The reality is Beijing is quite intractable. They have a different sensibility and perspective. It's an illusion to project Western wishful thinking onto how they approach this issue. They see Chinese stability, as well as the leadership of the party, at stake. These are issues on which there is almost no room for compromise. There is fragility in China and the belief among the leadership that if something happens in Hong Kong there will be a contagious effect on the mainland that might prove irresistible. This underlies what they do. Those of us who have been dealing with China for decades shouldn’t be surprised by that. So none of us should delude ourselves that there could be a change of heart or softness coming from China just around the corner. They're going to hold their line. How long can these protests keep going on? I have doubts about the sustainability about protests. Not because the cause isn't an admirable one. But let's compare with Tahrir Square [in Cairo, where demonstrations erupted in 2011] or Tiananmen in 1989. Those were places where people felt they had nothing to lose. That's why you had millions turning out. People were aligning their aspirations with them. Hong Kong could not be more different. Hong Kong is one of the most successful cities on the earth. People have very good lives. They don't see democratic development as the key to a good life, which they already have. They would like it, but they have other objectives, which the current economic and social system in Hong Kong effectively promote and ensure. So it's unrealistic to think that millions of Hong Kongers are going to remain supportive or even tolerant over weeks as the city grinds to halt. The sympathies are going to shift if this continues. I don't doubt that. People may be sympathetic, but reality and the needs of daily life intrude. And they're not going to put their lives on hold for a pipe dream. So [Hong Kong chief executive Leung Chun-ying's] strategy so far of watching and waiting is not stupid. Is there a constructive way out, or is there just an ending where one side wins and one side loses? Beijing is not going to lose. They're just not willing to, and they have the power to make that will stick. So what's the off-ramp? You need demonstrators and sensible leaders among the democrats to say, "This election China’s promised is better than what Hong Kong had before." It's universal suffrage; it's the first time Hong Kong will ever have a competitive election for chief executive. It falls short of a free, open competitive election. But it is at least a competitive election, where candidates have to appeal to the public to win.

### Extensions - censorship not key to stability

Internet dissent does not lead to political instability or upheaval

Min Tang, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, China, and, Narisong Huhe, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, China, ’13

(“Alternative framing: The effect of the Internet on political support in authoritarian China,” International Political Science Review 0(0) 1– 18)

Therefore, a study of individual-level attitudinal change in China where **uprisings like the Arab Spring have not yet happened** helps identify the **independent role of the Internet** in political changes and thus avoids either overestimation or underestimation of its contributions. On the one hand, the observed role of the Internet in facilitating **collective actions** like those in the Arab Spring **does not necessarily indicate that the new media directly caused any of the outcomes** with which they have been associated (Lynch, 2011: 302). **Any major political changes could have been facilitated by a** large range of factors, like economic crisis, poverty, corruption and external pressure. For this reason, even with the apparent role played by the Internet in the Arab Spring, **many are still** circumspect **about its real contribution** (Farrell, 2012: 45). On the other hand, as suggested earlier, the lack of large-scale uprisings does not mean the absence of the Internet effect. The contribution of the Internet does not necessarily happen at the moment of uprising; it precedes it, with the makeover of the underlying attitudinal basis, and thus constitutes a necessary, although not sufficient, condition for political changes. Without examining the underlying attitudinal changes, we cannot explain why the public ‘suddenly’ change their side to support the opposition movement and how the apparently stable regime lost public support before the crisis.

Given the ostensibly high level of general political support in China, we **do not suggest** that the legitimacy of the Chinese state is in imminent danger or that the Internet framing will definitely lead to uprisings. The relationship between attitudinal transformation and political actions is nothing but natural or definitive. **A body of social movement literature suggests that there is a wide gap between critical attitudes and protest activity**. For attitudinal changes to finally turn into political actions, the Internet needs to be further spread to generate a critical mass and increase the cost of repression for the state, which in turn induces regime concessions and encourages collective actions. The anti-system sentiment on the Internet has not led to political actions in China partly because alternative information and, especially, alternative framing on the Internet has not reached a significant portion of the population due to a digital divide and partly because the state has been able to effectively identify and repress online calls for action through a cyber-police system (King et al., 2013). But **the ability of the state** cannot be taken for granted. With the ever-increasing speed of assimilation of the Internet and mounting dissatisfaction among the public facilitated by the online alternative framing, **it becomes more difficult, if not** impossible**, for the state to censor all online activities or forestall Internet-facilitated collective actions**.

Censorship isn’t necessary because online leaders are ineffective

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(“Flatter world and thicker walls? Blogs, censorship and civic discourse in China” Public Choice (2008) 134: 31–46)

Will a critical mass of Chinese bloggers and Internet users ever be willing to openly defy censorship? One must also keep in mind that **the people blogging online are the most inclined to view their glass as half full as opposed to half empty** when it comes to personal freedoms: they are **the educated urban elites who have benefited more than any other segment of the Chinese population from the past 20 years of economic reforms**. There would need to be a much more profound and acute offline crisis for this group of people to find it worth risking the online and offline freedoms they have gained in exchange for the very uncertain gamble that they might be able to gain even more. **This is especially the case when no viable national thought leader is able to emerge online under the current system of controls—and** no viable alternative to the Chinese communist party has emerged offline either.

### Extensions - censorship inevitable

China is fully committed to cyber censorship

Cary 13

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In the short-term, censorship will most certainly not be lifted to a large degree: Xi has a long way to go in consolidating his power before he can set any reforms in motion. In the long-term, there may not be significant freedom of speech reforms either, unless the lack of freedom affects economic growth, Xi’s No. 1 priority. Censorship is seen as a key piece of the social stability puzzle. There is a great fear (whether warranted or not) that total freedom of information would allow Chinese citizens to “gang up” on the government and launch something akin to an Arab Spring. More specifically, the government worries that open information would allow Chinese citizens to learn about unsavory government actions in other parts of the country, allow them to coordinate large protests in response, or otherwise chip away at the authority of the government.

In terms of freedom of speech and U.S. companies, there are other issues involved, including China’s desire to not be “pushed around” by foreign companies and to manage information on its own terms. Nationalism and pride cannot be discounted when discussing the issue of censorship.

China won’t change

Zimmerman, 13

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A second conclusion is that there are limits to the effectiveness of US policies that attempt to alter Chinese domestic policies. In the case of potential WTO action, it is unlikely that China would change its censorship regime even if it were found to be in violation of its WTO commitments. The concern for domestic political stability overrides any potential costs due to noncompliance with a panel ruling. Such attempts by the US to alter Chinese censorship policies will likely be met with strong resistance, as China balks at any actions that attempt to challenge its sovereignty.

US principles don't resonate with China

Lin 10

Lin Hongyu is Professor in the University of International Relations, China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, Jan./Feb. 2010, "Google and Sino-U.S. Relations", http://www.cicir.ac.cn/english/ArticleView.aspx?nid=1911

The Google threatened last week to withdraw from China because its Gmail program had been hacked by people searching for sensitive information on Chinese human right activists. At the beginning, the Google case was only a commercial issue, but with the deep involvement of U.S. government, it became more and more complicated and sensitive. In fact, many people consider the Google incident as the sign of a new round ideological conflict between China and United States.

China and the U.S. have different ideological concepts and value systems. Ideological conflicts between them were not unusual over the past years. With different historical background and development level, China has different views on Internet information freedom. To the U.S. government, putting Internet freedom into the whole basket of information freedom is a good policy which goes in conformity with its national values. Hillary said:“principles like information freedom are universal, I hope foreign governments will pay close attention to this trend. American companies need to make this principle stand and to be part of our national brand. I am confident that consumers worldwide will reward companies that follow those principles.” But the Chinese government holds different points on it. Unlike the more advanced Western countries, the Chinese society is still vulnerable to the effect of multifarious information flowing in, especially when it is intentionally designed to create disorder in China. Many Chinese believe that today the media and government reports in the West are fully loaded with aggressive rhetoric against those countries that do not follow their lead. Based mechanically on their own history experience and obsessed with Cold War mentality, some Western countries worry about China’s rising and therefore show a very negative attitude towards China. Under such conditions, it is only too nature for China to pay more attention on Internet security than the so-called Internet freedom. According to the State Council Information Office’s statistics, in recent years, the Chinese government had received more than 80,000 Internet complaints and the great majority came from the Western countries. China, a victim of aggressive Western cyber crusade, will not accept the so-called “unrestricted Internet use” mentioned by White House spokesman Nick Shapiro when he was asked to make comment on Google incident.

### Extensions - CCP durable

CCP durable—adaptation solves risk of collapse

Minxin Pei, Claremont McKenna College Gov't Dept, Jan 2014, The Chinese Political Order: Resilience or Decay?, www.modernchinastudies.org/us/issues/current-issue/1361-the-chinese-political-order-resilience-or-decay.html

In comparative terms, one-party regimes such as the CCP possess far more developed institutions than other authoritarian regimes, such as military juntas, personal dictatorships, or traditional monarchies. The central political institution of such regimes – the monopolistic ruling party – dominates the state (including control of the military and law enforcement), directly performs administrative functions, coordinates actions of the bureaucracy, controls economic policy and critical resources, and penetrates deeply into society. A regime like the CCP also has elaborate and sophisticated rules governing recruitment, promotion, and succession. Even though such rules are often honored in the breach, they nevertheless perform a valuable organizational function in terms of regulating the behavior and setting the expectations of the members of the ruling elites. In the specific case of the CCP, the regime certainly looks formidable, both on paper and in practice. As of 2011, it has about 83 million members and recruits roughly 2 million new members a year. The CCP membership, as a share of the Chinese population, has risen considerably in recent years. In 1997, its 60 million members represented 4.6 percent of the population. In 2011, the 83 million CCP members accounted for 6.1 percent of the population, a one-third increase over 14 years. This reflects the CCP’s vigorous efforts to expand its ranks, particularly among the well-educated professionals and college students. The most critical factor contributing to the CCP’s durability in power is, without any doubt, its capacity for repression. To be sure, the CCP has abandoned the use of mass terror and constant political campaigns that were hallmarks of the Maoist era. However, the CCP has continued to maintain a vast apparatus of secret police, anti-riot police, censors, and informers. This apparatus constitutes the most important pillar on which the edifice of the one-party state rests. In the post-Tiananmen period, the CCP has significantly strengthened its repressive capacity and demonstrated repeatedly its ability to suppress any challenges to its power. Without the support of this repressive apparatus, it is difficult to imagine that the CCP will be able to defend its political monopoly. A second source of regime resilience is the CCP’s capacity for political co-optation. In spite of post-Mao economic reforms, the CCP has managed to maintain its Leninist grip over a large swath of the Chinese economy through SOEs, regulatory regimes, the banking system, and control of the appointments of economic bureaucracies and local officials. The ability to allocate economic rents allows the CCP to operate a huge political patronage system through which it can reward its loyalist with perks and desirable jobs. Such control provides the CCP with the means to co-opt individuals, particularly well-educated ones, into its ranks. The most successful case of such co-optation is the recruitment of college students and college graduates since 1989. Besides these two principal sources of regime resilience, we may add two additional, though less important, sources of regime resilience: capacity to exploit Chinese nationalism and ability to adopt tactical adaptations in responding to an increasingly demanding public. Since the 1990s, the CCP has been effectively exploiting Chinese nationalism as an alternative legitimating ideology. Through heavy investments in patriotic education, propaganda, and manipulation of cultural and historical symbols, the Chinese government has managed to appeal to nationalist sentiments and portray itself as the defender of China’s national honor in a hostile world. Scholarly research shows that since the 1990s it has acquired more anti-liberal and xenophobic characteristics due to the CCP’s successful campaign. Yet, it may be premature to conclude that Chinese nationalism could substitute communism for the CCP to rally the Chinese people to support its self-perpetuation in power. What is unknown regarding the potency of Chinese nationalism as a legitimating ideology for the CCP is whether its appeals to nationalism are powerful enough to divert domestic attention from its policy failings (such as corruption, environmental degradation, and inequality) and how the party can avoid the counterproductive effects of resurgent Chinese nationalism, such as high tensions with the West (which China relies on as export markets) and possible openings for political opposition to use nationalism as a cover to engage in anti-regime activities. The argument advanced by proponents of authoritarian resilience may be wrong in some crucial aspects – such as their claims regarding the succession mechanism, meritocracy in the party, and tolerance of political and social pluralism – but is right in one aspect: the party’s ability to adapt its tactics. The CCP prides itself as a learning organization. However, most of the lessons learned by the CCP from the more recent experience of the fall of one-party regimes (in particular, the fall of the Soviet Union) are tactical in nature. If anything, Chinese leaders seem to have missed the fundamental lesson from the fall of the Soviet Union and the democratic transitions in other authoritarian regimes: a forward-looking regime can save itself by engaging in political reform sooner rather than later. Based on official speeches and propaganda materials, it is clear that the Chinese ruling elites since Tiananmen have learned the opposite strategic lesson. They viewed any form of political reform as regime suicide. Although the CCP may not be capable of learning at the strategic level, it is capable of adapting at the tactical level. In the post-Tiananmen era, the CCP has acquired relatively effective tactics in addressing its challenges. For instance, while continuing to suppress both political demands from ordinary citizens and organized opposition, it has learned to selectively respond to non-political complaints from individuals. By using a mixture of tactics (such as punishing a small number of local officials to placate the public and compensating individuals for their economic losses), the Chinese government has managed to preserve its image as a competent and effective government. Improvement in the CCP’s tactical adaptability also extends to its use of repression in maintaining power. In the post-Tiananmen era, abundant economic resources and organizational learning have enabled the Chinese government to raise the sophistication of its repressive tactics in the areas of intelligence gathering, surveillance, censorship, and crowd control. In summary, the foregoing discussion suggests that the CCP remains a formidable one-party regime determined to maintain its political monopoly. Its capacity for repression rivals, if not exceeds, that of the former Soviet Union. Its use of co-optation has been effective in recruiting millions of social elites. Its appeal to Chinese nationalism, although not always effective, provides a considerable source of political legitimation for its rule. Its tactical adaptability has further increased its ability to respond to public demands through targeted repression and selective concessions.

## Capitalism, Neolib K – Answers

### 2AC vs. Capitalism, Neolib K

#### ( ) Perm – plan and all non-competitive parts of their alt

#### ( ) The Alt is insufficient and not workable. Capitalism exists outside of the US and China. There’s no apparatus to “abandon belief in capitalism”.

#### ( ) Alt fails worse than Aff ever could. Uniquely boosts social injustice.

Barnett ‘10

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From Chapter Twelve – “PUBLICS AND MARKETS: What’s wrong with Neoliberalism?” – From the book: The Handbook of Social Geography, edited by Susan Smith, Sallie Marston, Rachel Pain, and John Paul Jones III. London and New York: Sage. Available via http://www.open.ac.uk/socialsciences/emergentpublics/publications/barnett\_publicsandmarkets.pdf

In accepting the same simplistic opposition between individual freedom and social justice presented by Hayek, but simply reversing the evaluation of the two terms, critics of neoliberalism end up presenting highly moralistic forms of analysis of contemporary political processes. In resisting the idealization of the market as the embodiment of public virtue, they end up embracing an equally idealized view of the forum as the alternative figure of collective life (see Elster 1986). For example, while Harvey insists that neoliberalism is a process driven by the aim of restoring class power, he ends his analysis by arguing that it is the anti-democratic character of neoliberalism that should be the focal point of opposition (Harvey 2005, 205-206). But it is far from clear whether the theories of neoliberalism and neoliberalization developed by political economists, sometimes with the help of governmentality studies, can contribute to reconstructing a theory and practice of radical democratic justice. In Harvey’s analysis, the withdrawal of the state is taken for granted, and leads to the destruction of previous solidarities, unleashing pathologies of anomie, anti-social behaviour and criminality (ibid, 81). In turn, the vacuum created by the withdrawal of the state leads to social solidarities being reconstructed around other axes, of religion and morality, associationism, and nationalism. What has been described as the rise of the “movement society”, expressed in the proliferation of contentious politics of rights-based struggles and identity politics, Harvey sees as one aspect of a spread of corrosive social forms triggered by the rolling-back of states. In the wake of this rolling-back “[e]verything from gangs and criminal cartels, narco-trafficking networks, mini-mafias and favela bosses, through community, grassroots and non-governmental organizations, to secular cults and religious sects proliferate” (ibid, 171). These are alternative social forms “that fill the void left behind as state, powers, political parties and other institutional forms are actively dismantled or simply wither away as centres of collective endeavour and of social bonding” (ibid.). What’s really wrong with neoliberalism, for critics who have constructed it as a coherent object of analysis, is the unleashing of destructive pathologies through the combined withdrawal of the state and the unfettered growth of market exchange. ‘Individual freedom’ is presented as a medium of uninhibited hedonism, which if given too much free reign undermines the ascetic virtues of self-denial upon which struggles for ‘social justice’ are supposed to depend. Underwritten by simplistic moral denunciations of ‘the market’, these theories cover over a series of analytic, explanatory, and normative questions. In the case of both the Marxist narrative of neoliberalization, and the Foucauldian analysis of neoliberal governmentality, it remains unclear whether either tradition can provide adequate resources for thinking about the practical problems of democracy, rights and social justice. This is not helped by the systematic denigration in both lines of thought of ‘liberalism’, a catch-all term used with little discrimination. There is a tendency to present neoliberalism as the natural end-point or rolling-out of a longer tradition of liberal thought – an argument only sustainable through the implicit invocation of some notion of a liberal ‘episteme’ covering all varieties and providing a core of meaning. One of the lessons drawn by diverse strands of radical political theory from the experience of twentieth-century history is that struggles for social justice can create new forms of domination and inequality. It is this that leads to a grudging appreciation of liberalism as a potential source for insight into the politics of pluralistic associational life. The cost of the careless disregard for ‘actually existing liberalisms’ is to remain blind to the diverse strands of egalitarian thought about the relationships between democracy, rights and social justice that one finds in, for example: post-Rawslian political philosophy; post-Habermasian theories of democracy, including their feminist variants; various postcolonial liberalisms; the flowering of agonistic liberalisms and theories of radical democracy; and the revival of republican theories of democracy, freedom, and justice. No doubt theorists of neoliberalism would see all this as hopelessly trapped within the ‘neoliberal frame’ of individualism, although if one takes this argument to its logical conclusion, even Marx’s critique of capitalist exploitation, dependent as it is on an ideal of self-ownership, is nothing more than a variation on Lockean individual rights.

#### Zero link – empirics prove BIT’s don’t expand global capital. *Neg* epistemology’s biased.

Chilton ‘15

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Despite this slow start, the United States has now signed BITs with 47 countries. All U.S. BITs are based on a model treaty and, although the specific provisions of the model have evolved over the years, the core elements of these agreements have been the same (Akhtar and Weiss 2013, 8). First, agreements guarantee that investments made by individuals and corporations from the other country will be treated fairly and equitably. Second, the agreements limit expropriation of investment, and provide for compensation when expropriation does take place. Third, the agreements provide investors the right to transfer their property out of the foreign state freely. Fourth, the agreements place restrictions on trade-distorting performance requirements—like local content requirements or export quotas. Fifth, if the terms of the BIT have been violated and the national courts of the foreign country do not provide redress, the agreements authorize investors to force the foreign state to participate in binding arbitration. Taken together, these five provisions give assurances to capital exporters that investments made in the market of a treaty partner will be provided with legal protection. Perhaps unsurprisingly, as the number of BITs that the United States is party to has proliferated, so has scholarship on these agreements (Shaffer and Ginsburg 2012. 35-38). Although this scholarship has not included a single empirical study evaluating the motivations of the U.S. BITs program, scholars have consistently argued that the United States signed BITs because it hoped to influence the development of international investment law and to protect American investments abroad (Elkins, Guzman, and Simmons 2006, 815-16; Vandevelde 2005, 171; Lang 1998, 457; Vandevelde 1998a, 201-2; Vandevelde 1988,1-2; Gann 1985, 374; Sachs 1984, 195). Given this belief, scholars have evaluated U.S. BITs almost entirely based on their ability to protect and promote investment. Although it is certainly at least partially true that the United States was concerned with the development of international investment law and hoped that these treaties would help American investors, there are several reasons to doubt that this investment-centric view of the U.S. BITs program is the fully story. First, U.S. BIT negotiators have warned treaty partners that they should not expect a wave of new investments as a consequence of these agreements (Alvarez 2010, 621 n.69; Vandevelde 1998a, 212), which is evidence that U.S. officials themselves are aware that the economic impact of these agreements is likely quite limited. Second, if the United States were motivated by a desire to promote the development of international investment law and to protect American investors, it would have entered into a BIT with any country that would agree to its terms. This, however, was not the case (Vandevelde 1993, 169-70). Third, there is scant evidence of any pressure from American interest groups on the United States to ratify the BITs that it has signed, suggesting that U.S. investors are not eager to avail themselves of any new opportunities or protections that BITs may provide. Fourth, evidence suggests that U.S. BITs do not have a positive impact on investment flows between the United States and partner countries (Peinhardt and Allee 2012; Yackee 2008). Fifth, there is reason to believe that BITs do not influence companies' investment decisions (Yackee 2010), which calls into question whether BITs are negotiated to provide increased protections for capital exporters. Given the limited interest in—and evidence of—the investment benefits of BITs, it is worth reconsidering why the United States actively pursued a BITs program for three decades. I argue that the dominant narrative misses the mark: the United States did not primarily form BITs to promote and protect investments abroad, but instead to improve relationships with politically important developing countries. BITs have been used in this way because they have several features that make them an appealing foreign policy tool: they do not necessitate outlaying funds, require the United States to make only "redundant" obligations, are easy to sell politically, and take minimal effort to negotiate given their standardized nature. Having a BIT with the United States is attractive politically to the governments of many developing countries as well. Potential BIT partners are frequently eager to sign these treaties, even though they are warned that the agreements likely will not lead to new investments, because the treaty provides domestic political benefits to the country's government. Since international relations are a repeated game, a new treaty partner would thus likely reciprocate by extending political benefits to the United States in order to receive favorable treatment again in the future. The implication of this theory is that investment considerations will not explain which countries the United States has chosen to sign BITs with, and that looking solely at the investment consequences of the treaties ignores many of their potential benefits. Instead, it is my contention that political considerations will better explain which countries the United States has chosen to sign BITs with, and that BITs should be evaluated at least in part based on whether they have generated political dividends.

#### ( ) perm – do the aff – advance investment but without extending the most violent modes of capitalism.

#### ( ) Prefer policy framework. Regress – endless items could become nexus questions. Other options unfairly whisk away the 1AC and don’t teach pragmatic change – which is educationally valuable for both sides’ impact claims.

#### Capitalism innovation check their green impact and “try or die” args.

Harte and Harte 12

John, Professor of Ecosystem Sciences at the University of California, Berkeley and Mary Ellen, biologist and columnist who writes on climate change and population, “Alarmism Is Justified”, Foreign Affairs, 00157120, Sep/Oct 2012, Vol. 91, Issue 5

The Limits to Growth predicted catastrophe: humanity would deplete natural resources and pollute itself to death. Its solution was less economic growth, more recycling, and organic farming. My essay documented how the book's predictions were wildly off, mainly because its authors ignored how innovation would help people overcome environmental challenges. Because the book's goal was so dramatic -- averting the end of the world -- its recommendation was for society to simultaneously do everything in its power to forestall that outcome. Today, much of the environmental movement continues to evince such alarmism and, consequently, is unable to prioritize. Developed countries focus as much on recycling, which achieves precious little at a high cost, as they do on attaining the much larger benefits from tackling air pollution, a massive, if declining, threat. Meanwhile, some environmentalists' demands are simply counterproductive. Avoiding pesticides, for example, means farming more land less efficiently, which leads to higher prices, more hunger, more disease (because of a lower intake of fruits and vegetables), and less biodiversity. My essay argued that although the The Limits to Growth's analysis has been proved wrong, much of its doomsaying and policy advice still pervades the environmental debate 40 years later. These four critiques, instead of refuting my argument, in fact vindicate it. First, only Dennis Meadows really tries to defend The Limits to Growth's predictions of collapse, and he does so with little conviction. Second, at least some of the responses accept in principle that society needs to prioritize among its different environmental goals and that economic growth will make achieving them easier -- in Frances Beinecke's words, "prosperity often leads to greater environmental protection." Third, all four of the critiques of my essay rely on the language of doom to motivate action, which, to the detriment of the environment, convinces society that it must pursue all its environmental goals at once, regardless of the costs and benefits. Finally, by focusing on the threats of economic growth to the environment, the authors generally neglect that growth has lifted billions of people out of grinding poverty and that others may remain poor because of the developed world's environmental concerns, real or imagined. WRONG AGAIN Defending The Limits to Growth, Meadows curiously complains that I address only the original book, which is "long out of print." He then posits that my case rests on one table from that book, on resource depletion, which he says I misrepresent. That is incorrect on several counts. First, it is patently false to claim, as Meadows does by way of a quotation from Matthew Simmons, that "nowhere in the book was there any mention about running out of anything by 2000." (Jørgen Randers makes a similar point.) The Limits to Growth quoted approvingly the first annual report by the U.S. government's Council on Environmental Quality, in 1970: "It would appear at present that the quantities of platinum, gold, zinc and lead are not sufficient to meet demands. At the present rate of expansion … silver, tin and uranium may be in short supply even at higher prices by the turn of the century." Meadows' own table publicized "the number of years known global reserves will last at current global consumption," showing that gold, lead, mercury, silver, tin, and zinc would not last to the year 2000. The instances go on. According to the book's model, the main driver of the global system's so-called collapse would be the depletion of resources, and averting that outcome was the book's widely publicized rallying cry. So focusing on that aspect of the book can hardly be called a misrepresentation. What is more, claiming that this is my only critique ignores that I also showed how the book got pollution wrong and how its analysis of collapse simply did not follow. Meadows and Randers both claim that in their model, pollution consisted of long-lived toxics, not air pollution. In fact, they were much more vague on this question in 1972. In the best case for their predictions of deadly pollution, they meant air pollution, which today accounts for about 62 percent of all environmental deaths, according to the World Bank and the World Health Organization. But if they indeed meant long-lived toxics, their prediction that "pollution rises very rapidly, causing an immediate increase in the death rate" has been clearly disproven by the declining global death rate and the massive reductions in persistent pollutants. John Harte and Mary Ellen Harte put forth a similarly weak defense of The Limits to Growth, as they do not challenge my data. They quote an article by the ecologists Charles Hall and John Day to say that The Limits to Growth's results were "almost exactly on course some 35 years later in 2008." This is simply wrong when it comes to resource levels, as the data in my original article shows, and indeed the cited article contains not a single reference for its claims about oil and copper resource reductions. Harte and Harte further argue that the increase in the cost of resources during the last ten years is evidence of "the limitations on the human enterprise." Meadows claims that this uptick may "herald a permanent shift in the trend." Yet neither carries through the argument, because the empirical data from the past 150 years overwhelmingly undermine it. The reason is that a temporary increase in the scarcity of a resource causes its price to rise, which in turn encourages more exploration, substitution, and innovation across the entire chain of production, thereby negating any increase in scarcity. Harte and Harte demonstrate the unpleasant arrogance that accompanies the true faith, claiming that I "deny" knowledge, promote "scientific misconceptions," and display "scientific ignorance." They take particular issue with my assertion that DDT is a cheap solution to malaria, stating that I overlooked the issue of biological resistance. In fact, all malarial treatments face this problem, but DDT less so than the others. Whereas many malarial treatments, such as dieldrin, work only by killing insects, DDT also repels and irritates them. Dieldrin strongly selects for resistance, whereas DDT works in three ways and even repels 60 percent of DDT-resistant mosquitoes. FALSE ALARM All four critiques contain grand dollops of doom. Beinecke invokes "alarming" environmental problems from overfishing to the destruction of the rain forests and global warming. These are real issues, but they, too, deserve practical thinking and careful prioritization. Fish and rain forests, like other resources subject to political control, tend to be overused. By contrast, when resources are controlled by individuals and private groups, their owners are forced to weigh long-term sustainability. Indeed, Beinecke's response reflects the most unfortunate legacy of The Limits to Growth: because of its persistent belief that the planet is in crisis, the environmental movement suggests tackling all environmental problems at once. This is impossible, of course, so society ends up focusing mainly on what catches the public's attention. Beinecke acknowledges that campaigns to enact environmental policy "emerged from what people saw with their own eyes: raw sewage in the Great Lakes, smog so thick that it obscured the George Washington Bridge, oil despoiling Santa Barbara's pristine beaches." Yet the smog killed more than 300,000 Americans annually, whereas the effects of the oil spills, although serious, were of a much lower order of magnitude. She claims that the U.S. Clean Air Act somehow contradicts my argument, when I in fact emphasized that society should have focused much more on cleaner air. Today, roughly 135,000 Americans still die from outdoor air pollution each year, and two million people, mostly in the developing world, die from indoor air pollution. Instead of focusing on the many negligible environmental problems that catch the public's attention, as the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency did when it focused so heavily on pesticides in the 1970s and 1980s, government should tackle the most important environmental problems, air quality chief among them. Beinecke misses this tradeoff entirely. Harte and Harte demonstrate a similar lack of proportion and priority. In response to my claim that a slightly larger portion of the world's arable land -- roughly five percent -- will need to be tapped in order to feed humanity, they offer an unsubstantiated fear that such an expansion would undermine "giant planetary ecosystems." Yet when they fret about pesticides, they seem impervious to the fact that eschewing them would require society to increase the acreage of land it farms by more than ten times that amount. COOL DOWN If The Limits to Growth erred in some of its quantitative projections, then perhaps, as Harte and Harte put it, its "qualitative insights [are] still valid today." Randers cites global warming as the new reason the book was right. Discussing his predictions for high carbon dioxide emissions, Randers writes, "This future is unpleasantly similar to the 'persistent pollution scenario' from The Limits to Growth." But the comparison is unfounded and leads to poor judgment. In The Limits to Growth's, original formulation, pollution led to civilizational decline and death. Although many environmentalists discuss global warming in similarly cataclysmic terms, the scenarios from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change project instead a gradually worsening drag on development. Standard analyses show a reduction of zero to five percent of global GDP by 2100, in a world where the average person in the developing world will be 23 times as rich as he or she is today. Moreover, although the responses to my essay invoke global warming as a new rallying cry for environmental activism, they fail to suggest specific actions to avert it. Harte and Harte claim that "the scientific community knows how to transition to renewable clean energy." Sure, developed countries have the technical know-how to adopt clean energy, but they have not done so because it would still be phenomenally expensive. Policies aimed at stopping climate change have failed for the last two decades because much of the environmental movement, clutching dearly to The Limits to Growth's alarmism and confident sense of purpose, has refused to weigh the costs and benefits and has demanded that countries immediately abandon all polluting sources of energy. Many economists, including the 27 climate economists involved in the 2009 Copenhagen Consensus on Climate conference, have pointed out smarter ways forward. The best means of tackling global warming would be to make substantial investments in green energy research and development, in order to find a way to produce clean energy at a lower cost than fossil fuels. As one of the leading advocates of this approach, I cannot comprehend how Harte and Harte could claim that I do not support clean-energy innovation. Unfortunately, the world will be hard-pressed to focus on smarter environmental policies until it has expunged the dreadful doom of The Limits to Growth. And unless the environmental movement can overcome its fear of economic growth, it will also too easily forget the plight of the billions of poor people who require, above all, **more and faster growth**.

#### ( ) Impact as policy disad is silly – their “try-or-die” arg is empirically false and the perm solves it anyway. Prefer Aff’s try or die claims – specific scenarios and more workable alt.

### Extensions – Alt Fails

**No mindset shift and no alt solvency**

Matthew Lockwood 11, previously Associate Director for Climate, Transport and Energy at the Institute for Public Policy Research, “The Limits to Environmentalism”, March 25, <http://politicalclimate.net/2011/03/25/the-limits-to-environmentalism-4/>

This brings us neatly finally to the third problem with PWG: politics. Jackson does have some discussion of the need for our old favourite “political will” towards the end of the book, and there are some examples of concrete ideas (e.g. shorter working week, ban advertising aimed at children), but there is basically no political strategy. Indeed, the argument is framed in terms of the need for “social and economic change” and “governance”, but not politics at all. The key question is how we are supposed to get from where we are to where he wants us to be. Jackson acknowledges that **at the moment, many people want growth (or more precisely, economic stability) and so demand it of politicians, who then have a political incentive to deliver it**. The quandary (not really acknowledged) is which strategy to adopt in this situation. Do you first reshape the economy to deliver economic stability without growth (e.g. by a shorter working week), which then demonstrates to people socially and politically that growth isn’t necessary for a good life, or do you first have to bring about major social change, moving people away from consumerism, as a precondition for transforming the economy and making the end of growth politically feasible? The discussion in chapter 11 of the book sort of implies that Jackson is thinking in terms of the latter route, but it actually has no strategy. He lays out (some quite conventional, even dare I say it, already proposed by economists) policies like carbon taxation and the aforementioned shorter working week but there is nothing on political narrative. The closest we get to a strategy for social transformation is banning advertising aimed at children (also a theme of Tom Crompton’s) and policies to drive greater durability of products. A counterview might be that all these changes are needed, and it doesn’t matter so much what happens first, that they all reinforce each other etc etc. But I don’t think that’s enough. The political party in the UK that comes closest to offering the Jackson vision is the Green Party. They got 1% of the popular vote in the 2010 general election, and one MP. **What stronger evidence can there be that the vision on its own is not enough?** A final point takes us back to equity (see previous post), but this time within rich countries. Certainly within the US and the UK, a large group of people in the low-to-middle part of the income distribution have seen their real incomes stagnate or fall over the last decade, as the rich have got richer. Telling this “squeezed middle” that economic growth is to end is not going to go down well unless there is a credible strategy for redistribution. That’s why a good initial step for a more sustainable economy might be a set of good old-fashioned social democratic policies on tax and spend. Prosperity without Growth raises some very important questions, and Tim Jackson shows how tight a squeeze we are in. But the book leaves some even more crucial questions hanging. Of course ending economic growth in rich countries would make a solution to ecological limits a bit easier, but **this would play only a small role**. In the absence of radical technological change, only serious “de-growth”, what Kevin Anderson and Alice Bows call “planned economic recession” would be sufficient to bring about the cut in emissions needed. With rapid growth in poor countries this conclusion is even stronger. So what we should be focusing on is achieving that technological change. Yes, it hasn’t materialised so far, but nor have the policies for low carbon innovation we need to produce it – like Gandhi’s Western civilisation, the low carbon revolution would be a good idea. And yes, getting those policies in place will require political effort. **But that effort will be as nothing compared with the political challenge of replacing capitalism with a new steady state system** either lacking innovation or with a disappearing working week. Perhaps the most fundamental, indeed philosophical issue here is that, despite the fact that Jackson has made a good effort to make an argument about limits into an argument about quality of life, his underlying message is (pace Obama): “No, we can’t”. But beyond the environmentalist camp, **this message will not work**. In the face of the biggest collective challenge that humanity has faced, we need a narrative that has the human potential to solve problems, and overcome apparently unbeatable odds, at its heart.

**Capitalism is resilient and no alternative solves – recent economic crisis proves**

**Freedman, ‘9**. Lawrence, Prof of war studies @ King’s College London. “A Subversive on the Hill,” The National Interest, May-June, Lexis.

And yet, even as we experience a crisis of liberal capitalism, so far the most striking feature of the economic meltdown is the lack of any deep ideological struggle within the advanced capitalist states. The crisis has opened up space for alternatives, but the obvious one—state socialism—was discredited by the Soviet experience. Even with the rebalancing of the relationship between the market and the state, and governments adopting measures that are frankly socialistic, there is no confidence in a socialist ideology; states are determined to get failing banks back into private hands as soon as possible. There are no alternative candidate ideologies with a potentially universal application. When times are hard, as can already be seen, populist, nationalist responses tend to come to the fore, and they can feed on xenophobia; problems are blamed on foreigners or fat cats. This can encourage protectionism, which is economic nationalism. But this is not a viable economic alternative because globalization, and its associated interdependence, is real. However much politicians may demand forms of economic self-reliance or energy independence, autarkic options are barely credible and are apt to backfire when attempted—which is not to say that the attempts won’t be made. Then, of course, there would be the possibility not of a clash of ideologies or even of nationalist economies but of civilizations, along the lines suggested by the late Samuel Huntington. These religion-based civilizations are compatible with a variety of economic and political forms. Potentially the most severe challenge would be posed by radical Islamism, though this has many different, and often contradictory, strands. In some states Islam provides the language of the privileged elite; in others it speaks for the disenfranchised and the marginalized. True, Islamism poses a challenge of sorts to the Western world, but it is of a quite-different nature to that posed by Nazism and Communism. This is not an ideology that has become harnessed to advanced industrial or technological strength, and it is unlikely to be so. Within the major powers, Islam is always going to be a minority identity, even if in many cases it is a growing minority. More so, extreme Islamists are only a minority of the minority. Partly because of their marginal position they turn their anger and violence against those of whom they disapprove, which can be a very broad category, but they have no economic program of which to speak. Where Islamists have had a chance to run countries they have not done very well. So, for all its extremist potential, Islamism will continue to pose security threats to Muslim and Western countries, but it lacks the positive capacity to become a viable competing model. Even China, the supposedly rising power, has wholeheartedly embraced the capitalist model, and the fact that a Communist party remains in charge results in ideological confusion, internal rigidity in the face of assertions of political rights and an absence of a broader appeal. If there were an alternative ideology that offered a compelling explanation for capitalism’s failures and a new way forward, the international position of the United States and its allies would be at risk. As there is not, America has an opportunity to reform capitalism, reassess the relationships between markets and the state, and reassert the strength and flexibility of liberal values and institutions at home while demonstrating caution about the extent to which they can be actively promoted abroad. Liberal capitalism is an elastic ideology. It can spring back because it can take on new forms while staying true to its core principles.

**Their alt can’t overcome inevitability- only the perm solves- the alt gets absorbed into the system**

**Skonieczny ’10** (Interrupting Inevitability: Globalization and Resistance Amy Skonieczny\* Alternatives 35 (2010), 1–27 Prof at San Francisco State University, CA. E-mail: [askonie@sfsu.edu](mailto:askonie@sfsu.edu)

Critics of globalization, then, must **deride inevitability** arguments by pointing to the disruptions of alternative discourses. This has often taken the form of recognizing, identifying, and thinking through “contingency.”41 With a move to contingency, critics of teleological arguments emphasize the possibility of political action.42 For example, Gills represents this thinking when he states, “Globalization is not just an abstraction, but a felt experience by millions of individual people. It is for this reason that we believe that the logic of inevitabilism will not in the end prevail over the spirit of collective political resistance.”43 Thus contingency in the form of “collective political resistance” represents the negation of inevitability claims for this literature. However, this sets up a **dichotomous understanding** of globalization as either inevitable or contingent and **fails to engage the way** the tension of **contingency and inevitability functions** in the language, understanding, and practices (i.e., the shared discourse) of proponents and opponents alike. As the statements above indicate, there is a fundamental tension of inevitability and contingency within the discourse of globalization. It is understood and acted upon as if it were inevitable (“globalization is a fact, not a choice”), but nevertheless changeable (“you need to try and shape it”). While the dominant story of globalization insists that all anyone can do is adapt and adjust, it also suggests that the outcome is not predetermined—it is inevitable and contingent. By conceding (agentic) contingency yet claiming inevitability (or conceding aspects of inevitability but claiming contingency), proponents and opponents of globalization strengthen what has become a dominant discourse that is **increasingly successful at overcoming alternative visions** of the future. Analytically **pitting contingency against inevitability** as a way **to disrupt the discourse** that insists **that globalization is inevitable** **fails to address the complicated relationship between them** that is actually constitutive of this mainstream discourse of globalization. It is the **irresolvable tension** between contingency and inevitability that makes this discourse on globalization **powerful and pervasive and**, therefore, **dominant**. Because of this, searching out evidence of purposeful **action opposing globalization does not pose a significant challenge** to this dominant discourse of globalization; **contingency as purposeful action is already incorporated within the dominant discourse.** **Resistance is expected and readily absorbed.** Thus these **attempts at finding alternatives to a dominant discourse of globalization fail to address the function of inevitability** in collusion with contingency in propelling a dominant history of globalization. I claim that these two seemingly separate discourses instead form one logic of globalization—a logic of contingent inevitability that propels a dominant discourse and vision of globalization and enables it to subsume most criticism and opposition.

### Extensions – BITs don’t expand global capital

#### \*\*\*BITs don’t expand global capital. Prefer our scholarship – we replace Neg conjecture with social science.

Chilton ‘15

Adam Chilton – Faculty and Assistant Professor of Law at the University of Chicago. Adam received a BA and MA in Political Science from Yale University. Adam then went to Harvard University and earned a JD as well as a PhD in Political Science. “The Politics of the United States' Bilateral Investment Treaty Program" (Coase-Sandor Working Paper Series in Law and Economics No. 722, 2015). http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2409&context=law\_and\_economics

This project thus makes several important contributions to the literature on international investment law. First, this project should cause commentators and scholars to change the narrative offered to explain why the United States has pursued BITs with developing states. The existing literature on U.S. BITs almost exclusively claims that these treaties were negotiated to produce more favorable conditions for American investors and promote the development of pro-investor international law. After this project, this account should be replaced with the new explanation that BITs have been negotiated as a low cost foreign policy tool. Second, this paper is the first quantitative effort to consider directly why the United States might have chosen to pursue BITs with specific countries. Previous efforts have focused on explaining the proliferation of BITs from developing countries' perspectives (Alvarez 2010; Tobin and Busch 2010; Guzman 1998), but have not flipped the question and asked why the United States—or developed countries more broadly—would take the time to negotiate and ratify investment treaties that have limited direct influences on capital flows. Third, this project develops a theory that tries to explain both why the United States and developing countries would be motivated to sign investment treaties, even if they do not promote investment, and to explain why those treaties could still result in dividends—albeit political ones—for the United States. Finally, this project provides evidence suggesting that the United States' BITs program has produced benefits that have not yet been understood or explored. This evidence should cause scholars who are skeptical of the economic benefits of BITs to reassess the program based on the political advantages that they may provide.

#### Counter-examples prove that BIT’s aren’t designed to boost capitalism.

Chilton ‘15

Adam Chilton – Faculty and Assistant Professor of Law at the University of Chicago. Adam received a BA and MA in Political Science from Yale University. Adam then went to Harvard University and earned a JD as well as a PhD in Political Science. “The Politics of the United States' Bilateral Investment Treaty Program" (Coase-Sandor Working Paper Series in Law and Economics No. 722, 2015). http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2409&context=law\_and\_economics

Although this conventional explanation for the growth of the United States BITs program has been widely repeated, there is a great deal of qualitative evidence to suggest that the program was not motivated by a desire to promote the development of international investment law or protect American capital invested abroad. First, there is evidence that the government officials who negotiated BITs did not expect a large increase in Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) as a consequence of the agreements (Vandevelde 1998b, 524). In the words of one commentator, "as veteran U.S. BIT negotiators have repeatedly pointed out, U.S. negotiators have routinely alerted prospective BIT Partners not to expect that BITs would necessarily increase such flows from U.S. investors . . ." (Alvarez 2010, 621 n.69). Of course, it is possible that the negotiators still hoped that BITs would increase investment flows, or that BITs would protect existing and future investments—even if the investments were not flowing at a higher rate. The importance of this admission, however, is that if U.S. negotiators were skeptical that specific investment treaties would lead to new FDI from U.S. based investors, it is plausible that the officials pursuing the BITs were motivated by reasons other than simply increasing protections for American citizens and corporations. Second, if the United States were hoping simply to promote international law that is favorable to investment and provide protections to American investors, the United States should theoretically be willing to negotiate, sign, and ratify BITs with any state that was willing to agree to the U.S. model BIT. This at least would be a reasonable conclusion given the twin beliefs held by American negotiators that BITs will not impact existing investment flows (Alvarez 2010, 621) and that they require the United States to only make redundant concessions (Gann 1985, 374). As the United States' failure to ratify the BITs it negotiated with Panama and Haiti illustrate, however, this is far from the case. Both Panama and Haiti were among the first countries to sign BITs with the United States, but before the Senate approved the BITs, the governments in both countries were overthrown by regimes that the United States did not support (Vandevelde 1993, 169-70). As a consequence, the United States did not ratify the agreements with these countries because doing so was deemed inconsistent with the foreign policy objectives of the United States. In other words, the United States cared less about the potential to develop favorable international law while protecting American investments in Panama and Haiti—places experiencing serious unrest where such investor protections might be thought to be uniquely important—than it did about the politics of having the treaty in place with a government that it did not support. Third, it appears that there is little pressure from American interest groups on the United States to ratify the BITs that it has signed.5 Perhaps the best evidence of this fact is it has taken an average of 1,259 days for BITs that the United States has signed to be ratified and go into effect, but all of the BITs that the United States Senate has ratified have been approved by unanimous voice votes. Moreover, not only have business interests not opposed the BIT program, but organized labor has also not opposed the program (in part because there was no evidence that BITs would promote outward investment) (Vandevelde 2009, 26). This suggests that the long delays that have occurred before BITs are ratified are not a result of political opposition, but instead occur because the ratification of BITs is not a priority. This information also makes it plausible to infer that investors do not aggressively apply pressure to the Senate to approve BITs so that they can enjoy the increased protections that purportedly motivate the creation of the agreement in the first place.

#### Zero link to cap K – but we still solve our relations advantage.

Chilton ‘15

Adam Chilton – Faculty and Assistant Professor of Law at the University of Chicago. Adam received a BA and MA in Political Science from Yale University. Adam then went to Harvard University and earned a JD as well as a PhD in Political Science. “The Politics of the United States' Bilateral Investment Treaty Program" (Coase-Sandor Working Paper Series in Law and Economics No. 722, 2015). http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2409&context=law\_and\_economics

Scholars studying the United States' BITs program have consistently argued that it was motivated by a desire to help promote the development of international law that is friendly to investment, and to help protect American investments abroad. This paper challenges that view of the U.S. BITs program. Instead, I argue that BITs have been a foreign policy tool that the United States has used when it wanted a low cost way to signal that it would like to improve its relationship with a specific developing country. As a result, political considerations should help to explain the countries with which the United States signed BITs; and if the BIT program has been effective, BITs should have produced political benefits. This paper rigorously tested that theory by both showing that political considerations are better than investment considerations at predicting BIT formation, and that BITs are associated with at least modest political benefits.

#### Dismiss the Cap K’s sweeping and flawed assessments of BITs

Chilton ‘15

Adam Chilton – Faculty and Assistant Professor of Law at the University of Chicago. Adam received a BA and MA in Political Science from Yale University. Adam then went to Harvard University and earned a JD as well as a PhD in Political Science. “The Politics of the United States' Bilateral Investment Treaty Program" (Coase-Sandor Working Paper Series in Law and Economics No. 722, 2015). http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2409&context=law\_and\_economics

With that said, these findings still show that commentators should alter the way they describe, discuss, and evaluate the United States' BITs program. Not only do the results of this paper suggest that the narrative that the United States signed BITs to protect and promote investment be modified, but they also suggest that looking solely at the effect of BITs on FDI flows and investor protections may be the wrong way to measure their effectiveness. Instead, this paper demonstrates that it is time to acknowledge the political motivations of the program, and to start evaluating the program at least partially on political dividends that may it have produced.

## Security K – answers

### 2AC vs. Security K

#### ( ) Perm – do both.

#### ( ) Security impact wrong – too sweeping and proves alt fails.

Ling ‘97

(et al – LL.H.M. Ling is Associate Professor on the Graduate Program in International Affairs at The New School. She graduated from Wellesley College, and from Massachusetts Institute of Technology with a Ph.D.; along with Anna M. Agathangelou and , Director of the Global Change Institute in Nicosia and Former Assistant Professor of Women’s Studies and Politics at Oberlin; Studies in Political Economy, v54, Fall, p. 7-8)

Given these concerns with political transformation, post-colonialism exposes several internal ironies in dissident IR. Sankaran Krishna summarizes them accordingly:46 \*A Fixation on the West **Dissident** IR claims to recognize all identities in the study and practice of international life but **perpetuates a "remarkably self-contained and self-referential view of the West that** is] oblivious to the intimate dialogue between 'Western' and 'non-Western' economies, societies, and philosophies that underwrite the disenchantment with modernity that characterizes the present epoch." 'Absence of Materiality **Despite** its emancipatory **intentions, dissident IR tends to gloss over** "a vital and phvsicalistic sense" of life's injustices (as in **war) when** "so **preoccupied with practices of representation** and signification." 'Binding Dualisms **While denouncing** the **dualisms** that shackle sovereign **international relations** (e.g., **order vs. chaos**, domestic vs. international, objectivity vs. subjectivity), **dissident IR** itself r**eproduces** dichotomies such as **a totalizing critique vs. a capitulationist narrative, dissidence vs. sovereignty, good vs. bad**. 'Disabling Politics in **its deep suspicion of a stable subjectivity** and unitary agency, **dissident IR undermines an enabling politics for an emancipatory future**. Left unresolved, **these internal ironies may lead to a "new recipe of discipline and dominance."**47 Dissident IR's fixation with the West offers little analytical room for an interactive, articulating, and self-generating Other in international relations. It relegates to the Other**,** instead, an identity assigned by sovereign IR: i.e., as a mute, passive reflection of the West or as an Utopian projection based solely on its Othernessfrom the West With this construction of Self-Other relations, **dissident IR tends to romanticize the dangers of its** self-isolation into a **totalizing critique — especially for those who** must **bear the brunt of its repercussions**. Indeed, dissident IR's distaste for a singular, "sovereign" subjectivity further accentuates its elitism. After all, who can afford to not negotiate with sovereignty while refusing a coherent identity? As bell hooks writes. "Should we not be suspicious of postmodern critiques of the 'subject' when they surface at a historical momentwhen many subjugated people feel themselves coming to voice for the first time**?"**48 In short, these internal ironies of **dissident IR** continue to marginalize, silence, and exile precisely those it seeks to embrace. Worse yet,adds Roger Spegele, dissidence as offshore observation **"frees us from** the recognition that we have a moral **obligation to do anything** about it**."**49

#### ( ) Prefer policy framework. Checks regress – endless items become nexus questions. Other options unfairly whisk away the 1AC and fail to teach practical approaches to change.

#### ( ) Epistemology should not be the top priority for the ballot – that violent moves us from teaching effective action.

Jarvis 2K

(D.S.L., Lecturer n Government - U of Sydney, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND THE CHALLENGE OF POSTMODERNISM, p. 128-9)

Certainly it is rightand properthat weponder the depths of our theoretical imaginations**,** engage in epistemological and ontological debate, and analyze the sociology of our knowledge. But to suppose that this is the only task of international theory, let alone the most important one, smacks of intellectual elitism and displays a certain contempt for those who search for guidance in their daily struggles as actors in international politics. What does Ashley's project his deconstructive efforts, or valiant tight against positivism say to the truly marginalized, oppressed and destitute? How does it help solve the plight of the poor, the displaced refugees, the casualties of war, or the emigres of death squads? Does it in any way speak to those whose actions and thoughts comprise the policy and practice of international relations? On all these questions one must answer no. This is not to say, of course, that all theory should be judged by its technical rarionality and problem-solving capacity as Ashley forcefully argues. But to suppose that problem-solving technical theory is not necessary—or is in some, way bad—is a contemptuous position that abrogates any hope of solving some of the nightmarish realities that millions confront daily. Holsti argues, we need ask of these theorists and these theories tne ultimate question, “So what?” to what purpose do they deconstruct problematize, destabilize, undermine, ridicule, and belittle modernist and rationalist approaches? Does this get us any further, make the world any better, or enhance the human condition? In what sense can this "debate toward [a] bottomless pit of epistemology and metaphysics" be judgedpertinent relevant helpful, or cogent to anyone other than those foolish enough to be scholastically excited by abstract and recondite debate.

#### ( ) No link and turn – we haven’t said China is an intrinsic threat. We’ve said action-reaction cycles exists and that the US SHOULD MINIMIZE VIOLENT FORMS OF NATIONAL SECURITY REVIEW. We’re the opposite of the link.

#### Talking about threats isn’t tied to creating Chinese containment. Refusing to consider threats is a much worse alternative.

Friedberg ‘1

(Aaron L. Friedberg, Princeton University Woodrow Wilson School Professor of Politics and International Affairs, “News Post”, Commentary, Vol. 111, No. 2, February 2001, <https://lists.lsit.ucsb.edu/archives/gordon-newspost/2001-May/001274.html>, 10/17/12, atl)

Is it possible, finally, that merely by talking and perhaps even by thinking about a full-blown SinoAmerican rivalry we may increase the probability of its actually coming to pass? This is the clear implication of Michael Swaine ’s letter. Mr. Swaine worries that “ordinary observers,” unable to distinguish between descriptions of present reality and “hair-raising scenarios” of the future, will conclude that “an intense geostrategic rivalry is virtually inevitable, and . . . respond accordingly.” While I am flattered by the thought that my article could somehow change the course of history, I very much doubt that it, or a hundred more like it, will have any such effect. On the other hand, I am disturbed by the suggestion that we ought to avoid discussing unpleasant possibilities for fear that someone (presumably our political representatives and “ordinary” fellow citizens) might get the wrong idea. Acknowledging real dangers is a necessary first step to avoiding them, as well as to preparing to cope with them if they should nevertheless come to pass. Refusing or neglecting to do so, it seems to me, is a far more likely formula for disaster.

#### ( ) perm – Do the Aff and deploy our reps solely to justification for engaging China. Security reps might lead to containment – but they aren’t intrinsically tied to such responses. We don’t sever anything – we never defended containment.

#### ( ) Representational Alt bad in the context of US-Sino affairs. It won’t trickle up and it boosts violence.

Strub ‘15

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Finally. Mitchell argues that "Embracing China's 'new model' language may, itself, thus enable otherwise unlikely pragmatic achievements," and "...that reluctance to us the phrase is largely unjustified".19 This kind of reasoning is not, in fact, a pragmatic way to approach such a crucial issue. Considering that both the United States and China have expressed the idea that confrontation between a rising power and an established power is inevitable, simply relying on optimistic rhetoric could ultimately prove quite dangerous.20 The U.S.-China relationship has not yet reached a point of trust and cooperation wherein rhetoric alone can serve as a driving force for grand strategy concerns. Terms such as "may" and "largely unjustified" fail to appreciate the importance of the relationship or the seriousness of the situation and thus fall well short of providing acceptable motivation for policy formulation. Mitchell's recommendation, while contributing significantly to the intellectual discourse on China's rise and its effect on the U.S.-China relationship, falls short when it comes to the practicality of real world implementation. Several other more pragmatic and viable approaches exist, including gradual operationalization and elevation of relations to make tangible progress toward a specified target. Agreeing to a "new model" in hopes that it eventually facilitates change merely exchanges immediate progress for the hope of future improvements. If both China and the United States are serious about this issue, an agreement should be reached on what terms will satisfactorily define a "new model," followed by the concurrent signing of commitments to these arrangements and elevation of the status of the relationship. If, on the other hand, one or neither of the actors is in fact genuinely committed to this concept, then no amount of optimistic linguistic manipulation will solve the issues confronting them. A new arrangement of "major power relations" cannot come into existence overnight merely by declaring it so. Rather, this relationship must continue to grow gradually and define itself through empirical realities as opposed to rhetorically labeling it as something new in the hopes that the act of doing so will eradicate the associated complications and produce a mutually acceptable outcome.

(When the author of this evidence references “Mitchell”, the author is responding to the following article: Ryan Mitchell. "Redefining Pragmatic Engagement: The 'New Model\* of U.S.-China Relations and the Opportunity of Shared Consequences,'\* International Affairs Review 23. no. 3 - Summer 2015: 114. <http://www.iar-gwu.org>)

### Extensions – Alt Fails, Neg Framework - worse

#### Security K’s *dated* and *bankrupt*. *Alt fails* and *associated frameworks hamper understanding the world*.

Hynek ‘13

et al; Dr. Nik Hynek is Associate Professor of International Relations and Theory of Politics at the Metropolitan University Prague and Charles University. He holds PhD degree in International Politics and Security Studies from the Department of Peace Studies at the University of Bradford - “No emancipatory alternative, no critical security studies”- Critical Studies on Security - Volume 1, Issue 1, 2013. Modifed for potentially objectionable language. Obtained via Taylor & Francis Fresh Journals Collection

These ‘post-emancipatory’ scholars still frame Western and international intervention in potentially emancipatory terms, but the horizons and aspirations have been substantially lowered from the universalist call to radical academic policy advocacy, of the founders of emancipatory approaches within security studies. While the initial confident calls for emancipatory alternatives at least had an understanding of the need for emancipatory agency, unfortunately found only in Western powers and international institutions, the later approaches lack this clarity and confidence, merely suggesting that more ‘open’, ‘unscripted’, ‘locally sensitive’, ‘desecuritised’ and less ‘universalist’ and ‘liberal’ approaches can avoid the ‘resistances’ held to come from the local level. If these approaches are ‘emancipatory’ they lack any clear project or programme as to what these claims might mean or how they might be carried out in reality and are little different to mainstream think tank proposals calling for more ‘local ownership’, ‘local capacity-building’, ‘empowerment’, ‘sustainability’ and ‘resilience’ (see Chandler 2012, Forthcoming). This article has argued that the appendage ‘critical’ should be removed to allow Security Studies to free itself of the baggage of its founding. It is clear that what little emancipatory content critical security theorising had initially has been more than exhausted and, in fact, thoroughly critiqued. The boom in CSS in the 1990s and early 2000s was essentially parasitical on the shift in Western policy discourses, which emphasised the radical and emancipatory possibilities of power, rather than on the basis of giving theoretical clarity to counter-hegemonic forces. We would argue that the removal of the prefix ‘critical’ would also be useful to distinguish security study based on critique of the world as it exists from normative theorising based on the world as we would like it to be. As long as we keep the ‘critical’ nomenclature, we are affirming that government and international policy-making can be understood and critiqued against the goal of emancipating the non-Western Other. Judging policy-making and policy outcomes, on the basis of this imputed goal, may provide ‘critical’ theorists with endless possibilities to demonstrate their normative standpoints but it does little to develop academic and political understandings of the world we live in. In fact, no greater straw man (strawperson) could have been imagined, than the ability to become ‘critical’ on the basis of debates around the claim that the West was now capable of undertaking emancipatory policy missions. Today, as we witness a narrowing of transformative aspirations on behalf of Western policy elites, in a reaction against the ‘hubris’ of the claims of the 1990s (Mayall and Soares de Oliveira 2012) and a slimmed down approach to sustainable, ‘hybrid’ peacebuilding, CSS has again renewed its relationship with the policy sphere. Some academics and policy-makers now have a united front that rather than placing emancipation at the heart of policy-making it should be ‘local knowledge’ and ‘local demands’.

(Note to students: “CSS” is an acronym standing for “Critical Security Studies”)

### Extensions – Representations Framework bad in the context of the US-Sino Affairs.

#### In US-Sino affairs, Reps and language shouldn’t be prior questions. Alt fails and perm solves best.

Strub ‘15

Doug Strub is a second year M.A. candidate in the International Affairs program at George Washington University's Elliott School of International Relations. His research interests are East Asia, emerging markets, and U.S.-China relations. He recently returned from spending seven months in China studying Mandarin and working at the China Economic Review – “In Response: Seeking Truth from Facts: U.S.-China Relations Require More Than Rhetoric” - International Affairs Review - Volume XXIII, Number 3 • Summer 2015 – available at: http://iar-gwu.org/sites/default/files/articlepdfs/China%20Special%20Issue%20DOC%20C%20-%2012%20Seeking%20Truth%20from%20Facts%20-%20Strub.pdf

In "Redefining Pragmatic Engagement." Ryan Mitchell suggests that the United States and China should set aside their differences and embrace the cooperative, "win-win" language associated with China's proposed "new model of major country relations." Using a theoretical approach of social constructivism, the author suggests that "embracing China's 'new model' language may, itself, thus enable otherwise unlikely pragmatic achievements."1 While Mitchell presents considerable insight into the U.S.-China relationship and a wonderfully optimistic policy recommendation, basing the future of this relationship on an arrangement that relies too heavily on rhetoric and too little on substance raises several concerns. Three major complications arise from pursuing this constructive power of language as grounds for policy while discarding more concrete and tangible aspects of progress. First, China has not yet demonstrated its ability or willingness to act in accordance with its own rhetoric on a wide variety of issues. Second, the United States stands to gain little from committing to an undefined new type of relationship, while China would benefit greatly by announcing itself the equal of the United States. Mitchell's recommendation would allow China to take advantage of the new model's vagueness to redefine the relationship in terms favorable to itself Finally, the author's own hypothesis rests mainly on the optimism that this approach may produce favorable results. Rather than basing the future of Sino-American relations on hope, a more specific and concrete policy option should be implemented that will either satisfy both actors or make tangible progress toward such ends. In this regard, the United States has pushed for the two parties to "operationalize" the concept, though this has encountered pushback from China and results in the "Catch-22" discussed by Mitchell.2 A more palatable option would see both actors simultaneously make any necessary concessions. This approach can be carried out incrementally using a series of minimal but concrete and well-defined agreements implemented over time, complemented by gradual elevation of the rhetoric used to define the relationship to match these new realities. It is highly unlikely that the United States will agree to elevate the status of relations purely out of goodwill. If China desires to declare itself a global power equal to the United States, it must begin acting like one, not merely pledging to do so.

**2AC – A-to Pan/China Securitization**

**Pan is reductionist and the alt fails**

**Jones 14**

David Martin Jones, Professor of Politics at University of Glasgow, PhD from LSE, Australian Journal of Political Science, February 21, 2014, 49:1, "Managing the China Dream: Communist Party politics after the Tiananmen incident ", Taylor and Francis Online

Notwithstanding this Western fascination with China and the positive response of former Marxists, such as Jacques, to the new China, Pan discerns an Orientalist ideology distorting Western commentary on the party state, and especially its international relations (6). Following Edward Said, Pan claims that such Western Orientalism reveals ‘not something concrete about the orient, but something about the orientalists themselves, their recurring latent desire of fears and fantasies about the orient’ (16). In order to unmask the limits of Western representations of China’s rise, Pan employs a critical ‘methodology’ that ‘draws on constructivist and deconstructivist approaches’ (9). Whereas the ‘former questions the underlying dichotomy of reality/knowledge in Western study of China’s international relations’, the latter shows how paradigmatic representations of China ‘condition the way we give meaning to that country’ and ‘are socially constitutive of it’ (9). Pan maintains that the two paradigms of ‘China threat’ and ‘China opportunity’ in Western discourse shape China’s reality for Western ‘China watchers’ (3). These discourses, Pan claims, are ‘ambivalent’ (65). He contends that this ‘bifocal representation of China, like Western discourses of China more generally, tell us a great deal about the west itself, its self -imagination, its torn, anxious, subjectivity, as well as its discursive effects of othering’ (65). **This is a large claim.**

Interestingly, **Pan fails to note** that after the Tiananmen incident in 1989, **Chinese new left scholarship** also **embraced Said’s critique** of Orientalism in order **to reinforce** both **the party state and** a **burgeoning** sense of **Chinese nationalism**. To counter Western liberal discourse, academics associated with the Central Party School promoted an ideology of Occidentalism to deflect domestic and international pressure to democratise China. In this, they drew not only upon Said, but also upon Foucault and the post-1968 school of French radical thought that, as Richard Wolin has demonstrated, was itself initiated in an appreciation of Mao’s cultural revolution. In other words, the critical and deconstructive methodologies that came to influence American and European social science from the 1980s had a Maoist inspiration (Wolin 2010: 12–18).

Subsequently, in the changed circumstances of the 1990s, as American sinologist Fewsmith has shown, young Chinese scholars ‘adopted a variety of postmodernist and critical methodologies’ (2008: 125). Paradoxically, these scholars, such as Wang Hui and Zhang Kuan (Wang 2011), had been educated in the USA and were familiar with fashionable academic criticism of a postmodern and deconstructionist hue that ‘demythified’ the West (Fewsmith 2008: 125–29). This approach, promulgated in the academic journal Dushu (Readings), deconstructed, via Said and Foucault, Western narratives about China. Zhang Kuan, in particular, rejected Enlightenment values and saw postmodern critical theory as a method to build up a national ‘discourse of resistance’ and counter Western demands regarding issues such as human rights and intellectual property.

**It is through its affinity with this self-strengthening**, Occidentalist **lens, that Pan’s critical study should perhaps be critically read.** Simply put, Pan identifies a political economy of fear and desire that informs and complicates Western foreign policy and, **Pan asserts**, tells us more about the West’s ‘self-imagination’ than it does about Chinese reality. Pan attempts to sustain this claim via an analysis, in Chapter 5, of the self-fulfilling prophecy of the China threat, followed, in Chapters 6 and 7, by exposure of the false promises and premises of the China ‘opportunity’. Pan certainly offers a provocative insight into Western attitudes to China and their impact on Chinese political thinking. In particular, he demonstrates that China’s foreign policy-makers react negatively to what they view as a hostile American strategy of containment (101). In this context, Pan contends, accurately, that Sino–US relations are mutually constitutive and the USA must take some responsibility for the rise of China threat (107). **This latter point, however, is one** that Australian **realists** like Owen Harries, whom Pan cites approvingly, **have made consistently since the late** 19**90s.** In other words, **not all Western analysis uncritically endorses the view that China’s rise is threatening. Nor is all Western perception of this rise reducible to the threat scenario advanced by recent US administrations.**

Pan’s subsequent argument that the China opportunity thesis leads to inevitable disappointment and subtly reinforces the China threat paradigm **is**, also, somewhat **misleading**. On the one hand, Pan notes that Western anticipation of ‘China’s transformation and democratization’ has ‘become a burgeoning cottage industry’ (111). Yet, on the other hand, Pan observes that Western commentators, such as Jacques, demonstrate a growing awareness that the democratisation thesis is a fantasy. That is, Pan, like Jacques, argues that China ‘will neither democratize nor collapse, but may instead remain politically authoritarian and economically stable at the same time’ (132). To merge, as Pan does, the democratisation thesis into its authoritarian antithesis in order to evoke ‘present Western disillusionment’ (132) with China **is** somewhat **reductionist**. Pan’s contention that we need a new paradigm shift ‘to free ourselves from the positivist aspiration to grand theory or transcendental scientific paradigm itself’ (157) **might be admirable, but this will not be achieved by a constructivism that would ultimately meet with the approval of** what Brady terms **China’s thought managers** (Brady: 6).

### Extensions - Epistemology/Ontology not First

#### Epistemological debate is irrelevant - concrete action is inevitable - they fail to create useful knowledge

Friedrichs, Oxford politics lecturer, 2009

(Jorg, “From positivist pretense to pragmatic practice: Varieties of pragmatic methodology in IR scholarship. International Studies Review 11(3): 645–648)

As Friedrich Nietzsche ([1887] 1994:1; cf. Wilson 2002) knew, the knower isstrangely unknown to himself. In fact, it is much morehazardous to contemplate theway how we gain knowledge than to gain such knowledge in the ﬁrst place. This is not to deny that intellectuals are a narcissistic Kratochwil lot, with a penchant for omphaloskepsis. The typical result of their navel-gazing, however, is not increased self-awareness. Scholars are more likely to come up with ex-post-facto rationalizations of how they would like to see their activity than with accurate descriptions of how they go about business. As a result, in science there is a paradoxical divide between positivist pretenseand pragmatic practice. Many prominent scholars proceed pragmatically in gen-erating their knowledge, only to vest it all in a positivist cloak when it comes topresenting results. In the wake of Karl Popper (1963), fantasies about ingeniousconjectures and inexorable refutations continue to hold sway despite the muchmore prosaic way most scholars grope around in the formulation of their theo-ries, and the much less rigorous way they assess the value of their hypotheses. In proposing pragmatism as a more realistic alternative to positivist idealiza-tions, I am not concerned with the original intentions of Charles Peirce. Theseare discussed and enhanced by Ryto¨ vuori-Apunen (this forum). Instead, Ipresent various attempts to make pragmatism work as a methodology for IR scholarship. This includes my own preferred methodology, the pragmaticresearch strategy of abduction. As Fritz Kratochwil and I argue elsewhere, abduction should be at the center of our efforts, while deduction and induction areimportant but auxiliary tools (Friedrichs and 2009).Of course, one does not need to be a pragmatist to proceed in a pragmatic way. Precisely because it is derived from practice, pragmatic commonsense is a sold as the hills. For example, James Rosenau (1988:164) declared many yearsago that he coveted ‘‘a long-held conviction that one advances knowledge most effectively by continuously moving back and forth between very abstract and very empirical levels of inquiry, allowing the insights of the former to exert pressurefor the latter even as the ﬁndings of the latter, in turn, exert pressure for the for-mer, thus sustaining an endless cycle in which theory and research feed on eachother.’’ This was shortly before Rosenau’s turn to postmodernism, while he wasstill touting the virtues of behaviorism and standard scientiﬁc requisites, such asindependent and dependent variables and theory testing. But if we take his state-ment at face value, it appears that Rosenau-the-positivist was guided by a sort of pragmatism for all but the name. While such practical commonsense is certainly valuable, in and by itself, it does not qualify as scientiﬁc methodology. Science requires a higher degree of methodological awareness. For this reason, I am not interested here in pragma-tism as unspoken commonsense, or as a pretext for doing empirical researchunencumbered by theoretical and methodological considerations. Nor am I con-cerned with **pragmatism as an excuse for staging yet another epistemological debate**. Instead, I am interested in pragmatism as an instrument to go about research with an appropriate degree of epistemological and methodologicalawareness. Taking this criterion as my yardstick, the following three varieties of pragmatist methodology in recent IR scholarship are worth mentioning: theory synthesis, analytic eclecticism (AE), and abduction.Theory synthesis is proposed by Andrew Moravcsik (2003), who claims that theories can be combined as long as they are compatible at some unspeciﬁedfundamental level, and that data will help to identify the right combination of theories. He does not explicitly invoke pragmatism but vests his pleading in apositivist cloak by using the language of theory testing. When looking closer,however, it becomes apparent that his theoretical and methodological noncha-lance is far more pragmatic than what his positivist rhetoric suggests. Moravcsiksees himself in good company, dropping the following names: Robert Keohane,Stephen Walt, Jack Snyder, Stephen Van Evera, Bary Buzan, Bruce Russett, John O’Neal, Martha Finnemore, and Kathryn Sikkink. With the partial excep-tion of Finnemore, however, none of these scholars explicitly links his or herscholarship to pragmatism. They employ pragmatic commonsense in theirresearch, but devoutly ignore pragmatism as a philosophical and methodologicalposition. As a result, it is fair to say that theory synthesis is only on a slightly higher level of intellectual awareness than Rosenau’s statement quoted above. Analytic eclecticism, as advertized by Peter Katzenstein and Rudra Sil, links acommonsensical approach to empirical research with a more explicit commit-ment to pragmatism (Sil and Katzenstein 2005; Katzenstein and Sil 2008).The 7 Even the dean of critical rationalism, Karl Popper, is ‘‘guilty’’ of lapses into pragmatism, for example when hestates that scientists, like hungry animals, classify objects according to needs and interests, although with the impor-tant difference that they are guided in their quest for ﬁnding regularities not so much by the stomach but ratherby empirical problems and epistemic interests (Popper 1963:61–62). 646 Pragmatism and International Relations idea is to combine existing research traditions in a pragmatic fashion and thusto enable the formulation and exploration of novel and more complex sets of problems. The constituent elements of different research traditions are trans-lated into mutually compatible vocabularies and then recombined in novel ways.This implies that most scholars must continue the laborious process of formulat-ing parochial research traditions so that a few cosmopolitan colleagues will beenabled to draw upon their work and construct syncretistic collages. 8 In additionto themselves, Katzenstein and Sil cite a number of like-minded scholars such asCharles Tilly, Sidney Tarrow, Paul Pierson, and Robert Jervis. 9 The ascription isprobably correct given the highly analytical and eclectic approach of these schol-ars. Nevertheless, apart from Katzenstein and Sil themselves none of these schol-ars has explicitly avowed himself to AE.My preferred research strategy is abduction, which is epistemologically asself-aware as AE but minimizes the dependence on existing research traditions.The typical situation for abduction is when we, both in everyday life and as socialscientists, become aware of a certain class of phenomena that interests us for somereason, but for which we lack applicable theories. We simply trust, although we donot know for certain, that the observed class of phenomena is not random. Wetherefore start collecting pertinent observations and, at the same time, applyingconcepts from existing ﬁelds of our knowledge. Instead of trying to impose anabstract theoretical template (deduction) or ‘‘simply’’ inferring propositions fromfacts (induction), we start reasoning at an intermediate level (abduction). Abduction follows the predicament that science is, or should be, above all amore conscious and systematic version of the way by which humans have learnedto solve problems and generate knowledge in their everyday lives. As it iscurrently practiced, science is often a poor emulator of what we are able toachieve in practice. This is unfortunate because human practice is the ultimatemiracle. In our own practice, most of us manage to deal with many challenging situations. The way we accomplish this is completely different from**,** and far moreefﬁcient than, **the way knowledge is generated** according to standard scientiﬁc methods. If it is true that in our own practice we proceed not so much by induction or deduction but rather by abduction, then science would do well tomimic this at least in some respects. 10 Abduction has been invoked by numerous scholars, including Alexander Wendt, John Ruggie, Jeffrey Checkel, Martin Shapiro, Alec Stone Sweet, andMartha Finnemore. While they all use the term abduction, none has ever thor-oughly speciﬁed its meaning. To make up for this omission, I have developedabduction into an explicit methodology and applied it in my own research oninternational police cooperation (Friedrichs 2008). Unfortunately, it is impossi-ble to go into further detail here. Readers interested in abduction as a way toadvance international research and methodology can also be referred to my recent article with Fritz Kratochwil (Friedrichs and Kratochwil 2009).On a ﬁnal note, we should be careful not to erect pragmatism as the ultimateepistemological fantasy to caress the vanity of Nietzschean knowers unknown tothemselves, namely that they are ingeniously ‘‘sorting out’’ problematic situa-tions. Scientiﬁc inquiry is not simply an intimate encounter between a researchproblem and a problem solver. It is a social activity taking place in communitiesof practice (Wenger 1998). Pragmatism must be neither reduced to the utility of results regardless of their social presuppositions and meaning, nor to the 8 Pace Rudra Sil (this forum), the whole point about eclecticism is that you rely on existing traditions to blendthem into something new. There is no eclecticism without something to be eclectic about. 9 One may further expand the list by including the international society approach of the English school (Ma-kinda 2000), as well as the early Kenneth Waltz (1959). 10 Precisely for this reason, abduction understood as ‘Inference to the Best Explanation’ plays a crucial role inthe ﬁeld of Artiﬁcial Intelligence. 647 The Forum fabrication of consensus among scientists. **Pragmatism as the practice of dis-cursive communities and pragmatism as a device for the generation of useful knowledge are two sides of the same coin**

### Extensions – Aff’s China Security Discussion = Good and accurate

**Our knowledge of China is accurate—their authors have flawed information**

**Chan, UCB Professor and Chair of the Department of Political Science, 04**

(Steve, “Extended Deterrence in the Taiwan Strait: Learning from Rationalist Explanations in International Relations”, Asian Affairs, Vol 31, No. 3 (Fall, 2004), 10/17/12, atl)

Rationalist interpretations do not imply that people are omnipotent in their ability to procure and process information. We know all too well that people are subject to a variety of cognitive and perceptual errors (for example, Jervis 1976; Levy 1997; Kahneman and Tversky 2000; Tversky and Kahneman 1977). This recognition of limits to rationality, however, hardly warrants general attributions of naiveté , even stupidity, to government leaders. On the contrary, it seems sensible to start from the premise that officials know their counterparts far better than scholars may wish to acknowledge. Washington, Beijing, and Taipei, for instance, invest enormous time, effort, and resources in trying to gain an accurate understanding of each other. Academics have a hard time claiming any special insight or unique source of wisdom, whether it is based on mastery of the other side's language, intimate familiarity with its culture, or access to timely and sensitive information with restricted distribution. If anything, they are usually at a considerable disadvantage on these scores when compared to diplomats, intelligence analysts, and even journalists and business people. Indeed, academics in fields such as history and political science typically operate in the realm of common knowledge, outdated information, and mundane data. This confession in turn implies that at least for some of us, our individual and collective forte lies with the analysis of persistent empirical patterns and the formulation of general models of foreign policy conduct.

**No self-fulfilling prophecy with China- the reverse is true**

**Rachman ’96** (Gideon Rachman, Asia editor of the Economist, ’96 (Washington Quarterly, “Containing China”, ln)

Let us start with the self-fulfilling prophecy. This argument, often advanced by Sinologists, stresses Chinese paranoia. For historical reasons, the Chinese leadership is said to be deeply suspicious of the outside world. It assumes that outsiders will inevitably try to frustrate growing Chinese prosperity and power, however that power is used. Objecting to Chinese threats, protesting about human rights abuses, meeting the Taiwanese, attempting to leave Hong Kong with workable, democratic institutions, using words like containment: any and all of this will simply be interpreted by China as a plot to undermine Chinese stability. It may well be that the Chinese think like this. So what? The point is to respond to Chinese actions, not to try to fathom Chinese thought processes. If policymakers insist on playing the psychologist, perhaps they should model themselves on B. F. Skinner, rather than Freud. In other words rather than trying to divine the sources of Chinese behavior by analyzing old traumas, they should concentrate on behavior modification. A basic tenet of behavior therapy is not to reward behavior that you wish to discourage: giving in to threats is not generally regarded as sound practice. Ah, reply some Sinologists, but the Chinese are different. China, in the words of Henry Kissinger, "tends to react with neuralgia to any perceived slight to its dignity." n7 Well, perhaps. But **it is a myth that the Chinese never back down when put under pressure**. **There are recent examples that suggest the opposite.** In February 1995, the Chinese gave considerable ground over intellectual property rights when threatened with sanctions by the United States. The Chinese released Harry Wu, the Chinese-American human rights activist, when it became clear that imprisoning him would gravely damage U.S.-Chinese relations. After its display of public fury over the Lee Teng-hui visit, China quietly returned its ambassador to Washington and moved to patch up relations with the United States, despite failing to extract a public promise that Lee would never again be granted a U.S. visa. China also seems likely to give substantial ground in negotiations over accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO). **Believers in the self-fulfilling prophecy have got the argument the wrong way around**. It is certainly true that American, and indeed Asian, policies toward China could be a lot better thought out. But the West is not the source of friction: the real sources of the current tensions are Chinese actions, particularly Chinese threats to use force to assert claims over Taiwan and the South China Sea. The Chinese insist that they have never been an expansionist power. But China has very expansive ideas of where its legitimate borders lie. Because weak Chinese governments have always been especially prickly on issues of sovereignty, instability after the death of Deng Xiaoping may only heighten Chinese assertiveness.

**A-to: Endless War Impact**

**No risk of endless warfare**

**Gray 7**—Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies and Professor of International Relations and Strategic Studies at the University of Reading, graduate of the Universities of Manchester and Oxford, Founder and Senior Associate to the National Institute for Public Policy, formerly with the International Institute for Strategic Studies and the Hudson Institute (Colin, July, “The Implications of Preemptive and Preventive War Doctrines: A Reconsideration”, <http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/ssi10561/ssi10561.pdf>)

7. A policy that favors preventive warfare expresses a futile quest for absolute security. It could do so. Most controversial policies contain within them the possibility of misuse. In the hands of a paranoid or boundlessly ambitious political leader, prevention could be a policy for endless warfare. However, the American political system, with its checks and balances, was designed explicitly for the purpose of constraining the executive from excessive folly. Both the Vietnam and the contemporary Iraqi experiences reveal clearly that although the conduct of war is an executive prerogative, in practice that authority is disciplined by public attitudes. Clausewitz made this point superbly with his designation of the passion, the sentiments, of the people as a vital component of his trinitarian theory of war. 51 It is true to claim that power can be, and indeed is often, abused, both personally and nationally. It is possible that a state could acquire a taste for the apparent swift decisiveness of preventive warfare and overuse the option. One might argue that the easy success achieved against Taliban Afghanistan in 2001, provided fuel for the urge to seek a similarly rapid success against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. In other words, the delights of military success can be habit forming. On balance, claim seven is not persuasive, though it certainly contains a germ of truth. A country with unmatched wealth and power, unused to physical insecurity at home—notwithstanding 42 years of nuclear danger, and a high level of gun crime—is vulnerable to demands for policies that supposedly can restore security. But we ought not to endorse the argument that the United States should eschew the preventive war option because it could lead to a futile, endless search for absolute security. One might as well argue that the United States should adopt a defense policy and develop capabilities shaped strictly for homeland security approached in a narrowly geographical sense. Since a president might misuse a military instrument that had a global reach, why not deny the White House even the possibility of such misuse? In other words, constrain policy ends by limiting policy’s military means. This argument has circulated for many decades and, it must be admitted, it does have a certain elementary logic. It is the opinion of this enquiry, however, that the claim that a policy which includes the preventive option might lead to a search for total security is **not at all convincing**. Of course, folly in high places is always possible, which is one of the many reasons why popular democracy is the superior form of government. It would be absurd to permit the fear of a futile and dangerous quest for absolute security to preclude prevention as a policy option. Despite its absurdity, this rhetorical charge against prevention is a stock favorite among prevention’s critics. It should be recognized and dismissed for what it is, a debating point with little pragmatic merit. And strategy, though not always policy, **must be nothing if not pragmatic**.

**A-to: Fear of Alterity Link**

**No impact – “alterity” and “otherness” are vague buzzwords that can be mystically asserted in any context – zero political value or predictive power**

**Mwajeh 5** [Z Al-Mwajeh, Indiana University of Pennsylvania The School of Graduate Studies and Research Department of English, “CRITIQUE OF POSTMODERN ETHICS OF ALTERITY VERSUS EMBODIED (MUSLIM) OTHERS”, August 2005, <https://dspace.iup.edu/bitstream/handle/2069/23/Ziad%20Al-Mwajeh.pdf?sequence=1>]

However, I also think that key postmodernism tenets of radical alterity, incommensurability and undecidability cannot be easily thematized in writing, nor can they be **realized in praxis**. They are aporiatic. The only way to explicate their meanings and possibilities is through using modernist vocabulary they initially oppose and deconstruct. Sometimes, thematizing these aporiatic concepts, one lapses into cryptic and even incantational figurative language**, a practice that exposes the practical limitation** and limited accessibility of such cherished concepts (or non-concepts). **As a result, their translation into, or coextension with, lived realities become basically hypothetical, too.** Consequently, the abstract and idealized postmodern concepts verge on, and intersect with, **mystic**, (sometimes Biblical) **allusions** and traditions, a situation that **problematizes their political value and descriptive power in the realm of action**. For example, in Levinasian thought, knowing the other is incompatible with preserving its alterity. All representational endeavors reduce, or fail to capture, what they supposedly represent not only due to imperfect linguistic mediums, but also due to the fact that representation itself is a logocentric institution. It represents the other or the object from the perspective of the Same, usually a priori reducing its uniqueness or sublimity to the known, quantifiable and predictable. To curb such modernist reductive practices, Levinas’s alterity escapes all modernist categories as it is an Other not in a relational or quantifiable way. Rather, it is an Other in the sense of eliding comprehension and representation. Such Other resembles Levinas’s (Biblical) conception of God as absolute Alterity where our epistemological categories or mind cannot contain or represent Him. More important, **the ethics of alterity usually soars above urgent concrete issues that involve politically and economically charged self-other transactions.** Levinas’s other is ‘disembodied,’ not in Dr. Laing’s sense (e.g. The Divided Self). Rather, Levinas’s **alterity cannot be substantiated.** Defining or embodying the other violates its alterity and sublimity. Hence, any grand appeal such ethics may initially spark becomes questionable when **juxtaposed to our existing realities** and the factors that regulate self/other different modes of relations. 6 Statement of the Problem, Limitations of the Study and Methods In this study, I attempt to dislodge postmodern ethics from its speculative and elitist tendencies through turning to self-other ethical relations in various literary, discursive and political situations. I focus on bridging the gaps between theory and practice in order to expose the rifts and blind spots in postmodern ethics of alterity. I think that the demands that ‘alterity’ as a generalized abstract term exert differ from those raised by placed and temporalized others. For example, there is an urgent need to know how well Levinas’s concept of ‘absolute alterity’ or Derrida’s concept of ‘undecidability’ fares in political situations. In other words, to argue for prioritizing alterity as a new ethical turn is not the same as to motivate and effect such prioritization. While I agree that Levinas’s “infinite obligation to the other” sounds uplifting, realizing/effecting such a formula is a different story. Theoretically speaking, alterity is embraceable, but in lived realities, others fall on a spectrum of difference (sometimes opposition) from self according to various criteria. Actually, there is a general tendency to posit self and others in terms of difference and opposition, when in fact these are relative and operational terms. Polarizing self and other risks ossifying them into rigid negatively defining entities at the expense of their interdependence and mutual constitution. The terms other and self do not only designate metaphysical figures or linguistic relations, they also describe ontological realities. The metaphor of the ‘embrace’ may in it turn conceal a whole repertoire of idealism, philanthropy, and logocentrism/humanism. Worse, sometimes Levinasian ethics seems so good to be true or realizable, at least if taken literally. For the demand to meet the other on a neutral ground, pre-ontologically, looks more like an aesthetic ideal/condition that cannot be achieved as we always meet the other in context with our conceptions, motivations and values. Blaming Western Metaphysics, or ontology, for the imbalanced self-other relations somehow **brackets subject’s role and agency in the self-other various equations.**7 Moreover, we may indulge alterity ethics in closed and limited contexts that favor our train of thought and take that for a sufficient action. We may embrace the other or theorize about embracing and preserving alterity as ethics per se, but we may still live according to dialectical ‘alterity-blind’ institutions and practices. In such cases, we are either, consciously or subconsciously, acknowledging and maintaining theory/practice divisions, or we know that acting ethically toward the other entails more than theorizing about what form the most ethical relation should take. **Acting ethically demands sharing power and taking risks.** More problematically, the theoretical formulas may not function in the first place as **the roots of ‘unethical’ self-other relations cannot be automatically corrected by theoretically replacing modernist self**-centered by alterity-centered ethics. Furthermore, most of the writings about postmodernism—engage strenuous debates and often deploy elitist jargon, a practice that limits their accessibility and descriptive value. Very often philosophical and theoretical elitist debates alienate larger audiences and may even thrive at the expense of addressing concrete self-other transactions. To a certain degree, these debates are **inflated and divorced** from the stakes involved in political self-other lived transactions. **Once one crosses the threshold of speculating about self-other relations into considering them in light of indispensable concrete constituencies of race, gender, nationality, power grid, and other variables, cherished postmodern key terms—such as undecidability, alterity, and non-judgmentalism—become anomalous**. **Hard lived realities demand resolutions and involve recalcitrant stakes**. To solely dwell on the linguistic/discursive as the origin of self/other imbalance is to overlook the complex and intricate relations among discourses and actions. To put it differently, there has to be some mutual trafficking between metaphysics and lived realities, but **one cannot be reduced to the other in any straight predictable manner**. Nor are their relations reducible to cause-effect ones where Western Metaphysics’ privileging the subject and reducing the other/object is the causer, while racism, sexism, and colonial exploitation are the effects. This does not deny that there exists a ‘cause-effect’ relation between thought and lived realities, however. Alterity-centered postmodernism shows how modernist epistemology has failed to establish self-other relations as basically ethical by relegating the other to the status of a hierarchically inferior object or difference. But the downside to such critique is the transformation of the modernist individual/self into postmodernist subject. The postmodernist subject may not be more than a node or a surface/cite constructed by linguistic, economic and media systems. Thus, **the ethical turn toward alterity loses its halo when one considers the diminutive role played by human agency and intentionality**. Emphasizing the negative side of constructivism—being constructed by external or upper systems—postmodernism glosses over the subjects’ other various roles in sustaining and continuing, sometimes disrupting, dominant epistemological, economic and political systems. In other words, modernist subjects are primarily products of metaphysically pre-ordained itineraries **sidestepping other senses such as being a subject by initiating and performing actions by choice.** If subject primarily means subjected to, the ethics, responsibility and obligations, all become paradoxical. Furthermore, Levinas’s dictum to pre-ontologically encounter alterity makes sense; he thinks that the ethical should, or actually does, precede the ontological. But practically, such divisions may be divisions of convenience rather than of actuality as if the political and ethical belonged to different modes of living. I think that we do not need to submit to modernist disciplinary divisions of convenience nor do we need to separate the ethical from the political or from the ontological. I believe that ethics is not a formula or a prescription we choose to apply or we choose to leave behind. Ethics is intrinsic to action. Levinas’s move, however, has to be contextualized. It is his desire to remove self other relations from under modernist epistemological reductions and pragmatic/utilitarian arrangements that he wants to go back to a pure self-other encounter—before self-other dialectics. He wants to encounter the other before reductive logic moves in. Yet **such a move ends in an impasse**. Leaping back into the pre-ontological stems from Levinas’s ontological or epistemological consciousness. The irony is that one just cannot exit the ontological and still use its structures and vocabularies. Still, Levinas’s ethical dictum exposes the working of unconscious ethnocentrism or conscious bias in our self-other relations, systems and existence, unless we always foreground alterity. Consequently, alterity ethics is both a meta-ethical argument, or for some it constitutes a ‘moral principle,’ or a basic revelation about our human conditions: We are always in relation to—indebted to—the other. We may choose to elide such a realization, but we cannot change it.

**A-to: Heg Link**

**We control uniqueness – violence is at its lowest level in history because hegemony and strong economic growth are the deeper proximate checks against war**

\*War is at its lowest level in history because of US primacy---best statistical studies prove heg solves war because it makes democratic peace resilient globalization sustainable---it’s the deeper cause of proximate checks against war

**Owen 11 –** John M. Owen Professor of Politics at University of Virginia PhD from Harvard "DON’T DISCOUNT HEGEMONY" Feb 11 www.cato-unbound.org/2011/02/11/john-owen/dont-discount-hegemony/

Andrew Mack and his colleagues at the Human Security Report Project are to be congratulated. Not only do they present a study with a striking conclusion, **driven by data, free of theoretical or ideological bias**, but they also do something quite unfashionable: **they bear good news.** Social scientists really are not supposed to do that. Our job is, if not to be Malthusians, then at least to point out disturbing trends, looming catastrophes, and the imbecility and mendacity of policy makers. And then it is to say why, if people listen to us, things will get better. We do this as if our careers depended upon it, and perhaps they do; for if all is going to be well, what need then for us? Our colleagues at Simon Fraser University are brave indeed. That may sound like a setup, but it is not. I shall challenge neither the data nor the general conclusion that violent conflict around the world has been decreasing in fits and starts since the Second World War. When it comes to violent conflict among and within countries, things have been getting better. (The trends have not been linear—Figure 1.1 actually shows that the frequency of interstate wars peaked in the 1980s—but the 65-year movement is clear.) Instead I shall accept that Mack et al. are correct on the macro-trends, and focus on their explanations they advance for these remarkable trends. With apologies to any readers of this forum who recoil from academic debates, this might get mildly theoretical and even more mildly methodological. Concerning international wars, one version of the “nuclear-peace” theory is not in fact laid to rest by the data. It is certainly true that nuclear-armed states have been involved in many wars. They have even been attacked (think of Israel), which falsifies the simple claim of “assured destruction”—that any nuclear country A will deter any kind of attack by any country B because B fears a retaliatory nuclear strike from A. But the most important “nuclear-peace” claim has been about *mutually* assured destruction, which obtains between two robustly nuclear-armed states. The claim is that (1) rational states having second-strike capabilities—enough deliverable nuclear weaponry to survive a nuclear first strike by an enemy—will have an overwhelming incentive not to attack one another; and (2) we can safely assume that nuclear-armed states are rational. It follows that states with a second-strike capability will not fight one another. Their colossal atomic arsenals neither kept the United States at peace with North Vietnam during the Cold War nor the Soviet Union at peace with Afghanistan. But the argument remains strong that those arsenals did help keep the United States and Soviet Union at peace with each other. Why non-nuclear states are not **deterred** from fighting nuclear states is an important and open question. But in a time when calls to ban the Bomb are being heard from more and more quarters, we must be clear about precisely what the broad trends toward peace can and cannot tell us. They may tell us nothing about why we have had no World War III, and little about the wisdom of banning the Bomb now. Regarding the downward trend in *international* war, Professor Mack is friendlier to more palatable theories such as the “democratic peace” (democracies do not fight one another, and the proportion of democracies has increased, hence less war); the interdependence or “commercial peace” (states with extensive economic ties find it irrational to fight one another, and interdependence has increased, hence less war); and the notion that people around the world are more anti-war than their forebears were. Concerning the downward trend in *civil* wars, he favors theories of economic growth (where commerce is enriching enough people, violence is less appealing—a logic similar to that of the “commercial peace” thesis that applies among nations) and the end of the Cold War (which end reduced superpower support for rival rebel factions in so many Third-World countries). These are all plausible mechanisms for peace. What is more, none of them excludes any other; all could be working toward the same end. That would be somewhat puzzling, however. Is the world just lucky these days? How is it that an array of peace-inducing factors happens to be working coincidentally in our time, when such a magical array was absent in the past? The answer may be that one or more of **these mechanisms** reinforces some of the others, or perhaps some of them are mutually reinforcing. Some scholars, for example, have been focusing on whether economic growth might support democracy and vice versa, and whether both might support international cooperation, including to end civil wars. We would still need to explain how this charmed circle of causes got started, however. And here let me raise another factor, perhaps even less appealing than the “nuclear peace” thesis, at least outside of the United States. **That factor is** what international relations scholars call hegemony—specifically **American hegemony.** A theory that many regard as discredited, but that refuses to go away, is called hegemonic stability theory. The theory emerged in the 1970s in the realm of international political economy. It asserts that for the global economy to remain open—for countries to keep barriers to trade and investment low—one powerful country must take the lead. Depending on the theorist we consult, “taking the lead” entails paying for global public goods (keeping the sea lanes open, providing liquidity to the international economy), coercion (threatening to raise trade barriers or withdraw military protection from countries that cheat on the rules), or both. The theory is skeptical that international cooperation in economic matters can emerge or endure absent a hegemon. The distastefulness of such claims is self-evident: they imply that it is good for everyone the world over if one country has more wealth and power than others. More precisely, they imply that it has been good for the world that the United States has been so predominant. There is no obvious reason why hegemonic stability theory could not apply to other areas of international cooperation, including in security affairs, human rights, international law, peacekeeping (UN or otherwise), and so on. What I want to suggest here—suggest, not test—is that American **hegemony might** just **be a deep cause of the steady decline of political deaths** in the world. How could that be? After all, the report states that United States is the third most war-prone country since 1945. Many of the deaths depicted in Figure 10.4 were in wars that involved the United States (the Vietnam War being the leading one). Notwithstanding politicians’ claims to the contrary, a candid look at U.S. foreign policy reveals that the country is as ruthlessly self-interested as any other great power in history. The answer is that **U.S. hegemony might** just **be a deeper cause of** the **proximate causes** outlined by Professor Mack. Consider economic growth and openness to foreign trade and investment, which (so say some theories) render violence irrational. American power and policies may be responsible for these in two related ways. First, at least since the 1940s Washington has prodded other countries to embrace the market capitalism that entails economic openness and produces sustainable economic growth. The United States promotes capitalism for selfish reasons, of course: its own domestic system depends upon growth, which in turn depends upon the efficiency gains from economic interaction with foreign countries, and the more the better. During the Cold War most of its allies accepted some degree of market-driven growth. Second, the U.S.-led western victory in the Cold War damaged the credibility of alternative paths to development—communism and import-substituting industrialization being the two leading ones—and left market capitalism the best model. The end of the Cold War also involved an end to the billions of rubles in Soviet material support for regimes that tried to make these alternative models work. (It also, as Professor Mack notes, eliminated the superpowers’ incentives to feed civil violence in the Third World.) What we call globalization is caused in part by the emergence of the United States as the global hegemon. The same case can be made, with somewhat more difficulty, concerning the spread of democracy. Washington has supported democracy only under certain conditions—the chief one being the absence of a popular anti-American movement in the target state—but those conditions have become much more widespread following the collapse of communism. Thus in the 1980s the Reagan administration—the most anti-communist government America ever had—began to dump America’s old dictator friends, starting in the Philippines. Today Islamists tend to be anti-American, and so the Obama administration is skittish about democracy in Egypt and other authoritarian Muslim countries. But general U.S. material and moral support for liberal democracy remains strong.

**No root cause means deterrence and hegemony are the only way to reduce the likelihood of conflict**

**Sharp ‘08** – Assoc. Dep. General Counsel for Int’l Affairs @ DOD & Adjunct Prof. of Law @ Georgetown

(Former Dir. Of Research at the Law Library of Congress, Democracy and Deterrence: Foundations for an Enduring World Peace, Air University Press, Maxwell Air Force Base, May, 2008, Dr. Walter Gary Sharp Sr.)

http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA493031&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf

Moore concludes in Solving the War Puzzle that war arises from the interaction of all three Waltzian levels (individual, state or national, and international), whereas some proponents of the democratic peace principle focus only on government structures to explain war and some traditional realists focus only on the international system. Both realists and democratic peace proponents tend to emphasize institutions and systems, whereas Moore reminds us that people—leaders—decide to pursue war: Wars are not simply accidents. Nor, contrary to our ordinary language, are they made by nations. Wars are made by people; more specifically they are decided on by the leaders of nation states—and other nonnational groups in the case of terrorism—who make the decision to commit aggression or otherwise use the military instrument. These leaders make that decision based on the totality of incentives affecting them at the time of the decision. . . . . . . [Incentive theory] tells us that we simply have a **better chance of predicting war**, and fashioning **forms of intervention to control it**, if we focus squarely on the effect of variables from all levels of analysis in **generating incentives affecting the actual decisions** **made by those with the power to decide on war**.42 Incentive theory focuses on the **individual decisions that lead to war** and explains the synergistic relationship between the absence of effective deterrence and the absence of democracy. Together these three factors—the decisions of leaders made without the restraining effects of deterrence and democracy— are the cause of war: War is not strictly caused by an absence of democracy or effective deterrence or both together. Rather **war is caused by the human leadership decision to employ the military instrument**. The absence of democracy, the **absence of effective deterrence**, and most importantly, the synergy of an absence of both are **conditions** or factors **that predispose to war**. An absence of democracy likely predisposes by [its] effect on leadership and leadership incentives, and an absence of effective deterrence likely predisposes by its effect on incentives from factors other than the individual or governmental levels of analysis. To understand the cause of war is **to understand the human decision for war**; that is, major war and democide . . . are the consequence of **individual decisions responding to a totality of incentives**.43

**A-to: Prior Questions**

**Prior questions will never be fully settled---action’s prior**

Molly **Cochran 99**, Assistant Professor of International Affairs at Georgia Institute for Technology, “Normative Theory in International Relations”, 1999, pg. 272

To conclude this chapter, while modernist and postmodernist debates continue, while we are still unsure as to what we can legitimately identify as a feminist ethical/political concern, while we still are unclear about the relationship between discourse and experience**, it is** particularly **important** for feminists **that we proceed with analysis of** both **the material** (institutional and structural) as well as the discursive. This holds not only for feminists, but for all theorists oriented towards the goal of extending further moral inclusion in the present social sciences climate of epistemological uncertainty. **Important** ethical/**political concerns hang in the balance. We cannot afford to wait for the meta-theoretical questions to be conclusively answered**. Those answers may be unavailable. Nor can we wait for a credible vision of an **alt**ernative institutional order to appear before an emancipatory agenda can be kicked into gear. Nor do we have before us a chicken and egg question of which comes first: sorting out the metatheoretical issues or working out which practices contribute to a credible institutional vision. The two questions can and should be pursued together, and can be via moral imagination. Imagination can help us think beyond discursive and material conditions which limit us, by pushing the boundaries of those limitations in thought and examining what yields. In this respect, I believe international ethics as pragmatic critique can be a useful ally to feminist and normative theorists generally.

**No prior questions – we don’t have to prove the universality of the liberal subject**

Owen, Southampton political theory reader, 2002

(David, “Re-orienting International Relations: On Pragmatism, Pluralism and Practical Reasoning”, Millennium 31.3, SAGE)

Commenting on the ‘philosophical turn’ in IR, Wæver remarks that ‘[a] frenzy for words like “epistemology” and “ontology” often signals this philosophical turn’, although he goes on to comment that these terms are often used loosely.4 However, loosely deployed or not, it is clear that debates concerning ontology and epistemology play a central role in the contemporary IR theory wars. In one respect, this is unsurprising since it is a characteristic feature of the social sciences that periods of disciplinary disorientation involve recourse to reflection on the philosophical commitments of different theoretical approaches, and there is no doubt that such reflection can play a valuable role in making explicit the commitments that characterise (and help individuate) diverse theoretical positions. Yet, such a philosophical turn is not without its dangers and I will briefly mention three before turning to consider a confusion that has, I will suggest, helped to promote the IR theory wars by motivating this philosophical turn. The first danger with the philosophical turn is that it has an inbuilt tendency to prioritise issues of ontology and epistemology over **explanatory and/or interpretive power** as if the latter two were **merely a simple function of the former.** But while the explanatory and/or interpretive power of a theoretical account is not wholly independent of its ontological and/or epistemological commitments (otherwise criticism of these features would not be a criticism that had any value), it is by no means clear that it is, in contrast, wholly dependent on these philosophical commitments. Thus, for example, one need not be sympathetic to rational choice theory to recognise that it can provide powerful accounts of certain kinds of problems, such as the tragedy of the commons in which dilemmas of collective action are foregrounded. It may, of course, be the case that the advocates of rational choice **theory cannot give a good account of why this type of theory is powerful** in accounting for this class of problems (i.e., how it is that the relevant actors come to exhibit features in these circumstances that approximate the assumptions of rational choice theory) and, if this is the case, it is a philosophical weakness—but this does not undermine the point that, for a certain class of problems, **rational choice theory may provide the best account** available to us**.** In other words, while the critical judgement of theoretical accounts in terms of their ontological and/or epistemological sophistication is one kind of critical judgement, it is not the only or even necessarily the most importantkind. The second danger run by the philosophical turn is that because **prioritisation of ontology** and epistemology promotes theory-construction from philosophical first principles, it cultivates a theory-driven rather than problem-driven approach to IR. Paraphrasing Ian Shapiro, the point can be put like this: since it is the case that there is always a plurality of possible true descriptions of a given action, event or phenomenon, the challenge is to decide which is the most apt in terms of getting a perspicuous grip on the action**,** event or phenomenon in question given the purposes of the inquiry; yet, from this standpoint, ‘theory-driven work is part of a **reductionist program’** in that it ‘dictates always opting for the description that calls for the explanation that flows from the preferred model or theory’.5 The justification offered for this strategy rests on the mistaken belief that it is necessary for social science because general explanations are required to characterise the classes of phenomena studied in similar terms. However, as Shapiro points out, this is to misunderstand the enterprise of science since ‘whether there are general explanations for classes of phenomena is a question for social-scientific inquiry, not to be prejudged before conducting that inquiry’.6 Moreover, **this strategy easily slips into the promotion of the pursuit of generality over that of empirical validity.** The third danger is that the preceding two combine to encourage the formation of a particular image of disciplinary debate in IR—what might be called (only slightly tongue in cheek) ‘the Highlander view’—namely, an image of warring theoretical approaches with each, despite occasional temporary tactical alliances, dedicated to the strategic achievement of sovereignty over the disciplinary field. It encourages this view because the turn to, and prioritisation of, ontology and epistemology stimulates the idea that there can only be one theoretical approach which gets things right, namely, the theoretical approach that gets its ontology and epistemology right. This image feeds back into IR exacerbating the first and second dangers, and so a potentially vicious circle arises.

**A-to: Rana**

**Rana’s claim is too sweeping, the alt is impossible**

David **Cole 12**, professor of law at Georgetown, “Confronting the Wizard of Oz: National Security,

Expertise, and Secrecy” 44 Conn. L. Rev. 1617-1625 (2012), <http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/1085>)

Rana is right to focus our attention on the assumptions that frame modern Americans’ conceptions about national security, but his assessment raises three initial questions. First, it seems **far from clear** that there ever was a “golden” era in which national security decisions were made by the common man, or “the people themselves,” as Larry Kramer might put it.8 Rana argues that neither Hobbes nor Locke would support a worldview in which certain individuals are vested with superior access to the truth, and that faith in the superior abilities of so-called “experts” is a phenomenon of the New Deal era.9 While an increased faith in scientific solutions to social problems may be a contributing factor in our current overreliance on experts,10 I doubt that national security matters were ever truly a matter of widespread democratic deliberation. Rana notes that in the early days of the republic, every able-bodied man had to serve in the militia, whereas today only a small (and largely disadvantaged) portion of society serves in the military.11 But serving in the militia and making decisions about national security are two different matters. The early days of the Republic were at least as dominated by “elites” as today. Rana points to no evidence that decisions about foreign affairs were any more democratic then than now. And, of course, the nation as a whole was far less democratic, as the majority of its inhabitants could not vote at all.12 Rather than moving away from a golden age of democratic decision-making, it seems more likely that we have simply replaced one group of elites (the aristocracy) with another (the experts). Second, to the extent that there has been an epistemological shift with respect to national security, it seems likely that it is at least in some measure **a response to objective conditions**, not just an ideological development. If so, it’s not clear that we can solve the problem **merely by “thinking differently**” about national security. **The world has, in fact, become more interconnected and dangerous** than it was when the Constitution was drafted. At our founding, the oceans were a significant buffer against attacks, weapons were primitive, and travel over long distances was extremely arduous and costly. The attacks of September 11, 2001, or anything like them, would have been inconceivable in the eighteenth or nineteenth centuries. Small groups of non-state actors can now inflict the kinds of attacks that once were the exclusive province of states. But because such actors do not have the governance responsibilities that states have, they are less susceptible to deterrence. The Internet makes information about dangerous weapons and civil vulnerabilities far more readily available, airplane travel dramatically increases the potential range of a hostile actor, and it is not impossible that terrorists could obtain and use nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons.13 The knowledge necessary to monitor nuclear weapons, respond to cyber warfare, develop technological defenses to technological threats, and gather intelligence is **increasingly specialized**. The problem is **not just how we think about security** threats; it is also at least in part **objectively based**.

### A-to: Reps Cause War

**Reps don’t cause war**

**Reiter 95** DAN REITER is a Professor of Political Science at Emory University and has been an Olin post-doctoral fellow in security studies at Harvard “Exploring the Powder Keg Myth” International Security v20 No2 Autumn 1995 pp 5-34 JSTOR

A criticism of assessing the frequency of preemptive wars by looking only at wars themselves is that this misses the non-events, that is, instances in which preemption would be predicted but did not occur. However, excluding non-events should bias the results in favor of finding that preemptive war is an important path to war, as the inclusion of non-events could only make it seem that the event was less frequent. Therefore, if preemptive wars seem infrequent within the set of wars alone, then this would have to be considered strong evidence in favor of the third, **most skeptical view of preemptive war**, because even when the sample is rigged to make preemptive wars seem frequent (by including only wars), they are still rare events. Below, a few cases in which preemption did not occur are discussed to illustrate factors that constrain preemption. The rarity of preemptive wars offers preliminary support for the third, most skeptical view, that the preemption scenario does not tell us much about how war breaks out. Closer examination of the three cases of preemption, set forth below, **casts doubt** on the validity of the two preemption hypotheses discussed earlier: that **hostile images of the enemy** increase the chances of preemption, and that belief in the dominance of the offense increases the chances of preemption. In each case there are motives for war aside from fear of an imminent attack, indicating that such fears may **not be sufficient to cause war**. In addition, in these cases of war the two conditions hypothesized to stimulate preemption—hostile images of the adversary and belief in the military advantages of striking first—are **present to a very high degree**. This implies that these are **insubstantial causal forces**, as they are associated with the outbreak of war only when they are present to a very high degree. **This reduces even further the significance of these forces as causes of war.** To illustrate this point, consider an analogy: say there is a hypothesis that saccharin causes cancer. Discovering that rats who were fed a lot of saccharin and also received high levels of X-ray exposure, which we know causes cancer, had a higher risk for cancer does not, however, set off alarm bells about the risks of saccharin. Though there might be a relationship between saccharin consumption and cancer, this is not demonstrated by the results of such a test.

**A-to: Representations First**

**Representations not first**

**Tuathail 96**

(Gearoid, Department of Geography at Virginia Polytechnic Institute, Political Geography, 15(6-7), p. 664, science direct)

While theoretical debates at academic conferences are important to academics, the discourse and concerns of foreign-policy decisionmakers are quite different, so different that they constitute a distinctive problemsolving, theory-averse, policy-making subculture. There is a danger that academics assume that the discourses they engage are more significant in the practice of foreign policy and the exercise of power than they really are. This is not, however, to minimize the obvious importance of academia as a general institutional structure among many that sustain certain epistemic communities in particular states. In general, I do not disagree with Dalby’s fourth point about politics and discourse except to note that his statement-‘Precisely because reality could be represented in particular ways political decisions could be taken, troops and material moved and war fought’-evades the important question of agency that I noted in my review essay. The assumption that it is representations that make action possible is inadequate by itself. Political, military and economic structures, institutions, discursive networks and leadership are all crucial in explaining social action and should be theorized together with representational practices. Both here and earlier, Dalby’s reasoning inclines towards a form of idealism. In response to Dalby’s fifth point (with its three subpoints), it is worth noting, first, that his book is about the CPD, not the Reagan administration. He analyzes certain CPD discourses, root the geographical reasoning practices of the Reagan administration nor its public-policy reasoning on national security. Dalby’s book is narrowly textual; the general contextuality of the Reagan administration is not dealt with. Second, let me simply note that I find that the distinction between critical theorists and poststructuralists is a little too rigidly and heroically drawn by Dalby and others. Third, Dalby’s interpretation of the reconceptualization of national security in Moscow as heavily influenced by dissident peace researchers in Europe is highly idealist, an interpretation that ignores the structural and ideological crises facing the Soviet elite at that time. Gorbachev’s reforms and his new security discourse were also strongly selfinterested, an ultimately futile attempt to save the Communist Party and a discredited regime of power from disintegration. The issues raised by Simon Dalby in his comment are important ones for all those interested in the practice of critical geopolitics. While I agree with Dalby that questions of discourse are extremely important ones for political geographers to engage, there is a danger of fetishizing this concern with discourse so that we neglect the institutional and the sociological, the materialist and the cultural, the political and the geographical contexts within which particular discursive strategies become significant. Critical geopolitics, in other words, should not be a prisoner of the sweeping ahistorical cant that sometimes accompanies ‘poststructuralism nor convenient reading strategies like the identity politics narrative; it needs to always be open to the patterned mess that is human history.

**Reps don’t come first and don’t cause violence**

**Rodwell, Manchester Metropolitan University PhD candidate, 2005**

(Jonathan, “Trendy But Empty: A Response to Richard Jackson”, <http://www.49thparallel.bham.ac.uk/back/issue15/rodwell1.htm>)

In this response I wish to argue that the Post-Structural analysis put forward by Richard Jackson is inadequate when trying to understand American Politics and Foreign Policy. The key point is that this is an issue of methodology and theory. I do not wish to argue that language is not important, in the current political scene (or indeed any political era) that would be unrealistic. One cannot help but be convinced that the creation of identity, of defining ones self (or one nation, or societies self) in opposition to an ‘other’ does indeed take place. Masses of written and aural evidence collated by Jackson clearly demonstrates that there is a discursive pattern surrounding post 9/11 U.S. politics and society. [i] Moreover as expressed at the start of this paper it is a political pattern and logic that this language is useful for politicians, especially when able to marginalise other perspectives. Nothing illustrates this clearer than the fact George W. Bush won re-election, for whatever the reasons he did win, it is undeniable that at the very least the war in Iraq, though arguable far from a success, at the absolute minimum did not damage his campaign. Additionally it is surely not stretching credibility to argue Bush performance and rhetoric during the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks also strengthened his position. However, having said that, the problem is Jackson’s own theoretical underpinning, his own justification for the importance of language. If he was merely proposing that the understanding of language as one of many causal factors is important that would be fine. But he is not. The epistemological and theoretical framework of his argument means the ONLY thing we should look at is language and this is the problem.[ii] Rather than being a fairly simple, but nonetheless valid, argument, because of the theoretical justification it actually becomes an almost nonsensical. My response is roughly laid out in four parts. Firstly I will argue that such methodology, in isolation, **is fundamentally reductionist** with a theoretical underpinning that does not conceal this simplicity. Secondly, that a strict use of post-structural discourse analysis results in an epistemological cul-de-sac in which **the writer cannot actually say anything.** Moreover the reader has no reason to accept anything that has been written. The result is at best an explanation that remains as equally valid as any other possible interpretation and at worse a work that **retains no critical force whatsoever.** Thirdly, possible arguments in response to this charge; that such approaches provide a more acceptable explanation than others are, in effect, both a tacit acceptance of the poverty of force within the approach and of the complete lack of understanding of the identifiable effects of the real world around us; thus highlighting the contradictions within post-structural claims to be moving beyond traditional causality, re-affirming that rather than pursuing a post-structural approach we should continue to employ the traditional methodologies within History, Politics and International Relations. Finally as a consequence of these limitations I will argue that the post-structural call for ‘intertextuals’ must be practiced rather than merely preached and that an understanding and utilisation of all possible theoretical approaches must be maintained if academic writing is to remain useful rather than self-contained and narrative. Ultimately I conclude that whilst undeniably of some value post-structural approaches are at best a footnote in our understanding . The first major problem then is that historiographically discourse analysis is so capacious as to be largely of little use. The process of inscription identity, of discourse development is not given any political or historical context, it is argued that it just works, is simply a universal phenomenon. It is history that explains everything and therefore actually explains nothing. To be specific if the U.S. and every other nation is continually reproducing identities through ‘othering’ it is a constant and universal phenomenon that fails to help us understand at all why one result of the othering turned out one way and differently at another time. For example, how could one explain how the process resulted in the 2003 invasion of Iraq but didn’t produce a similar invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 when that country (and by the logic of the Regan administrations discourse) the West was threatened by the ‘Evil Empire’. By the logical of discourse analysis in both cases these policies were the result of politicians being able to discipline and control the political agenda to produce the outcomes. So why were the outcomes not the same? To reiterate the point how do we explain that the language of the War on Terror actually managed to result in the eventual Afghan invasion in 2002? Surely it is impossible to explain how George W. Bush was able to convince his people (and incidentally the U.N and Nato) to support a war in Afghanistan without referring to a simple fact outside of the discourse; the fact that a known terrorist in Afghanistan actually admitted to the murder of thousands of people on the 11h of Sepetember 2001. The point is that if the discursive ‘othering’ of an ‘alien’ people or group is what really gave the U.S. the opportunity to persue the war in Afghanistan one must surly wonder why Afghanistan. Why not North Korea? Or Scotland? If the discourse is so powerfully useful in it’s own right why could it not have happened anywhere at any time and more often? Why could the British government not have been able to justify an armed invasion and regime change in Northern Ireland throughout the terrorist violence of the 1980’s? Surely they could have just employed the same discursive trickery as George W. Bush? Jackson is absolutely right when he points out that the actuall threat posed by Afghanistan or Iraq today may have been thoroughly misguided and conflated and that there must be more to explain why those wars were enacted at that time. Unfortunately that explanation cannot simply come from the result of inscripting identity and discourse. On top of this there is the clear problem that the consequences of the discursive othering are not necessarily what Jackson would seem to identify. This is a problem consistent through David Campbell’s original work on which Jackson’s approach is based[iii]. David Campbell argued for a linguistic process that ‘always results in an other being marginalized’ or has the potential for ‘demonisation’[iv]. At the same time Jackson, building upon this, maintains without qualification that the systematic and institutionalised abuse of Iraqi prisoners first exposed in April 2004 “is a direct consequence of the language used by senior administration officials: conceiving of terrorist suspects as ‘evil’, ‘inhuman’ and ‘faceless enemies of freedom creates an atmosphere where abuses become normalised and tolerated”[v]. The only problem is that the process of differentiation does not actually necessarily produce dislike or antagonism. In the 1940’s and 50’s even subjected to the language of the ‘Red Scare’ it’s obvious not all Americans came to see the Soviets as an ‘other’ of their nightmares. And in Iraq the abuses of Iraqi prisoners are isolated cases, it is not the case that the U.S. militarily summarily abuses prisoners as a result of language. Surely the massive protest against the war, even in the U.S. itself, is also a self evident example that the language of ‘evil’ and ‘inhumanity’ does not necessarily produce an outcome that marginalises or demonises an ‘other’. Indeed one of the points of discourse is that we are continually differentiating ourselves from all others around us without this necessarily leading us to hate fear or abuse anyone.[vi] Consequently, the clear fear of the Soviet Union during the height of the Cold War, and the abuses at Abu Ghirab are unusual cases. To understand what is going on we must ask how far can the process of inscripting identity really go towards explaining them? As a result at best all discourse analysis provides us with is a set of universals and a heuristic model.

**A-to: Structural Violence 1st**

**Extinction outweighs structural violence**

**Bostrom 12** (Nick, Professor of Philosophy at Oxford, directs Oxford's Future of Humanity Institute and winner of the Gannon Award, Interview with Ross Andersen, correspondent at The Atlantic, 3/6, “We're Underestimating the Risk of Human Extinction”, <http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2012/03/were-underestimating-the-risk-of-human-extinction/253821/>)

Bostrom, who directs Oxford's Future of Humanity Institute, has argued over the course of several papers that human extinction risks are poorly understood and, worse still, **severely underestimated by society**. Some of these existential risks are fairly well known, especially the natural ones. But others are obscure or even exotic. Most worrying to Bostrom is the subset of existential risks that arise from human technology, a subset that he expects to grow in number and potency over the next century. Despite his concerns about the risks posed to humans by technological progress, Bostrom is no luddite. In fact, he is a longtime advocate of transhumanism---the effort to improve the human condition, and even human nature itself, through technological means. In the long run he sees technology as a bridge, a bridge we humans must cross with great care, in order to reach new and better modes of being. In his work, Bostrom uses the tools of philosophy and mathematics, in particular probability theory, to try and determine how we as a species might achieve this safe passage. What follows is my conversation with Bostrom about some of the most interesting and worrying existential risks that humanity might encounter in the decades and centuries to come, and about what we can do to make sure we outlast them. Some have argued that we ought to be directing our resources toward humanity's existing problems, rather than future existential risks, because many of the latter are highly improbable. You have responded by suggesting that **existential risk mitigation may in fact be a dominant moral priority over the alleviation of present suffering**. Can you explain why? Bostrom: Well suppose you have a moral view that counts future people as being worth as much as present people. You might say that fundamentally it doesn't matter whether someone exists at the current time or at some future time, just as many people think that from a fundamental moral point of view, it doesn't matter where somebody is spatially---somebody isn't automatically worth less because you move them to the moon or to Africa or something. A human life is a human life. If you have that moral point of view that future generations matter in proportion to their population numbers, then you get this **very stark implication that existential risk mitigation has a much higher utility than pretty much anything else that you could do**. There are so many people that could come into existence in the future if humanity survives this critical period of time---we might live for billions of years, our descendants might colonize billions of solar systems, and there could be billions and billions times more people than exist currently. **Therefore, even a very small reduction in the probability of realizing this enormous good will tend to outweigh even immense benefits like eliminating poverty or curing malaria**, which would be tremendous under ordinary standards.

**No structural violence impact**

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Between the brutal civil war in Syria, the government shutdown and all of the deadly dysfunction it represents, the NSA spying revelations, and massive inequality, it’d be easy to for you to enter 2014 thinking the last year has been an awful one. But you’d be wrong. We have every reason to believe that **2013 was**, in fact, **the best year on the planet** for humankind. Contrary to what you might have heard, virtually all of the most important forces that determine what make people’s lives good — the things that determine how long they live, and whether they live happily and freely — are trending in an extremely happy direction. While it’s possible that this progress **could be reversed** by something like runaway climate change, the effects will have to be dramatic to overcome the extraordinary and growing progress we’ve made in making the world a better place. Here’s the five big reasons why. 1. Fewer people are dying young, and more are living longer. The greatest story in recent human history is the simplest: we’re winning the fight against death. “There is not a single country in the world where infant or child mortality today is not lower than it was in 1950,” writes Angus Deaton, a Princeton economist who works on global health issues. The most **up-to-date numbers** on global health, the 2013 World Health Organization (WHO) statistical compendium, confirm Deaton’s estimation. Between 1990 and 2010, the percentage of children who died before their fifth birthday dropped by almost half. Measles deaths declined by 71 percent, and both tuberculosis and maternal deaths by half again. HIV, that modern plague, is also being held back, with deaths from AIDS-related illnesses down by 24 percent since 2005. In short, fewer people are dying untimely deaths. And that’s **not only** true in rich countries: life expectancy has gone up between 1990 and 2011 in every WHO income bracket. The gains are even more dramatic if you take the long view: global life expectancy was 47 in the early 1950s, but had risen to 70 — a 50 percent jump — by 2011. For even more perspective, the average Briton in 1850 — when the British Empire had reached its apex — was 40. The average person today should expect to live almost twice as long as the average citizen of the world’s wealthiest and most powerful country in 1850. In real terms, this means millions of fewer dead adults and children a year, millions fewer people who spend their lives suffering the pains and unfreedoms imposed by illness, and millions more people spending their twilight years with loved ones. And the trends are all positive — “progress has accelerated in recent years in many countries with the highest rates of mortality,” as the WHO rather bloodlessly put it. What’s going on? Obviously, it’s fairly complicated, but the most important drivers have been technological and political innovation. The Enlightenment-era advances in the scientific method got people doing high-quality research, which brought us modern medicine and the information technologies that allow us to spread medical breakthroughs around the world at increasingly faster rates. Scientific discoveries also fueled the Industrial Revolution and the birth of modern capitalism, giving us more resources to devote to large-scale application of live-saving technologies. And the global spread of liberal democracy made governments accountable to citizens, forcing them to attend to their health needs or pay the electoral price. We’ll see the enormously beneficial impact of these two forces, technology and democracy, repeatedly throughout this list, which should tell you something about the foundations of human progress. But when talking about improvements in health, we shouldn’t neglect foreign aid. Nations donating huge amounts of money out of an altruistic interest in the welfare of foreigners is historically unprecedented, and while not all aid has been helpful, health aid has been a huge boon. Even Deaton, who wrote one of 2013′s harshest assessments of foreign aid, believes “the case for assistance to fight disease such as HIV/AIDS or smallpox is strong.” That’s because these programs have demonstrably saved lives — the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), a 2003 program pushed by President Bush, paid for anti-retroviral treatment for over 5.1 million people in the poor countries hardest-hit by the AIDS epidemic. So we’re outracing the Four Horseman, extending our lives faster than pestilence, war, famine, and death can take them. That alone should be enough to say the world is getting better. 2. Fewer people suffer from extreme poverty, and the world is getting happier. There are fewer people in abject penury than at any other point in human history, and middle class people enjoy their highest standard of living ever. We haven’t come close to solving poverty: a number of African countries in particular have chronic problems generating growth, a nut foreign aid hasn’t yet cracked. So this isn’t a call for complacency about poverty any more than acknowledging victories over disease is an argument against tackling malaria. But make no mistake: as a whole, the world is much richer in 2013 than it was before. 721 million fewer people lived in extreme poverty ($1.25 a day) in 2010 than in 1981, according to a new World Bank study from October. That’s astounding — a decline from 40 to about 14 percent of the world’s population suffering from abject want. And **poverty rates are declining in every national income bracket**: even in low income countries, the percentage of people living in extreme poverty ($1.25 a day in 2005 dollars) a day gone down from 63 in 1981 to 44 in 2010. We can be fairly confident that these trends are continuing. For one thing, they survived the Great Recession in 2008. For another, the decline in poverty has been fueled by global economic growth, which looks to be continuing: global GDP grew by 2.3 percent in 2012, a number that’ll rise to 2.9 percent in 2013 according to IMF projections. The bulk of the recent decline in poverty comes form India and China — about 80 percent from China \*alone\*. Chinese economic and social reform, a delayed reaction to the mass slaughter and starvation of Mao’s Cultural Revolution, has been the engine of poverty’s global decline. If you subtract China, there are actually more poor people today than there were in 1981 (population growth trumping the percentage declines in poverty). But we shouldn’t discount China. If what we care about is fewer people suffering the misery of poverty, then it shouldn’t matter what nation the less-poor people call home. Chinese growth should be celebrated, not shunted aside. The poor haven’t been the only people benefitting from global growth. Middle class people have access to an ever-greater stock of life-improving goods. Televisions and refrigerators, once luxury goods, are now comparatively cheap and commonplace. That’s why large-percentage improvements in a nation’s GDP appear to correlate strongly with higher levels of happiness among the nation’s citizens; people like having things that make their lives easier and more worry-free. Global economic growth in the past five decades has dramatically reduced poverty and made people around the world happier. Once again, we’re better off. 3. War is becoming rarer and less deadly. APTOPIX Mideast Libya CREDIT: AP Photo/ Manu Brabo Another massive conflict could overturn the global progress against disease and poverty. But it appears war, too, may be losing its fangs. Steven Pinker’s 2011 book The Better Angels Of Our Nature is the gold standard in this debate. Pinker brought a treasure trove of data to bear on the question of whether the world has gotten more peaceful, and found that, in the long arc of human history, both war and other forms of violence (the death penalty, for instance) are on a centuries-long downward slope. Pinker summarizes his argument here if you don’t own the book. Most eye-popping are the numbers for the past 50 years; Pinker finds that “the worldwide rate of death from interstate and civil war combined has juddered downward…from almost 300 per 100,000 world population during World War II, to almost 30 during the Korean War, to the low teens during the era of the Vietnam War, to single digits in the 1970s and 1980s, **to less than 1 in the twenty-ﬁrst century**.” Here’s what that looks like graphed: Pinker CREDIT: Steven Pinker/The Wall Street Journal So it looks like the smallest percentage of humans alive since World War II, and in all likelihood in human history, are living through the horrors of war. Did 2013 give us any reason to believe that Pinker and the other scholars who agree with him have been proven wrong? **Probably not.** The academic debate over the decline of war really exploded in 2013, but the “declinist” thesis has fared pretty well. Challenges to Pinker’s conclusion that battle deaths have gone down over time have not withstood scrutiny. The most compelling critique, a new paper by Bear F. Braumoeller, argues that if you control for the larger number of countries in the last 50 years, war happens at roughly the same rates as it has historically. There are lots of things you might say about Braumoeller’s argument, and I’ve asked Pinker for his two cents (update: Pinker’s response here). But most importantly, if battle deaths per 100,000 people really has declined, then his argument doesn’t mean very much. If (percentage-wise) fewer people are dying from war, then what we call “war” now is a lot less deadly than “war” used to be. Braumoeller suggests population growth and improvements in battle medicine explain the decline, but that’s not convincing: tell me with a straight face that the only differences in deadliness between World War II, Vietnam, and the wars you see today is that there are more people and better doctors. There’s a more rigorous way of putting that: today, we see many more civil wars than we do wars between nations. The former tend to be less deadly than the latter. That’s why the other major challenge to Pinker’s thesis in 2013, the deepening of the Syrian civil war, isn’t likely to upset the overall trend. Syria’s war is an unimaginable tragedy, one responsible for the rare, depressing increase in battle deaths from 2011 to 2012. However, the overall 2011-2012 trend “fits well with the observed long-term decline in battle deaths,” according to researchers at the authoritative Uppsala Conflict Data Program, because the uptick is not enough to suggest an overall change in trend. We should expect something similar when the 2013 numbers are published. Why are smaller and smaller percentages of people being exposed to the horrors of war? There are lots of reasons one could point to, but two of the biggest ones are the spread of democracy and humans getting, for lack of a better word, better. That democracies never, or almost never, go to war with each other is not seriously in dispute: the statistical evidence is ridiculously strong. While some argue that the “democratic peace,” as it’s called, is caused by things other than democracy itself, there’s good experimental evidence that democratic leaders and citizens just don’t want to fight each other. Since 1950, democracy has spread around the world like wildfire. There were only a handful of democracies after World War II, but that grew to roughly 40 percent of all by the end of the Cold War. Today, a comfortable majority — about 60 percent — of all states are democracies. This freer world is also a safer one. Second — and this is Pinker’s preferred explanation — people have developed strategies for dealing with war’s causes and consequences. “Human ingenuity and experience have gradually been brought to bear,” Pinker writes, “just as they have chipped away at hunger and disease.” A series of human inventions, things like U.N. peacekeeping operations, which nowadays are very successful at reducing violence, have given us a set of social tools increasingly well suited to reducing the harm caused by armed conflict. War’s decline isn’t accidental, in other words. It’s by design. 4. Rates of murder and other violent crimes are in free-fall. Britain Unrest CREDIT: Akira Suemori/AP Photos Pinker’s trend against violence isn’t limited just to war. It seems likes crimes, both of the sort states commit against their citizens and citizens commit against each other, are also on the decline. Take a few examples. Slavery, once commonly sanctioned by governments, is illegal everywhere on earth. The use of torture as legal punishment has gone down dramatically. The European murder rate fell 35-fold from the Middle Ages to the beginning of the 20th century (check out this amazing 2003 paper from Michael Eisner, who dredged up medieval records to estimate European homicide rates in the swords-and-chivalry era, if you don’t believe me). The decline has been **especially marked** in recent years. Though homicide crime rates climbed back up from their historic lows between the 1970s and 1990s, reversing progress made since the late 19th century, they have collapsed worldwide in the 21st century. 557,000 people were murdered in 2001 — almost three times as many as were killed in war that year. In 2008, that number was 289,000, and the homicide rate has been declining in 75 percent of nations since then. Statistics from around the developed world, where numbers are particularly reliable, show that it’s not just homicide that’s on the wane: it’s almost all violent crime. US government numbers show that violent crime in the United States declined from a peak of about 750 crimes per 100,000 Americans to under 450 by 2009. G7 as a whole countries show huge declines in homicide, robbery, and vehicle theft. So even in countries that aren’t at poor or at war, most people’s lives are getting safer and more secure. Why? We know it’s not incarceration. While the United States and Britain have dramatically increased their prison populations, others, like Canada, the Netherlands, and Estonia, reduced their incarceration rates and saw similar declines in violent crime. Same thing state-to-state in the United States; New York imprisoned fewer people and saw the fastest crime decline in the country. The Economist’s deep dive into the explanations for crime’s collapse provides a few answers. Globally, police have gotten better at working with communities and targeting areas with the most crime. They’ve also gotten new toys, like DNA testing, that make it easier to catch criminals. The crack epidemic in the United States and its heroin twin in Europe have both slowed down dramatically. Rapid gentrification has made inner-city crime harder. And the increasing cheapness of “luxury” goods like iPods and DVD players has reduced incentives for crime on both the supply and demand sides: stealing a DVD player isn’t as profitable, and it’s easier for a would-be thief to buy one in the first place. But there’s one explanation The Economist dismissed that strikes me as hugely important: the abolition of lead gasoline. Kevin Drum at Mother Jones wrote what’s universally acknowledged to be the definitive argument for the lead/crime link, and it’s incredibly compelling. We know for a fact that lead exposure damages people’s brains and can potentially be fatal; that’s why an international campaign to ban leaded gasoline started around 1970. Today, leaded gasoline is almost unheard of — it’s banned in 175 countries, and there’s been a decline in lead blood levels by about 90 percent. Drum marshals a wealth of evidence that the parts of the brain damaged by lead are the same ones that check people’s aggressive impulses. Moreover, the timing matches up: crime shot up in the mid-to-late-20th century as cars spread around the world, and started to decline in the 70s as the anti-lead campaign was succeeding. Here’s close the relationship is, using data from the United States: Lead\_Crime\_325 Now, non-homicide violent crime appears to have ticked up in 2012, based on U.S. government surveys of victims of crime, but it’s very possible that’s just a blip: the official Department of Justice report says up-front that “the apparent increase in the rate of violent crimes reported to police from 2011 to 2012 was not statistically significant.” So we have no reason to believe crime is making a come back, and every reason to believe the historical decline in criminal violence is here to stay. 5. There’s less racism, sexism, and other forms of discrimination in the world. Nelson Mandela CREDIT: Theana Calitz/AP Images Racism, sexism, anti-Semitism, homophobia, and other forms of discrimination remain, without a doubt, extraordinarily powerful forces. The statistical and experimental evidence is overwhelming — this irrefutable proof of widespread discrimination against African-Americans, for instance, should put the “racism is dead” fantasy to bed. Yet the need to combat discrimination denial shouldn’t blind us to the good news. Over the centuries, humanity has made extraordinary progress in taming its hate for and ill-treatment of other humans on the basis of difference alone. Indeed, it is very likely that **we live in the least discriminatory era in the history of modern civilization.** It’s not a huge prize given how bad the past had been, but there are still gains worth celebrating. Go back 150 years in time and the point should be obvious. Take four prominent groups in 1860: African-Americans were in chains, European Jews were routinely massacred in the ghettos and shtetls they were confined to, women around the world were denied the opportunity to work outside the home and made almost entirely subordinate to their husbands, and LGBT people were invisible. The improvements in each of these group’s statuses today, both in the United States and internationally, are incontestable. On closer look, we have reason to believe the happy trends are likely to continue. Take racial discrimination. In 2000, Harvard sociologist Lawrence Bobo penned a comprehensive assessment of the data on racial attitudes in the United States. He found a “national consensus” on the ideals of racial equality and integration. “A nation once comfortable as a deliberately segregationist and racially discriminatory society has not only abandoned that view,” Bobo writes, “but now overtly positively endorses the goals of racial integration and equal treatment. There is no sign whatsoever of retreat from this ideal, despite events that many thought would call it into question. The magnitude, steadiness, and breadth of this change should be lost on no one.” The norm against overt racism has **gone global**. In her book on the international anti-apartheid movement in the 1980s, Syracuse’s Audie Klotz says flatly that “the illegitimacy of white minority rule led to South Africa’s persistent diplomatic, cultural, and economic isolation.” The belief that racial discrimination could not be tolerated had become so widespread, Klotz argues, that it united the globe — including governments that had strategic interests in supporting South Africa’s whites — in opposition to apartheid. In 2011, 91 percent of respondents in a sample of 21 diverse countries said that equal treatment of people of different races or ethnicities was important to them. Racism obviously survived both American and South African apartheid, albeit in more subtle, insidious forms. “The death of Jim Crow racism has left us in an uncomfortable place,” Bobo writes, “a state of laissez-faire racism” where racial discrimination and disparities still exist, but support for the kind of aggressive government policies needed to address them is racially polarized. But there’s reason to hope that’ll change as well: two massive studies of the political views of younger Americans by my TP Ideas colleagues, John Halpin and Ruy Teixeira, found that millenials were significantly more racially tolerant and supportive of government action to address racial disparities than the generations that preceded them. Though I’m not aware of any similar research of on a global scale, it’s hard not to imagine they’d find similar results, suggesting that we should have hope that the power of racial prejudice may be waning. The story about gender discrimination is very similar: after the feminist movement’s enormous victories in the 20th century, structural sexism still shapes the world in profound ways, but the cause of gender equality is making progress. In 2011, 86 percent of people in a diverse 21 country sample said that equal treatment on the basis of gender was an important value. The U.N.’s Human Development Report’s Gender Inequality Index — a comprehensive study of reproductive health, social empowerment, and labor market equity — saw a 20 percent decline in observable gender inequalities from 1995 to 2011. IMF data show consistent global declines in wage disparities between genders, labor force participation, and educational attainment around the world. While enormous inequality remains, 2013 is looking to be the worst year for sexism in history. Finally, we’ve made astonishing progress on sexual orientation and gender identity discrimination — largely in the past 15 years. At the beginning of 2003, zero Americans lived in marriage equality states; by the end of 2013, 38 percent of Americans will. Article 13 of the European Community Treaty bans discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation, and, in 2011, the UN Human Rights Council passed a resolution committing the council to documenting and exposing discrimination on orientation or identity grounds around the world. The public opinion trends are positive worldwide: all of the major shifts from 2007 to 2013 in Pew’s “acceptance of homosexuality” poll were towards greater tolerance, and young people everywhere are more open to equality for LGBT individuals than their older peers. best\_year\_graphics-04 Once again, **these victories are** partial and **by no means inevitable**. Racism, sexism, homophobia, and other forms of discrimination aren’t just “going away” on their own. They’re losing their hold on us because people are working to change other people’s minds and because governments are passing laws aimed at promoting equality. Positive trends don’t mean the problems are close to solved, and certainly aren’t excuses for sitting on our hands. That’s true of everything on this list. The fact that fewer people are dying from war and disease doesn’t lessen the moral imperative to do something about those that are; the fact that people are getting richer and safer in their homes isn’t an excuse for doing more to address poverty and crime. But too often, the worst parts about the world are treated as **inevitable**, the prospect of radical victory over pain and suffering dismissed as utopian fantasy. The overwhelming force of the evidence shows that to be false. As best we can tell, the reason humanity is getting better is because humans have decided to make the world a better place. We consciously chose to develop lifesaving medicine and build freer political systems; we’ve passed laws against workplace discrimination and poisoning children’s minds with lead. So far, these choices have more than paid off. It’s up to us to make sure they continue to.

**War turns structural violence but not the other way around**

Joshua **Goldstein**, Int’l Rel Prof @ American U, **2001**, War and Gender, p. 412

First, peace activists face a dilemma in thinking about causes of war and working for peace. Many peace scholars and activists support the approach, “if you want peace, work for justice.” Then, if one believes that sexism contributes to war one can work for gender justice specifically (perhaps among others) in order to pursue peace. This approach brings strategic allies to the peace movement (women, labor, minorities), but rests on the assumption that injustices cause war. The evidence in this book suggests that causality runs at least as strongly the other way. War is not a product of capitalism, imperialism, gender, innate aggression, or any other single cause, although all of these influence wars’ outbreaks and outcomes. Rather, war has in part fueled and sustained these and other injustices.9 So,”if you want peace, work for peace.” Indeed, if you want justice (gender and others), work for peace. Causality does not run just upward through the levels of analysis, from types of individuals, societies, and governments up to war. It runs downward too. Enloe suggests that changes in attitudes towards war and the military may be the most important way to “reverse women’s oppression.” The dilemma is that peace work focused on justice brings to the peace movement energy, allies, and moral grounding, yet, in light of this book’s evidence, the emphasis on injustice as the main cause of war seems to be empirically inadequate.

## Elections Answers

Note that this frontline assumes that the Neg ran the Clinton Good Election DA with a climate change, war, and economy impact. If the Neg did not run this, adjust accordingly.

### 2AC – frontline

#### ( ) Link doesn’t turn case — election year China bashing inevitably quiets down after November and doesn’t tank relations.

#### ( ) Trump will win – GOP unity, messaging, Clinton missteps.

Boychuk 6-3-16. [Ben, associate editor of the Manhattan Institute’s City Journal, "Why Trump will win the White House" The Sacramento Bee -- www.sacbee.com/opinion/op-ed/ben-boychuk/article81455472.html]

Donald Trump will win the 2016 presidential election. Not “might” win. Not “could win under the following circumstances.” He’s going to win as surely as the sun rises in the east, as certainly as high tide follows low, and as definitively as Steph Curry laid waste to the Oklahoma Thunder’s defense. What am I, clairvoyant? Of course not. Just as it’s wise to never say “never” – except maybe #NeverTrump – it’s never a good idea for somebody to make unqualified predictions in print about unknowable future events. Bold claims had better be backed by solid reasons. Although Trump is running nearly even with Hillary Clinton in national polls, the Vegas bookmakers remain optimistic about Clinton’s chances. The online betting site PaddyPower.com currently puts the odds of Clinton winning at 1 in 2, with Trump at 7 to 4. Bernie Sanders is a 20-to-1 long shot. Would I be willing to put my money where my mouth is? Don’t be ridiculous. Gambling is a sin! But I wouldn’t bet against a Trump victory. Here are five reasons why: His rhetoric resonates. (Even as it appalls.) Everyone knows that Trump is an outrage machine. What few people appreciate is that Trump is a well-calibrated outrage machine. He has fastened on to issues that other candidates couldn’t discuss without sounding like pandering flip-floppers. Trump has departed from Republican orthodoxy on health care, taxes, free trade and immigration. Often he seems to contradict himself. He has said everything is negotiable – especially the outrageous things he’s said. Will he build a wall on the southern U.S. border and make Mexico pay for it? Maybe, maybe not. But he’s opened up the discussion like no one has before. “Trump’s selection of issues is part of his persuasion talents,” writes Scott Adams, the creator of “Dilbert” who has been blogging for months about the Trump phenomenon. “He was smart enough to pick the topics with the most emotional power. It was intentional.” “Keep in mind,” Adams adds, “that every candidate had the same options that Trump did, but only Trump chose correctly.” Adams says that is no accident: “The public just thinks it is.” By the way, Adams thinks Trump will win “in a landslide.” Most Republicans are falling in line. I’m a die-hard #NeverTrump guy, but I know I’m among a minority. Although some prominent Republican leaders have withheld their support, it’s clear that the GOP rank-and-file is rallying to the presumptive nominee. On Thursday, Speaker of the House Paul Ryan, R-Wis., ended weeks of speculation and endorsed Trump, saying “the reality is, on the issues that make up our agenda, we have more common ground than disagreement.” A unified Republican Party is far more likely now. Democrats, meantime, are divided among dedicated Clinton supporters and Sanders’ cadres of bitter-enders. The Bernie voters tend to be millennials. Clinton may not be able to count on their support in November. Gotcha journalism doesn’t faze Trump. Oh, that Trump is such a thin-skinned baby! Did you see his “epic meltdown” during his news conference at Trump Tower last week? He kept berating the reporters for not doing their jobs. What a buffoon! At least, that’s what The New York Times, The Washington Post, the Chicago Tribune and the crew on “Morning Joe” said. What my friends in the media fail to understand is the great mass of would-be readers and viewers really, really don’t like us. They certainly don’t trust us. And so when Trump calls ABC News reporter Tom Llamas “a sleaze” and Llamas responds with pained indignation, who do you suppose wins that confrontation? “Why am I a sleaze?” Llamas protested. “You’re a sleaze because you know the facts and you know the facts well,” Trump replied. Trump never apologizes and never backs down. The media may despise him, but voters despise the media more. That’s why he’s winning. Hillary follows his lead – badly. Trump has run a non-traditional campaign and defied all expectations and expert predictions so far. Meantime, Clinton has rebooted her campaign four or five times since April. Clinton doesn’t know how to respond to Trump. The campaign is peddling the catchphrase, “Love Trumps Hate.” But as Adams points out, that’s a terrible slogan. “Humans put greater cognitive weight on the first part of a sentence than the last part,” he writes. “This is a well-understood phenomenon. And the first part literally pairs LOVE and TRUMP.”

#### ( ) Relations advantage outweighs — vital to prevent existential nuclear conflict and solve global problems like warming. Close superpower ties are more important than a single presidency.

#### ( ) Orlando thumps — terror fears hurt Obama’s approval ratings and feed Trump’s narrative.

#### ( ) China policy not key and link is inevitable

He, 16 --- He Yafei is former vice minister of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State Council, and former vice minister at the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China US Focus, “U.S. Election and Its Impact on China”, 1/25, http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/u-s-election-and-its-impact-on-china/

Here comes China, whose economic growth and military modernization in recent years represents, to American people, a world that undergoes rapid changes and evolves to a multipolar one where the US is no longer being able to call shot on everything. The resentment against globalization is on the rise. Overall strategic retrenchment and an emphatic shift to focus more on China are taking place simultaneously. “Scapegoating” China is inevitable. “China has taken jobs away from American workers”. “China is manipulating its currency to gain advantage in trade”. “China is being aggressive in the South China Sea and trying to drive the US out of the Western Pacific”. The list of complaints can go on and on. It doesn’t matter whether those accusations and complaints are true or not to American politicians and voters as long as they have “election value”. For instance, the renminbi has appreciated against the US dollar to the tune of 30% since 2008, but voices are still strong in America calling for the RMB to appreciate further. We all know from experience that China-bashing is common and “cost-free” in US elections. This time around is no different. What is different is that while without agreeing to the concept of “G2”, there is a broad recognition that the US and China are the two major powers in today’s world. It is no hyperbole to say that nothing gets done without close cooperation between the two nations, be it climate change, energy security, non-proliferation of WMD, etc. In this connection the US election does have an impact on China and US-China relations as noted by Robert Manning, who said the US-China relationship enters “dangerous waters” in 2016. What can be done to counteract the negative spillover from the US election this year? On the one hand, there need to be more cooperative actions from both sides to reinforce the relationship. Climate change is one, cooperation in the Middle East is another. To quicken the pace of negotiation on BIT is definitely useful with emphasis on shortening the “negative list”. The US-China relationship is simply too important for both nations not to make extra efforts in election years to make it stronger in the face of increased headwind. On the other hand, we ought to stay calm and ready to meet any possible frictions and challenges in close coordination and consultation to minimize damage to the bilateral relations. We have to understand that “China-bashing” is more words than actions. Any new administration once in the White House will be more realistic and down-to-earth in its China policy as determined by shared interests of both nations worldwide.In reality, China has not been the key issue in the election so far despite some rhetoric by candidates from both parties. To prioritize the issues that voters care about most, the threat posed by terrorist organizations such as IS ranks at the top of the list. Next comes illegal immigration because as of now there are between 12 million to 20 million illegals residing in the US depending on how you estimate them. Further down the list is tax policy. As is often quoted, “There are two things certain in life. One is death and the other is taxes”. Another concern that comes before China is the dangerous situation in the Middle East. So you can see clearly that China figures rather low on this “worry list” in the minds of American voters.

#### ( ) Surprises thump — this election is historically unpredictable. Something bigger than the plan is likely to happen between now and November.

#### ( ) Link not unique — Trump already captured China-specific anti-Trade rhetoric via his opposition to Obama’s TPP.

#### ( ) No impact — Trump’s agenda will go nowhere – Congress checks.

Ferguson 5-8-16. [Niall, professor of history at Harvard and a senior fellow of the Hoover Institution at Stanford, "Keep calm — the Constitution will constrain Trump" Boston Globe -- https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2016/05/08/keep-calm-constitution-will-constrain-trump/vb06y2Q2O5khvkZKdHl7pI/story.html]

The only half-decent argument for keeping calm is that the Constitution was purpose-built to constrain a man like Trump. To see why the separation of powers still matters, just consider what Trump says he is going to do if he wins. By the end of his first 100 days as president, Trump assured The New York Times recently, his wall along the Mexican border would be designed and his blanket ban on Muslim immigration would be in place. On Day 1, those American companies that have the temerity to employ people abroad would be threatened with punitive fines. Finally, Trump would impose an across-the-board tariff on Chinese imports. “We can’t continue to allow China to rape our country,” he declared at a rally last weekend. Now for the good news. He can do almost none of this if Congress opposes him. According to the Constitution (Article I, Section 8), it is not the president but Congress that has the power to regulate immigration, taxation, and trade. The president’s principal power lies in his being commander in chief of the armed forces. Even his right to make treaties is conditional on “the advice and consent” of the Senate. In short, the Donald’s antiglobalization program depends on his being able to muster majorities in Congress. How easy is that going to be when the speaker of the House — a Republican — can’t bring himself to endorse Trump and the Democrats stand a good chance of retaking the Senate?

#### ( ) No warming impact — Paris can’t be repealed and congressional gridlock will prevent Clinton *or* Trump from implementing their climate agendas.

#### ( ) Protectionism advantage outweighs — causes WMD conflict and collapses the global economy. Free trade is more important than a single presidency — plan creates a structural framework that survives Trump.

#### ( ) No warming extinction — no consensus for catastrophic scenarios

Kopits et al 14 -- National Center for Environmental Economics, US Environmental Protection Agency; Alex Marten, Ann Wolverton (Elizabeth, 9/1/2014, "Incorporating ‘catastrophic’ climate change into policy analysis," Climate Policy 14(5), Galileo)

It is common within the academic and public discourse on climate change for the term ‘catastrophe’ to be invoked when describing possible outcomes of a changing climate and in justifying particular responses to the problem. It has been suggested that the potential for abrupt, large-scale ‘catastrophic impacts’ due to climate change is the most important aspect for determining the optimal level of response (Pindyck & Wang, 2012; Weitzman, 2009) and that ‘the economic case for a stringent GHG abatement policy, if it is to be made at all, must be based on the possibility of a catastrophic outcome’ (Pindyck, 2012). Thus, it is perhaps not surprising that analyses of GHG mitigation benefits are often criticized for failing to adequately capture catastrophic impacts (e.g. National Academy of Sciences, 2010; Tol, 2009). However, despite the seeming importance of such potential climate change-related events, there has been little progress in defensibly integrating catastrophic impacts into analyses of the benefits of climate policy. One obstacle that has impeded progress on this front is the inconsistent and sometimes nebulous way in which the expression ‘catastrophic impacts’ has been used (Hulme, 2003). The term often refers to any climate-induced impact that exhibits one or more characteristics: relatively sudden occurrence, irreversible transition to a new state after crossing a threshold, and relatively large physical or welfare impacts. In addition, some researchers consider catastrophic impacts to necessarily result from low-probability events. For this reason the types of impacts covered under the catastrophic label are often numerous and heterogeneous, everything from dieback of Amazon rainforests over the coming decades to the potential massive release of methane emissions from the sea floor over the next thousand years (Lenton et al., 2008). Some have even argued for establishing a global threshold for climate change, below which there is negligible risk of violating ‘planetary boundaries’ that ‘define the safe operating space for humanity’ ... [and] avoid crossing threshold levels of key variables ‘with deleterious or potentially even disastrous consequences for humans’ scales’ (Rockstrom et al., 2009, p. 472).1 In public discourse, catastrophic impacts are often invoked as a seemingly monolithic occurrence,2 a tendency that is also often present in economic analyses of such events. By assuming uniformity, researchers have severely limited their ability to substantively inform policy discussions. This tendency may arise from an absence of literature that summarizes significant differences between potential large-scale climate events and what that means for incorporating them into economic analysis. In addition, many economic modelling efforts fall substantially short in incorporating scientific evidence regarding the causes, likelihood, and potential physical impacts of such climate change-induced events. While one expects a natural lag in the incorporation of new scientific findings into economic models, this shortcoming appears to stem more from fundamental differences between disciplines as to what constitutes relatively rapid or large changes (the scientific literature does not even use the term catastrophe, instead relying on the phrase ‘abrupt climate change’) and the appropriate end points to measure in policy analysis. Both of these concerns have been observed by natural scientists (e.g. Hulme, 2003), and calls are increasing across the scientific community for more research on welfare impacts, with better links to the scientific evidence on how physical processes are likely to unfold (e.g. Lenton, 2011; Lenton & Ciscar, 2013).

# \*\*\*\*AFF CASE BACKLINES START HERE

## Backline Solvency for CFIUS

### Solvency – advocate for less security review

#### China seeks CFIUS reforms

Chen ‘15

Chen Jie is a journalist and editor with The Xinhua News Agency. This evidence internally cites Li Daokui, director of Tsinghua University's Center for China in the World Economy and Jeffery Schott, senior fellow at the PIIE. The PIIE is The Peterson Institute for International Economics, and is a private and non-profit think tank focused on international economics, based in Washington, D.C. According to the 2014 Global Go To Think Tank Index Report (Think Tanks and Civil Societies Program, University of Pennsylvania), Peterson is number 15 (of 150) in the "Top Think Tanks Worldwide" - “China, U.S. pin high hopes on Xi's visit for breakthrough in BIT talks” - Source: Xinhua- Sept 20th - http://english.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/pla-daily-commentary/2015-09/20/content\_6689649.htm

Many Chinese companies have been put to the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), an inter-agency organization tasked to review foreign investors' acquisition activities in the country, for national security reasons. The number of Chinese companies subject to such reviews is disproportionately high considering China's relatively small investment scale in the United States. 　　As a result, Chinese firms are facing rising uncertainties and restraints when investing in the U.S. soil. Jeffery Schott, senior fellow at the PIIE, said there is a need to improve the transparency of the CFIUS. "What the BIT can do is to increase the transparency of the CFIUS procedure to ensure that it is a narrowed focus." China hopes that the U.S. side could treat Chinese enterprises equally, remove its discriminating practices, and drop the wrong hypothesis that all Chinese investments have a governmental background with untold political and military motives, Li said.

#### China seeks US reforms to CFIUS review

Dollar ‘15

David Dollar, Senior Fellow, John L. Thornton China Center, Brookings Institution – “United States - China Two -way Direct Investment : Opportunities and Challenges” – January - http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2015/02/23-us-china-two-way-direct-investment-dollar/us-china-two-way-direct-investment-dollar.pdf

In the other direction, a large amount of potential Chinese investment into the U.S. gets reviewed by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the U.S. (CFIUS), an inter-agency body that reviews mergers and acquisitions for potential national security issues. In 2012, China topped the list of countries whose proposed transactions were reviewed by CFIUS. In that year China accounted for 4% of FDI in to the U.S., but fully 20% of CFIUS cases. 11 On the positive side, CFIUS only reviews a small number of transactions each year (114 in 2012), and most of these move ahead (though often with some mitigation). On the negative side, the fact that a number of high - profile Chinese investments have been blocked by CFIUS affects the overall climate for Chinese investment in the U.S. These cases include CFIUS blocking Sany Group’s acquisition of four small wind farms on the grounds that they are located close to U.S. military facilities and CFIUS preventing Huawei’s acquisition of 3Leaf, a high - technology firm. Chinese policy - makers and entrepreneurs perceive CFIUS to be a major obstacle to increased Chinese investment in the U.S. The commentary about CFIUS in t he Chinese press and on the internet is quite negative: CFIUS, a mysterious committee that keeps confidential its investigation process, objection reason and legal explanation , has been considered a roadblock in overseas investment in the U.S. by many Chinese companies , and even denounced as a tool for trade protection. -- Caixin, January 2014

#### China’s opposed to vague “national security” clause in US CFIUS reviews.

Moran ‘15

Dr. Theodore H. Moran holds the Chair in International Business and Finance at the School of Foreign Service, *Georgetown University*, where he teaches and conducts research at the intersection of international economics, business, foreign affairs, and public policy. Dr. Moran is founder of the Landegger Program in International Business Diplomacy, and serves as Director in providing courses on international business-government relations and negotiations. Dr. Moran is consultant to the United Nations, to diverse governments in Asia and Latin America and received his PhD from Harvard. “Chinese Investment and CFIUS: Time for an Updated (and Revised) Perspective” - Policy Brief: NUMBER PB15-17 – Peterson Institute for International Economics – September - https://piie.com/publications/pb/pb15-17.pdf

China complains that the regulatory process surrounding foreign acquisition of US companies is opaque, unreliable, highly politicized, and discriminatory against Chinese firms, with allegations that national security is used as a guise to block controversial takeovers. Is this an accurate appraisal? Looking at the past, the Chinese complaints are not without reason. China first experienced the politics in Washington surrounding a foreign acquisition in 2005, when CNOOC, a 70 percent government-owned national oil company, proposed to buy the US oil company Unocal (Moran 2009; Moran and Oldenski 2013; Bergsten, Hufbauer, and Miner 2014).

#### Plan solves - China’s pushing for the US to loosen security exemptions.

Li ‘16

et al; Li Qiaoyi is a reporter with the Global Times that writes for the newspaper’s Opinion Pages. Internally quoting Chen Deming, president of the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits - “China-US investment treaty talks near last stage “ – Global Times – March 24th - http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/975689.shtml

Since China and the US started the BIT negotiations in 2008, there have been 24 rounds of talks. In 2013, the two sides reached a major breakthrough when they began discussing each other's negative list, which identifies all the areas that are not open to investors. Just last week, Premier Li Keqiang said at a news conference after the conclusion of the annual legislative session in Beijing that the two sides are making efforts to speed up the BIT talks and that China will gradually increase market access for US investors, adding that the process should be mutual. "The US should also be more open to China, not only in terms of market access, but also in the review aspect where more transparency is needed," Chen, who is currently president of the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits, said at a BFA panel discussion on Wednesday. China became the US' largest trading partner in 2015 with bilateral trade reaching $560 billion, so a treaty between the two countries would have a major impact on the world economy, according to Chen. He also noted that China and the US have already reached a high-standard foreign investment agreement on the BIT, though negotiations remain.

### Solvency – softening CFIUS review solves

#### CFIUS-specific plan mechanism

Ou ‘16

David Ou is a Master of Public Policy candidate at the Luskin School of Public Affairs at UCLA. David is interested in international and regional development and the role of business and trade in creating a common prosperity. Before returning to school to pursue his Master’s at UCLA, David conducted field research projects as a student at Fudan University, completed an independent research project on private enterprises in the Pearl River Delta, and developed business opportunities with a local trading company in Southeast Asia. “Mayhem and Accusations: US-China Investment Politics” – From the Magazine: The Generation - May 17, 2016 - http://the-generation.net/mayhem-and-accusations-us-china-investment-politics/

Last month, a Chinese delegation of engineers and contractors came to Los Angeles to explore the possibility of starting a waste management facility. Before they asked about investment opportunities and local regulations, their first question was about the likelihood of their potential investment running afoul with the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS). CFIUS is a little-known agency that reviews foreign transactions that could result in control of an American business. Under President George W. Bush, it notably blocked Dubai Ports World’s attempted acquisition of six US ports, including the Port of New York and New Jersey. More recently, in 2012, CFIUS required Chinese-owned Ralls Corporation to retroactively divest from a wind farm in proximity to a military facility without due process; both settled the resulting suit in 2015. US-China investments are, not surprisingly, filled with controversy. Business and commerce are becoming an increasing part of the countries’ rivalry. Both countries accuse each other of economic hostilities. China accuses the US of encirclement with the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement and electronic intelligence collection in the country. The US accuses China of intellectual property violations and cyber and industrial espionage. The suspicion has led many in America to become wary of China’s investments, especially in military-sensitive areas like semiconductors. In February, Fairchild Semiconductors rejected a Chinese acquisition offer for an inferior US offer because of possible CFIUS intervention. In 2015, Tsinghua Holdings, a state-owned enterprise (SOE) invested in by Tsinghua University, attempted to purchase a number of semiconductor enterprises including a bid for a unit of Philips. Philips rejected the deal over concerns expressed by CFIUS revolving around gallium nitride, a next-generation microchip material, which US anti-air Patriot Missile systems use. These issues with Chinese investments partly stem from the fundamental economic nature of the Chinese state. The Chinese state is very much an economic state, with the line between politics and business frequently blurred. SOEs consist of over 40 percent of China’s non-agricultural GDP. Even after extensive privatization within the past few decades, SOEs continue to occupy a significant position of power as strategic “pillars” of the economy; economic success is political success. Top executives of key SOEs are privileged with red phones that connect directly with China’s party elite and other SOE executives. The Chinese state frequently promotes “national champions,” companies that not only seek profit but also support national interests. SOEs are normally supported to keep an economic sector Chinese, or secure sectors like steel and telecommunications from failure. For example, UnionPay is considered “the champ of all national champions” by dominating the Chinese credit card industry as a monopoly. Critics attribute UnionPay’s supremacy to state protection with unwarranted foreign entry bans. It is easy to see the incentives for the Chinese to conduct industrial espionage if the state is literally invested in the economy. With an intimate state-business relationship, US concerns will not easily be mollified as Chinese investments continue to increase. Fortunately, a US-China bilateral investment treaty (BIT) that has been under negotiation since 2013 seems to be reaching its conclusion this year. Its details are not yet available to the public but the agreement could potentially offer clarity and protection to investors on both sides of the Pacific with clearer CFIUS determination criteria for foreign investors and proper regulations on SOE investments to alleviate American fears. By working out a proper agreement, legitimate investors will be able to make efficient economic decisions rather than take on suboptimal investments they think will be approved by CFIUS. But, as the Presidential election cycle winds up this year, more anti-trade and anti-treaty sentiments will rise. Donald Trump, the presumptive Republican candidate, has tapped and fomented anti-Chinese sentiments with vitriolic attacks on bilateral trade and economic relations, threatening the BIT’s future. This is a shame. The US stands to benefit the most from foreign direct investment because of its low domestic savings and, in some cases, by allowing investments to resurrect local economies. In setting up mutually agreed upon rules, both countries may reduce the mayhem and accusations that inhibit business and investment as well as a robust US-China relationship. Such stability will allow investors like last month’s waste delegation to first ask how their investment will thrive rather than how it will survive.

### Narrowing CFIUS solves

#### Narrowing the ambiguity of CFIUS reassures Chinese investors and supports a Bilateral Investment Treaty.

Perles ‘12

Joshua K. Perles - J.D. Candidate, New York University School of Law, 2013. “BECOMING THE GOOSE THAT LAYS GOLDEN EGGS: PROTECTING U.S. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN CHINA THROUGH CHINESE INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES” - New York University Journal of International Law and Politics - 45 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 259 – lexis; allrev

Amending CFIUS Review There are currently several barriers to Chinese direct investment in the United States; principal among them is U.S. political review of investment transactions. n142 The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) is a nine-member panel composed of presidential appointees from various agencies n143 that is tasked with reviewing the national security implications of foreign investment transactions. n144 Unfortunately, there is substantial evidence that "national security" has become a pretext for protectionist and anti-Chinese political motivations. n145 The legislation that created CFIUS contains no definition of "national security," n146 and this ambiguity is often used to pursue illegitimate objectives. n147 This broad power of [\*283] review is increasingly used to scrutinize, delay, and derail mergers and acquisitions, particularly those originating in China. n148 For example, CFIUS intervened when a Shaanxi-based, state-owned enterprise attempted to acquire a USD $ 26.5 million majority stake in Firstgold, a Nevada gold-mining corporation. n149 Ostensibly, CFIUS was concerned with the mines' proximity to a Navy airbase, n150 but it is difficult to imagine how Chinese control of four gold mines 50 miles from an airbase poses a significant threat to national security. Rather, some industry experts interpreted the decision as U.S. resistance to China's "hoarding" of gold. n151 CFIUS can even investigate foreign acquisitions post-closing. For example, after Huawei acquired U.S. server technology firm 3Leaf, CFIUS retroactively reviewed the deal, eventually "recommending" that Huawei divest itself of 3Leaf. n152 Huawei reluctantly complied. n153 CFIUS's concerns allegedly arose because Huawei was founded by a former member of the People's Liberation Army (PLA). n154 Once again, barring more specific information, it is difficult to understand how a corporation presents a significant national security risk simply because it was founded by a PLA veteran. Even though CFIUS rarely uses its formal authority to block transactions, a few high profile cases n155 have had a disproportionate [\*284] chilling effect on Chinese investors. n156 Placing CFIUS review beyond the influence of political actors - perhaps by granting it a measure of independence or amending its authority n157 - would go a long way towards reassuring foreign investors. Ultimately, what matters is the perception of Chinese investors, and at present they have very little about which to feel reassured. n158 2. Concluding a Specialized Bilateral Investment Treaty The U.S. government should not only remove barriers like CFIUS but also should actively encourage Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) in U.S. IP-producing firms. One way to encourage such investment is through the creation of a specialized bilateral investment treaty (BIT). Though they vary in specific content, BITs guarantee investors of the treaty states international legal protections when investing in the other treaty state (e.g., "fair and equitable treatment," "national treatment," "most favored nation treatment," and protection against "denial of justice," as well as access to various international arbitration forums). n159 BITs do not necessarily result in increased FDI, but they are most likely to do so when they co-occur with strong economic factors in the host state (e.g., quality of labor, infrastructure, access to natural resources, per capita GDP, and the size and growth of the economy). n160 As the United States is already the world's top recipient of FDI, n161 it [\*285] offers an attractive economic environment, and a BIT with China could help generate investment through a more hospitable regulatory environment.

### A-to “BIT wouldn’t pass the US Senate”

#### Senate would approve a BIT – business pressure’s a game-changer.

Xinhua ‘15

Internally quoting David Dollar, currently a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and formerly an economic and financial emissary to China in the US Department of Treasury. Also internally quoting Adam Posen, president of Washington-based Peterson Institute for International Economics - “Investment treaty to top China-US S&ED agenda, doable under Obama administration” – Original Source: Xinhuanet.com – 2015-June-23 obtained via: http://www.newsgd.com/news/2015-06/23/content\_126864324\_2.htm

Once the investment treaty is struck, it would require a two- thirds vote in the US Senate for approval. "My feeling is the ratification will have to wait until after the next presidential election," said Huang. "We often have a situation where a trade agreement is negotiated under one president, and then approved under the next one, and even if the party switches," echoed Dollar, citing the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), covering Canada, Mexico and the US, as an example to illustrate his point of view. NAFTA was first negotiated under former Republican President George H.W. Bush, and then approved under the following Democratic President Bill Clinton. "I think basically they would vote yes because they would be hearing from, particularly from American business community. This is very important for the development of the US economy," Dollar said of the Senate's support for BIT. Posen was confident that the BIT would be finally approved by the Senate, though the US and China have had tensions over issues such as the South China Sea dispute, cyber security. "The US has successfully in the past segregated economic issues from political issues," Posen said, "We have areas of difference. We have areas of common interests. The BIT is in both countries' interests." "The Senate tends to be more mature in dealing with these issues than the House," Posen said, adding that's why the US Constitution stipulates foreign treaties should be approved by the Senate instead of the House.

#### a BIT would pass the US Senate

Rapoza ‘14

Kenneth Rapoza reports for Dow Jones, The Wall Street Journal and Barron’s. This evidence is internally quoting Neal Asbury, CEO of The Legacy Companies. Asbury is a member of the International Policy Committee of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce in Washington D.C. Asbury has received the E-Star Export Award and the Export Achievement Award from the U.S. Department of Commerce. Asbury's company was recognized as National Champion Exporter of The Year “China Says U.S. Investment Treaty On 'Fast Track'” - Forbes – July 10th - http://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2014/07/10/china-says-u-s-investment-treaty-on-fast-track/#5e675c1d4930

Further negotiations will be held in Washington DC in late July. Both sides want to get a document prepared to send to their respective lawmakers. In the U.S., that means U.S. Trade Representative, Treasury and State hammering out a document they can get to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. From there, it would go to a vote in the Senate. “If a (bilateral investment treaty) was going up today, it would pass the Senate,” said Neal Asbury, CEO of The Legacy Companies, manufacturers of food service equipment. ”We need this treaty. China can pretty much buy anything they want over here, and we cannot do the same in China.”

### A-to “Plan makes low quality BIT”

#### ( ) “high quality” is a code-word for “US demands every detail without compromise”. That stance will fail – proving the turn non-unique.

#### ( ) BIT is already “high quality” – The Aff’s negotiating stance doesn’t change that.

Li ‘16

et al; Li Qiaoyi is a reporter with the Global Times that writes for the newspaper’s Opinion Pages. Internally quoting Chen Deming, president of the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits - “China-US investment treaty talks near last stage “ – Global Times – March 24th - http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/975689.shtml

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#### Plan solves the turns – it cultivates Chinese acceptance of higher standards for incoming US investments.

Aoki ‘13

et al; Yohsuke Aoki is currently The Deputy Director, Administrative Coordination Division, Minister's Secretariat Ministry of Defense of Japan and co-authored this paper while in a MA program at Columbia University School of International and Public Affairs This paper is a Capstone Project for The Brookings Institution and with Dr. Irene Finel-Honigman served as The Capstone Advisor. Dr. Irene Finel-Honigman is an Adjunct Professor of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University - “Chinese Foreign Direct Investment in the United States” - https://sipa.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/AY13\_Brookings\_FinalReport.pdf

Last but not least, inward FDI can serve other U.S. economic and strategic interests in facing China’s rise. By welcoming Chinese investments, the U.S. would encourage China to keep its doors open to American investments. As argued by Ambassador Shaun E. Donnelly, “China has come an incredibly long way in its investment policies, as in so many other areas, over the past 30 years...but China has not yet established an open, market- based investment regime. Far from it. Screenings, controls, restrictions, informal pressures, forced localization, and political interventions unfortunately remain central to the Chinese investment system.” To continually drive forward Chinese convergence with liberal international economic order depends on America’s continuing demonstration of the virtues of openness. Take the potential bilateral investment treaty (BIT) as an example. Both governments recognize its important role in improving bilateral economic relations and have begun cabinet-level negotiations since 2008. There is no doubt that ongoing discussion requires America’s continuing open and welcome attitude towards inward FDI from China. Furthermore, increasing Chinese investments can enhance Chinese investors’ compliance with global business norms when an increasing number of Chinese companies are exposed to U.S. or western standards of corporate governance, public reporting, and acquisition financing. One of the three principles of the Obama administration’s China policy is that “while welcoming China’s rise...it is essential that this occurs within the context of international law and norms.” Having inward FDI from China can be an effective means that forces Chinese investors, particularly Chinese state-owned investors, to abide by U.S. rules and institutions.

#### BIT broadly spurs the economic reform agenda within China

Morrison ‘15

Wayne M. Morrison, Specialist in Asian Trade and Finance for the Congressional Research Service - China-U.S. Trade Issues - December 15, 2015 - Congressional Research Service - https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33536.pdf

Many analysts contend the negotiation of a U.S. - China BIT could have significant implications for bilateral commercial relations and the Chinese economy. According to USTR, Michael Froman, such an agreement “ offer a major opportunity to engage on China’s domestic economic reforms and to pursue greater market access, a more level playing field, and a substantially improved investment environment for U.S. firms in China. ” 106 For China, a high - standard BIT could help facilitate greater competition in China and result in more efficient use of resources, factors which economists contend could boost economic growth. Some observers contend that China’s pursuit of a BIT with the United States represents a strategy that is being used by reformers in China to jumpstart widespread economic reforms (which appear to have been stalled in recent years). This strategy, it is argued, is similar to that used by Chinese reformers in their efforts to get China into the WTO in 2001. Such international agreements may give political cover to economic reformers because they can argue that the agreements build on China’s efforts to become a leader in global affairs. This may make it harder for vested interests in China who benefit from the status quo to resist change.

### A-to “CFIUS not key – Congressional or Public Pressure outweigh”

#### CFIUS is key – it outweighs Congressional or Public Pressure.

Miner ‘15

et al; SEAN MINER is China program manager and research associate at the Peterson Institute for International Economics. The Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE; Peterson Institute) is a private and non-profit think tank focused on international economics, based in Washington, D.C. According to the 2014 Global Go To Think Tank Index Report (Think Tanks and Civil Societies Program, University of Pennsylvania), Peterson is number 15 (of 150) in the "Top Think Tanks Worldwide" - From the Chapter “COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UN AND THE US-CHINA BILATERAL INVESTMENTTREA" CHALLENGES IN MEETING CHINA'S DEMANDS” – From the paper “TOWARD A US-CHINA INVESTMENT TREATY” - PIIE Briefing 15-1 - February 2015 –Modified for potentially objectionable language - https://piie.com/publications/briefings/piieb15-1.pdf

Since the FINSA reform of CFIUS legislation in 2007, US domestic political pressure has been less effective in stopping transactions. During Shuanghui International's purchase of Smithfields in 2013, the largest pork producer in the United States, there was significant congressional opposition to a Chinese firm taking over an important part of US food supply, but congressional pressure was not strong enough to force Shuanghui to withdraw its bid. The bid subsequently passed a CFIUS investigation and the acquisition was completed in July 2013. This may have been partly due to greater Chinese experience at acquiring US firms, and therefore increasing confidence by the Chinese investors that they could withstand public criticism and just focus on national security concerns. Shuanghui started educating public opinion early and hired skillful lawyers and consultants to guide the Chinese parent through the process. Moreover, there was no legitimate security concern in this case, just the fact that an important American company would be sold to a Chinese company. Shuanghui's skill in navigating both the CFIUS process and potential congressional opposition provides a teaching lesson to other Chinese firms that seek to acquire "brand name" US firms.

### A-to “TPP ruins the BIT”

#### Finalizing the BIT will check any negative effect that TPP may have on relations.

China Today ‘15

“Heads Together on the China-U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaty” – June 2nd – Modified for potentially objectionable language - http://www.chinatoday.com.cn/english/columns/2015-06/02/content\_690482.htm

As a bilateral treaty, the aim of the BIT is to encourage citizens of both countries to invest in one another and to promote and protect such investment. Its content encompasses protection, investment treatment, expropriation and compensation, currency exchange, and dispute resolution. Both China and the United States have signed BITs with other countries. As the top two world economies, they have, under a deep political and economic background, been doing their utmost to advance negotiations. Since the financial crisis of 2008, the international economy has gone through significant adjustment. New features are apparent in the economic situation and relations between China and the United States, and their domestic and foreign policies. The start and accomplishment of the BIT now seems to be in sight (attainable). First of all, the treaty addresses both China and the United States’ need for economic reform. Following profound changes in demographic structure, production factor prices, and the international economic situation, the Chinese economy has bid farewell to its golden period of two-digit growth and entered a “new normal” of slower growth and an adjusted development mode. Releasing further reform dividends and promoting a higher-level of opening-up has become an important consensus of the new-generation Chinese leadership. This became evident during the Third Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, when it was elevated to a national strategy. Having been hit hard by the financial crisis, the United States has started to reflect on its development mode. While strengthening its virtual economy management, the Obama administration must also revitalize the manufacturing industry in an all-out effort to reinvigorate the real economy. It can thus improve people’s well-being and consolidate its world “leading status.” Both sides require healthier, more sustainable development and better, safer investment to propel their reforms. The changes in the two countries’ economic structure and economic policies constitute the foundation for signing the bilateral investment treaty. The treaty also adapts to changes in China-U.S. economic relations. The global economy downturn had a grim effect on China’s exports, which have picked up little since the American economy recovered. The excessive production capacity of some of China’s commodities, and U.S. protectionism towards China are significant factors in the slow growth of China’s exports to the United States. China’s investment in the United States, however, has grown rapidly. Ministry of Commerce statistics show that it rose from US $1.88 billion in 2007 to US $9.3 billion in 2012. Meanwhile China’s direct investment in the United States reached US $8.023 billion in 2013, and the compound annual growth rate grew to 41.54 percent from 2009 to 2013, ranking first worldwide, according to U.S. Department of Commerce statistics. The U.S. Rhodium Group long-term follow-up study of Chinese investment shows that Chinese enterprises’ investment in the United States broke the US $10 million barrier in 2014, when it hit US $12 billion. The “going global” strategy of Chinese enterprises and capital tallies with the Obama administration’s “choose the U.S” policy of inviting outside investment. This has had profound impact on China- U.S. trade and investment relations. It is interesting to note that, due to multiple factors, the trend of U.S. direct investment in China in recent years appears to be that of stagnation or even decline. Maintaining its attraction for Western capital, including from the U.S., through reform and opening-up is part of China’s efforts to promote the bilateral investment treaty. The treaty also offers a way of managing the two countries’ strategic relations. Since 2010, the U.S. has been promoting the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP) and Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). Both are efforts to reverse the negative effects of the financial crisis and globalization and to reinvent international trade and investment rules to impose higher standards more in line with American interests. China, which is excluded, seems to be facing a challenge similar to that of 2001 when it sought to join the WTO. Under the backdrop of intensified Sino-U.S. strategic competition, growing risks of military confrontation and mounting economic and trade frictions, decision-makers in both countries have proved their leadership skills by controlling bilateral relations. To China, the benefits of proactively promoting Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and Sino-EU and Sino-U.S. bilateral investment treaty negotiations are twofold: both are (1) conducive to strengthening its economic strength and influence and (2) to maintaining the role of trade and economy in stabilizing the bilateral relations. They also contribute to building new major-country relations. The combination of multiple subjective and objective factors thus places the item, “forming a unified management standard for foreign capital entering the other country” firmly on the agenda.

#### TPP concerns wont ruin the positive effects of a BIT

Sanchez ‘15

The Diplomat‘s Ankit Panda spoke with Francisco Sanchez, former Under Secretary of commerce for international trade at the Department of Commerce – “Forging the Trans-Pacific Partnership: An Insider's Take” – The Diplomat - June 10, 2015 – http://thediplomat.com/2015/06/forging-the-trans-pacific-partnership-an-insiders-take/

What, if any, effect do the TPP negotiations have on the United States-China Bilateral Investment Treaty negotiations? While China is not currently part of the TPP, Secretary of Commerce Penny Pritzker has made it clear that the deal is open to all in the Pacific region, including China. To date, China has decided to pursue its own trade initiatives. Regardless of the Chinese decision on TPP, however, the Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) stands on its own as a common sense policy for both China and the United States. It will establish binding rules to guide future of investments between the United States and China that are beneficial to both parties. As the United States and China share the most important economic relationship in the world, with trade between them totaling over $550 billion every year, such rules are needed to maintain stable commerce in the future. I think that both the U.S. and China recognize this. At Secretary [of State John] Kerry’s recent meeting with China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi, Wang stated that both sides should move more quickly to finalize BIT. I am optimistic that this will happen soon.

### China will say “Yes”

#### China will say “Yes” – recent history proves they’re willing to sign BIT’s.

Zeng ‘ 16

et al; Ka Zeng is Professor of Political Science and Director of Asian Studies at the University of Arkansas. From the article: “Variation in Bilateral Investment Treaty Provisions and Foreign Direct Investment Flows to China, 1997–2011” – From the Journal: International Interactions - Published online: March 22nd, 2016 – Taylor and Francis Database – available via http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03050629.2016.1164460

China’s phenomenal economic growth in the past decades has been fueled in large part by the influx of FDI into the country. While traditionally a capital importer, the country has quickly emerged as a capital exporter as a result of the transformation of the economy from a centrally planned to a market-oriented one, spearheaded by the adoption of the “Going Global” strategy in 2008 and the country’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001 (Cai 2006). The growing importance of FDI for the Chinese economy has accentuated the importance of BITs as a policy instrument to protect and promote both inward and outward FDI. Since the conclusion of its first BIT with Sweden in 1982, China has signed 130 treaties as of June 2013, making it one of the most active users of BITs worldwide.2 About one-third (42 of the 130) of the BITs China have signed so far are with high-income economies, with the rest of the BITs being with lower-income economies. Content analysis of Chinese BITs (Berger 2008) reveals three phases in the evolution of China’s BIT policy and a sharp turn in China’s approach toward BITs at the end of the 1990s from a restrictive approach toward a more liberal one featuring stronger protection of foreign investment. While China’s BIT policy prior to the beginning of the 1980s is characterized by considerable hostility toward foreign investors and emphasizes the need to exert sovereign control over FDI entry and regulate foreign investment (Kong 2003), Beijing has started to cautiously support the legal protection of FDI since the beginning of the reform era (Chen 2006). However, it was not until 1998 that China’s approach toward BITs underwent a fundamental shift toward stronger procedural and substantive protection of FDI. Since then, Chinese BITs have increasingly offered foreign investors access to international arbitration under the rules of the ICSID or the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL). Some of these agreements also offer unrestricted national treatment as well as comprehensive absolute standards of treatment to foreign investors without subjecting them to any qualifications, as is the case with some of the earlier agreements (Schill 2007). Overall, the evolution of China’s approach toward BITs in favor of a more liberal one reflects the country’s growing international economic interdependence and the rising importance of not only IFDI but also OFDI to the Chinese economy. The growing importance of BITs as an instrument for China’s FDI governance thus provides us with rich empirical data for analyzing the effect of the design of bilateral investment agreements on their ability to stimulate investment flows between the signatories.

### A-to China’s prioritization of SOE’s means no solvency

#### In BIT negotiations, China will soften its pro-SOE stance.

Jenny ‘15

Nicolas Jenny is a political risk analyst specializing in European and the Asia-Pacific Affairs. Nicolas provides original insight across a range of topics including governance, security, economics, trade and climate change. Nicolas is a contributor to Global Risk Insights and holds a Double Degree as a Master of Chinese Politics and Diplomacy (Europe and Asia in Global Affairs), International Relations and Affairs from Fudan University. “Can a China-US investment treaty bring security to the Asia-Pacific?” – Global Risk Insight - October 6, 2015 - http://globalriskinsights.com/2015/10/can-a-china-us-investment-treaty-bring-security-to-the-asia-pacific/

Several roadblocks must first be addressed by both sides: US legislators are concerned about the favourable terms given to Chinese SOEs & domestic firms and the application of China’s anti-monopoly law; the Chinese are concerned about the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), which has the power to block foreign investment should it be deemed a threat to national security. However, there is a strong impetus for both countries to overcome these issues.

### A-to “China won’t comply with the terms of the BIT”

#### China *will* comply – reputational and financial costs will outweigh

Zeng ‘ 16

et al; Ka Zeng is Professor of Political Science and Director of Asian Studies at the University of Arkansas. From the article: “Variation in Bilateral Investment Treaty Provisions and Foreign Direct Investment Flows to China, 1997–2011” – From the Journal: International Interactions - Published online: March 22nd, 2016 – Taylor and Francis Database – available via http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03050629.2016.1164460

Arguments about why BITs may stimulate FDI emphasize how they can help leaders make effective commitments to FDI protection by providing an effective “hands-tying” mechanism (Fearon 1997), generating sufficient ex post costs to deter the host country from undertaking expropriation, or legitimizing a host market for foreign investors through cognitive or normative processes (Trevino, Thomas, and Cullen 2008). It has been suggested that BITs generate ex post costs of noncompliance by reducing the ambiguity of the host government’s obligations and making it more difficult for a government that has violated its obligations to argue otherwise, bringing reputational and financial costs to bear on countries that fail to abide by the decisions of BITs’ dispute settlement procedure (García-Bolívar and Schmidt 2006; ICSID 2006), directly affecting the diplomatic interests of the home government (Elkins, Guzman, and Simmons 2006; Kerner 2009), and offering the prospect of international arbitration through a set of clearly articulated dispute settlement procedures that make it difficult for states to act in ways that directly contradict their stated principles (Elkins et al. 2006).

#### China will comply and there’s a fallback if they don’t – empirics go Aff.

Frisbie ‘14

John Frisbie is the president of the US-China Business Council (USCBC) and has more than 25 years of experience in business and government relations with China, including nearly 10 years living and working in Beijing. Frisbie received his BA and MBA degrees from the University of Texas at Austin. “Why an Investment Treaty with China Matters”- China Business Review – March 31, 2014 - <http://www.chinabusinessreview.com/why-an-investment-treaty-with-china-matters/>

Can we trust China to honor such an agreement? On the whole, China has a decent albeit not perfect record of complying with agreements that it has signed onto, but the BIT provides an additional way to ensure that it does. It gives the US government and American companies enforceable rules that they can use when China fails to meet its commitments under the BIT.

### A-to “Investors won’t feel comfortable entering the Chinese market”

#### BIT sends a comforting signal to foreign investors

Zeng ‘ 16

et al; Ka Zeng is Professor of Political Science and Director of Asian Studies at the University of Arkansas. From the article: “Variation in Bilateral Investment Treaty Provisions and Foreign Direct Investment Flows to China, 1997–2011” – From the Journal: International Interactions - Published online: March 22nd, 2016 – Taylor and Francis Database – available via http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03050629.2016.1164460

In addition to raising the ex post cost of noncompliance, BITs can create ex ante costs by sending a credible signal to foreign investors about a country’s seriousness in protecting foreign investment (Neumeyer and Spess 2005; Rose-Ackerman and Tobin 2005). Importantly, BITs generate the so-called sovereignty costs for governments that are engaged in the negotiation, ratification, and subsequent compliance of an investment treaty by limiting the ability of a host government to use certain policy tools for domestic social and development purposes (Peterson 2004); providing foreign investors with an advantage over domestic and unprotected investors, who not only have to confront the heightened competition spurred by BITs but also have to navigate the domestic legal system that offers less comprehensive investment protection to investors (Kerner 2009); and raising the political costs for a host government to assemble a coalition in favor of foreign investors’ rights in order for the treaty to be ratified (Elkins et al. 2006).

#### History proves China will pass BITs that comfort investors

Zeng ‘ 16

et al; Ka Zeng is Professor of Political Science and Director of Asian Studies at the University of Arkansas. From the article: “Variation in Bilateral Investment Treaty Provisions and Foreign Direct Investment Flows to China, 1997–2011” – From the Journal: International Interactions - Published online: March 22nd, 2016 – Taylor and Francis Database – available via http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03050629.2016.1164460

For example, compared to BITs signed during the 1980s and much of the 1990s, Chinese BITs signed after 1998 provide much more enhanced absolute and relative standards of treatment to foreign investors. In terms of absolute standards, the 2000 China-Brunei BIT represents the first treaty, other than the 1988 China-Australia one, to guarantee such standards without imposing any qualifications (Berger 2008). With regard to relative standards of treatment, most Chinese BITs signed between 1982 and 1998 merely granted foreign investors MFN status without also providing for national treatment or provided national treatment with certain exemptions.4 In contrast, Chinese BITs signed after 1998 have begun to offer unrestricted national treatment on a permanent basis, especially in relation to developed countries. China’s BITs with the Netherlands, Germany, and Finland—signed in 2001, 2003, and 2004 respectively—all provide examples of unrestricted national treatment. Similarly, more recent Chinese BITs increasingly offer foreign investors access to international arbitration under the rules of the ICSID or the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), with the 1998 China-Barbados or the 2000 China-Botswana BIT offering one of the earliest examples of such provisions.5 Indeed, variation in BIT provisions in the aforementioned areas may differentially affect the host government’s ability to credibly signal its commitment to open and liberal economic policies favorable to foreign investors. First, BITs help to increase the coherence, transparency, predictability, and stability of the host market. To the extent foreign investors have a long-term horizon and expect to deal with multiple agencies during various phases of the investment project, it is important that there will be no sudden changes in host policies adversely affecting investor interests, that the agencies in the host country act in a coherent manner, and that the host country’s laws and regulations are clearly spelled out and communicated to the foreign investor (UNCTAD 2009). BITs address these concerns by clearly establishing the legal obligations of host country authorities in a binding document that the host country cannot contravene unilaterally. For example, absolute and relative standards of treatment provide the overall criteria for judging whether a contracting party is providing fair and satisfactory treatment to foreign investment and for determining how specific provisions should be applied in individual cases (UNCTAD 1998). These principles help to ensure that agencies in the host country observe principles such as fair and equitable treatment and that they behave in a coherent and predictable manner. Treaties that provide greater assurances and a clearer and more transparent framework for interpreting states’ obligations should, therefore, send even more credible signals about a contracting party’s commitment to maintain open markets and a receptive investment environment.

### A-to “BIT won’t boost investment”

#### A Bilateral Investment Treaty would unlock much more investment.

Barshefsky & Long ‘14

Charlene Barshefsky served as U.S. Trade Representative from 1997 to 2001. Long Yongtu served as China's chief WTO negotiator from 1995 to 2001 - “Now Is the Time for U.S.-China Investment Treaty” – Caixin Online - July 7th, 2014 – available via: http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:2fAY-Rfr9PgJ:english.caixin.com/2014-07-07/100700377.html+&cd=14&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us

A BIT can provide the framework to unleash far more investment in both directions. It would ensure that the United States and China provide each other's investors with the ability to buy, sell, and maintain ownership and control of investments, without facing discrimination on the basis of national origin. It would also establish clear criteria by, for example, narrowing national security reviews to those sectors of essential security relevance, as well as limiting other barriers to investment related to intellectual property, technology transfer, technical standards and the treatment of state-owned enterprises. And it would establish credible legal mechanisms for resolving investment disputes.

### A-to “China’s Negative List derails negotiations”

#### The length of China’s “Negative list” won’t derail BIT negotiations.

Xinhua ‘15

Internally quoting Yukon Huang, a senior associate in the Asia Program of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Also internally quoting Adam Posen, president of Washington-based Peterson Institute for International Economics - “Investment treaty to top China-US S&ED agenda, doable under Obama administration” – Original Source: Xinhuanet.com – 2015-June-23 obtained via: http://www.newsgd.com/news/2015-06/23/content\_126864324\_2.htm

China's Vice Finance Minister Zhu Guangyao said in the same month that China had shortened its negative lists for the pilot free trade zones in Shanghai, Guangdong, Tianjin, and Fujian, but the negative list offers for the BIT talks will be decided through tough bilateral negotiations. While China's initial negative list offer "may be longer than the US wants," the fact there's a negative list is already "a huge progress," said Posen, who expected the two countries to move forward the investment treaty talks during the two-day high-level S&ED meetings starting Tuesday. Yukon Huang, a senior associate in the Asia Program of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, said the issue of negative list is "probably overemphasized in some ways" as it's so precise and easy to focus on. "From Chinese side, I think this is still part of the bargain session. They're not going to reveal their automatic intentions without more significant discussions about how it will be handled, " Huang told Xinhua in a separate interview, noting that more flexibility is needed to deal with negative list offers. Huang said it is necessary to realize that "both sides want to have a BIT," as it will help address a number of investment concerns between the US and China, and investors from both countries will get better access to each other's markets.

### A-to “Solvency requires Grand Solution to many issues”

#### We don’t need to “fix” the whole relationship – we only need to improve the most important variables. That checks a short-term spiral.

#### Bolstering ties *doesn’t* require a Grand Solution to many issues

Zhang ‘15

Chin Chin Zhang is a M.A. candidate for International Trade & Investment Policy at George Washington University's Elliott School of International Affairs in 2016. Her study integrates the political, economic and financial dynamics of global currents, with regional focuses on the United States, European Union and China. She worked in the financial services industry while earning her B.S. in Applied Mathematics from University of California-Los Angeles – From the article - “In Response: Simple Ingredients for the Sino-American Partnership” - International Affairs Review - Volume XXIII, Number 3 • Summer 2015 – available at: http://www.iar-gwu.org/sites/default/files/articlepdfs/China%20Special%20Issue%20DOC%20C%20-%2003%20Simple%20Ingredients%20-%20Zhang.pdf

A winning Sino-American partnership does not require a blueprint significant in scale, but rather a few vital steps toward mutual understanding. Essentially, it is time for the United State to respect Chinese sovereignty and trust China's leadership capacity in economic development. In exchange, China needs to further liberalize its capital market, create a fair environment for American and foreign investment, and consider some measures to assume more international responsibility in combating terrorism. The education front, with its fewer conflicts of national interests, provides a pragmatic starting point to build trust. *After that*, policymakers in both nations need to constantly keep in mind a mutually beneficial partnership when deciding each further move.

### US and China *can* deviate from a standard BIT

#### The US and China can deviate from the terms set-forth in a conventional BIT.

Chow ‘15

Daniel C.K. Chow - Professor of Law at The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law. “WHY CHINA WANTS A BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY WITH THE UNITED STATES” - BOSTON UNIVERSITY INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL, Volume 33 – available at: <https://www.bu.edu/ilj/files/2015/04/Chow-Why-China-Wants-a-Bilateral-Investment-Treaty.pdf>

The purpose of a BIT is to provide market access and inject international trade law principles into a domestic legal system in order to protect FDI from discriminatory measures in the host nation.145 A restriction on protectionist measures is expected to increase the flow of FDI to both parties to a BIT. This market access approach underlies the purpose of the 2012 Model BIT. The United States and China could deviate significantly from the Model BIT and exclude some of the basic principles set forth above, but this seems unlikely considering the consistent practice of the United States of basing all recent BITs on Model BITs approved by the State Department.146 Assuming that the United States and China agree on a BIT that is based upon the 2012 Model BIT. this Part of the article examines in detail how a BIT could (1) limit the ability of the United States to block or unravel investment transactions involving China; and (2) further China's own policy initiatives.

## Backlines – US-China Relations

### A-to “Alt cause – X issue hurts relations”

#### BIT key to US-Sino ties – it would allow the US and China to disagree on other issues without risking broad damage to relations.

Lehr ‘15

Deborah Lehr is the Director of the Paulson Institute, located at the University of Chicago. Lehr also served in the US Government as a Deputy Assistant US Trade Representative for China, where she was a lead negotiator for China’s accession to the World Trade Organization, for two intellectual property rights negotiations and was part of the negotiations for the 1992 Market Access Agreement, the United States’s first major bilateral trade agreement with China covering a broad range of sectors. In addition, Lehr was one of the youngest Directors of Asian Affairs at the National Security Council, and was involved in export control and trade policy issues at the Department of Commerce. An economist by training, Lehr built a successful consulting business representing Western and Chinese companies seeking to expand their operations in China and third markets. Her clients included firms such as JP Morgan, Pfizer, Johnson & Johnson, Sesame Workshop, Tory Burch, Goldman Sachs, Sony Music, Time Warner and Boeing. “Why a US-China Bilateral Investment Treaty Matters” – Paulson Institute - February 13, 2015 - http://www.paulsoninstitute.org/paulson-blog/2015/02/13/why-a-us-china-bilateral-investment-treaty-matters/

A bilateral investment treaty (BIT) with China would benefit the economies of both the United States and China, by creating new streams of two-way trade and investment. The growing and interdependent economic relationship between the United States and China is the underlying fabric that binds our countries together. It provides a foundation that allows us to disagree on specific issues without threatening the overall relationship. As China becomes a more active player on the world stage, it’s important for the United States to work with China and to support their entry and full participation in global, rules-based institutions. To delve into the importance of a bilateral investment treaty to both countries, the Paulson Institute—with its partners, Goldman Sachs, the US-China Business Council and the China Development Reform Foundation—convened a US-China CEO Investment Dialogue to explore the implications of a possible agreement to both countries. The discussions included the US Secretary of Commerce, the US Trade Representative, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, the Chinese Ambassador, as well as leading US and Chinese CEOs, Mayors and high level opinion leaders. A lively discussion ensued about potential opportunities for increasing jobs, investment and exports. All agreed that it was important that China continue to be part of the rules based systems on trade. As a former US trade negotiator with China during the WTO and other negotiations, I witnessed first hand how bringing China into the rules based trading systems pays off. In the early 1990s, one of the most transformational commitments we obtained came down to one important line. It simply required China to publish its own trade laws. Previously, China’s trade laws and regulations had been confidential; while companies were expected to abide by them, they could be arrested if they actually read or owned a copy. This requirement of transparency fundamentally changed the trading regime to the benefit of both Chinese and US companies. Two decades later, laws are published and commented on, making the playing field more balanced. China’s WTO accession provided a ten-year road map for opening and reform of China’s economy. It outlined how sectors would open to foreign competition. And both countries benefited from this transparency. Low cost Chinese exports to the United States have increased over 330 percent since the signing of the agreement. And US exports to China rose by 533 percent since China’s accession. Yet that ten-year road map ran out four years ago. A high standard bilateral investment treaty can fill the resulting gap. It would bring greater transparency and consistency to the investment environment for both countries. A bilateral investment treaty would be good for China because the required opening of the market would bring in investments, encouraging more competition in the consumer and services sectors. That in turn would help China achieve its ambitious plan to transform its economic model away from export led growth to a more consumption based model. Such a treaty would also help clarify regulations for Chinese companies investing in the United States. And why would a bilateral investment treaty be good for the United States? For one, it would create a more transparent and level playing field for US companies in China, leading to greater opportunities for US investors. It would also encourage more Chinese companies to invest in the United States as part of the Chinese government’s “going out” initiative to encourage overseas investment. This in turn, would create jobs and opportunities for American workers. There is enormous opportunity to increase trade and investments between the United States and China. So far, Chinese actual investment in the United States, less than $4 billion in 2014, is less than 5 percent of the $101 billion that China invested overseas last year. Clear, transparent regulations about investment in the United States might open the doors to more money coming in, creating new jobs. US investment in China, more than $50 billion, no doubt would increase as the playing field becomes more level. President Xi has set out an ambitious economic reform agenda; just as Premier Zhu Rongji had done at the time of China’s WTO accession. China’s large-scale state owned enterprises and cheap exports are no longer reaping the economic gains they once did. The United States has a unique opportunity to work with China on a new roadmap for future growth. More engagement with China can lead to positive outcomes for both countries. Indeed, we think it’s crucial.

#### A BIT can immediately give momentum to US-Sino ties. Economic ties are key to check downward spirals.

US-China Business Council ‘15

The US-China Business Council (USCBC) is a private, nonpartisan, nonprofit organization of roughly 220 American companies that do business with China. This letter was jointly released with the Paulson Institute at the University of Chicago. This letter – which was sent to President Obama and President Xi – was signed by 94 executives that supported a US-China Bilateral Investment Treaty. The list of co-signers includes: Barbara Hackman Franklin, Former US Secretary of Commerce; Warren E. Buffett, Chief Executive Officer, Berkshire Hathaway; Michael Bloomberg, Founder Bloomberg LP; and Carla A. Hills, Former US Trade Representative. September 14, 2015 – available at: https://www.uschina.org/sites/default/files/Sept%202015%20CEO%20BIT%20letter%20to%20Presidents%20Obama%20and%20Xi%20%28ENG%20%2B%20CHI%29.pdf

On the eve of President Xi’s state visit to the United States, we want to reiterate the importance of strong and mutually-beneficial trade and investment ties between our two countries. As the two largest economies in the world, the United States and China need a positive and enduring commercial relationship, which is an essential anchor for global economic growth. Since China’s reform and opening up began in 1978, bilateral trade and economic relations have grown steadily to become the foundation of the US-China relationship. Our two countries now trade over $600 billion of goods and services. It is because of this robust foundation that throughout the various strains on the relationship, periods of diplomatic tension, and even a severe economic crisis, the economic relationship has endured and remained steady. We fully believe that it is in both of our countries’ interest to take the necessary steps to maintain, strengthen, and expand that relationship. As such, we firmly support the rapid conclusion of a meaningful and high standard Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) between our two countries. As we look at the range of issues on the bilateral agenda, a high-standard BIT – with clear provisions providing equal treatment to each country’s investors and a short list of exceptions – is one of the key items that could make an immediate and tangible impact for both of our economies. Just as China’s accession to the World Trade Organization in 2001 stimulated dramatic growth in bilateral trade, concluding a BIT agreement will provide greater transparency and consistency to our respective investment regimes. We believe that increased cross border investment flows will create economic growth and jobs, lending new momentum to the commercial relationship and fortifying the economic foundation already built.

### Economic Coop key, BIT key

#### \*\*BIT is the best way to build overall US-Sino ties – it does spillover to non-economic realms.

Shambaugh ‘15

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The central task going into a new year, therefore, is to build on this new momentum in order to strengthen the foundation of the relationship, build strategic trust, and work in tandem (or in parallel) on global issues of mutual concern. While we hope that the new stabilization and momentum coming out of the summit between President Barack Obama and President Xi Jinping is not temporary, as was the case following the 2011 summit between Obama and former Chinese president Hu Jintao, it will require hard work and consistent efforts on both sides to capitalize on the new gains made in Beijing in November. Perhaps the most immediate opportunity - and one that would give an enormous boost to the relationship - would be an early conclusion to the negotiations on the Bilateral Investment Treaty. Early in the New Year the two governments are due to exchange draft "negative lists" of sectors which would be off-limits to investment from the other country. The fact that there will be such sectors is inevitable - the operative questions are which ones and can they be harmonized? This is likely to produce some of the toughest negotiations in the US-China relationship since China's World Trade Organization entry negotiations nearly two decades ago. But they need not be as protracted as the WTO negotiations and can hopefully be brought to fruition quickly and efficiently. Both nations stand to benefit a great deal from further opening to bilateral investment.

#### Economic ties are key to the US-Sino relationship. A BIT is vital.

Liu ‘15

Liu Yang reports for the Global Times – this article internally quotes Jin Canrong, associate dean at the School of International Studies of Renmin University of China and David Dollar, senior fellow with the foreign policy and global economy and development programs at Brookings Institution. “As China’s rise alarms US think tanks, the importance of good ties must not be forgotten” – Global Times – August 31st - http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/939965.shtml

Many experts believe that economic issues are key to resolving disagreements between the two powers. Jin Canrong, associate dean at the School of International Studies of Renmin University of China, said regarding the US debate over China policy that "whether the participant is a political hawk or dove, the intention is to safeguard the interests of the US… And when the economy is concerned, the picture can be much more optimistic." Jin said that China and the US have both fallen into the Thucydides Trap, a term used to describe the phenomenon in which a rising power provokes fear in the ruling power, thus leading to danger in both parties. The current debate is a manifestation of the fear and anxiety the US is now facing. His endorsement of strengthening economic ties is echoed by US economists on China. David Dollar, senior fellow with the foreign policy and global economy and development programs at Brookings Institution, said that the two countries should turn to the economy when their political relations are tense. Economic dependence is the stabilizer in the bilateral relationship between the two countries, and as long as that is strengthened, the two countries will be able to be more confident when dealing with thorny issues. Dollar thinks that speeding up talks on a bilateral investment treaty, which could open the doors for large amounts of investment in both directions if it addresses key issues, is an important opportunity to boost mutual dependence between the two countries. In a paper, he also criticized the US for not joining the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, an important new institution in the fastest growing region of the world economy.

### Econ Coop => Security Coop

#### BIT promotes stability in the Asia-Pacific – now is the time for a treaty breakthrough.

Jenny ‘15

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While discussions surrounding a Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) have focused on the potential for increased trade and investment, a BIT could also help alleviate security concerns and create lasting peace in the Asia-Pacific region. With Xi Jinping’s visit to the US over, the two leaders have pledged to continue working towards achieving a comprehensive BIT (for a quick summary of key outcomes during Xi Jinping’s visit, have a look at GRI’s latest infograph at the bottom of this article). Negotiations originally began in 2008, but were put on hold following Obama’s election. Now that a firm commitment has been made by both parties, the prospects for reaching such a treaty are increasingly bright. The main aim of a Sino-US BIT is to help encourage bilateral investment by guaranteeing companies non-discriminatory market access and protection from arbitrary treatment. In that respect, a BIT makes strong economic sense in the current climate by providing a level playing field for both US and Chinese companies to invest in one another’s markets.

### BIT solves for US-Sino Relations, spillover

#### BIT solves – serves a stabilizer for the *broader* US-Sino relationship

Xinhua ‘15

Internally quoting - Li Daokui, director of Tsinghua University's Center for China in the World Economy - “China, U.S. Pin High Hopes on Xi's Visit for Breakthrough in BIT Talks” – Xinhua - Sept 20th - Available at: http://english.cri.cn/12394/2015/09/20/4182s896786.htm

Such a treaty will help address a number of investment concerns of the United States and China, and investors from both countries will get better access to each other's markets, said Yukon Huang, former World Bank's country director for China and senior associate with the Asia Program of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Li Daokui, director of Tsinghua University's Center for China in the World Economy, has seen some other advantages the treaty will bring about to the two countries. China and the United States are complementary in many areas, especially in capital, Li told Xinhua recently. The United States needs large capital for infrastructure construction so as to prompt its economic recovery, while China, with relatively abundant funds, has already become a net exporter of capital, he said. Also, the Chinese government has been following a strategy of "going out" to encourage firms to invest overseas. On a broader scale, the China-U.S.relationship cries out for a stabilizer to address sensitive and complicated issues emerging in the development of bilateral ties, the Chinese economist said, adding that the BIT will serve as such a stabilizer in the future.

### BIT key to check US-Sino war

#### BIT checks US-Sino war – now is the key time to finalize the treaty. Check escalations of cyber-war and naval incidents.

Jenny ‘15

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The US and China have already made narrowing down the list of sectors which will be restricted to foreign investment a key priority. The time is therefore ripe for producing results – political momentum on both sides of the Pacific is strong. The biggest benefits of a far-reaching and comprehensive BIT would exceed simple investment and trade. Rather, the treaty will provide the opportunity to significantly increase cooperation between both countries and in doing so will greatly reduce tensions in the entire Asia-Pacific region. Since Kant’s principle of perpetual peace, the notion that trade decreases the chance of interstate conflict has become widely accepted. The logic is simple: by increasing bilateral investment, the cost of conflict becomes too high for both countries to consider it a viable option. The European Community (EC) was built on this foundation by making the cost of another war between France and Germany too high to fathom. The process of negotiating towards a BIT is as important as the end result. BITs are difficult to achieve because they require negotiating through political and economic security challenges which are sensitive topics in both countries. However, the fact that both sides are willing to sit down and talk about these traditionally taboo areas is a success in itself and will help both sides become increasingly open in their dealings and achieve trust between one another. With the US and China as the two biggest ‘strategic competitors’ in the region, the potential to calm tensions in the region is high. Concerns over the risk of cyber-attacks spilling into kinetic war would be largely mitigated. Unexpected encounters at sea between each other’s navies would be less likely to result in conflict, while tensions between US regional allies and China could be allayed. Most importantly, societal relations would be greatly improved. With over 50% of Americans seeing China as a threat, a BIT would help promote China as an economic opportunity.

#### US-Sino ties will spiral to armed conflict in the squo – a BIT is needed to boost relations

Webster ‘15

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Three years ago, when the scholars Wang Jisi and Kenneth Lieberthal published a joint study of mutual distrust between the United States and China, they identified a frustrating reality faced by those working toward stable U.S.–China relations. Despite good faith efforts, many American and Chinese thinkers and negotiators were having a very hard time trusting one another. Three years later, it’s not just distrust but a new kind of fatalism that is surging in both countries—a Cold War–inspired notion that different interests and political systems inevitably will lead to rivalry and armed confrontation. Clearly change is necessary. Some recent U.S. policy has been tactically clever. On several issues, the Obama administration has reached into the legal toolbox to put pressure on China—for instance through indictments of accused PLA hackers, arrests of commercial spies, and support for the Philippine arbitration case brought against China under the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea. These efforts can be dialed up or down: Sanctions could be levied, for instance, and freedom of navigation operations could be intensified or dropped. Meanwhile, notwithstanding modest investments as part of the “rebalance,” the U.S. government has avoided a more confrontational military build-up. These legal approaches, however, may never bear fruit in stopping objectionable moves online and in the South China Sea. Engagement also has been relatively strong. Summits between the two presidents have galvanized their nations’ bureaucracies to reach agreements that might otherwise have languished. If negotiations toward a bilateral investment treaty go well, the benefits for both economies and bilateral ties could be great. The Obama-Xi agreement to push for real action at this year’s Paris climate summit also could pay off. But these affirmative efforts also could fail.

## Backlines – SCS war scenario (US-Sino Relations)

### yes scs war coming – uniqueness

SCS aggression is at a tipping point

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(Ryan, “The Tipping Point: Has the U.S.-China Relationship Passed the Point of No Return?” October 26, <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-tipping-point-has-the-us-china-relationship-passed-the-14168?page=3>)

Conflict between a rising power and an established power **is not inevitable** as most realist scholars suggest. However, in every relationship, there is a tipping point or a point of no return, and China and the United States **are rapidly approaching this point**. As traditional diplomatic outlets have done little to resolve the more challenging issues presently affecting the Sino-American relationship, these two great powers have been increasingly **relying on their military capabilities** and hard power tactics. That’s **especially true** in the South China Sea, which is one of the single greatest points of contention between China and the United States. While there is a realization on both sides of the Pacific that a kind of strategic stability is necessary to prevent great power conflict, both China and the United States remain **unwilling to compromise** and make the kind of meaningful concessions required to move the relationship further from confrontation and conflict and **closer to cooperation and rapprochement**. Instead, these two countries are drawing lines in the sand and preparing for the worst.

Failed pursuit of strategic stability

China’s proposed solution to the Sino-American strategic stability issue is the “new model of major-country relations,” which encourages the United States and China to avoid confrontation and conflict, respect one another’s political systems and national interests—specifically China’s core interests—and pursue win-win cooperation. China is exceptionally enthusiastic about this proposal and brings it up at every high-level Sino-American meeting. Chinese enthusiasm for the “new model of major-country relations” can be explained in a number of different ways. American acceptance of China’s proposal would facilitate Beijing’s rise, legitimize the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) as a leader for national strength and revival and reduce the likelihood of American containment. As acceptance of the “new model of major-country relations” would create an international environment conducive to China’s rise, it would essentially allow China to become the preeminent power in Asia without great power competition or conflict. This proposal also has the potential to put China on par with the United States, to elevate it to an equal status, one acknowledged by the United States. Not only would American recognition of China’s strength and power have effects abroad, but it would also stoke Chinese nationalism and strengthen CCP leadership at home. Furthermore, this new model is a means of establishing a new code of conduct for the Sino-American relationship that is more in line with Chinese national interests, opening the door for the creation of a Chinese sphere of influence in Asia and, potentially, a Sino-centric regional order.

Prior to the recent meeting between Xi Jinping and Barack Obama, Xi announced that China’s proposed “new model of major-country-relations” would be an important discussion point for the meeting, but, while this proposal was brought up during the meeting, no clear progress was made. Because U.S. leaders believe that the “new model of major-country relations” is not in America’s best interests, the United States has repeatedly dismissed China’s proposal. As the hegemonic power, the United States maintains its power by dominating global politics; to accept a geopolitical framework alternative proposed by a strategic rival requires sacrificing a certain amount of power and influence. Along those same lines, acceptance of China’s proposal might give other states in the international system the impression that the United States is in decline and on the losing end of the classic “Thucydides trap.” Outside of traditional power politics, the call for the United States to respect China’s “core interests”— as many Chinese and foreign scholars have noted—is a loaded statement. While the United States is not opposed to respecting a state’s national interests, it tends to be unwilling to respect national interests which are highly contested, which is the situation for the majority of China’s “core interests.” In addition to traditional Chinese national interests, such as Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang, China’s “core interests” also cover most of its territorial claims in Asia. The United States is concerned that China’s “new model of major-country relations” is a ploy designed to trick the United States into acknowledging China’s extensive territorial claims and undercutting the interests of American allies and long-time strategic partners in the Asia-Pacific region, which would likely result in the weakening of the American-led “hub-and-spoke” security structure, a security framework China hopes to replace with its New Asian Security Concept. There are also suspicions in the United States that China’s proposal is a call for the creation of spheres of influence, a concept to which the Obama administration has been consistently opposed.

America’s approach to Sino-American strategic stability is to have China and the United States focus on cooperation and agree to avoid letting competition in one area affect cooperation and collaboration in others. In many ways, this resembles China’s old “shelving disputes and pursuing joint development” strategy for Asia. As this kind of strategy is the geopolitical equivalent of sweeping dirt under the rug, it is only effective to a point. **Eventually, the dirt spills out.** Sooner or later, unaddressed problems surface. At best, this approach **is only a** temporary stop **on the road to functional strategic stability.** At worst, this approach has already outlived its usefulness. China views this strategy as an attempt by the United States to avoid addressing China’s demands that the United States acknowledge China’s rise to great power status and redefine the relationship accordingly, which only encourages the already strong Chinese desire to push forward the “new model of major-country relations.” China and the United States are at an impasse regarding strategic stability. While both states have made commitments and promises to prevent great power conflict, neither China nor the United States has developed a reasonable or implementable **solution** for Sino-American strategic stability. Thus, competition continues unmanaged, **unchecked and confrontation is** steadily evolving into conflict.

Drawing Lines in the “Sea”

### A-to: no escalation

#### SCS war risks nuclear escalation

Goldstein‘15

(Lyle J., Associate Professor in the China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI) at the U.S. Naval War College, “The Main Problem with America’s Abundant South China Sea Hawks,” October 28, <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-main-problem-america%E2%80%99s-abundant-south-china-sea-hawks-14186?page=4)>

Vuving’s general perspective is most clearly revealed in the final sentence of his essay when he suggests that “the greatest myth of all is that the U.S. cannot and should not contain China.” That is a kind of cryptic way of saying that “**the U.S. should contain China**.” **I emphatically disagree** with that conclusion for all the most obvious reasons (e.g. **the** risk of armed conflict between nuclear powers, trillions of dollars wasted on militarized rivalry, the imperative to cooperate on climate change and nuclear nonproliferation, etc.), **as do the** vast majority of America’s China specialists**, Asia specialists, as well as academic and policy experts in the wider field of international relations.**

Never mind that Vuving is apparently so far outside the mainstream; he still makes a number of valuable points in the essay that I would actually agree with, and these points are worth underlining at the outset as our common ground or shared assessments. We are apparently agreed that “Washington’s support of Southeast Asian claimants will create incentives for them to be more assertive and aggressive.” One of the most interesting discussions in Vuving’s essay is his very frank suggestion that “the term ‘freedom of navigation’ is a bad choice of words. Its meaning varies according to the legal position of the national perspective you take.” I agree with Vuving’s point here, but this statement may separate him from most American “hawks,” who have made “freedom of navigation” their primary rallying cry. It does have a ring to it, admittedly.

But then, we are both realists, and do not wish to fight bloody wars over such ethereal and nebulous concepts as defending “the global commons.” As to whether Beijing will close the gates to South China Sea maritime trade or otherwise attempt to restrict navigation, we are again agreed that “China has enormous vested interest in keeping the flow of commerce through the South China Sea unimpeded.” It is also noteworthy that Vuving agrees with me that “the outcome of a U.S.-China war is **highly uncertain**.” He goes on to explain his view that the “chance of a U.S. defeat is **comparable** to that of a Chinese defeat.” Given the daunting constraints (e.g. surprise, geography, etc.) that U.S. forces could face in such a conflict, I concur with that conclusion. It seems thus quite clear that Vuving does not subscribe to the “clean their clocks” school among America’s South China Sea hawks. That is encouraging, and on the basis of his realistic understanding of the military balance, he does conclude near the end of his essay that “war is something that needs to be avoided.” Once again, I strongly agree with Vuving on this point.

So what is the main issue of disagreement, after all? It concerns what Vuving and others have termed **“gray-zone” operations**. Vuving suggests that my analysis is flawed because I am using the “wrong lens” of war/peace binary decisions when, according to his assessment, “disputes and contestation [are primarily] occurring in a gray zone between war and peace.” Thus, the claim is advanced that Washington would have had a variety of options for contesting against Beijing in the so-called “Scarborough Shoal Crisis” during spring 2012—if only Americans understood that the game is weiqi rather than chess. Vuving is highly critical of the Obama Administration for being allegedly misled by Beijing’s tricks in the so-called grey zone. Vuving actually undermines his own critique when he concedes that Manila most likely did call on Washington for “military backup” in those circumstances.

The critique is further undermined by the lack of specifics regarding what exactly were Washington’s options during that crisis—apart from calling in airstrikes. Should Washington have organized some fishing boats to contest against the Chinese fishing boats at the atoll? Perhaps Vuving and others are calling for U.S. Coast Guard cutters to go “head-to-head” with water cannons and the like against their Chinese counterparts? These are, of course, rhetorical questions, because no such feasible options exist for mounting counter–gray zone operations of this kind. Nor is it feasible to retaliate by having our diplomats and prompting sympathetic journalists to use the moniker “West Philippine Sea,” vice “South China Sea” as a smart power method to turn the tables against China. The point is that the only way to stop China’s advance in the South China Sea in its tracks **is to threaten the use of force,** and, barring that threat, we are mostly reliant on Chinese good will.

It is quite instructive, actually, when considering “gray-zone operations,” to think about the other classic case. Indeed, the term only really became popular in strategic studies circles after Russia’s seizure of Crimea by “little green men” in March 2014. The implication of Vuving’s argument in this critique seems to be that if the U.S. and NATO had simply understood that this was a gray-zone operation rather than being fooled by Mr. Putin, that there could have been a proper gray-zone response. Washington could respond against “little green men” with “little beige men” (U.S. combat troops in desert camo, but lacking U.S. insignia, of course). The scenario is laughable, and no such options were ever under any consideration, to my estimate. The point is that the Russian “gray-zone operation” in Crimea was successful because Moscow’s gambit also represented a clear and credible threat to resort to the use force.

True, Beijing’s shenanigans in and around Scarborough Shoal are a little less clear and credible in that respect, but the unmistakable message has been that these ships, albeit unarmed for the most part, will be defended by Chinese armed might **if necessary**. Arguably, the Chinese gray-zone initiatives are more clever as they are less easily condemned since they do not represent an overt use of force, but rather a veiled threat to employ force. Thus, the first and most obvious counter to Vuving’s critique is that U.S. non-military options for use in such maritime gray-zone operations do not presently exist and are not likely to be created in the next decade—no matter how many former U.S. and Japanese coast guard vessels are gifted to the Philippines.

Still, the far more potent argument beyond the relatively obvious questions regarding feasibility against countering Chinese shenanigans with American shenanigans **is that neither side knows where the other’s red lines actually lie**. Thus, Vuving’s prescription to “up the ante” with either containment measures or robust support for front-line states **is all but certain to** increase tensions, such that “sleepwalking” into a U.S.-China direct armed clash becomes a near certainty. What is ultimately so shallow, therefore, about Vuving’s line of critique and the argumentation of most hawks is they do not admit that their prescriptions necessarily **entail risks associated with the** slippery slope of escalation. Perhaps I’ve misunderstood him, but Vuving seems to me to be saying implicitly: “Trust me. Beijing is not really serious. This is just a game of weiqi with no actual risk of military conflict. If Washington is serious, Beijing will back down.”

This type of oblivious attitude to the risk of conflict could be excusable perhaps if China was not a nuclear power with increasingly potent conventional forces to match. In fact, this demeanor is distressingly common among hawks of the “cakewalk” school, but we have already seen that Vuving has a relatively clear appraisal of the military balance and has recognized that outright U.S. military superiority in the Western Pacific is a vestige of the past. Thus, there is a clear contradiction in Vuving’s thinking: he does not view the military balance as favorable to the U.S., and yet he recommends escalatory maneuvers.

This is not only foolhardy from a military-strategic point of view, but also starkly ignorant of history. Did the Russian czar think that he would spark the largest war in history when he opted to mobilize forces in response to the Serbian crisis in 1914? Did President Roosevelt know that he was contributing to setting the Pacific War in motion when he pushed the U.S. Pacific Fleet from the West Coast to Pearl Harbor to deter Japan from striking at Singapore in 1940? Washington clearly misunderstood Chinese intentions in 1950 during the Korean War and underestimated Hanoi’s determination when undertaking escalation in Vietnam. The point is that one hardly has to look very far to find examples of leaders, including American leaders, “sleepwalking” into major conflicts. Do we really believe our leaders are any wiser or better informed today than they were back then?

Another point made by Vuving in his critique is more sensible, and concerns the actual strategic value of China’s newly built facilities in the South China Sea. He contends that I misunderstand China’s strategy, because I focus on resources (oil and fish) vice strategic location. For example, he holds that the main value of Scarborough Shoal is that it is an “ideal place from which to watch and patrol the central eastern sector of the South China Sea.” But another surveillance post in the South China Sea is quite redundant, because Beijing already has more than enough patrol assets (military, coast guard or militia)—and that is not even considering ample and developing aerial surveillance capabilities, as well as real-time satellite reconnaissance.

In fact, our assessments are not that different with respect to the new facilities in the Spratly islets. He explains, “Although China’s military assets on the South China Sea islands will be highly vulnerable in wartime, they can be very useful for peacetime patrolling and psychological intimidation.” A main point of my initial analysis was to draw attention to the high vulnerability of any Chinese assets based on these facilities in the age of precision guided munitions. So Vuving evidently accept my analysis for military conflict scenarios—as does a Pentagon official who was quoted in this forum as saying, “If China wants to build vulnerable airstrips on these rocks, let them—**they just constitute a bunch of easy targets that would be taken out within minutes of a real contingency**.”

I agree with Vuving that these facilities in the South China Sea will allow for somewhat increased surveillance and even maybe, yes, “intimidation.” Chinese sailors and air crews may be a little less green after getting a break from their long patrols. Chinese fishing boats may indeed grow more numerous in the area if they know they have a truly safe shelter from the common typhoons that sweep the area. But who exactly will be intimidated by the increased Chinese presence during peacetime? Will the U.S. Navy be intimidated? Of course not. Those likely to be intimidated by an elevated Chinese patrol presence are local hydrocarbon exploration and fishing interests. Thus, we return to the issue of resources, and I again emphatically reject the notion that Washington should take active steps in the direction of military conflict with Beijing to support Philippine or Vietnamese oil and fishing interests.

Vuving’s critique repeats many times that the new Chinese facilities in the Spratlys will indeed “allow China to upset the military balance.” Not only does he posit that China is likely to deploy thirty to forty fourth-generation aircraft to the new airstrips in the Spratlys, but he also claims that regional states will be deterred from attacking the new airfields, because “China can declare that it makes no difference between an attack on these islands and an attack on its mainland.”

To my estimate, it is still **quite early** to suggest that China is able or likely to stage so many fighter aircraft out of the new facilities. One leading expert on PLA development has stated, for example, that the only plane that will fly from these “bases” **will be the small maritime patrol aircraft,** the Y-7. As he explained it, that is partly due to the weak coral base of these airstrips, **which can neither support heavy aircraft nor the tough tempo that fighter operations** **would require**. But let’s assume the worst case, putting aviation logistics aside as well, that Chinese fighter interceptor squadrons will not only be deployed to these remote airstrips, but will deploy in operationally significant numbers. I have posited that, in any contest with the U.S., these aircraft would likely be smoking, twisted metal wrecks within the first twenty-four hours of the beginning of a conflict. Vuving does not contest that point, but says that the new Chinese facilities will “upset the regional balance.”

My response to this point is that **there is actually no “regional balance” to upset**. Since the 1990s (if not before), China has had the firepower to take on and defeat any Southeast Asian opponent with relative ease. In 1988, for example, they swept aside Vietnamese forces in a lopsided set of naval skirmishes to set up several preliminary bases in the Spratlys. I have discussed the very uneven nature of the China-Vietnam military contest in some detail in an interview with the New York Times and also in this article for National Interest. Thus, Vuving is correct to say that China will have vast military superiority in the South China Sea with its new set of airstrips in the Spratlys. However, my view is that China was already vastly superior in military terms (when the U.S. is not involved), **so the actual change to the military balance is** quite marginal.

And for the same reason that the new facilities will be highly vulnerable to U.S. firepower, so even Southeast Asian nations will have a reasonably good chance to put the new airstrips out of commission for lengthy periods. Indeed, one does not have to turn the islets into a “sea of fire” by cratering every part of the runway, when all that is required is to take out the fuel or munitions storage facilities. Most ideally, stealthy and relatively invulnerable submarines could barrage the new Chinese bases with missiles from various vectors. Vietnam and Malaysia could develop those capabilities quite easily. But even laggard Philippines could likely put ordnance on these obvious targets by, for example, quietly purchasing an array of medium and long-range surface-to-surface cruise missiles that South Korea has been developing for a long time. True, that may require some adjustment of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), but that would be wholly reasonable in the face of China’s major conventional missile buildup. Other weapons systems could also be used to inhibit air operations, such as planting sea mines around the islets to interdict their resupply.

This kind of deterrence will be much more effective than attempts to massively scale up the Philippines’ coast guard to play gray-zone games against China’s massive coast guard forces. The latter approach is a genuine pipe dream for the foreseeable future. Maybe Vietnam’s coast guard prospects are a little better, but most Americans would oppose their taxes going to fund Vietnam’s coast guard since these gray-zone games are just about oil and fisheries interests and do not seriously impact U.S. national security.

The strangest and most objectionable part of Vuving’s critique comes near the end. Here he candidly suggests that “China and the United States may share the same view when it comes to nautical freedom…” and, as I have related above, Vuving also explains that “freedom of navigation” does not quite fit the bill as a persuasive rallying cry for confronting Beijing in the South China Sea. Therefore, he argues, the real question in the South China Sea is about China’s alleged “grave threat to U.S. leadership in the region.” This line of reasoning seems to resemble closely that classic neo-conservative tract from 1992, authored by Paul Wolfowitz, that claimed the goal of U.S. foreign and defense policy should be primacy, plain and simple.

Vuving may underestimate Americans’ distaste for the rather tautological formula of seeking to maintain leadership in all areas of the world in order to preserve primacy. In the critique’s final, tortured logic, Vuving explains: “The concentration in this domain of Asia’s chief arteries means that, to paraphrase Harold Mackinder, he who controls the East and South China Seas, dominates Asia; and with the rise of Asia, he who dominates this region, commands the world.” It strikes me as particularly odd and disappointing that even today leading American strategists could engage in such bombastic nineteenth-century rhetoric by looking to British imperialist theorists for guidance. Mackinder and such thinkers were obsessed with protecting India from the imagined Russian threat, neglecting the fact that Russia’s help would be badly required in the contests that would follow for Britain. Next, these contemporary South China Sea hawks, with Mackinder tucked under their arms, will propose erecting myriad new coaling stations around the “spice islands” and perhaps also making the U.S. presence in Afghanistan permanent—the better to protect the Asian “heartland” from China’s encroaching Silk Road initiative. Americans thankfully have more common sense than to pursue expansion and endless conflict on the other side of the planet indefinitely. Certainly, that is how the founders of our country distinguished themselves from statesmen in London way back when.

I am on record repeatedly calling for both a stronger U.S. Navy (increased numbers of submarines, for example), as well as the prudent drawing of credible red lines that would cover the home islands of our allies. Vuving mischaracterizes my approach when he suggests that my view is the U.S. should “keep its hands out of the South China Sea.” Indeed, I am reasonably comfortable with present U.S. force levels in the area, as well as occasional patrols by U.S. forces. Limited goals require neither massive forces nor enormous engagement. There may come a day when the U.S. needs to commit many more resources for deterrence in the Western Pacific, or could even have to contemplate a major war to halt Chinese aggression. But such dangers are nowhere on the horizon. The present danger is “fear itself,” related to the Thucydides Trap, not to mention the quite irrational or uninformed urgings of odious parochial and nationalist interests of various “third-party” states.

To summarize, Vuving does make a number of valuable points and I concur with parts of his assessment, including especially his clear-eyed view of the military balance and his rejection of high-sounding, but quite inappropriate rhetoric. As noted above, I do accept that Beijing has made some incremental gains with its new facilities in the Spratlys both with respect to “gray-zone” operations and also in underlining its military superiority versus Southeast Asian states, though I don’t think these marginal gains should be exaggerated, since they do not fundamentally alter previous strong advantages held by Beijing. Far and away the biggest problem in Vuving’s critique, and among many like-minded hawks, however, is the misguided notion that there is a clear and discernible line between non-military methods of coercion (“gray-zone” operations) and actual combat that rational leaders in Beijing, Manila, Hanoi and Washington certainly will not cross. **That binary assessment is a** gross simplification of these situations **that will inevitably be confused by the** “fog” of crisis and thus gravely underestimates the potential for escalation to war. A step in the right direction would be for such hawks, advocating for containment policies and the like, to be more candid and recognize that their recommendations carry significant risks, not only of heightened tensions and wasted resources, but also **of** direct armed conflict **among** nuclear armed superpowers.

## Backlines – ECS war scenario (US-Sino Relations)

### A-to no escalation

Causes accidental launch and miscalculation

Hellman 13 (Martin Hellman Professor Emeritus of Electrical Engineering Stanford University, 1/22/2013, "Could Japan Drag America into War with China", nuclearrisk.wordpress.com/2013/01/22/could-japan-drag-america-into-war-with-china/)

Several earlier posts on this blog have highlighted the risk that China and Japan might come to blows over a few tiny, uninhabited islands known as the Senkaku in Japan and the Diaoyu in China. One pathway to war is **inadvertent escalation** as a result of both nations sending jet fighters over the disputed territory. As noted in an an article in yesterday’s New York Times:

In the past several months, both China and Japan have sent civilian maritime vessels to the waters around the uninhabited islands. On Jan. 10, China ordered a surveillance aircraft to fly near the area. In response, Japan scrambled F-15 fighter jets to take a look, and in response to the Japanese, the Chinese dispatched J-10 fighter jets.

**The** tit-for-tat **moves have raised concerns that an** accident **could occur and lead to a** dangerous cycle of retaliation.

Under a longstanding security treaty with Japan, **the United States is obliged to defend the country,** including the uninhabited islands, a position that Mrs. Clinton referred to at the news conference. She also repeated that Washington recognized that the islands were administered by Japan.

For its part, China insists that the islands belong to China, a claim that it says is supported by historical documents.

If war should break out, the US is on record as saying that its mutual security treaty with Japan extends to these islands, meaning **the US would have to fight a** nuclear-armed **China**.

### A-to “crisis management checks”

No crisis management

White 12 (Hugh White is professor of strategic studies at ANU and a visiting fellow at the Lowy Institute., 12/26/2012, "Caught in a bind that threatens an Asian war nobody wants”, http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-opinion/caught-in-a-bind-that-threatens-an-asian-war-nobody-wants-20121225-2bv38.html#ixzz2cRlp8kcr)

**THIS is how wars usually start: with a steadily escalating stand-off** over something intrinsically worthless. So **don't be too surprised if the US and Japan go to war with China** next year over the uninhabited rocks that Japan calls the **Senkakus** and China calls the Diaoyu islands. And don't assume the war would be contained and short.

Of course we should all hope that common sense prevails.

It seems almost laughably unthinkable that the world's three richest countries - two of them nuclear-armed - would go to war over something so trivial. But **that is to confuse what starts a war with what causes it**. The Greek historian Thucydides first explained the difference almost 2500 years ago. He wrote that the catastrophic Peloponnesian War started from a spat between Athens and one of Sparta's allies over a relatively insignificant dispute. But what caused the war was something much graver: the growing wealth and power of Athens, and the fear this caused in Sparta.

The analogy with Asia today is uncomfortably close and not at all reassuring. No one in 431BC really wanted a war, but when Athens threatened one of Sparta's allies over a disputed colony, the Spartans felt they had to intervene. They feared that to step back in the face of Athens' growing power would fatally compromise Sparta's position in the Greek world, and concede supremacy to Athens.

The Senkakus issue is likewise a symptom of tensions whose cause lies elsewhere, in China's growing challenge to America's long-standing leadership in Asia, and America's response. In the past few years China has become both markedly stronger and notably more assertive. America has countered with the strategic pivot to Asia. Now, China is pushing back against President Barack Obama's pivot by targeting Japan in the Senkakus.

The Japanese themselves genuinely fear that China will become even more overbearing as its strength grows, and they depend on America to protect them. But they also worry whether they can rely on Washington as China becomes more formidable. China's ratcheting pressure over the Senkakus strikes at both these anxieties.

**The push and shove over the islands has been escalating for months**. Just before Japan's recent election, China flew surveillance aircraft over the islands for the first time, and since the election both sides have reiterated their tough talk.

Where will it end? The risk is that, without a clear circuit-breaker, **the escalation will continue until at some point shots are exchanged, and a** spiral to war begins that no one can stop. Neither side could win such a war, and **it would be devastating not just for them but for the rest of us**.

No one wants this, but the crisis will not stop by itself. One side or other, or both, will have to take positive steps to break the cycle of action and reaction. This will be difficult, because any concession by either side would so easily be seen as a backdown, with huge domestic political costs and international implications.

It would therefore need real political strength and skill, which is in short supply all round - especially in Tokyo and Beijing, which both have new and untested leaders. And each side apparently hopes that they will not have to face this test, because they expect the other side will back down first.

Beijing apparently believes that if it keeps pushing, Washington will persuade Tokyo to make concessions over the disputed islands in order to avoid being dragged into a war with China, which would be a big win for them. Tokyo on the other hand fervently hopes that, faced with firm US support for Japan, China will have no choice but to back down.

And in Washington, too, most people seem to think China will back off. They argue that China needs America more than America needs China, and that Beijing will back down rather than risk a break with the US which would devastate China's economy.

Unfortunately, the Chinese seem to see things differently. They believe America will not risk a break with China because America's economy would suffer so much.

**These mutual misconceptions carry the** seeds of a terrible miscalculation, as each side underestimates how much is at stake for the other. For Japan, bowing to Chinese pressure would feel like acknowledging China's right to push them around, and accepting that America can't help them. For Washington, not supporting Tokyo would not only fatally damage the alliance with Japan, it would amount to an acknowledgment America is no longer Asia's leading power, and that the ''pivot'' is just posturing. And for Beijing, a backdown would mean that instead of proving its growing power, its foray into the Senkakus would simply have demonstrated America's continued primacy. So for all of them, **the largest issues of power and status are at stake**. These are exactly the kind of issues that great powers have often gone to war over.

## Backlines – Taiwan war scenario (US-Sino Relations)

### A-to: “no escalation”

Backstops and crisis management will fail

Elbridge Colby 13, analyst at the Center for Naval Analysis, Nuclear Weapons and US-China Relations, March, <http://csis.org/files/publication/130307_Colby_USChinaNuclear_Web.pdf>

Taiwan. Taiwan remains the single most plausible and dangerous source of tension and conflict between the United States and China. Beijing continues to be set on a policy to prevent Taiwan's independence, and the United States maintains the capability to come to Taiwan's defense.12 [FOOTNOTE 12] 12. The United States has maintained a consistent one-China policy—based on the three U.b.-China Joint Communiques and the Taiwan Relations Act—for eight presidential administrations. It opposes any unilateral actions by either side to alter the status quo and believes that cross-strait issues should be resolved peacefully in a manner acceptable to the people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. [END OF FOOTNOTE] Although tensions across the Taiwan Strait have subsided since both Taipei and Beijing embraced a policy of engagement in 2008, the situation remains combustible, complicated by rapidly diverging cross-strait military capabilities and persistent political disagreements.15 Moreover, for the foreseeable future Taiwan is the contingency in which nuclear weapons would most likely become a major factor, because the fate of the island is intertwined both with the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party and the reliability of U.S. defense commitments in the Asia-Pacific region. [FOOTNOTE 13] 13. Richard Betts has observed well the dangers stemming from the Taiwan situation, which he terms "the main potential flashpoint for the United States in East Asia." He notes mat "no other major flashpoint is more likely to bring the United States into combat with a major power.... Americans and Chinese see the issues at stake in the dispute over Taiwan in different terms; U.S. policy on the defense of Taiwan is uncertain, andthus so is the understanding in Beijing, Taipei, and Washington over how far the United States might go under different circumstances." He goes on to say mat "neither great power can fully control developments that might ignite a crisis. This is a classic recipe for surprise, miscalculation, and uncontrolled escalation." See Richard K. Betts, American Force: Dangers, Delusions, and Dilemmas in National Security (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), 186. [END OF FOOTNOTE]

### A-to: “leaders check”

Aggression is likely – the Chinese public and military leadership are pushing unification

Yitan Li 14, assistant professor of political science at Seattle University, At the Nexus of New Challenges: China’s Leadership Change and Cross-Strait Relations, Fudan Journal of the Humanities & Social Sciences

The re-alignment is significant in a number of ways. **Princelings** are known to **have** better and **stronger ties to conservative and military factions**. **Previous** leaders, both Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao. have been criticized **by the military** (as well as by Chinese citizens) for being too soft on Taiwan and other actors that have strategic interests in Taiwan or the region, such as the U.S. or Japan. **This could easily lead to** the new leadership's "overcompensation of the military" (Ovcrholt 2012). This is evident in the new leadership from two different aspects. One is that **the** central **leadership has allowed the military to play a** more **prominent role at the top level**. The other is that the military itself is fighting to play a more important role in policy decision making as part of factional struggle.

Second, in Taiwan, a new identity is being solidified. Increasingly, more people in Taiwan are viewing themselves as Taiwanese, instead of Chinese. This new identity is primarily due to social changes people have experienced in Taiwan. The most important social change in recent years is that Taiwan has become a democracy. **People in Taiwan**, regardless of their party affiliations and historical lineages to the Mainland, **are increasingly** more **willing to defend and maintain that unique identity, which is different and separate from the Chinese identity on the Mainland**.

Third, **nationalism**, particularly popular nationalism, **has been on the rise** in mainland China. **Both the state and its citizens are** becoming more **confident in acting more aggressively** and assertively **toward Taiwan** and others. Therefore, it is imperative, under the public's pressure, for China's new leaders to defend the territorial integrity of the country. No one should be surprised by China's behavior, as "every country pursues national interests. It is only natural for China to do so" (Jia 2005a) with regard to Taiwan, which is one of China's core national interests. **As China becomes stronger**, it is natural to **anticipate it to act tougher**.

Fourth. China is in no doubt growing stronger, economically and militarily in the region. This has led to increasingly more assertive and aggressive behaviors toward others. The new leadership so far has not made any explicit policy changes toward Taiwan. Both Beijing and Taipei recognize Taiwan's increasingly asymmetrical dependence on the Mainland. During Jiang Zemin's and Hu Jintao's years, maintaining the status quo in the Taiwan Strait was the preferred policy option. While stability in the Taiwan Strait is still absolutely important for Beijing. Taipei, the region and the world, one must recognize some of the important changes that have been discussed above. While a direct military conflict in the Taiwan Strait serves no one's interests. **China's leadership can now deal with the Taiwan issue on** Beijing's terms more confidently than ever before. **When this is coupled with a** potentially **more** eager military faction, **which favors** more hawkish and aggressive **means, and a** more demanding public to act more toughly toward any potential Taiwan independence, **the future could be** somewhat bleak.

## Backlines – Climate Change scenario (US-Sino Relations)

### US-Sino ties solves Climate Change

#### US-Sino ties key to global health and green initiatives.

Florick ‘15

et al; Davis Florick is a master's candidate in East-West Studies at Creighton University. His areas of concentration include, but are not limited to. East Asia and former Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union states. He was recently interviewed, in print, by Voice of America regarding North Korean tunnels under the Demilitarized Zone and. on television, with Consider This... where he discussed the recent upheaval in Ukraine. He has also been published in International Affairs Forum, the World Business Institute. and previously in International Affairs Review. “Remapping U.S.-China Relations: A Holistic Approach to Building Long-Term Confidence and Transparency” – International Affairs Review - Volume XXIII, Number 3 • Summer 2015 – available at: http://www.iar-gwu.org/sites/default/files/articlepdfs/China%20Special%20Issue%20DOC%20C%20-%2002%20Remapping%20US-China%20Relations%20-%20Florick%20and%20Cronkleton.pdf

The relationship between the United States and China is unique in the annals of the international system. Holistically, never before have two states with such different cultures emerged as leaders on the world stage. While the United States and China have competing localized and short-term interests, a multitude of strategic incentives motivate them to cooperate, even in the face of obstacles, because "a number of critical problems that the planet and individual nations face cannot be adequately addressed without Sino-American collaboration, among them global economic growth, world health, and environmental issues."1 Cooperation between the two is imperative for the international community to move forward. The challenge is to preserve the focus on strategic priorities despite the tantalizing prospect of pursuing operational opportunities.

#### US-Sino coop key to global solutions on climate change, energy security, food security, and cyberactivity.

Shambaugh ‘15

David Shambaugh is a professor of political science and international affairs at the George Washington University, as well as a non-resident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. David is regarded inside and outside China as an authority on China's foreign policy, military and security issues and Chinese politics, and has been cited in the state media. He is a regular media commentator, and has acted as an advisor to the United States government and several private foundations and corporations. He was formerly the editor of the China Quarterly, and is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations - “China, U.S. Should Make New Ties” – Brookings, Opinion Section – originally appeared in The China Daily: USA – January 7th – available at: http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2015/01/07-china-us-should-make-new-gains-shambaugh

A third set of issues high on the agenda will be to forge practical cooperation on a number of so-called global governance issues - including counterterrorism, anti-piracy, climate change, maritime security, economic stability, energy security, food security, and setting global rules for cyberactivity. Whether Washington and Beijing work in tandem to address these issues, or work on separate but parallel tracks, such cooperation is critical to addressing these international challenges.

### A-to “Too late – beyond the tipping point”

#### ( ) Not too late – every reduction key

Nuccitelli 12

[Dana, is an environmental scientist at a private environmental consulting firm in the Sacramento, California area. He has a Bachelor's Degree in astrophysics from the University of California at Berkeley, and a Master's Degree in physics from the University of California at Davis. He has been researching climate science, economics, and solutions as a hobby since 2006, and has contributed to Skeptical Science since September, 2010, <http://www.skepticalscience.com/realistically-what-might-future-climate-look-like.html>]

We're not yet committed to surpassing 2°C global warming, but as Watson noted, we are quickly running out of time to realistically give ourselves a chance to stay below that 'danger limit'. However, 2°C is not a do-or-die threshold. Every bit of CO2 emissions we can reduce means that much avoided future warming, which means that much avoided climate change impacts. As Lonnie Thompson noted, the more global warming we manage to mitigate, the less adaption and suffering we will be forced to cope with in the future. Realistically, based on the current political climate (which we will explore in another post next week), limiting global warming to 2°C is probably the best we can do. However, there is a big difference between 2°C and 3°C, between 3°C and 4°C, and anything greater than 4°C can probably accurately be described as catastrophic, since various tipping points are expected to be triggered at this level. Right now, we are on track for the catastrophic consequences (widespread coral mortality, mass extinctions, hundreds of millions of people adversely impacted by droughts, floods, heat waves, etc.). But we're not stuck on that track just yet, and we need to move ourselves as far off of it as possible by reducing our greenhouse gas emissions as soon and as much as possible. There are of course many people who believe that the planet will not warm as much, or that the impacts of the associated climate change will be as bad as the body of scientific evidence suggests. That is certainly a possiblity, and we very much hope that their optimistic view is correct. However, what we have presented here is the best summary of scientific evidence available, and it paints a very bleak picture if we fail to rapidly reduce our greenhouse gas emissions. If we continue forward on our current path, catastrophe is not just a possible outcome, it is the most probable outcome. And an intelligent risk management approach would involve taking steps to prevent a catastrophic scenario if it were a mere possibility, let alone the most probable outcome. This is especially true since the most important component of the solution - carbon pricing - can be implemented at a relatively low cost, and a far lower cost than trying to adapt to the climate change consequences we have discussed here (Figure 4).

### A-to “Warming Not Real”

#### ( ) Global Warming is happening – most recent and best evidence concludes that it is human induced

Muller ‘12

[Richard, professor of physics at the University of California, Berkeley, and a former MacArthur Foundation fellow, “The Conversion of a Climate-Change Skeptic”, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/30/opinion/the-conversion-of-a-climate-change-skeptic.html?pagewanted=all]

CALL me a converted skeptic. Three years ago I identified problems in previous climate studies that, in my mind, threw doubt on the very existence of global warming. Last year, following an intensive research effort **involving a dozen scientists**, I concluded that global warming was real **and that the prior estimates of the rate of warming were correct.** I’m now going a step further: Humans are almost entirely the cause. My total turnaround, in such a short time, is the result of careful and objective analysis by the B**erkeley** E**arth** S**urface** T**emperature** project, which I founded with my daughter Elizabeth. Our results show that the average temperature of the earth’s land has risen **by two and a half degrees Fahrenheit over the past 250 years, including an increase of one and a half degrees over the most recent 50 years**. Moreover, it appears likely that essentially all of this increase results from the human emission of greenhouse gases. **These findings are stronger than those of the** Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change **[IPCC**], the United Nations group that defines the scientific and diplomatic consensus on global warming. In its 2007 report, the I.P.C.C. concluded only **that most of the warming of the prior 50 years could be attributed to humans**. It was possible, according to the I.P.C.C. consensus statement, that the warming before 1956 could be because of changes in solar activity, and that even a substantial part of the more recent warming could be natural. Our **Berkeley Earth approach used** sophisticated statistical methods **developed largely by our lead scientist**, Robert Rohde, **which** allowed us to determine earth land temperature much further back in time. We carefully studied issues raised by skeptics: biases from urban heating (we duplicated our results using rural data alone), from data selection (prior groups selected fewer than 20 percent of the available temperature stations; we used virtually 100 percent), from poor station quality (we separately analyzed good stations and poor ones) and from human intervention and data adjustment (our work is completely automated and hands-off). In our papers we demonstrate that **none of these potentially troublesome effects unduly biased our conclusions. The historic temperature pattern we observed has abrupt dips that match the emissions of known explosive volcanic eruptions**; the particulates from such events reflect sunlight, make for beautiful sunsets and cool the earth’s surface for a few years. There are small, rapid variations attributable to El Niño and other ocean currents such as the Gulf Stream; because of such oscillations, the “flattening” of the recent temperature rise that some people claim is not, in our view, statistically significant. What has caused the gradual but systematic rise of two and a half degrees? We tried fitting the shape to simple math functions (**exponentials, polynomials**), to solar activity and even to rising functions like world population. **By far** the best match was to the record of atmospheric **carbon dioxide** (CO2), **measured from atmospheric samples and air trapped in polar ice.**

#### ( ) Neg args are empirically denied- positive feedback loops and biodiversity loss is proven

Lyderson ‘9

(Kari, journalist, Washington Post, “Scientists: Pace of Climate Change Exceeds Estimates” 2/15 – online)

The pace of global warming is likely to be much faster than recent predictions, because industrial greenhouse gas emissions have increased more quickly than expected and higher temperatures are triggering self-reinforcing feedback mechanisms in global ecosystems, scientists said Saturday. "We are basically looking now at a future climate that's beyond anything we've considered seriously in climate model simulations," Christopher Field, founding director of the Carnegie Institution's Department of Global Ecology at Stanford University, said at the annual meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science. Field, a member of the United Nations' Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, said emissions from burning fossil fuels since 2000 have largely outpaced the estimates used in the U.N. panel's 2007 reports. The higher emissions are largely the result of the increased burning of coal in developing countries, he said. Unexpectedly large amounts of carbon dioxide are being released into the atmosphere as the result of "feedback loops" that are speeding up natural processes. Prominent among these, evidence indicates, is a cycle in which higher temperatures are beginning to melt the arctic permafrost, which could release hundreds of billions of tons of carbon dioxide and methane into the atmosphere, said several scientists on a panel at the meeting. The permafrost holds 1 trillion tons of carbon, and as much as 10 percent of that could be released this century, Field said. Along with carbon dioxide melting permafrost releases methane, which is 25 times more potent a greenhouse gas than carbon dioxide. "It's a vicious cycle of feedback where warming causes the release of carbon from permafrost, which causes more warming, which causes more release from permafrost," Field said. Evidence is also accumulating that terrestrial and marine ecosystems cannot remove as much carbon from the atmosphere as earlier estimates suggested, Field said. In the oceans, warmer weather is driving stronger winds that are exposing deeper layers of water, which are already saturated with carbon and not as able to absorb as much from the atmosphere. The carbon is making the oceans more acidic, which also reduces their ability to absorb carbon. On land, rising carbon dioxide levels had been expected to boost plant growth and result in greater sequestration of carbon dioxide. As plants undergo photosynthesis to draw energy from the sun, carbon is drawn out of the atmosphere and trapped in the plant matter. But especially in northern latitudes, this effect may be offset significantly by the fact that vegetation-covered land absorbs much more of the sun's heat than snow-covered terrain, said scientists on the panel. Earlier snowmelt, the shrinking arctic ice cover and the northward spread of vegetation are causing the Northern Hemisphere to absorb, rather than reflect, more of the sun's energy and reinforce the warming trend. While it takes a relatively long time for plants to take carbon out of the atmosphere, that carbon can be released rapidly by wildfires, which contribute about a third as much carbon to the atmosphere as burning fossil fuels, according to a paper Field co-authored. Fires such as the recent deadly blazes in southern Australia have increased in recent years, and that trend is expected to continue, Field said. Warmer weather, earlier snowmelt, drought and beetle infestations facilitated by warmer climates are all contributing to the rising number of fires linked to climate change. Across large swaths of the United States and Canada, bark beetles have killed many mature trees, making forests more flammable. And tropical rain forests that were not susceptible to forest fires in the past are likely to become drier as temperatures rise, growing more vulnerable. Preventing deforestation in the tropics is more important than in northern latitudes, the panel agreed, since lush tropical forests sequester more carbon than sparser northern forests. And deforestation in northern areas has benefits, since larger areas end up covered in exposed, heat-reflecting snow. Many scientists and policymakers are advocating increased incentives for preserving tropical forests, especially in the face of demand for clearing forest to grow biofuel crops such as soy. Promoting biofuels without also creating forest-preservation incentives would be "like weatherizing your house and deliberately keeping your windows open," said Peter Frumhoff, chief of the Union of Concerned Scientists' climate program. "It's just not a smart policy." Field said the U.N. panel's next assessment of Earth's climate trends, scheduled for release in 2014, will for the first time incorporate policy proposals. It will also include complicated models of interconnected ecosystem feedbacks.

#### ( ) Consensus is on our side

EDF 9.

[ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND, 1-13 “GLOBAL WARMING MYTHS AND FACTS” -- <http://www.edf.org/page.cfm?tagID=1011>]

FACT: There is no debate among scientists about the basic facts of global warming. The most respected scientific bodies have stated unequivocally that global warming is occurring, and people are causing it by burning fossil fuels (like coal, oil and natural gas) and cutting down forests. The U.S. National Academy of Sciences, which in 2005 the White House called "the gold standard of objective scientific assessment," issued a joint statement with 10 other National Academies of Science saying "the scientific understanding of climate change is now sufficiently clear to justify nations taking prompt action. It is vital that all nations identify cost-effective steps that they can take now, to contribute to substantial and long-term reduction in net global greenhouse gas emissions." (Joint Statement of Science Academies: Global Response to Climate Change [PDF], 2005) The only debate in the science community about global warming is about how much and how fast warming will continue as a result of heat-trapping emissions. Scientists have given a clear warning about global warming, and we have more than enough facts — about causes and fixes — to implement solutions right now.

### A-to “Warming = Not Anthropogenic”

#### ( ) Scientific consensus proves warming is anthropogenic

Monbiot ‘7

[George, Prof @ Oxford Brookes U, Heat: How to Stop the Planet from Burning p 5]

But the link has also been established directly. A study of ocean warming over the past forty years, for example, published in the journal *Science* in 2005, records a precise match between the distribution of heat and the intensity of manmade carbon dioxide emissions. Its lead author described his findings thus: The evidence is so strong it should put an end to any debate about whether humanity is causing global warming. This sounds like a strong statement, but he is not alone. In 2004, another article in *Science* reported the results of a survey of scientific papers containing the words ‘global climate change’. The author found 928 of them on the database she searched. None of the papers, she discovered, disagreed with the consensus position… Politicians, economists, journalists and others may have the impression of confusion, disagreement, or discord among climate scientists, but that impression is incorrect. In 2001 the Royal Society, the United Kingdom’s pre-eminent scientific institution, published the following statement: Despite increasing consensus on the science underpinning predictions of global climate change, doubts have been expressed recently about the need to mitigate the risks posed by global climate change. We do not consider such doubts justified. It was also signed by the equivalent organizations in fifteen other countries. Similar statements have been published by the US National Academy of Sciences, the American Meteorological Society, the American Geophysical Union and the American Association for the Advancement of Science.

### A-to “Aff = Biased Authors”

#### ( ) Our climate models are the most accurate- studies of studies prove

Science Daily ‘8

(4/6, "Climate Models Look Good When Predicting Climate Change", <http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2008/04/080402100001.htm>)

The accuracy of computer models that predict climate change over the coming decades has been the subject of debate among politicians, environmentalists and even scientists. A new study by meteorologists at the University of Utah shows that current climate models are quite accurate and can be valuable tools for those seeking solutions on reversing global warming trends. Most of these models project a global warming trend that amounts to about 7 degrees Fahrenheit over the next 100 years. Scientific opinion on climate change In the study, co-authors Thomas Reichler and Junsu Kim from the Department of Meteorology at the University of Utah investigate how well climate models actually do their job in simulating climate. To this end, they compare the output of the models against observations for present climate. The authors apply this method to about 50 different national and international models that were developed over the past two decades at major climate research centers in China, Russia, Australia, Canada, France, Korea, Great Britain, Germany, and the United States. Of course, also included is the very latest model generation that was used for the very recent (2007) report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). "Coupled models are becoming increasingly reliable tools for understanding climate and climate change, and the best models are now capable of simulating present-day climate with accuracy approaching conventional atmospheric observations," said Reichler. "We can now place a much higher level of confidence in model-based projections of climate change than in the past." The many hours of studying models and comparing them with actual climate changes fulfills the increasing wish to know how much one can trust climate models and their predictions. Given the significance of climate change research in public policy, the study's results also provide important response to critics of global warming. Earlier this year, working group one of the IPCC released its fourth global warming report. The University of Utah study results directly relate to this highly publicized report by showing that the models used for the IPCC paper have reached an unprecedented level of realism.

#### ( ) Neg authors are worse- they’re just special interest hacks

Hansen ‘6

(Jim. Director of the NASA Goddard Institute for Space Studies, Adjunct Professor of Earth and Environmental Sciences at Columbia University’s Earth Institute. “The Threat to the Planet” The New York Review of Books. Pages 11-12. http://www.pdfdownload.org/pdf2html/pdf2html.php?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.astro.columbia.edu%2F~roban%2Flab\_2006\_fall%2Fhansen.pdf&images=yes )

Why are the same scientists and political forces that succeeded in controlling the threat to the ozone layer now failing miserably to deal with the global warming crisis? Though we depend on fossil fuels far more than we ever did on CFCs, there is plenty of blame to go around. Scientists present the facts about climate change clinically, failing to stress that business-as- usual will transform the planet. The press and television, **despite an overwhelming scientific** **consensus concerning global warming**, give equal time to fringe "contrarians" supported by the fossil fuel industry. Special interest groups mount effective disinformation campaigns to sow doubt about the reality of global warming. The government appears to be strongly influenced by special interests, or otherwise confused and distracted, and it has failed to provide leadership. The public is understandably confused or uninterested. I used to spread the blame uniformly until, when I was about to appear on public television, the producer informed me that the program "must" also include a "contrarian" who would take issue with claims of global warming. Presenting such a view, he told me, was a common practice in commercial television as well as radio and newspapers. Supporters of public TV or advertisers, with their own special interests, require "balance" as a price for their continued financial support. Gore's book reveals that while more than half of the recent newspaper articles on climate change have given equal weight to such contrarian views, **virtually none of** **the scientific articles in peer-reviewed journals have questioned the consensus that emissions from human activities cause global warming.** As a result, **even when the scientific evidence is clear, technical nit-picking by contrarians leaves the public with the false impression that there is still great scientific uncertainty about the reality and causes of climate change**.

### A-to “ Species Adapt”

( ) Species can’t adapt- rate of warming is too fast

Costello and Maslin ‘8

[Anthony, Professor of International Child Health and Director of the UCL Institute for Global Health. Mark, Professor UCL Environment Institute. “Apocalypse Now?” – THE LANCET -- 7/12]

Climate change affects all ecosystems. Carbon dioxide will reach two to three times its mid-19th-century level by 2100 leading to major changes in seasonal temperatures and rainfall patterns. Normally with this sort of climate change animals and plants would simply migrate with their preferred climate. However, the rate of human-induced climate change is so rapid that many plant species cannot migrate fast enough and also in many places human beings already occupy the space into which the ecosystem would migrate. Ecosystems most at risk are alpine meadows, cloud forests, arctic tundra, and coral reefs.

#### ( ) Temperature spikes destroy resilience – must slow the rate.

EPA ‘7

[United States Environmental Protection Agency. “Climate Change-health and environmental effects: ecosystems and biodiversity.” http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/effects/ecosystemsandbiodiversity.html -- 12/20]

Observations of ecosystem impacts are difficult to use in future projections because of the complexities involved in human/nature interactions (e.g., land use change). Nevertheless, the observed changes are compelling examples of how rising temperatures can affect the natural world and raise questions of how vulnerable populations will adapt to direct and indirect effects associated with climate change. The IPCC (IPCC, 2007) has noted, During the course of this century the resilience of many ecosystems (their ability to adapt naturally) is likely to be exceeded by an unprecedented combination of change in climate and in other global change drivers (especially land use change and overexploitation), if greenhouse gas emissions and other changes continue at or above current rates. By 2100 ecosystems will be exposed to atmospheric CO2 levels substantially higher than in the past 650,000 years, and global temperatures at least among the highest as those experienced in the past 740,000 years. This will alter the structure, reduce biodiversity and perturb functioning of most ecosystems, and compromise the services they currently provide.

### A-to “Feedbacks Solve”

#### ( ) Feedbacks are net positive

Homer-Dixon ‘7

[Thomas - Centre for International Governance Innovation Chair of Global Systems at the Balsillie School of International Affairs, Professor in the Centre for Environment and Business in the Faculty of Environment at the University of Waterloo, PhD in IR from MIT -- 11/14, Address to the conference for a Globally Integrated Climate Policy for Canada, "Positive Feedbacks, Dynamic Ice Sheets, and the Recarbonization of the Global Fuel Supply: The New Sense of Urgency about Global Warming", http://www.homerdixon.com/articles/excerpt-new\_urgency-thomas\_homer-dixon.pdf]

Let me now say a little bit more about some other feedbacks. This is one of the punch lines of my presentation today. I mentioned earlier that there are two general kinds of feedback: those that operate more- or-less directly on temperature, such as the ice-albedo feedback, and those that operate on Earth’s carbon cycle, where warming produces a change in the amount of carbon in the atmosphere. We have a fairly good understanding of the former and not such a good understanding of the latter. One carbon feedback that worries scientists involves the melting of the permafrost in Siberia, Alaska, and Northern Canada. As the permafrost melts it releases large quantities of methane – a very powerful greenhouse gas that, in turn, causes more warming. Scientists are also concerned about the potential release of more carbon dioxide from forests: just yesterday researchers reported evidence that, as the climate has warmed, the Canadian boreal forest has gone from being a carbon sink to a slight carbon emitter. And then there’s the matter of pine bark beetles. As you likely know, we’ve lost wide swaths of pine forest in British Columbia and Alaska – huge areas of trees – to bark-beetle infestation. As the climate warms, bark-beetle populations reproduce through two generations during the summer, and beetle mortality is lower during the winter. Both these changes mean that beetle populations become much larger overall. If these larger populations cross the Rockies and get into the boreal forest that stretches from Alberta to Newfoundland, and if they kill that forest, the forest will be susceptible to fire that could release astounding quantities of carbon dioxide. I asked Stephen Schneider, a leading cli- mate scientist at Stanford, about the implications of such a develop- ment. He just shrugged and said, ‘well, we’re talking about billions of tonnes of carbon.’ Other potentially destabilizing carbon-cycle feedbacks include the drying of the Amazon and the possibility that if it dries it will burn; the drying of peat bogs in Indonesia, which have already been susceptible to wide-spread burning; and the saturation of ocean carbon sinks. The Southern Ocean around Antarctica is no longer absorbing carbon diox- ide to the extent it did in the past. Warming has produced much more vigorous winds closer to Antarctica. These winds have churned up the sea and brought to the surface deep carbon-rich water, which absorbs less carbon from the atmosphere. Also, higher levels of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere are acidifying the oceans, a change could reduce populations of molluscs and phytoplankton that absorb carbon into the calcium carbonate of their shells. Our climate has both positive and negative feedbacks. The positive ones are self-reinforcing, and the negative ones equilibrate the climate and counteract the tendency towards self-reinforcing climate change. The big question for climate scientists then is: What is the balance is between the positive and negative feedbacks? A consensus has emerged over the last two years – a consensus again not reflected in the recent IPCC reports – that the positive feedbacks in the climate system are much stronger and more numerous than the negative feedbacks. In a paper published last year in Geophysical Research Letters, Scheffer, Brovkin, and Cox carried out a comprehensive assessment of the feed- back situation.7 They wrote, ‘[we] produce an independent estimate of the potential implications of the positive feedback between global tem- peratures and greenhouse gasses.’ In other words, these researchers focused specifically on carbon cycle feedbacks. They went on, ‘we sug- gest that feedback of global temperature and atmosphere CO2 will promote warming by an extra 15% to 78% on a century scale over and above the IPCC estimates.’ Let’s turn to the issue of dynamic ice sheets. The Greenland ice sheet is the second largest mass of ice in the world, after that in Antarctica. If we melt Greenland entirely, we get seven metres of sea-level rise. If we melt the West Antarctic ice sheet, we get another five metres. If we melt the rest of Antarctica, we get an additional fifty or so metres. The Greenland ice sheet will probably be the first to melt, because it’s the most vulnerable. During the last interglacial period 125,000 years ago, when temperatures were roughly what they’re going to be at the end of this century, much of Greenland melted, and sea levels were four to six metres higher than they are right now.

## Backlines – Protectionism

### \*\*Specific US-Sino CFIUS disputes coming now, 2016 key

#### A US-Sino protectionism war’s coming in the short-term. CFIUS spats are key.

Flicker ‘16

et al; Scott Flicker is the Chair of the Paul Hastings Washington D.C. office. Mr. Flicker has represented both acquiring and acquired interests in foreign investment/national security reviews before the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (“CFIUS”). Mr. Flicker has served as an adjunct professor of law at George Washington University School of Law, and as a guest lecturer on international trade at the George Washington University. He received his J.D. from the University of California at Los Angeles. “CFIUS and China: Is This The Year of The Big Showdown ?” – Insights - March 04, 2016 - http://www.paulhastings.com/publications-items/details/?id=96a7e869-2334-6428-811c-ff00004cbded

Observers of the global trade scene are familiar with the refrain: “The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States is biased against Chinese investors. Despite vows from policymakers that the process is investor-neutral, apolitical, and focused on core national security issues, the reality is that CFIUS is the bouncer at the door of the U.S. economy regulating entry by our most formidable geopolitical rival.” As then-Minister of Commerce Chen Deming complained to U.S. officials in 2011, screening of Chinese investment is “neither fair nor transparent.”[1] Is he right? Maybe. 2016 is shaping up as the year when this debate might well come to a head. In just the first two months, the CFIUS process played a decisive role in turning back three significant Chinese investment deals in the U.S. technology space, and a fourth deal looms. To be precise, in one case CFIUS completed an investigation and rejected proposals by the parties to mitigate undisclosed national security concerns. The second deal never made it to a CFIUS review. Instead, the U.S. target rejected a Chinese bid in favor of a slightly lower offer from a U.S. company, citing the “unacceptable level of risk” that the Chinese takeover would be blocked by CFIUS. And in the third, a routine decision by CFIUS to convert its initial review to a formal investigation opened an escape hatch through which the Chinese investor exited the deal. The coming weeks will also see CFIUS grappling with the reported $43 billion acquisition of Swiss agrotech company Syngenta, which owns chemical and R&D facilities in the U.S., by state-owned giant ChemChina. There is no question that the pace of Chinese outbound M&A is on the rise. And the United States remains the most stable and desired destination for Chinese companies looking to hedge against asset devaluation in their own economy while securing technological upgrades in the process. There is zero evidence that CFIUS is targeting Chinese acquisitions for heightened scrutiny, but the sheer increase in the number of Chinese deals that will be filed for review sets the stage for an outright economic confrontation between World’s economic superpowers.

### Modeling- backlines

#### Other countries have national security clauses – US conduct is key to reversing a trend towards global protectionism.

Zucker & Hari ‘13

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The United States has a strong interest in clear and speedy review processes when American companies pursue foreign investments. And the US Governments own comportment can and likely does influence the behavior of other governments in this regard. If the CFIUS review process is seen by other governments to offer neither clarity nor speed, this may be used to justify foreign protectionism. China in particular has criticized the CFIUS regulations as "excessively stringent" in the past.48 In response to Ralls, the Chinese Minister of Commerce, Chen Deming, stated that "[a] small group of lawmakers in some developed countries still have a Cold War mentality when assessing Chinese companies' overseas investment."49 It is widely reported that the case is being closely watched by the Chinese government.50 At least ten countries, including China, now have investment review processes similar to CFIUS.51 While it is understandable that other governments utilize national security reviews, there is a risk that they will game the customary international law exception that permits measures considered "necessary to protect essential interests" to circumvent World Trade Organization rules on non-discrimination and national treatment.52 To prevent retaliation against American companies, more transparency and due process in CFIUS reviews may be good policy. The US has long been a leader in developing prudential standards that are adopted internationally. Along these lines, the US has led efforts to harmonize national security review procedures and standards through the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).53 The OECD Guidelines for Recipient Country Investment Policies Relating to National Security were adopted by OECD governments on April 4, 2008. They recommend, among other things, greater accountability by using a "mix of political and judicial oversight mechanisms to preserve the neutrality and objectivity of the investment review process while also assuring its political accountability."54 Far from allowing for judicial oversight, the US Government's response to Ralls in federal court was that CFIUS and Presidential decision-making are beyond the scope of judicial review. Progress on efforts to harmonize national security reviews will remain slow until a more transparent national security review policy is adopted. Abroad, the US should acknowledge the legitimacy of other countries conducting their own national security reviews. At home, CFIUS should seek to serve as a model for other countries conducting national security reviews by resisting attempts to cloak protectionism under the guise of such reviews and by acting in such a manner that it might not reasonably be accused of doing so.

#### Narrowing CFIUS criteria solves for perceptions of abuse and avoids spiraling protectionism.

Tipler ‘14

Christopher M. Tipler was – at the time of this writing – completing his JD from the University of Pennsylvania - During law school, Chris drafted petitions for writ of certiorari and merits briefs and prepared cases for argument before the United States Supreme Court. Prior to law school, he worked for a global advisory firm focused on national security and risk management. “Defining 'National Security': Resolving Ambiguity in the CFIUS Regulations”- 35 J. Int'l L. 1223 (2014). Available at: <http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol35/iss4/12>

Foreign governments are also likely to take retaliatory measures to prevent FDI by U.S. businesses within their borders if they perceive actions by the Committee as protectionist. By adding the critical infrastructure and critical technology, the factors used when making national security determinations have been criticized as "broadly over-inclusive," which "threatens to send the message that the United States is taking an increasingly protective stance toward FDI."186 Indeed, many perceive CFIUS as a tool for protectionist measures,187 and the broad nature of the national security definition could allow for more protectionist actions in the future.188 Whether or not these claims are valid, the perception of protectionism by the United States is likely to strain international relations189 and can lead to retaliatory measures that block U.S. foreign investment within that country.190 Many countries have begun implementing CFIUS-style bodies that the governments could use for protectionist purposes under the guise of national security review. Some prominent examples include major U.S. trade partners like Canada, Germany, China, and the European Union.191 Most notably, Article 12 of China's 2006 Provisions on Acquisition of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors installs a similar body to conduct national security reviews, leading to concerns that China will use this body for protectionist purposes.192 However, the scope of its national security review is "even murkier and less efficient"193 due to its "vague and as-yet-undefined process and lack of investor protections."194 As a result, China could respond to CFIUS's actions blocking Chinese investment in the United States, such as the recent prohibition of the Ralls Corp. investment,195 and prevent an even wider array of U.S. FDI in China. Therefore, by providing clear guidelines regarding what transactions raise national security concerns, the United States could potentially increase FDI, calm political tensions, and create more opportunities for U.S. businesses to invest abroad.

### CFIUS enforcement on China is key to the global signal

#### US enforcement patterns towards China are key to the global signal – Chinese mergers hold the international spotlight.

Stanley ‘15

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In recent years, there has been a global "proliferation of merger control regimes." n188 The enforcement of such regimes has been deeply problematic. n189 Although these regimes are governed by organizations or agreements such as the World Trade Organization ("WTO"), n190 the North America Free Trade [\*1062] Agreement ("NAFTA"), n191 or bilateral and multilateral investment treaties, these governing bodies typically allow departures from obligations for national security risks. n192 As a result, international merger control regimes remain ambiguous, vague, and difficult to navigate. Countries such as India, Germany, and, most significantly, China, have created or threatened to create regulatory regimes in response to the CFIUS reviews. n193 Retaliatory legislation in response to a disapproved transaction by the United States was instituted by China in 2011, n194 wherein China codified its own national security review framework, mirroring that of CFIUS. Contemporary transactions involving foreign persons domiciled in China appear to be the epicenter of disputes surrounding CFIUS reviews.196 China remains in the spotlight due to its position as one of the world's leading economies.197 Additionally, these blockbuster reviews involve high-dollar transactions, are often prolonged, and face aggressive political pressure.198 Although fears of Chinese-cultivated espionage materialized with the Justice Department's indictment of five officers in China's People's Liberation Army for attempts to steal U.S. commercial trade secrets, the integrity of the CFIUS review process continues to be debated.199

### Yes, reversible

#### US policy can reverse global manipulation of national security clauses.

Zucker & Hari ‘13

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A more transparent review process could be good foreign and economic policy, as it would simultaneously promote investment from and ease tensions with China. Chinese Commerce Minister Chen recently stated, "{f}or every three Chinese yuan planned to be invested in the United States, only one yuan is approved by the US authorities."56 Minister Chen's comments may have some merit when Chinese investment growth in the US is compared to Europe. In 2008, China invested less than USD 1 billion in Europe and the US. However, in Europe, where fewer national security reviews make headlines, Chinese FDI has exceeded USD 10 billion in each of the last two years. In the United States, Chinese investment, while still impressive, amounted to USD 6.5 billion in 2013.57 Given that China holds an estimated USD 3.3 trillion in foreign reserves, more predictable national security reviews likely would lead to increased Chinese investment in the United States.58

### BIT shapes global market models

#### US-Sino BIT re-shapes global economics. Countries will model for *political* and *economic* reasons.

Kong ‘10

et al; Kong Qingjiang is Professor of Law of Zhejiang Gongshang University, China. “US-CHINA BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY NEGOTIATIONS” – This section is from the Executive summary - Kong is listed as lead author. February 25th, 2010 http://www.eai.nus.edu.sg/publications/files/BB507.pdf

If the US model BIT is finally adopted with minor revisions, the BIT could open more Chinese sectors, including services, to US investors and offer more forms of investments. Expectedly it can ease tensions concerning the national security issue. The far-reaching implications of the BIT lies in the institutional aspect; as one of the most liberalized BITs, it will serve as an inspiration for, and add to the momentum to, institution-building for global investment flow. It will also serve as an example for other developing countries to follow and particularly for the rest of the BRIC countries. Moreover, it might cast a shadow on the rest of the economies as to whether there will be an investment drainage, which in turn will lead to a competition for BIT negotiations and for investment.

(Note: this evidence internally references “BRIC” economies – that stands for the economies of Brazil, Russia, India and China.)

**Protectionism and Econ Advantage**

US econ advantage = also forthcoming in wave two.

**1AC – Heg Impact**

**US economic strength is the crucial internal link to heg and global stability – best data proves**

**Hubbard 10** – Hegemonic Stability Theory: An Empirical Analysis By: Jesse Hubbard Jesse Hubbard Program Assistant at Open Society Foundations Washington, District Of Columbia International Affairs Previous National Democratic Institute (NDI), National Defense University, Office of Congressman Jim Himes Education PPE at University of Oxford, 2010

**Regression analysis of this data shows** that Pearson’s r-value is -.836. **In the case of American hegemony, economic strength is a better predictor of violent conflict than even overall national power**, which had an r-value of -.819. The data is also well within the realm of statistical significance, with a p-value of .0014. While the data for British hegemony was not as striking, the same overall pattern holds true in both cases. During both periods of hegemony, hegemonic strength was negatively related with violent conflict, and yet use of force by the hegemon was positively correlated with violent conflict in both cases. Finally, in both cases, economic power was more closely associated with conflict levels than military power. Statistical analysis created a more complicated picture of the hegemon’s role in fostering stability than initially anticipated. VI. Conclusions and Implications for Theory and Policy To elucidate some answers regarding the complexities my analysis unearthed, I turned first to the existing theoretical literature on hegemonic stability theory. The existing literature provides some potential frameworks for understanding these results. Since economic strength proved to be of such crucial importance, reexamining the literature that focuses on hegemonic stability theory’s economic implications was the logical first step. As explained above, the literature on hegemonic stability theory can be broadly divided into two camps – that which focuses on the international economic system, and that which focuses on armed conflict and instability. This research falls squarely into the second camp, but insights from the first camp are still of relevance. Even Kindleberger’s early work on this question is of relevance. Kindleberger posited that the economic instability between the First and Second World Wars could be attributed to the lack of an economic hegemon (Kindleberger 1973). But economic instability obviously has spillover effects into the international political arena. Keynes, writing after WWI, warned in his seminal tract The Economic Consequences of the Peace that Germany’s economic humiliation could have a radicalizing effect on the nation’s political culture (Keynes 1919). Given later events, his warning seems prescient. In the years since the Second World War, however, the European continent has not relapsed into armed conflict. What was different after the second global conflagration? Crucially, the United States was in a far more powerful position than Britain was after WWI. As the tables above show, Britain’s economic strength after the First World War was about 13% of the total in strength in the international system. In contrast, the United States possessed about 53% of relative economic power in the international system in the years immediately following WWII. The U.S. helped rebuild Europe’s economic strength with billions of dollars in investment through the Marshall Plan, assistance that was never available to the defeated powers after the First World War (Kindleberger 1973). The interwar years were also marked by a series of debilitating trade wars that likely worsened the Great Depression (Ibid.). In contrast, when Britain was more powerful, it was able to facilitate greater free trade, and after World War II, **the United States played a leading role in creating institutions like the GATT that had an essential role in facilitating global trade** (Organski 1958). The possibility that economic stability is an important factor in the overall security environment should not be discounted, especially given the results of my statistical analysis. Another theory that could provide insight into the patterns observed in this research is that of preponderance of power. Gilpin theorized that **when a state has the preponderance of power in the international system, rivals are more likely to resolve their disagreements without resorting to armed conflict** (Gilpin 1983). The logic behind this claim is simple – it makes more sense to challenge a weaker hegemon than a stronger one. This simple yet powerful theory can help explain the puzzlingly strong positive correlation between military conflicts engaged in by the hegemon and conflict overall. It is not necessarily that military involvement by the hegemon instigates further conflict in the international system. Rather, this military involvement could be a function of the hegemon’s weaker position, which is the true cause of the higher levels of conflict in the international system. Additionally, it is important to note that **military power is,** in the long run, **dependent on economic strength**. Thus, it is possible that **as hegemons lose relative economic power, other nations are tempted to challenge them even if their short-term military capabilities are still strong**. This would help explain some of the variation found between the economic and military data. The results of this analysis are of clear importance beyond the realm of theory. As the debate rages over the role of the United States in the world, hegemonic stability theory has some useful insights to bring to the table. What this research makes clear is that a strong hegemon can exert a positive influence on stability in the international system. However, this should not give policymakers a justification to engage in conflict or escalate military budgets purely for the sake of international stability. If anything, **this research points to the central importance of economic influence in fostering international stability**. To misconstrue these findings to justify anything else would be a grave error indeed. Hegemons may play a stabilizing role in the international system, but this role is complicated. **It is economic strength, not military dominance that is the true test of hegemony**. **A weak state with a strong military is a paper tiger** – it may appear fearsome, but it is vulnerable to even a short blast of wind.

**US economic strength prevents and de-escalates all global conflicts**

**Hubbard 10** – Hegemonic Stability Theory: An Empirical Analysis By: Jesse Hubbard Jesse Hubbard Program Assistant at Open Society Foundations Washington, District Of Columbia International Affairs Previous National Democratic Institute (NDI), National Defense University, Office of Congressman Jim Himes Education PPE at University of Oxford, 2010

Research into the theoretical underpinnings of this topic revealed that there are two main subfields within the literature on hegemonic stability. One line of study, an avenue pursued by prominent theorists such as Kindleberger, Keohane, and Ikenberry focuses primarily on questions of related to the economic system. The other avenue, pursued by theorists such as Gilpin, looks at the role of hegemonic governance in reducing violent conflict. In my research, I focus on this aspect of hegemonic stability – its implications for military conflict in the international system. To research this question, I undertook a broad quantitative study that examined data from both the American and British hegemonic epochs, focusing on the years of 1815-1939 in the case of British hegemony, and 1945 to 1999 in the case of American hegemony. I hypothesized that hegemonic strength was inversely correlated with levels of armed conflict in the international system. Using the data from the Correlates of War Project, I was able to perform a number of statistical analyses on my hypothesis. To measure hegemonic strength, I used the Composite Index of National Capability, a metric that averages together six different dimensions of relative power as a share of total power in the international system. **I then matched this data with data cataloging all conflicts in the international system since 1815**. I organized this data into five-year increments, in order to make statistical analysis more feasible. **Regression analysis** of the data **revealed** that **there was a statistically significant negative** **correlation between relative hegemonic power and conflict levels in the international system.** However, further statistical tests added complications to the picture of hegemonic governance that was emerging. Regression analysis of military actions engaged in by the hegemon versus total conflict in the system revealed a highly positive correlation for both American and British hegemony. Further analysis revealed that in both cases, **military power was a less accurate predictor of military conflict than economic power**. There are several possible explanations for these findings. It is likely that economic stability has an effect on international security. In addition, **weaker hegemons are more likely to be challenged militarily** than stronger hegemons. Thus, **the hegemon will engage in more conflicts during times of international insecurity**, because such times are also when the hegemon is weakest. Perhaps the most important implication of this research is that **hegemons may well be more effective in promoting peace through economic power than through the exercise of military force.** II. Research Question In examining hegemonic stability theory, there are several important questions to consider. First of all, an acceptable definition of what constitutes a hegemon must be established. Secondly, a good measure of what constitutes stability in the international system must be determined. Certainly, the frequency and severity of interstate conflict is an important measure of stability in the international system. However, other measures of stability should also be taken into account. Conflict in the international system takes on a wide range of forms. While military conflict is perhaps the most violent and severe dimension, it is only one of many forms that conflict can take. Conflict need not be confined to wars between traditional states. Terrorism, piracy, and guerilla warfare are also types of conflict that are endemic to the international system. Economic conflict, exemplified by trade wars, hostile actions such as sanctions, or outright trade embargos, is also an important form of conflict in the international system. States can also engage in a range of less severe actions that might be deemed political conflict, by recalling an ambassador or withdrawing from international bodies, for example. Clearly, “stability” as it pertains to the international system is a vast and amorphous concept. Because of these complexities, a comprehensive assessment of the theory is beyond the purview of this research. However, completing a more focused analysis is a realistic endeavor. Focusing on international armed conflicts in two select periods will serve to increase the feasibility the research. I will focus on the period of British hegemony lasting from the end of the Napoleonic wars to 1939 and the period of American hegemony beginning after the Second World War and continuing until 1999, the last year for which reliable data is available. The proposed hypothesis is that in these periods, **the hegemon acted as a stabilizing force by reducing the frequency and severity of international armed conflict.** The dependent variable in this case is the frequency and severity of conflict. The primary independent variable is the power level of the hegemon. This hypothesis is probabilistic since it posits that the hegemon tended to reduce conflict, not that it did so in every single possible instance. One way to test this hypothesis would be through a case-study method that examined the role of Britain and the United States in several different conflicts. This method would have the advantage of approaching the problem from a very feasible, limited perspective. While it would not reveal much about hegemony on a broader theoretical level, it would help provide practical grounding for what is a highly theoretical area of stuffy in international relations. Another method would be to do a broader quantitative comparison of international conflict by finding and comparing data on conflict and hegemonic strength for the entire time covered by British and American hegemony. **The hypothesis is falsifiable**, because it could be shown that the hegemon did not act as a stabilizing force during the years of study. **It** also **avoids** some of **the pitfalls associated with the case study method**, such as selection bias and the inherently subjective nature of qualitative analysis.

**Econ Ups---General**

**Econ---A2: Econ High**

**Econ’s wrecked and won’t recover**---entering period of “secular stagnation”, economist consensus, low employment, slowing population growth, tech change, inequality, high consumer debt, savings glut

**Davidson, 3-25** – Jacob Davidson, news editor at Time, worked at Money as an economy/finance reporter, 3-25-2016, “This Theory Explains Why the U.S. Economy Might Never Get Better”, TIME, http://time.com/4269733/secular-stagnation-larry-summers/

In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, conventional wisdom among economists, business leaders, and policy makers was fairly straightforward: Once the banks were bailed out, the stimulus spent, and businesses had a few years to recover, the U.S. economy would return to its usual healthy growth. Time, in other words, would heal the wounds of the subprime collapse and subsequent turbulence. But if any recovery has **turned conventional wisdom on its head**, it’s this one. Over the last eight years, America’s economic prospects have **lagged even the most pessimistic early predictions**. In 2011, the Federal Reserve predicted that U.S. real GDP would, at worst, grow by 3.5% in 2013 and that the economy would expand between 2.5% and 2.8% annually in the long run. In every year since, the Fed has revised its predictions downward. (The most recent estimate predicts 2.2% annual growth in 2016, and 2% growth in the long run—a rate more than one-third lower than the post-war average.) Even employment, a source of uplifting headlines in recent weeks, is **deceptively weak**. The unemployment rate—which ignores those who gave up looking for a job—has hit new lows, but the percentage of Americans (between ages 25 and 54) who are actually working is over three points lower than its pre-crisis peak. These confounding circumstances have led **many economists** to rally behind the concept of so-called **“secular stagnation.”** As a diagnosis, secular stagnation is simple: It’s the idea that the economic problems the U.S. continues to face aren’t a product of the “business cycle,” the ebb and flow of boom times and recession (hence the “secular” part), but may well be **permanent drags on the modern economy**. “It’s a kind of long term and sustained slow-down in economic growth,” says Larry **Summers**, who served as Bill Clinton’s treasury secretary and is widely credited with dusting off the concept of secular stagnation and bringing it into the mainstream. The phrase was originally coined in a 1938 address by economist Alvin Hansen to the American Economic Association. Grappling with the sluggish recovery that followed the Great Depression, Hansen predicted that slower population growth and a lower speed of technological progress would combine to thwart full employment, wage increases, and general economic expansion. In both cases, Hansen’s reasoning was the same: without new people entering the work force and new inventions coming onto the market, there would be less investment in new goods, employees and services. Without investment, fewer businesses would open or expand, growth would slow, and more workers would be unable to find jobs. Hansen painted an eerily familiar picture: “This is the essence of secular stagnation,” he explained, “sick recoveries which die in their infancy and depressions which feed on themselves and leave a hard and seemingly immovable core of unemployment.” He could have been describing 1938 or 2016. World War II effectively solved at least one of Hansen’s concerns. The U.S. population exploded, thanks to a post-war baby boom. Meanwhile, high government spending during the conflict boosted the economy, and new inventions like jet airplanes, interstate highways, and eventually computers kept productivity and growth churning. Hansen’s theory was mothballed—until 2013 when Summers reintroduced the idea as an explanation to America’s sluggish economic recovery in a speech at the International Monetary Fund. Since Summers’ IMF address, economists have piled on with many different ideas on exactly what is causing America’s current growth crisis—so much so that Berkeley professor Barry Eichengreen has referred to secular stagnation as “an economist’s Rorchach Test.” Though the consensus around what secular stagnation means is loose, one factor almost everyone agrees on is the **lack of population growth** that concerned Hansen has re-emerged as a problem. Population growth means people need more stuff—especially capital-intensive things like housing that require especially large expenditures—and businesses invest in new workers and equipment to provide that stuff. The reverse is also true: as U.S. population growth has fallen and the baby boom generation approaches retirement age, the number of new consumers and workers who can produce and buy things has dropped off. “Slow or negative growth in the working-age population means low demand for new investments,” Nobel prize winner Paul Krugman explained in a 2014 article. Changing technological trends have also been blamed for discouraging investment. Summers notes that this has happened in two ways: first, the internet revolution has allowed companies like WhatsApp—which had just 55 employees when it was acquired for $19 billion by Facebook in 2014—to reach a higher market valuation than Sony. Growing a multi-billion dollar company used to require hiring lots of workers, constructing offices and factories and so on. Nowadays, all you need is a loft and a couple of Macbooks. Summers also identifies a related problem: the types of capital companies actually do need to invest in—computers and software—have gotten drastically cheaper. The result is that as businesses open or expand, they no longer need to spread their wealth around by purchasing costly machinery. Eichengreen, who considers himself a secular stagnation agnostic, finds this argument particularly persuasive. He adds that all types of capital goods, not just computers, have fallen in price over time as manufacturing has gotten increasingly efficient. “The one factor I’m most convinced by is the relative price of capital goods has being going down for 30 to 40 years,” the professor says. “Firms can do the same things spending less.” Beyond **demographics** and **technological change**, there are a myriad of other explanations for lack of investment. **Growing inequality** means those most likely to spend their money, the middle class and people with lower incomes, have seen their wages grow the least. That means less spending and less demand, which ultimately means less production and hiring. Another proposed factor is high levels of consumer debt, which depresses spending as consumers divert money they would have used at the mall, say, toward paying their credit card interest. Some, like Northwestern economics professor Robert J. Gordon, place less emphasis on lack of investment and more on Hansen’s other idea: that technological innovation has faltered—**for real this time**. Gordon agrees with many of Summers’ concerns, but blames much of the slowdown over the last fifty years on a lack of important new inventions. “We had a complete transformation of human life in the special century between 1870 and 1970,” Gordon says. “Since then we’ve had plenty of innovation, but in a narrower sphere; in entertainment, communication, and information technology.” Gordon argues those recent innovations have **failed to increase productivity** in the same way running water, the combustion engine, and indoor plumbing did for the previous generation. As a result, economic growth has been comparatively sluggish—especially now that the gains from the internet boom have largely been absorbed. Secular stagnation also has its fair share of prominent skeptics. Harvard Professor Kenneth Rogoff agrees with some of the stagnation theory, such as lower population growth hurting output, but attributes most of the slowdown to a passing “**debt supercycle**” where post-recession economies are dragged down by high levels of debt that hold back growth until deleveraging is complete. Former Federal Reserve Chair Ben Bernanke chalks up slow post-recession growth to a **global savings glut** where investment is held back by various trade and economic policies, such as the decision by some countries to build large hoards of foreign currency reserves. If Bernanke is right, there is nothing fundamentally wrong with the economy and those bad policies must simply be reversed. What makes secular stagnation so disconcerting for economists who do believe in the theory is that it **defies traditional remedies for poor growth**. In the past, if the economy had too little investment and growth stalled, the Federal Reserve could simply lower interest rates, which reduces returns on savings and makes borrowing and investing cheaper. If interest rates go low enough, business owners often decide that spending on expanding their business or research and development will yield higher returns than saving. At the same time, individuals are more inclined to spend or invest than to let their money sit in a bank. That typically kicked the economy back into gear.

**Global decline’s guaranteed---**IMF/G20 predictions,protectionism, collapsing investment, structural weakness, and political inertia**---reject their optimism bias**

**Laudicina, 3-25** – Paul Laudicina, 3-25-2016, “Wanted: Bold Leadership to Steady Global Economy”, http://www.forbes.com/sites/paullaudicina/2016/03/25/wanted-bold-leadership-to-steady-global-economy/#6e06da9537f7

In recent weeks, leaders from the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (**IMF**) and the Group of 20 (**G20**) finance ministers have issued their **most dire warnings on the state of the world economy since the Global Financial Crisis**. Yet, the problems they have highlighted are **unlikely to be addressed**. Leaders in key economies around the world are **unlikely** to enact the **fiscal and structural reform** policies that would address **economic vulnerabilities**. Why are global leaders again steering into the storm? Put simply, despite the understanding among macroeconomists and those in the policy sphere of **growing risks to global economic recovery**, many analysts continue to explain away worrying economic indicators such as the **stalling out of globalization**. Technocrats are sounding alarm bells while politicians find room to skate on the thin ice of unsound but positive global outlooks. Politicians and business leaders alike are drawn to the siren song of “happy talk.” By failing to face facts, they are again creating serious risk to the global economy in the form of **complacency**. Rather than confronting head on the challenges that economies and businesses now face, leaders seem increasingly captive to a range of **decision biases** that may not actually make the future safer for their constituents, employees, or shareholders. At best, this is ignorance. At worst, **negligence**. One of the primary dangers to worldwide economic growth is the **hiatus in globalization** that has persisted since the financial crisis. Global trade in goods peaked at 52% of global GDP in 2008, reaching only 49% of GDP in 2014 after **falling each year since 2011**. And yet leaders worldwide have allowed the WTO’s Doha Round of world trade talks to languish. At the same time, international flows of both direct and portfolio investment remained below their pre-crisis peaks in U.S. dollar terms as of 2014 (the latest year for which full data is available). **The high-growth years of globalization are behind us**. This is a result of **economic** factors such as reduced international trade in commodities –notably China’s significantly lower demand for commodities– in addition to **political** factors such as **rising nationalism and protectionism** around the world. Unwarranted optimism about the state of globalization and the global economy is often inspired by **dogmatic techno-optimism**. One area in which globalization is flourishing is in the cross-border flow of information in the form of digital communications. It appears that such developments may be inspiring leaders to simply hope that some new technological advance will save the day. While this era of massive technological change is both empowering for consumers and disruptive for existing businesses, the economic significance of globalized digital information is often **overstated, without sufficient analysis**. Take the notion that digital flows have replaced world trade in goods lost to the events of 2008-2009 or to China’s continued slowdown. Assigning value to digital flows is extremely difficult, and speculative at best. There isn’t a clean answer to the question of how an increase in global data flows translates to global economic value generation. In a recent study, Canadian company Sandvine found that the Internet video service Netflix consumes over one-third of all downstream Internet bandwidth during peak periods in North America. Consumption of this content is of course good for Netflix’s bottom-line and highly entertaining to its customers. But such digital flows are hardly revolutionary or consequential for broader global economic activity. More instructive on the overall impact of the global technological shift underway is the serious research of Northwestern University economist Robert J. Gordon. In his latest book, The Rise and Fall of American Growth, Gordon argues that inventions of the past half-century have had only a fraction of the economic impact of those of the preceding century, from electric lighting to indoor plumbing to the jet engine. At the very least, the work of serious thinkers such as Gordon bears more consideration in assessing just how much our current age of digital technological change may have **lesser global economic returns**, no matter how much it is challenging existing business models and changing lifestyles. Assuming away tough truths about weakened globalization and the many risks plaguing the global economy does nothing to assure continued global prosperity. In fact, such complacency on the part of our global leaders only makes the probability of these risks manifesting themselves even more likely. In order to mitigate these risks and reboot globalization, bold leadership and **dramatic actions are needed**. G20 finance ministers admitted as much recently in Shanghai, saying that “we need to do more to achieve our common objectives for global growth” and “we will use all policy tools—monetary, fiscal and structural—individually and collectively to achieve these goals.” If such actions were taken, globalization would likely resume the growth it enjoyed in the pre-crisis era and the global economic recovery would finally be on solid ground. However, the lack of willingness and ability on the part of leaders across the G20 countries to implement such actions in recent years **does not bode well for the sustainability of global economic recovery**. Regrettably, it appears much more likely that political leaders will remain complacent and again kick the can down the road. As such, business leaders should take very seriously statements by the IMF and the G20 that **there is something increasingly wrong with the state of the world today**. They should also take with a grain of salt the happy talk that tends to permeate business literature. Rather, cold objectivity is now, as ever, key to unlocking value and protecting core interests. With so much in flux, we should all be on guard. What sounds too good to be true almost always is.

**Global econ’s doomed---**

**Laundry list of global shocks make crash inevitable---policy backstops can’t solve**

**Roubini, 3-02** – Nouriel Roubini, professor at NYU’s Stern school of business and chairman of Roubini Global Economics, 3-2-2016, “Is the world economy having a 2008 moment?”, Guardian, http://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/mar/02/is-the-world-economy-having-a-2008-moment-stock-markets-financial-crisis

The question I am asked most often nowadays is this: are we back to 2008 and another global financial crisis and recession? My answer is a straightforward no, but that the recent episode of global financial market turmoil is likely to be more serious than any period of volatility and risk-off behaviour since 2009. This is because there are now at least **seven sources of global tail risk**, as opposed to the **single factors** – the eurozone crisis, the Federal Reserve “taper tantrum,” a possible Greek exit from the eurozone, and a hard economic landing in China – that have fuelled volatility in recent years. **First, worries about a hard landing in China** and its likely impact on the stock market and the value of the renminbi have returned with a vengeance. While China is more likely to have a bumpy landing than a hard one, investors’ concerns have yet to be laid to rest, owing to the ongoing growth slowdown and continued capital flight. **Second, emerging markets are in serious trouble**. They face global headwinds (China’s slowdown, the end of the commodity super cycle, the Fed’s exit from zero policy rates). Many are running macro imbalances, such as twin current account and fiscal deficits, and confront rising inflation and slowing growth. Most have not implemented structural reforms to boost sagging potential growth. And currency weakness increases the real value of trillions of dollars of debt built up in the last decade. **Third, the Fed probably erred** in exiting its zero-interest-rate policy in December. Weaker growth, lower inflation (owing to a further decline in oil prices), and tighter financial conditions (via a stronger dollar, a corrected stock market, and wider credit spreads) now threaten US growth and inflation expectations. **Fourth, many simmering geopolitical risks are coming to a boil**. Perhaps the most immediate source of uncertainty is the prospect of a long-term cold war – punctuated by proxy conflicts – between the Middle East’s regional powers, particularly Sunni Saudi Arabia and Shia Iran. **Fifth, the decline in oil prices** is triggering falls in US and global equities and spikes in credit spreads. This may now signal weak global demand – rather than rising supply – as growth in China, emerging markets, and the US slows. Weak oil prices also damage US energy producers, which comprise a large share of the US stock market, and impose credit losses and potential defaults on net energy exporting economies, their sovereigns, state-owned enterprises, and energy firms. As regulations restrict market makers from providing liquidity and absorbing market volatility, every fundamental shock becomes more severe in terms of risk-asset price corrections. **Sixth, global banks are challenged** by lower returns, owing to the new regulations put in place since 2008, the rise of financial technology that threatens to disrupt their already-challenged business models, the growing use of negative policy rates, rising credit losses on bad assets (energy, commodities, emerging markets, fragile European corporate borrowers), and the movement in Europe to “bail in” banks’ creditors, rather than bail them out with now-restricted state aid. **Finally, the European Union and the eurozone could be ground zero of global financial turmoil this year**. European banks are challenged. The migration crisis could lead to the end of the Schengen Agreement, and (together with other domestic troubles) to the end of German chancellor Angela Merkel’s government. Moreover, **Britain’s exit from the EU is becoming more likely**. With the Greek government and its creditors once again on a collision course, the risk of Greece’s exit may return. Populist parties of the right and the left are gaining strength throughout Europe. Thus, Europe increasingly risks disintegration. To top it all off, its neighborhood is unsafe, with wars raging not only in the Middle East, but also – despite repeated attempts by the EU to broker peace – in Ukraine, while Russia is becoming more aggressive on Europe’s borders, from the Baltics to the Balkans. In the past, tail risks were more occasional, growth scares turned out to be just that, and the policy response was strong and effective, thereby keeping risk-off episodes brief and restoring asset prices to their previous highs (if not taking them even higher). **Today, there are seven sources of potential global tail risk, and the global economy is moving from an anemic expansion** (positive growth that accelerates) **to a slowdown** (positive growth that decelerates), which will lead to further reduction in the price of risky assets (equities, commodities, credit) worldwide. At the same time, the policies **that stopped and reversed the doom** loop between the real economy and risk assets **are running out of steam**. The policy mix is suboptimal, owing to excessive reliance on monetary rather than fiscal policy. Indeed, monetary policies are becoming increasingly unconventional, reflected in the move by several central banks to negative real policy rates; and such unconventional policies risk doing more harm than good as they hurt the profitability of banks and other financial firms. Two dismal months for financial markets may give way in March to a relief rally for assets such as global equities, as some key central banks (the People’s Bank of China, the European Central Bank, and the Bank of Japan) ease more, while others (the Fed and the Bank of England) will remain on hold for longer. But **repeated eruptions** from some of the seven sources of global tail risk will make the rest of this year – unlike the previous seven – a bad one for risky assets and **anaemic for global growth**.

**Econ---A2: Econ Low**

**Econ’s strong despite international pressures---predictive and newest data**

---Specifically answers: Oil/commodity prices, dollar appreciation, and China/Europe/Brazil/Russia decline

**Hartman, 3-25** – Mitchell Hartman, senior reporter for employment and Marketplace’s Entrepreneurship Desk, 3-25-2016, “Economy ended 2015 stronger, recession danger recedes”, Marketplace, http://www.marketplace.org/2016/03/24/world/economy-now-picking-after-2015-fizzle-out

In its third and final estimate of gross domestic product (GDP) in Q4 2015, the Commerce Department reports that GDP **grew by 1.4 percent**. That is a 0.4 percent upward revision from the previous (second) estimate released in February. The final upward revision in GDP was due primarily to higher final figures for **consumer spending**. The final reading for Q4 GDP growth of 1.4 percent compares to 2.0 percent GDP growth in the third quarter. The full-year annual growth rate for real GDP in 2015 was 2.4 percent, the same as in 2014. There were **multiple drags on the U.S. economy** in the final months of 2015, including extreme winter weather, plunging global oil and other commodity prices, a rising U.S. dollar (which hurts U.S. exports and manufacturers), and economic troubles in China, Europe, Brazil and Russia. “GDP slowed in the final quarter of last year,” said analyst Steve Murphy at Capital Economics in Toronto. **But** he said that **looking forward** at U.S. economic prospects in 2016, “**there’s nothing that points to a sustained downturn** or anything too concerning.” Economist Joe Brusuelas at consulting firm RSM said that following the sharp market downturn and extreme volatility of January and early February, **economic conditions have stabilized**. “Right now, if you look at **fundamentals** in the **U**nited **S**tates, we’re seeing **decent growth**—somewhere around 2.5 percent,” Brusuelas said. “There’s **very strong job growth**, a decent **recovery in housing and auto sales**, and even **consumer retail sales** in luxury, entertainment and accommodation.”

**All major indicators show strength and resilience---recession’s inconceivable**

---strong consumer spending, employment, business confidence, and consumer confidence

---A2: Stock collapse – it’s recovered since the crash at the end of 2015

**Olsen, 3-26** – Christina Olsen, citing both Commerce Department data and Chris Rupkey, chief economist at MUFG Union Bank in New York, 3-26-2016, “US Economy Remains Strong Mainly Due to Strong Consumer Spending”, Maine News Online, https://mainenewsonline.com/content/16037869-us-economy-remains-strong-mainly-due-strong-consumer-spending

The economic indicators suggest that U.S. economy is still **going strong**, mainly helped by **strong consumer spending** and **positive business sentiment**. U.S. economic growth during fourth quarter was better than estimates of economic analysts as the GDP increased by 1.4 percent annual rate. Earlier reports had estimated GDP growth of one percent but strong consumer spending in the United States has helped the economy. The Commerce Department released the GDP data for fourth quarter on Friday. Economists were surprised as the **strong consumer spending** has been **supporting the U.S. economy**. While manufacturers might have reduced their inventory levels considering the risk of lower sales and piling up production, the GDP data suggests that consumer spending **remained strong across the country**. Earlier this year, the stock markets faced sell-off as investors were worried about faltering growth in the United States and other parts of the world. However, in March, the stock indices managed to **recover their losses** for year 2016 and **closed above the levels witnessed in December 2015**. U.S. consumer spending has remained strong over the last few quarters. Consumers have been saving on their gas bills as oil prices have remained low. Secondly, the strong labor market has kept consumer sentiment upbeat. Over the last few quarters, the labor market has **shown strength** and **that has given support to the U.S. economy in the long run**. Consumer spending is a main driving force for the U.S. economy. Chris Rupkey, chief economist at MUFG Union Bank in New York said, “The consumer is **back in the driver’s seat**. There is **no sign of recession** in these data, so this will put a smile on Fed officials’ faces and argues for their policy of gradual interest-rate normalization to continue.” However, energy sector has been suffering for the last few quarters as the energy prices have remained low. Multi-national companies have also faced drop in their earnings as the U.S. dollar has remained strong compared to other countries. U.S. dollar has gained 10.5 percent in 2015 compared to currencies of main trading partners of the United States. Economists are now looking at the next Federal Reserve meeting as an important trigger for the stock markets and economy. If the Federal Reserve keeps the rates at current level in the next policy meeting, the real estate sector could **continue to outperform** for the next quarter. The economy grew at a 2 percent pace in the third quarter and expanded by 2.4 percent for all of 2015. Consumer spending, which accounts for more than two thirds of U.S. economic activity, rose at a 2.4 percent pace and not the 2 percent reported last month. Relatively strong consumer spending underscores the economy’s underlying strength and should **further allay fears of a recession** — concerns that triggered a massive stock-market sell-off early this year. Together with a tightening labor market and rising inflation, that probably keeps the Federal Reserve on a path to gradually raise interest rates this year.

**It’s strong---labor, housing, and confidence. Growth will continue.**

**Stockton, 3-04** – David J. Stockton, senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics and chief macroeconomist at LH Meyer, “Chapter 2: The US Economic Expansion Remains on Track”, REALITY CHECK FOR THE GLOBAL ECONOMY, Peterson Institute for International Economics, PIIE Briefing 16-3, March 2016

These recent developments make it possible, but **not likely**, that a much bleaker outlook for the US economy is in the offing. To be sure, if the recent tightening of financial conditions persists, a modest drag on aggregate demand and activity will occur, necessitating a more pessimistic economic forecast. But **most** of the **evidence** suggests the US economy’s expansion **remains on track** and that recent pessimism in the markets and among the public may be **overdone**. Perhaps the clearest signal that the expansion is proceeding at a healthy clip comes from the **labor market**. Gains in nonfarm payroll employment have averaged over 230,000 per month over the past three months and 215,000 per month over the past six months. Only about 100,000 per month are needed to stabilize the unemployment rate. By that standard, the recent pace of hiring has been **solid**, contributing to the fall in the unemployment rate from 5.3 percent six months ago to 4.9 percent in January—extending the long decline that began in late 2009. In addition, job openings as a share of employment now **exceed prerecession levels**, and rising quit rates suggest that workers are feeling increasingly comfortable leaving a job to pursue employment elsewhere. Initial claims for unemployment insurance show the four-week moving average of initial claims was 272,000 in mid-February—not far from recent lows but well below the 340,000 average level in the first few months of the last cyclical downturn and very far from the 695,000 weekly claims in the depths of the recession. In another encouraging development, the household sector has **remained strong** this year after some softness late last year, with retail sales **rebounding sharply**, contributing to an anticipated increase in real consumer spending of 2½ to 3 percent in the first quarter. Likewise, the **U**niversity of **Mich**igan measure of consumer sentiment, at around 90, **remains healthy**. The 4- or 5-point decline in recent months has caused some concern, but that dropoff looks paltry compared with the 20- to 30-point declines often observed as the economy enters recession. Sales of new motor vehicles have been running around 17½ million units in recent months, a **high level** **reinforcing** a picture of **positive consumer confidence**. Housing starts have been flat in recent months after a long steady uptrend—a pause in demand that may be related to the latest heightened financial volatility. But this sluggishness could also reflect statistical noise combined with supply constraints in the construction industry. Looking ahead, lower mortgage rates resulting from the recent decline in Treasury rates should boost demand. House prices have increased 5 to 6 percent over the past year, suggesting **persistent strength** in the demand for housing. And with household formations up sharply over the past year, prospects for continued recovery in housing **remain good**.

**Global econ’s fine and stable---prefer qualified analysis**---their ev is inundated in armchair economics

**Posen, 3-04** – Adam S. Posen, president of the Peterson Institute for International Economics and external voting member of the Bank of England’s rate-setting Monetary Policy Committee, “Chapter 1: Why We Need a Reality Check”, REALITY CHECK FOR THE GLOBAL ECONOMY, Peterson Institute for International Economics, PIIE Briefing 16-3, March 2016

A more realistic view of our economic problems is one where a repeat of crisis on a global scale is **not imminent**. The world is indeed beset by economic challenges, notably many of a structural nature, involving climate change, demographics and fiscal sustainability, and, perhaps most pressing, a slowdown in productivity growth. Substantial uncertainties have also emerged in the political realm, ranging from instability in the Middle East, to the impact of migration on the European Union, to the electoral viability of populist demagogues in the United States. Combined with the wake-up call from the financial crisis that almost all asset classes and the overall business cycle are more volatile than assumed in the precrisis boom years, there is a strong case for taking a lower trend rate of growth and thus risk-adjusted returns going forward. But even this last point is not new information revealed to investors in recent weeks or months. It has already been evident for some time. **Greater confidence in the world economy’s resilience and near-term prospects is justified**. Market fears about the ability of policy to stabilize growth and promote inflation, if understandable, are **exaggerated** or in some cases **unfounded**. All the more reason then not to allow ourselves to be distracted by a financial market tail wagging the macroeconomic dog. At a fundamental level, most of the major economies, starting with China and the **U**nited **S**tates, are **growing more sustainably now than a decade ago**, at their slower rates. That growth is not built on rising private or public leverage, with the notable exception of China—and even in China some restructuring is under way with ample savings to cushion the process. Even where the situation is not so rosy, many in the markets seem to be **confusing strains and suboptimal situations with acute instability**, not just for Italian banks and for Brazilian budgets but also for Latin America more generally or for trends in global trade. A more normal muddling through with poor but stable conditions is a **far better bet**. And where some in the markets moving prices fear that normal economic laws have been reversed—that monetary policy is ineffective or that low oil prices are on net harmful—**they are likely to be proven clearly wrong**, as they were previously on inflation and commodity prices. Having some **clarity** to distinguish between the more solid underlying economic outlook and the shadows thrown by financial puppetry is **critical to making the right policy decisions to avoid an unnecessary recession**.

## Econ Ups---China Specific

**Econ---A2: Econ High**

**China’s screwed---laundry list of crises and incompetent officials make hard landing likely**

**Cheng, 3-28** – Allen T. Cheng, Asia Bureau Chief at Institutional Investor, 3-28-2016, “China Confusion: Ascendant Power or Troubled Economy?”, Institutional Investor, http://www.institutionalinvestor.com/article/3540753/banking-and-capital-markets-banking/china-confusion-ascendant-power-or-troubled-economy.html?ArticleId=3540753

Investors can’t help but notice two kinds of news coming out of China these days. One tells a story of near-**panic-driven stock market declines**, a **falling currency**, **high and rising debt levels**, and a **rapid slowdown in growth** – all adding up to evidence of a so-called **hard landing** for the world’s second-largest economy. The other type of news portrays a confident, rising superpower that is setting up institutions to rival the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, a country whose companies are embarking on a record-breaking spree of offshore acquisitions while its wealthy elite drive up property prices from Manhattan to Mayfair. China is increasingly presenting a bipolar persona to the world, confusing its trade partners and global investors, who can’t seem to agree on which portrayal is more accurate. Complicating the matter is the fact that Chinese officials – who seemed poised and methodical when growth rates were high – appear **much more fallible** these days. Regulators’ abrupt interventions in the stock market last summer and sudden minidevaluation of the yuan **frightened investors** and **stoked market volatility** rather than providing reassurance. Officials rarely talk openly about the rationale behind their strategies, and when they do talk, they often give mixed signals, **fueling doubts** about both their ability to handle the nation’s difficult transition and their commitment to the reforms required to move China away from investment- and export-led growth toward greater reliance on domestic consumption and private sector development. Concerns about China **carry extra prominence this year**, as it is Beijing’s turn to serve as president of the **G**roup of **20** nations, for the first time. China overtook Japan to become the world’s second-largest economy in 2010 and now has a gross domestic product of $11.3 trillion, almost three times the size of its Asian neighbor’s. It has stood out with its leadership in the formation of new multilateral lenders – the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bankand the New Development Bank – placing officials in Beijing in a unique position to challenge their counterparts in the U.S., Europe and Japan, who for decades collectively set the rules of global finance through the G-7, the World Bank and the IMF. “This is the first time that China has played such a key role in coordinating policy for the world economy,” says Kenneth Courtis, a former vice chairman of Goldman Sachs Asia who now chairs his own investment firm, Starfort Investment Holdings. Notwithstanding talk of a Chinese hard landing, Courtis says the mainland remains a source of strength for the global economy. China generated nearly 40 percent of world growth in 2015 and is on course to do the same again this year, he contends. “She is more than carrying her weight,” he says. “Remember, China is but 13 to 14 percent of world GDP.” Others are not so sanguine. Last month Moody’s Investors Service lowered the outlook on its China sovereign debt rating of Aa3 **to negative from stable**, citing concerns about a **weakening of the country’s fiscal and financial position**. Moody’s noted a rise in government debt to 40.6 percent of GDP at the end of 2015 and a huge decline of $762 billion in foreign exchange reserves last year. In addition, the rating agency said there was increasing “uncertainty about the authorities’ capacity to implement reforms – given the scale of reform challenges – to address **imbalances in the economy**.” The debt concerns surrounding Chinese banks and nonfinancial companies are **even greater**. Corporate leverage has risen sharply because the authorities provided stimulus to the economy in the wake of the 2008-’09 financial crisis through a big increase in bank lending. Although official figures say less than 1 percent of Chinese bank loans are nonperforming, a recent report by Katherine Lei, a banking analyst at J.P. Morgan in Hong Kong, said the real level of NPLs is about 7 percent if one includes loans through the shadow banking system, which includes credit extended via brokerages, wealth management products and other avenues. “After 2008, when Beijing launched a massive investment push, the global ruling elite all praised China for saving the global economy,” says Andy Xie, an independent strategist in Shanghai who previously worked as Morgan Stanley’s chief economist in Asia. Since 2008, China has increased overall credit – including bank lending, shadow banking credit and government borrowing – by more than $20 trillion, or 176 percent of GDP, to finance the construction of factories, apartment buildings, roads and railways, he says. But, Xie adds, “investment does not guarantee final demand.” The rapid rise in credit **produced a bubble** in property prices and fueled an **explosion of short-term loans** through the credit cooperatives, trusts and other entities that make up the shadow banking sector. Analysts estimate this sector has $5 trillion in outstanding loans, equivalent to 44 percent of GDP, with much of the credit extended to local government-linked companies and invested in infrastructure projects that take years to mature. And analysts can’t help but question how the Chinese government will be able to handle a crisis if large volumes of defaults occur. The Chinese central government has allowed some local governments to sell municipal and provincial bonds in an effort to convert the short-term loans to longer-term debt instruments, but these efforts **may not work fast enough to avert a sharp rise in NPLs**. In a worst-case scenario, such bad debts could surge to 20 percent of GDP, says J.P. Morgan’s Lei. That estimate “is far from our base case,” she writes in her report, “but if it happens, China’s commercial banking system would need 5 trillion yuan of capital.” The government, which still sits on more than $3 trillion of foreign exchange reserves, can afford to recapitalize its banks, Lei says, but that would just perpetuate the credit dependency that leaves the economy vulnerable. The economy itself has a dual nature that gives rise to both optimism and pessimism, generating uncertainty about the real outlook, says Andy Rothman, a veteran China watcher and investment strategist at Matthews International Capital Management, a $23.7 billion, Asia-focused asset manager in San Francisco. “**Manufacturing weakness** has led to the development of a distinct rust belt in China, where industries related to construction and natural-resources extraction are concentrated,” says Rothman, who went to China in 1983 as a U.S. Foreign Service officer, then worked as a Shanghai-based strategist with Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia for 14 years before joining Matthews International in 2014. The rust belt consists of five provinces where GDP growth was only 5 percent in 2015 and unemployment is nearly double the national average of 4 percent. By contrast, China’s other 26 provinces, home to 84 percent of the population, grew at a rate of about 8 percent last year, Rothman estimates. In the slow-growth provinces – Heilongjiang, Liaoning and Jilin in the industrial northeast and mining-dependent Shaanxi and Henan south and west of Beijing – thousands of state-owned enterprises employing millions of workers need to be restructured because of overcapacity or lack of competitiveness, says Rothman. But debt is concentrated among a relatively small number of state-owned companies, while the private companies that generate most of China’s new jobs and investment have already deleveraged, he says. Notwithstanding the severity of China’s challenges, there are signs that government reform efforts are moving the economy away from its dependence on public sector investment and export-led growth. For the first time, services and private sector consumption accounted for more than half of the country’s GDP, or 51.4 percent, in 2015, up from 41.4 percent a decade ago. The strength of those sectors is mitigating weakness in manufacturing and construction, Rothman says. If this rebalancing continues, China’s economic deceleration will be gradual, he contends. Yet fresh stimulus measures are **raising concerns** among some analysts that policymakers are going soft on reform to maintain social stability. Less than a week after China hosted the G-20 meeting of finance ministers and central bank governors in late February in Shanghai, Premier Li Keqiang announced a slew of initiatives aimed at supporting growth. They included cuts in bank reserve ratios and mortgage down-payment requirements, an expansion of value-added tax reductions to all industries and a $245 billion budget for infrastructure spending this year. Li also announced a $15 billion allocation to retrain several millions of workers who will be laid off as a result of the massive restructuring of state-owned companies. The government is budgeting for a fiscal deficit of 3 percent of GDP this year – up from 2.3 percent in 2015 and the highest level since 1949 – to ensure a “reasonable range” of growth, Li told delegates to the National People’s Congress in Beijing on March 5. He also set a growth target of 6.5 to 7 percent for 2016, down from 7.5 percent in 2014 and 7 percent in 2015. It was the first time the government had adopted a range rather than a precise growth target. Officials face a tough balancing act in trying to reduce excess capacity while maintaining social stability, and some analysts believe Li’s measures **fail to get the balance right**. Although the government can’t afford to move too quickly, it needs to eliminate excess capacity if it wants the economy to thrive in the long run, says Jianguang Shen, Mizuho Securities’ Hong Kong-based chief Asia economist. “With more attention being placed on stabilizing the economy, structural reform **may be delayed**,” he says. “However, we believe that only through concrete structural reform can China boost productivity and make growth sustainable.”

**Industry’s dropping and policy is failing---reject official data**

**Japan News, 3-28** – Japan News by the Yomiuri Shimbun, 3-29-2016, “China survey indicates weak economy”, http://the-japan-news.com/news/article/0002837778

BEIJING (Reuters) — Capital expenditure by Chinese companies fell to the **lowest in at least five years** in the first quarter, a private survey showed, highlighting **persistent weakness** in the economy **even as the government ratchets up policy support** to head off a sharper slowdown. The quarterly survey of over 2,200 firms by China Beige Book International (CBB) also showed **less hiring** by companies, marking the second consecutive quarter of downward pressure on employment as executives scale back borrowing and spending. Only 33 percent of firms reported capital expenditure growth in the first quarter, the lowest in the survey’s five-year history. The share of firms reporting capital expenditure growth has fallen by over 40 percent since the second quarter of 2014. However, profits in the first quarter improved from the previous quarter’s lows as revenue growth steadied, the survey showed. “It’s unclear whether the economy as a whole weakened again in the first quarter. But policy challenges appear to have grown, and Beijing therefore may perceive the economy as **weaker**,” survey report authors Leland Miller and Shehzad Qazi wrote. Economists have **questioned China’s official statistics for years and turn to private surveys** such as the CBB and measures such as concrete, steel or electricity production to **better gauge changes** in the world’s second-largest economy. Vice Premier Zhang Gaoli told a high-level economic forum last week that recent data through early March showed that the economy is improving. The latest reported data showed factory output in January and February grew at its **weakest pace since 2008**, while exports and imports **continued to shrink**, although fixed-asset investment growth beat expectations due to quickening property investment. The survey showed just 23 percent of firms expanded their workforces in the first quarter, falling to half of what CCB reported in its inaugural report back in 2012. “Less borrowing and spending was necessary after the 2009-10 excesses. Less hiring is a much more pointed problem,” it said. The survey’s findings of growing strains on corporate China echo those of a Reuters analysis last week, which showed Chinese companies are **facing their tightest liquidity crunch in a decade** as customers take longer to pay their bills, forcing some into more costly and less secure borrowing to stay afloat.

**Econ---A2: Econ Low**

**China growth’s high and will continue---service sector growth, strong labor, and structural checks make decline unlikely**

---A2: China’s leaders are incompetent – elites don’t have control over important service sector growth and won’t roll back safety mechanisms due to popular demand

---A2: Industrial decline – it’s buffered by service growth

---A2: Currency appreciation – it helps the service sector more than it hurts exports, WTO agrees it’s great

**Lardy, 3-04** – Nicholas R. Lardy, Anthony M. Solomon Senior Fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, “Chapter 4: Reality Check on China”, REALITY CHECK FOR THE GLOBAL ECONOMY, Peterson Institute for International Economics, PIIE Briefing 16-3, March 2016

Fears of a hard landing in China and the prospect that the Chinese government might allow markets to force down its currency by 20 percent or more are widely cited as a cause of global market volatility and a deteriorating global economic outlook in 2016. An even bleaker view is advanced by a growing minority that rejects the official 6.9 percent growth rate for last year, arguing that China’s growth has already collapsed to the low single digits. But these pessimistic narratives focus excessively on China’s **industrial sector**, where growth has been moderating for six years. Little noticed is the fact that **services** have become the **major driver of China’s economic growth** and now account for **over half of GDP**. The ultra-bearish view is not consistent with the **strong growth** of **wages**, household disposable **income**, airline and rail passenger traffic, household outlays on entertainment, and other indicators of **strong service sector growth**. A number of factors suggest that services such as wholesale and retail trade, restaurants and hotels, health, education, leasing and business services, finance, and information transmission, software, and information technology will **continue to drive China’s economic growth**. Start with demographics. Wages have been rapidly rising in China for some time, so much so that household disposable income for several years has risen faster than GDP. Now that the working age population is actually shrinking, this trend is likely to **strengthen**, **bolstering** the **growth** of private consumption expenditures. Second, the World Bank now classifies China as an **upper-middle-income** country, a stage of development when the services share of private consumption expenditure rises inexorably while the goods share of consumption expenditure falls. The combination of these two factors will **drive demand** for services. A third factor will reinforce this trend: a gradual decline in China’s sky high household saving rate. The Chinese government has made substantial progress in building out the social safety net over the last decade. With 95 percent of the population covered by some form of health insurance and a rapidly rising share eligible for pensions, the precautionary demand for saving is waning, bringing down the household saving rate. A fourth important factor likely to continue driving the growth of services production is the **exchange rate**. For much of the 2000s the undervaluation of the renminbi constituted a subsidy for China’s exports, which are overwhelmingly industrial goods, and an implicit tax on services, which are mostly nontradable. Undervaluation thus increased the profits in industrial production at the expense of services, tilting investment into industry and away from services. This began to change in 2005, when the exchange rate became more flexible. Appreciation of the currency has picked up in more recent years, as acknowledged by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and even the US Treasury. The Fund in mid-2015 went so far as to say that “the substantial appreciation of the RMB in real effective terms this year has brought the exchange rate to a level that is **no longer undervalued**.” This observation is confirmed strikingly in the allocation of investment in China. The service share of investment fell for most of the 2000s but in 2015 recorded its third consecutive annual rise, accounting for almost six-tenths of investment. Finally, services production is more labor intensive than industrial production, so the rising share of services in GDP leads to **stronger growth of urban employment** than in the earlier pattern of development. This growth then feeds back into the labor market, contributing to the further growth of household income. Each of these factors driving the growth of China’s service sector, with the possible exception of a strengthening social safety net, is **structural**. Their influence will **persist**, independent of the skill of China’s economic policymakers. And the authorities are hardly likely to dial back their decade-long policy of building a stronger safety net, which is not only politically popular but also has contributed importantly to the leadership’s goal of generating growth more through domestic consumption demand than through investment.

**Chinese consumers are resilient---their warrants don’t translate into real harm or recession**

**Simpson, 3-23** – Colin Simpson, 3-23-2016, “China's Urban Consumers More Optimistic Even amid Slowing Growth”, Bloomberg, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-03-23/china-s-urban-consumers-more-optimistic-even-amid-slowing-growth

Strength in **real estate** and **labor** markets helped consumers in China’s biggest cities **shrug off last year’s slowdown**, according to a new survey based on 12,000 interviews. RFi Group’s Urban Financial Sentiment Index rose to 101 in the second half of 2015, up from 92.5 in the first half. Readings over 100 show consumers say they’re optimistic about their financial positions, while those below indicate pessimism, according to the Sydney-based market research firm and financial data provider. The gauge was above 105 in late 2013 and early 2014. The findings show consumers **remained resilient** late last year even amid a $5 trillion stock plunge, yuan devaluation, and economic growth that slowed from 7 percent in the first two quarters of 2015 to 6.9 percent in the third and finally a six-year low of 6.8 percent. Such optimism is **good news for policy makers** working to shift toward a more consumer-led economy. "Consumers **remain** fairly **sheltered** from developments in the industrial sectors of the economy," RFi Senior Economist Amit Khan wrote in the report published Tuesday. "There is **little correlation** with the massive swings in Chinese stocks over the last 18 months." The survey is based on interviews with consumers dating back to April 2013 in Beijing, Guangzhou, Tianjin, Shanghai and Shenzhen, and combines data on intentions to spend, save and borrow over the coming year. RFi plans to update the gauge every six months. Khan cited **property prices** and **labor markets** as primary reasons consumers grew more optimistic. "In the tier one cities such as Beijing, Shenzhen and Shanghai we’ve seen a strong recovery in price growth, particularly in 2015," he said. The majority of those interviewed said that the stock market collapse, in which shares plunged by almost half from June to August, had a **minimal impact** on their net worth. Inflation was the biggest concern, with far fewer worried about unemployment. Thirty percent of the respondents said they planned to spend more in the next 12 months.

## Econ Backlines

### Econ---A2: Econ Resilient

**Econ’s fragile---their indicators are wrong and don’t translate into real strength**

**Hansen, 3-26** – Steven Hansen, international business and industrial consultant, 3-26-2016, “The Economy Keeps Stumbling Along”, Seeking Alpha, http://seekingalpha.com/article/3961069-economy-keeps-stumbling-along

Once a month, I assemble an economic forecast based on analysis of various data points which have led the economy. Historically, most of the time the economy trends up or trends down - but recently the economy simply has been **frozen** with **little change** in the rate of growth. My view of the economy is at Main Street level - not necessarily GDP. My position is that GDP has **disconnected** from the real economy. A thinking person might say that GDP never projected the real economy - and it was never more obvious with the current situation where rate of change of growth slowed to a crawl. The jumping around of GDP in a flat economy is noticeable. We will be releasing our economic forecast next week - and conditions have been flat (near the **zero growth** line) for **three months**. All indicators I view outside the elements of our forecast are mixed and confused. **Nothing is strong**. One of my favorite indicators to understand if the rate of economic growth is accelerating or decelerating is the relationship between the year-over-year growth rate of non-farm private employment and the year-over-year real growth rate of retail sales. This index is currently showing **no growth differential**. When retail sales grow faster than the rate of employment gains (above zero on the below graph) - the rate of growth of the economy is usually accelerating.

**The next recession will be different – resiliency is gone**

**Isidore 11** – Chris, writer and economic analyst, CNNMoney Senior Writer Chris Isidore, Previously worked at the Journal of Commerce, Post-Tribune, went to University of Chicago, “Recession 2.0 would hurt worse,” 2011

The risk of double dip recession is rising. And while economists disagree on just how likely the U.S. economy is to fall into another downturn, they generally agree on one thing -- **a new recession would be worse than the last and very difficult to pull out of.** "Going back into recession now would be scary, because **we don't have the resources or the will to respond**, and our initial **starting point** **is such a point of weakness**," said Mark Zandi, **chief economist at Moody's** Analytics. "It won't **feel like a new recession**. It would likely **feel like a depression**."Zandi said the recent sell-off in stocks have caused him to raise the odds of a new recession to 33% from 25% only 10 days ago. Other economists surveyed by CNNMoney are also [raising their recession risk estimates](http://money.cnn.com/2011/08/03/news/economy/recession_risk_economy/index.htm?iid=EL). The survey found an average chance of a new recession to be about 25%, up from a [15% chance](http://money.cnn.com/2011/06/10/news/economy/recession_economic_survey/index.htm?iid=EL) only three months ago. Of the 21 economists who responded to the survey, six have joined Zandi in increasing their estimates in just the last few days. The main reason: the huge slide in stocks. Standard & Poor's [downgrade of the U.S. credit rating](http://money.cnn.com/2011/08/06/news/economy/sp_rating_fallout/index.htm?iid=EL) is another concern. "The correction in equity markets raises the risk of recession due to the negative [hit to wealth](http://money.cnn.com/2011/08/08/markets/stock-market-loss/index.htm?iid=EL) and [confidence](http://money.cnn.com/2011/08/08/pf/expert/investing_cash.moneymag/index.htm?iid=EL)," said Sal Guatieri, senior economist for BMO Capital Markets. Even with a [430-point rebound](http://money.cnn.com/2011/08/09/markets/markets_newyork/index.htm?iid=EL) in the Dow Jones industrial average Tuesday following the Federal Reserve meeting, major U.S. stock indexes have lost more than 11% of their value over the last 12 trading days. [Recovery at risk](http://money.cnn.com/news/economy/recovery_at_risk/?iid=EL) A plunge in stocks doesn't necessarily mean a new recession. The economy avoided a recession after the stock market crash of 1987. "Stock price declines are often misleading indicators of future recessions," said David Berson, chief economist of BMI Group. But with the economy already so fragile, the shock of another stock market drop and resulting [loss of wealth](http://money.cnn.com/2011/08/08/markets/stock-market-loss/index.htm?iid=EL) could be the tipping point. "It really does matter where the economy is when it gets hit by these shocks," said Zandi. "If we all [pull back on spending](http://money.cnn.com/2011/08/02/news/economy/personal_income_spending/index.htm?iid=EL), that's a prescription for a long, painful recession," he said. Most economists say they aren't worried that S&P's downgrade makes recession more likely, although a few said any bad news at this point increases the risk. "The downgrade has a psychological impact in terms of hurting consumer confidence," said Lawrence Yun, chief economist with the National Association of Realtors. On shakier ground Another recession could be **even worse** thanthe last one for a few reasons. For starters, **the** **economy is more vulnerable than it was in 2007** when the Great Recession began. In fact, **the economy would enter the new recession much weaker than** the start of **any** other **downturn** since the end of **World War II**. Unemployment currently stands at 9.1%. In November 2007, the month before the start of the Great Recession, it was just 4.7%. And the large number of Americans who have stopped looking for work in the last few years has left the [percentage of the population with a job](http://money.cnn.com/2011/08/08/news/economy/unemployment_jobs/index.htm?iid=EL) at a 28-year low. Various parts of the economy also have yet to recover from the last recession and would be at serious risk of lasting damage in a new downturn. [Home values continue to lose ground](http://money.cnn.com/2011/08/09/real_estate/home_price_recovery/index.htm?iid=EL) and are projected to continue their fall. While manufacturing has had a nice rebound in the last two years, industrial production is still 18% below pre-recession levels. There are nearly 900 banks on the [FDIC's list of troubled institutions](http://finance.fortune.cnn.com/2011/05/24/problem-banks-list-hits-888/?iid=EL), the highest number since 1993. Only 76 banks were at risk as the Great Recession took hold. But **what has economists particularly worried is** that **the tools** generally **used to try to jumpstart an economy** teetering on the edge of recession **aren't available** this time around. "**The reason we didn't go into** a **depression three years** **ago is** the **policy** response by Congress and the Fed," **said** Dan Seiver, **a finance professor** at San Diego State University. "**We won't see that this time**." Three times between 2008 and 2010, Congress approved massive spending or temporary tax cuts to try to stimulate the economy. But fresh from the [bruising debt ceiling battle](http://money.cnn.com/2011/08/02/news/economy/debt_ceiling_senate_vote/?iid=EL) and credit rating downgrade, and with elections looming, the federal government has shown little inclination to move in that direction. So this **new recession would** likely **have virtually no policy effort to counteract it.**

**Econ---A2: No Impact – Statistics**

**Economic decline causes global war**

**Royal 10** (Jedediah, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction – U.S. Department of Defense, “Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises”, Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, Ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 213-215)

Less intuitive is how periods ofeconomic decline may **increase the likelihood of external conflict**. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defence behaviour of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances Modelski and Thompson's (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding thatrhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and theoften **bloody transition** from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such aseconomic crises could usher in a redistribution of relative power(see also Gilpin. 1981) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, **increasing the risk of miscalculation (**Feaver, 1995). Alternatively,even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a **permissive environment for conflict** as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner. 1999). Separately, Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown. Second, on a dyadic level, Copeland's (1996, 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that **'**future expectation of trade' is a **significant variable** in understanding economic conditions and security behaviour of states**.** He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However,if the expectations of future trade decline**,** particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources, **the likelihood for conflict increases**, as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises couldpotentially be thetriggerfor decreased trade expectationseither on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states.4 Third,others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess(2002)find a s**trong correlat**ion between internal conflict and external conflict, **particularly during** periods of **economic downturn**. They write: The linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour. Moreover, thepresence of a recession tends to **amplify the extent** to which international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other**. (**Blomberg & Hess, 2002. p. 89)Economic decline hasalsobeen linked with an **increase in the likelihood of terrorism (**Blomberg, Hess, & Weerapana, 2004), which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government."Diversionary theory" suggests **that,** when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sittinggovernments have increased incentives to **fabricate external** military conflicts to create a 'rally around the flag'effect**.** Wang (1996), DeRouen (1995). and Blomberg, Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999), and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest thatthe tendency towards diversionary tactics are greater for democratic statesthan autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office dueto lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing thatperiods of weak economic performance in the **U**nited **S**tates, and thus weak Presidential popularity, **are statistically linked** to an increase in the use of force. In summary, recent economic scholarship positively correlates economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science **scholarship links economic decline with external conflict** at systemic, dyadic and national levels.5 This implied connection between integration, crises and armed conflict has not featured prominently in the economic-security debate and deserves more attention.

**Econ---A2: No Impact – Collapse Slow**

**Nature of international relations means that conflict will arise fast from collase**

Craig **Turpin**, Executive editor of New Jersey newspapers, 10/14 **2008**, Critical Mass: Economic leadership or dictatorship, http://www.nj.com/cranford/index.ssf/2008/10/critical\_mass\_economic\_leaders.html

A **global economic collapse will** also increase the chance of global conflict. As economic systems shut down, so will the distribution systems for resources like petroleum and food. It is certainly within the realm of possibility that nations perceiving themselves in peril will, if they have the military capability, use force, just as Japan and Nazi Germany did in the mid-to-late 1930s. Every nation in the world needs access to food and water. Industrial nations -- the world powers of North America, Europe, and Asia -- need access to energy. When the world economy runs smoothly, reciprocal trade meets these needs. If the world economy collapses, the use of military force becomes a more likely alternative. And given the increasingly rapid rate at which world affairs move; the world could devolve to that point very quickly.

### Econ---A2: No Great Power Draw In

**Decline snowballs conflict**

**Auslin 9** (Michael, Resident Scholar – American Enterprise Institute, and Desmond Lachman – Resident Fellow – American Enterprise Institute, “The Global Economy Unravels”, Forbes, 3-6, http://www.aei.org/article/100187)

What do these trends mean in the short and medium term? The Great Depression showed how social and global chaos followed hard on economic collapse. The mere fact that parliaments across the globe, from America to Japan, are unable to make responsible, economically sound recovery plans suggests that they do not know what to do and are simply hoping for the least disruption. Equally worrisome is the adoption of more statist economic programs around the globe, and the concurrent decline of trust in free-market systems. The threat of instability is a pressing concern. China, until last year the world's fastest growing economy, just reported that 20 million migrant laborers lost their jobs. Even in the flush times of recent years, China faced upward of 70,000 labor uprisings a year. A sustained downturn poses grave and possibly immediate threats to Chinese internal stability. The regime in Beijing may be faced with a choice of repressing its own people or diverting their energies outward, leading to conflict with China's neighbors. Russia, an oil state completely dependent on energy sales, has had to put down riots in its Far East as well as in downtown Moscow. Vladimir Putin's rule has been predicated on squeezing civil liberties while providing economic largesse. If that devil's bargain falls apart, then wide-scale repression inside Russia, along with a continuing threatening posture toward Russia's neighbors, is likely. Even apparently stable societies face increasing risk and the threat of internal or possibly external conflict. As Japan's exports have plummeted by nearly 50%, one-third of the country's prefectures have passed emergency economic stabilization plans. Hundreds of thousands of temporary employees hired during the first part of this decade are being laid off. Spain's unemployment rate is expected to climb to nearly 20% by the end of 2010; Spanish unions are already protesting the lack of jobs, and the specter of violence, as occurred in the 1980s, is haunting the country. Meanwhile, in Greece, workers have already taken to the streets. Europe as a whole will face dangerously increasing tensions between native citizens and immigrants, largely from poorer Muslim nations, who have increased the labor pool in the past several decades. Spain has absorbed five million immigrants since 1999, while nearly 9% of Germany's residents have foreign citizenship, including almost 2 million Turks. The xenophobic labor strikes in the U.K. do not bode well for the rest of Europe. A prolonged global downturn, let alone a collapse, would dramatically raise tensions inside these countries. Couple that with possible protectionist legislation in the United States, unresolved ethnic and territorial disputes in all regions of the globe and a loss of confidence that world leaders actually know what they are doing. The result may be a series of small explosions that coalesce into a big bang.

**Multiple scenarios for nuke war**

**Kemp 10** (Geoffrey, Director of Regional Strategic Programs – Nixon Center and Former Director of the Middle East Arms Control Project – Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, The East Moves West: India, China, and Asia’s Growing Presence in the Middle East, p. 233-234)

The second scenario, called Mayhem and Chaos, is the opposite of the first scenario; everything that can go wrong does go wrong. The world economic situation weakens rather than strengthens, and India, China, and Japan suffer a major reduction in their growth rates, further weakening the global economy. As a result, energy demand falls and the price of fossil fuels plummets, leading to a financial crisis for the energy-producing states, which are forced to cut back dramatically on expansion programs and social welfare. That in turn leads to political unrest: and nurtures different radical groups, including, but not limited to, Islamic extremists. The internal stability of some countries is challenged, and there are more “failed states.” Most serious is the collapse of the democratic government in Pakistan and its takeover by Muslim extremists, who then take possession of a large number of nuclear weapons. The danger of war between India and Pakistan increases significantly. Iran, always worried about an extremist Pakistan, expands and weaponizes its nuclear program. That further enhances nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, with Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt joining Israel and Iran as nuclear states. Under these circumstances, the potential for nuclear terrorism increases, and the possibility of a nuclear terrorist attack in either the Western world or in the oil-producing states may lead to a further devastating collapse of the world economic market, with a tsunami-like impact on stability. In this scenario, major disruptions can be expected, with **dire consequences for** two-thirds of **the planet’s population**

**Economic decline causes great power wars**

**Patrick ‘9** (Protecting Free Trade by Stewart Patrick, 03.13.2009, Stewart Patrick, senior fellow and director of the Program on International Institutions and Global Governance at the Council on Foreign Relations, is the author of The Best Laid Plans: The Origins of American Multilateralism and the Dawn of the Cold War (Rowan & Littlefield).

President Obama has committed to working with U.S. trade partners to avoid “escalating protectionism.” He is wise to do so. As never before, U.S. national security requires a commitment to open trade. President Obama and his foreign counterparts should reflect on the lessons of the 1930s—and the insights of Cordell Hull. The longest-serving secretary of state in American history (1933–1944), Hull helped guide the United States through the Depression and World War II. He also understood a fundamental truth: “When goods move, soldiers don’t.” In the 1930s, global recession had catastrophic political consequences—in part because policymakers took exactly the wrong approach. Starting with America’s own Smoot Hawley Tariff of 1930, the world’s major trading nations tried to insulate themselves by adopting inward looking protectionist and discriminatory policies. **The result was a vicious, self-defeating cycle of tit-for-tat retaliation**. As states took refuge in prohibitive tariffs, import quotas, export subsidies and competitive devaluations, international commerce devolved into a desperate competition for dwindling markets. Between 1929 and 1933, the value of world trade plummeted from $50 billion to $15 billion. Global economic activity went into a death spiral, exacerbating the depth and length of the Great Depression. The economic consequences of protectionism were bad enough. The political consequences were worse. As Hull recognized, global economic fragmentation lowered standards of living, drove unemployment higher and increased poverty—accentuating social upheaval and leaving destitute populations “easy prey to dictators and desperadoes.” The rise of Nazism in Germany, fascism in Italy and militarism in Japan is impossible to divorce from the economic turmoil, which allowed demagogic leaders to mobilize support among alienated masses nursing nationalist grievances. **Open** economic **warfare poisoned the diplomatic climate and exacerbated great power rivalries, raising**, in Hull’s view, “**constant temptation to use force, or threat of force, to obtain what could have been got through normal processes of trade**.” Assistant Secretary William Clayton agreed: “Nations which act as enemies in the marketplace cannot long be friends at the council table.” This is what makes growing protectionism and discrimination among the world’s major trading powers today so alarming. In 2008 world trade declined for the first time since 1982. And despite their pledges, seventeen G-20 members have adopted significant trade restrictions. “Buy American” provisions in the U.S. stimulus package have been matched by similar measures elsewhere, with the EU ambassador to Washington declaring that “Nobody will take this lying down.” Brussels has resumed export subsidies to EU dairy farmers and restricted imports from the United States and China. Meanwhile, India is threatening new tariffs on steel imports and cars; Russia has enacted some thirty new tariffs and export subsidies. In a sign of the global mood, WTO antidumping cases are up 40 percent since last year. Even less blatant forms of economic nationalism, such as banks restricting lending to “safer” domestic companies, risk shutting down global capital flows and exacerbating the current crisis. If unchecked, **such** economic **nationalism could raise diplomatic tensions among the world’s major powers.** At particular risk are U.S. relations with China, Washington’s most important bilateral interlocutor in the twenty-first century. China has called the “Buy American” provisions “poison”—not exactly how the Obama administration wants to start off the relationship. U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner’s ill-timed comments about China’s currency “manipulation” and his promise of an “aggressive” U.S. response were not especially helpful either, nor is Congress’ preoccupation with “unfair” Chinese trade and currency practices. For its part, Beijing has responded to the global slump by rolling back some of the liberalizing reforms introduced over the past thirty years. Such practices, including state subsidies, collide with the spirit and sometimes the law of open trade. The Obama administration must find common ground with Beijing on a coordinated response, or risk retaliatory protectionism that could severely damage both economies and escalate into political confrontation. A trade war is the last thing the United States needs, given that China holds $1 trillion of our debt and will be critical to solving flashpoints ranging from Iran to North Korea. In the 1930s, authoritarian great-power governments responded to the global downturn by adopting more nationalistic and aggressive policies. Today, the economic crisis may well fuel rising nationalism and regional assertiveness in emerging countries. Russia is a case in point. Although some predict that the economic crisis will temper Moscow’s international ambitions, evidence for such geopolitical modesty is slim to date. Neither the collapse of its stock market nor the decline in oil prices has kept Russia from flexing its muscles from Ukraine to Kyrgyzstan. While some expect the economic crisis to challenge Putin’s grip on power, there is no guarantee that Washington will find any successor regime less nationalistic and aggressive. Beyond generating great power antagonism, misguided protectionism could also exacerbate political upheaval in the developing world. As Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair recently testified, the downturn has already aggravated political instability in a quarter of the world’s nations**.** In many emerging countries, including important players like South Africa, Ukraine and Mexico, **political stability rests on a precarious balance**. **Protectionist policies could well push developing economies and emerging market exporters over the edge**. In Pakistan, a protracted economic crisis could precipitate the collapse of the regime and fragmentation of the state**.**

### Econ---A2: No Nuke War

**Yes nuke war from decline**

**Merlini 11** – Cesare Merlini 11, nonresident senior fellow at the Center on the United States and Europe and chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Italian Institute for International Affairs, May 2011, “A Post-Secular World?”, Survival, Vol. 53, No. 2

Two neatly opposed scenarios for the future of the world order illustrate the range of possibilities, albeit at the risk of oversimplification. The first scenario entails the premature crumbling of the post-Westphalian system. One or more of the acute tensions apparent today evolves into an open and traditional **conflict** between states, perhaps even **involving the use of nuclear weapons.** The crisis might be triggered by a collapse of the global economic and financial system, the vulnerability of which we have just experienced, and the prospect of a second Great Depression, with consequences for peace and democracy similar to those of the first. Whatever the trigger, the unlimited exercise of national sovereignty, exclusive self-interest and rejection of outside interference would self-interest and rejection of outside interference would likely be amplified, **empty**ing, perhaps entirely, the half-full glass of **multilateralism**, including the UN and the European Union. Many of the more likely conflicts, such as between Israel and Iran or India and Pakistan, have potential religious dimensions. Short of war, tensions such as those related to immigration might become unbearable. Familiar issues of creed and identity could be exacerbated. One way or another, the secular rational approach would be sidestepped by a return to theocratic absolutes, competing or converging with secular absolutes such as **unbridled nationalism.**

**Depression causes global nuclear war**

**Mead 9** (Walter Russell, Henry A. Kissinger Senior Fellow in U.S. Foreign Policy – Council on Foreign Relations, “Only Makes You Stronger”, The New Republic, 2-4, http://www.tnr.com/politics/story.html?id=571cbbb9-2887-4d81-8542-92e83915f5f8&p=2)

The greatest danger both to U.S.-China relations and to American power itself is probably not that China will rise too far, too fast; it is that the current crisis might end China's growth miracle. In the worst-case scenario, the turmoil in the international economy will plunge China into a major economic downturn. The Chinese financial system will implode as loans to both state and private enterprises go bad. Millions or even tens of millions of Chinese will be unemployed in a country without an effective social safety net. The collapse of asset bubbles in the stock and property markets will wipe out the savings of a generation of the Chinese middle class. The political consequences could include dangerous unrest--and a bitter climate of anti-foreign feeling that blames others for China's woes. (Think of Weimar Germany, when both Nazi and communist politicians blamed the West for Germany's economic travails.) Worse, instability could lead to a vicious cycle, as nervous investors moved their money out of the country, further slowing growth and, in turn, fomenting ever-greater bitterness. Thanks to a generation of rapid economic growth, China has so far been able to manage the stresses and conflicts of modernization and change; nobody knows what will happen if the growth stops. India's future is also a question. Support for global integration is a fairly recent development in India, and many serious Indians remain skeptical of it. While India's 60-year-old democratic system has resisted many shocks, a deep economic recession in a country where mass poverty and even hunger are still major concerns could undermine political order, long-term growth, and India's attitude toward the United States and global economic integration. The violent Naxalite insurrection plaguing a significant swath of the country could get worse; religious extremism among both Hindus and Muslims could further polarize Indian politics; and India's economic miracle could be nipped in the bud. If current market turmoil seriously damaged the performance and prospects of India and China, the current crisis could join the Great Depression in the list of economic events that changed history, even if the recessions in the West are relatively short and mild. The United States should stand ready to assist Chinese and Indian financial authorities on an emergency basis--and work very hard to help both countries escape or at least weather any economic downturn. It may test the political will of the Obama administration, but the United States must avoid a protectionist response to the economic slowdown. U.S. moves to limit market access for Chinese and Indian producers could poison relations for years. For billions of people in nuclear-armed countries to emerge from this crisis believing either that the United States was indifferent to their well-being or that it had profited from their distress could damage U.S. foreign policy far more severely than any mistake made by George W. Bush. It's not just the great powers whose trajectories have been affected by the crash. Lesser powers like Saudi Arabia and Iran also face new constraints. The crisis has strengthened the U.S. position in the Middle East as falling oil prices reduce Iranian influence and increase the dependence of the oil sheikdoms on U.S. protection. Success in Iraq--however late, however undeserved, however limited--had already improved the Obama administration's prospects for addressing regional crises. Now, the collapse in oil prices has put the Iranian regime on the defensive. The annual inflation rate rose above 29 percent last September, up from about 17 percent in 2007, according to Iran's Bank Markazi. Economists forecast that Iran's real GDP growth will drop markedly in the coming months as stagnating oil revenues and the continued global economic downturn force the government to rein in its expansionary fiscal policy. All this has weakened Ahmadinejad at home and Iran abroad. Iranian officials must balance the relative merits of support for allies like Hamas, Hezbollah, and Syria against domestic needs, while international sanctions and other diplomatic sticks have been made more painful and Western carrots (like trade opportunities) have become more attractive. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia and other oil states have become more dependent on the United States for protection against Iran, and they have fewer resources to fund religious extremism as they use diminished oil revenues to support basic domestic spending and development goals. None of this makes the Middle East an easy target for U.S. diplomacy, but thanks in part to the economic crisis, the incoming administration has the chance to try some new ideas and to enter negotiations with Iran (and Syria) from a position of enhanced strength. Every crisis is different, but there seem to be reasons why, over time, financial crises on balance reinforce rather than undermine the world position of the leading capitalist countries. Since capitalism first emerged in early modern Europe, the ability to exploit the advantages of rapid economic development has been a key factor in international competition. Countries that can encourage--or at least allow and sustain--the change, dislocation, upheaval, and pain that capitalism often involves, while providing their tumultuous market societies with appropriate regulatory and legal frameworks, grow swiftly. They produce cutting-edge technologies that translate into military and economic power. They are able to invest in education, making their workforces ever more productive. They typically develop liberal political institutions and cultural norms that value, or at least tolerate, dissent and that allow people of different political and religious viewpoints to collaborate on a vast social project of modernization--and to maintain political stability in the face of accelerating social and economic change. The vast productive capacity of leading capitalist powers gives them the ability to project influence around the world and, to some degree, to remake the world to suit their own interests and preferences. This is what the United Kingdom and the United States have done in past centuries, and what other capitalist powers like France, Germany, and Japan have done to a lesser extent. In these countries, the social forces that support the idea of a competitive market economy within an appropriately liberal legal and political framework are relatively strong. But, in many other countries where capitalism rubs people the wrong way, this is not the case. On either side of the Atlantic, for example, the Latin world is often drawn to anti-capitalist movements and rulers on both the right and the left. Russia, too, has never really taken to capitalism and liberal society--whether during the time of the czars, the commissars, or the post-cold war leaders who so signally failed to build a stable, open system of liberal democratic capitalism even as many former Warsaw Pact nations were making rapid transitions. Partly as a result of these internal cultural pressures, and partly because, in much of the world, capitalism has appeared as an unwelcome interloper, imposed by foreign forces and shaped to fit foreign rather than domestic interests and preferences, many countries are only half-heartedly capitalist. When crisis strikes, they are quick to decide that capitalism is a failure and look for alternatives. So far, such half-hearted experiments not only have failed to work; they have left the societies that have tried them in a progressively worse position, farther behind the front-runners as time goes by. Argentina has lost ground to Chile; Russian development has fallen farther behind that of the Baltic states and Central Europe. Frequently, the crisis has weakened the power of the merchants, industrialists, financiers, and professionals who want to develop a liberal capitalist society integrated into the world. Crisis can also strengthen the hand of religious extremists, populist radicals, or authoritarian traditionalists who are determined to resist liberal capitalist society for a variety of reasons. Meanwhile, the companies and banks based in these societies are often less established and more vulnerable to the consequences of a financial crisis than more established firms in wealthier societies. As a result, developing countries and countries where capitalism has relatively recent and shallow roots tend to suffer greater economic and political damage when crisis strikes--as, inevitably, it does. And, consequently, financial crises often reinforce rather than challenge the global distribution of power and wealth. This may be happening yet again. None of which means that we can just sit back and enjoy the recession. History may suggest that financial crises actually help capitalist great powers maintain their leads--but it has other, less reassuring messages as well. If financial crises have been a normal part of life during the 300-year rise of the liberal capitalist system under the Anglophone powers, so has war. The wars of the League of Augsburg and the Spanish Succession; the Seven Years War; the American Revolution; the Napoleonic Wars; the two World Wars; the cold war: The list of wars is almost as long as the list of financial crises. **Bad** economic times can breed wars. Europe was a pretty peaceful place in 1928, but the Depression poisoned German public opinion and helped bring Adolf Hitler to power. If the current crisis turns into a depression, what rough beasts might start slouching toward Moscow, Karachi, Beijing, or New Delhi to be born? The United States may not, yet, decline, but, if we can't get the world economy back on track, we may still have to fight.

### Econ---A2: No Snowball

**Brink is now---collapse triggers all impacts and creates a domino effect**

**Broward 9** (Via Newsflavor – A Network of Political and World News Journalists, “Will an Economic Collapse Kill You?”, 4-9, <http://newsflavor.com/opinions/will-an-economic-collapse-kill-you/>)

It may or may not sound likely to you, but the economy is on the brink of collapse. The stock market is riding a sled down a steep hill. The United States government is spending money faster than it can print it. Right now the government is passing bills and proposals that will give trillions of dollars to failing companies and bankrupt manufacturers. They believe that by giving these companies resources to invest and expand, the economy will expand. The problem with this plan is that the same companies that are receiving billions of dollars in aid aren’t prepared to handle this money better than they used capitol in the past. Chances are these companies still have the same investors and management that they did pre-bailout, so who’s to say that they won’t make the same mistakes they’ve made in the past? The most likely thing to happen is that these companies are going to spend this money the same way they have in the past and that these companies are going to go bankrupt, again. These companies are the **lynchpin** of the economy, such as major insurance providers, banks, investment firms, manufacturers, etc. If these companies or firms were to collapse, the economy would be falling down the same pit as these companies. Not just the United States economy, because the U.S. is a major trade partner in this world, and most other countries are dependent on the United States one way or another, a **U**nited **S**tates collapse would cause a **domino effect** on the world’s economy. If the United States economy failed, for example, we could see Iraq, Iran, and Russia fall with them, because all of their economies are reliant off the selling of oil. Then the nations who are reliant on their economies would fail, etc. Now it’s time to look at the consequences of a failing world economy. With five official nations having nuclear weapons, and four more likely to have them there could be major consequences of another world war. The first thing that will happen after an economic collapse will be **war over resources**. The United States currency will become useless and will have no way of securing reserves. The United States has little to no capacity to produce oil, it is totally dependent on foreign oil. If the **U**nited **S**tates stopped getting foreign oil, the government would go to no ends to secure more, if there were a war with any other major power over oil, like Russia or China, these wars would most likely involve nuclear weapons. Once one nation launches a nuclear weapon, there would of course be **retaliation**, and with five or more countries with nuclear weapons there would most likely be a **world nuclear war**. The risk is so high that acting to save the economy is the **most important issue** facing us in the 21st century.

## Heg Backlines

**Heg---A2: Alt Causes – General**

#### Economic dominance solves all alt causes- regression analysis proves even when economic hegemons are out-gunned they maintain primacy and conflict suppression- that’s Hubbard.

### Heg---A2: Conflict Stays Regional

**Collapse of leadership destroys the economy and causes escalating conflict that goes global**

**Felzenberg 11** (Alvin S., Lecturer – University of Pennsylvania and Yale University and Alexander B. Gray, Ph.D. Candidate in International Affairs – George Washington University, “The New Isolationism”, The National Review, 1-3, http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/256150/new-isolationism-alvin-s-felzenberg)

Anything Reps. Ron Paul (R., Tex.) and Barney Frank (D., Mass.) both support should give the rest of us pause. Their proposal to slash defense spending by $1 trillion over a decade — only the most recent joint effort by the new isolationists on the Left and Right to curtail American military strength around the world — is as foolhardy as it is unrealistic. Were such a policy enacted, the nation and the world would be set on a path not toward peace, but toward instability, conflict, and a lessening of freedom in many corners of the world. As the deteriorating situation on the Korean peninsula reminds us, the security concerns of the United States do not disappear in times of economic distress. America’s interests, whether economic, strategic, diplomatic, or moral, cannot be set aside when Congress tires of them. The United States and the world paid a severe price for the ostrich-like behavior too many democratic nations exhibited during the 1920s and 1930s. Reps. Paul and Frank appear determined to repeat this mistake. The United States continues to face an array of global challenges that require a modern, technologically superior military. It is very much in the interests of the United States to uphold the territorial integrity and economic independence of much of Asia, maintain the security of critical waterways such as the Strait of Hormuz, and protect American trade from pirates and terrorists worldwide. Rather than regard the nation’s defenses as a ready source of money available for diversion to domestic concerns, Congress and the president should identify the challenges America faces and assure that its military is able to meet them. At its core, the Frank-Paul effort appears to be an attempt to prevent repetitions of wars the two congressmen regard as either unnecessary or faultily executed. But the United States has broader and more important long-run national-security concerns than Iraq and Afghanistan. As the U.S. became bogged down in those two countries, it began feeling strains elsewhere, precipitated by China, Russia, and potentially toxic menaces such as Iran and Venezuela. Counterinsurgency warfare and Predator-drone strikes against transnational terrorists certainly defined much of the last decade. But the next decade will witness increasing competition among nation-states for control of valuable resources and the exertion of influence worldwide. Russia, through its control of vital energy pipelines, seeks to draw Western Europe more closely into its orbit, thereby weakening the latter’s historical ties to the United States. By taking a similar approach to Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan, Georgia, the Baltics, and Moldova, **Russia** is on the verge of re-colonizing economically many of its former satellites.  China, while continuing to upgrade its naval capabilities, grows increasingly assertive. In pursuit of its own Monroe Doctrine for East Asia, Beijing has proclaimed its sovereignty over the entire South China Sea, menaced neighbors from India to Vietnam, used its economic muscle to intimidate Japan, and increased its threats against Taiwan. China’s leaders have been studying the writings of the 19th-century American naval theorist Alfred Thayer Mahan, who demonstrated the connection between sea power and economic strength. At the turn of the last century, Theodore Roosevelt found in Mahan the blueprint for achieving unprecedented American influence in world affairs. His efforts to build both a strong navy and a sound economy ushered in the “American century,” the period in which the United States became a force for good throughout the world and a beacon of hope for those yearning to breathe free. In pursuing a “blue-water” ocean-going navy capable of supporting their expanding global economic ambitions, the Chinese are acting from a desire to defend their nation’s trade and access to world markets, with a focus on energy supplies. It is critical that the Chinese — who are closely studying both Mahan’s writings and the history of the Monroe Doctrine — and Americans who see Chinese hegemony over Asia as either inevitable or a price they are willing to pay in exchange for slashing defense spending not draw the wrong lessons from history. Both sides should understand that it was not American might that gave the Monroe Doctrine force, but the then all-powerful British navy. For much of the 19th century, Great Britain had reasons of its own for keeping other nations out of the Western Hemisphere and for wanting to see the United States develop internally. If appropriately funded, the United States Navy has the capacity to play a similar role in China’s rise — perhaps, in the process, influencing how China develops. Should China conclude that the United States intends to remain a visible and active presence in the region, it will respond accordingly. Acting together, the two nations might embark on a series of cooperative ventures designed to help assure a steady flow of trade and an unimpeded exchange of people, goods, and ideas. They can also work together to combat a rise in piracy and terrorism in Asia and elsewhere and to respond to humanitarian crises, like the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. For its part, China, should it continue to hold North Korea in check, will achieve some of the status it seeks as a rising world power, with commensurate influence on the world stage.  Should China conclude, on the other hand, that the United States intends to turn inward, it may grow even more ambitious and assertive in its region and beyond, potentially menacing world peace. Its smaller neighbors nervously wait to see how the United States will respond to China’s growing assertiveness. Should they come to believe that the U.S. is in retreat, they will make their own accommodations with Beijing. That result would wreak irreparable damage both to America’s economy and to its security.  Messrs. Frank and Paul and their supporters have taken it into their minds that a reduced American presence in world affairs, particularly where the military is involved, would be a good thing. They had better think again: World politics, like nature, is hardly prone to respect vacuums. Iran and Venezuela remain as bellicose and destabilizing as ever, in spite of two years of Obama “engagement.” Iran squats beside the Strait of Hormuz, through which much of the world’s energy supply travels. Iran has also, the original Monroe Doctrine be damned, extended its military cooperation with Hugo Chávez’s authoritarian regime. Evidence is strong that Venezuela is providing sanctuary for Hezbollah terrorists in South America. The alliance of these two anti-American and increasingly menacing states could pose a threat to the United States of a kind that would make us nostalgic for the Cuban Missile Crisis. Faced with such challenges, the United States can ill afford military retrenchment as advocated by the new isolationists. While waste in the Pentagon’s budget can and should be cut, the new isolationists want to do it with a chainsaw when a scalpel is needed. In the last decade, the U.S. Navy’s fleet has shrunk to its smallest size since the 19th century, just as potential rivals such as China have not only expanded theirs but have begun to target perceived American maritime vulnerabilities. The U.S. Air Force is fielding an aging and shrinking force, while China is developing an advanced fighter for sale to adversaries of America, including Iran. A world in which the United States willingly ceded power and influence would both be more dangerous and prove less receptive to values that most Americans share, such as respect for human rights, the need to restrain governments through the rule of law, and the sanctity of contracts. By reducing its military strength to alarmingly low levels, the United States would create dangerous power vacuums around the world that other nations, with entirely different values, would be only too happy to fill. That, as history shows, would make war more, rather than less, likely. Congress and the president would do well to reflect on those lessons and remember their duty to provide a dominant American military presence on land, at sea, and in the air.

### Heg---A2: Econ Not k2 Heg

**US economic power is critical to global stability and solves every major global impact**

**Gelb ’10** (“GDP Now Matters More Than Force” Leslie H. Gelb is President Emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations. He was a senior official in the U.S. Defense Department from 1967 to 1969 and in the State Department from 1977 to 1979, and he was a Columnist and Editor at The New York Times from 1981 to 1993. Published 2010 by Foreign Affairs in Washington DC, USA . Written in English. Table of Contents A U.S. Foreign Policy for the Age of Economic Power

Today, the United States continues to be the world's power balancer of choice. It is **the only regional balancer against China in Asia, Russia in eastern Europe, and Iran in the Middle East.** Although Americans rarely think about this role and foreign leaders often deny it for internal political reasons, the fact is that Americans and non-Americans alike require these services. Even Russian leaders today look to Washington to check China. And Chinese leaders surely realize that they need the U.S. Navy and Air Force to guard the world's sea and trading lanes. Washington should not be embarrassed to remind others of the costs and risks of the United States' security role when it comes to economic transactions. That applies, for example, to Afghan and Iraqi decisions about contracts for their natural resources, and to Beijing on many counts. U.S. forces maintain a stable world order that decidedly benefits China's economic growth, and to date, Beijing has been getting a free ride. A NEW APPROACH In this environment, the first-tier foreign policy goals of the United States should be a strong economy and the ability to deploy effective counters to threats at the lowest possible cost. Second-tier goals, which are always more controversial, include retaining the military power to remain the world's power balancer, promoting freer trade, maintaining technological advantages (including cyberwarfare capabilities), reducing risks from various environmental and health challenges, developing alternative energy supplies, and advancing U.S. values such as democracy and human rights. Wherever possible, second-tier goals should reinforce first-tier ones: for example, it makes sense to err on the side of freer trade to help boost the economy and to invest in greater energy independence to reduce dependence on the tumultuous Middle East. But no overall approach should dictate how to pursue these goals in each and every situation. Specific applications depend on, among other things, the culture and politics of the target countries. An overarching vision helps leaders consider how to use their power to achieve their goals. This is what gives policy direction, purpose, and thrust--and this is what is often missing from U.S. policy. The organizing principle of U.S. foreign policy should be to use power to solve common problems. The good old days of being able to command others by making military or economic threats are largely gone. Even the weakest nations can resist the strongest ones or drive up the costs for submission. Now, U.S. power derives mainly from others' knowing that they cannot solve their problems without the United States and that they will have to heed U.S. interests to achieve common goals. Power by services rendered has largely replaced power by command. No matter the decline in U.S. power, **most nations** do not doubt that the United States **is the indispensable leader in solving major international problems**. This problem-solving capacity creates opportunities for U.S. leadership **in everything from trade talks to military-conflict resolution to international agreements on** global **warming**. Only Washington can help the nations **bordering the South China Sea forge a formula for sharing** the region's **resources**. **Only Washington has a chance of pushing the Israelis and the Palestinians toward peace**. Only Washington can bargain to increase the low value of a Chinese currency exchange . rate that disadvantages almost every nation's trade with China. But it is clear to Americans and non-Americans alike that Washington lacks the power to solve or manage difficult problems alone; the indispensable leader must work with indispensable partners. To attract the necessary partners, Washington must do the very thing that habitually afflicts U.S. leaders with political hives: compromise. This does not mean multilateralism for its own sake, nor does it mean abandoning vital national interests. The Obama administration has been criticized for softening UN economic sanctions against Iran in order to please China and Russia. Had the United States not compromised, however, it would have faced vetoes and enacted no new sanctions at all. U.S. presidents are often in a strong position to bargain while preserving essential U.S. interests, but they have to do a better job of selling such unavoidable compromises to the U.S. public. U.S. policymakers must also be patient. The weakest of nations today can resist and delay. Pressing prematurely for decisions--an unfortunate hallmark of U.S. style--results in failure, the prime enemy of power. Success breeds power, and failure breeds weakness. Even when various domestic constituencies shout for quick action, Washington's leaders must learn to buy time in order to allow for U.S. power--and the power of U.S.-led coalitions--to take effect abroad. Patience is especially valuable in the economic arena, where there are far more players than in the military and diplomatic realms. To corral all these players takes time. Military power can work quickly, like a storm; economic power grabs slowly, like the tide. It needs time to erode the shoreline, but it surely does nibble away. To be sure, U.S. presidents need to preserve the United States' core role as the world's military and diplomatic balancer--for its own sake; and because it strengthens U.S. interests in economic transactions. But **economics has to be the main driver for current policy, as nations calculate power more in terms of GDP than military might. U.S. GDP will be the lure and the whip in the international affairs of the twenty-first century. U.S. interests abroad cannot be adequately protected or advanced without an economic reawakening at home.**

**History proves- competitive decline will spark great power wars**

**Petras ’10** (James Petras, professor at Saint Mary's University, Petras is the author of more than 62 books published in 29 languages, and over 600 articles in professional journals, including the American Sociological Review, British Journal of Sociology, Social Research and Journal of Peasant Studies. Petras received his B.A. from Boston University and Ph.D. from the University of California at Berkeley.[1] During his life he received the Western Political Science Association's the Best Dissertation award (1968), the Career of Distinguished Service Award from the American Sociological Association's Marxist Sociology Section and the Robert Kenny Award for Best Book of 2002.[1][3] War with China? The Dangers of a Global Conflagration Rising and Declining Economic Powers: The Sino-US Conflict Deepens By Prof. James Petras

**Will the intensified conflicts between the US and China** inevitably **lead to a global conflagration?** **If recent** past **history is any indication the answer is a resounding yes**. **The most destructive wars of the 20th century were the result of confrontations between established** (EIP) **and rising** (RIP) imperial **powers**. The practices and policies of the former serve as guides to the latter. England’s colonial exploitation of India, its markets, treasury, raw materials and labor served as a model for Germany’s war and attempted conquest of Russia[1]. The enmity between Churchill and Hitler had as much to do with their common imperial visions, as it did their conflicting views of politics. Likewise, European and US colonial plunder of Southeast Asia and China’s coastal cities served as a model for Japan’s drive to colonize and exploit Manchuria, Korea and mainland China. In each instant the conflict between early established, but stagnant, imperial powers and late developing dynamic empires **led to world wars** in which only the intervention of another rising imperial power, the United States (as well as the unanticipated military prowess of the Soviet Union), secured the defeat of the RIP. The US emerged from the war as the dominant imperial power, displacing the established European imperial powers, subordinating the RIP of Germany and Japan and confronting the Sino-Soviet bloc[2]. With the demise of the USSR and the conversion of China into a dynamic capitalist country, the stage was set for a new confrontation between an established imperial power (EIP) the US and its European allies and China, the newly emerging world power. The US empire covers the world with nearly 800 military bases[3], multi-lateral (NATO) and bi-lateral military alliances, a dominant position in the self-styled international financial institutions (World Bank, International Monetary Fund) and with multi-national banks, investment houses and industries in Asia, Latin America, Europe and elsewhere. China did not challenge or borrow the US model of military driven empire building. Even less does it look at the previous Japanese or German approach to challenging established empires. Its dynamic growth is driven by economic competitiveness, market relations guided by a developmental state and a willingness to borrow, learn, innovate and expand internally and overseas displacing US market supremacy in regions and countries in Latin America, the Middle East and Asia, as well as inside the US and the European Union[4]. Established Imperial States World and regional wars, insofar as they involved EIS (and most wars directly and via proxies engaged the imperial states) **resulted from efforts to retain privileged positions in established markets**, accessing raw materials, exploiting labor via mercantile, colonial, bilateral and multilateral agreements. Frequently trading zones linked the imperial and dependent country and region and excluded potential competitors. Military bases were “super-imposed’ over imperial controlled economic zones. Networks of political clients favored imperial countries.

**Heg---A2: No Impact – General**

**1. Prefer our data- their ev is all in the context of military power not economic heg- our Hubbard ev is a statistical analysis and shows that while military power isn’t key to conflict, economic power is- That’s Hubbard- until they read a card about economic power they haven’t even begun to clash with our advantage**

#### 2. Economic power key to check transition wars- US lashout is highly probable in a world of declining economic leadership- that’s Hubbard

**Global nuclear war**

**Brooks 13** – Stephen G., Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, G. John ikenberry, Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University and Global Eminence Scholar at Kyung Hee University in Seoul and William C. Wohlforth, Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, “Lean Forward”, Foreign Affairs, January / February, 92(1)

They are wrong. In making their case, advocates of retrenchment overstate the costs of the current grand strategy and understate its benefits. In fact, the budgetary savings of lowering the United States' international profile are debatable, and there is little evidence to suggest that an internationally engaged America provokes other countries to balance against it, becomes overextended, or gets dragged into unnecessary wars. The benefits of deep engagement, on the other hand, are legion. U.S. security commitments **reduce competition** in **key regions** and act as a **check against potential rivals**. They help maintain an open **world economy** and give Washington leverage in economic negotiations. And they make it easier for the **U**nited **S**tates to secure cooperation for combating a **wide range of global threats**. Were the **U**nited **S**tates to cede its global leadership role, it would forgo these proven upsides while exposing itself to the unprecedented downsides of a world in which the country was less secure, prosperous, and influential. AN AFFORDABLE STRATEGY Many advocates of retrenchment consider the United States' assertive global posture simply too expensive. The international relations scholar Christopher Layne, for example, has warned of the country's "ballooning budget deficits" and argued that "its strategic commitments exceed the resources available to support them." Calculating the savings of switching grand strategies, however, is not so simple, because it depends on the expenditures the current strategy demands and the amount required for its replacement--numbers that are hard to pin down. If the United States revoked all its security guarantees, brought home all its troops, shrank every branch of the military, and slashed its nuclear arsenal, it would save around $900 billion over ten years, according to Benjamin Friedman and Justin Logan of the Cato Institute. But few advocates of retrenchment endorse such a radical reduction; instead, most call for "restraint," an "offshore balancing" strategy, or an "over the horizon" military posture. The savings these approaches would yield are less clear, since they depend on which security commitments Washington would abandon outright and how much it would cost to keep the remaining ones. If retrenchment simply meant shipping foreign-based U.S. forces back to the United States, then the savings would be **modest at best**, since the countries hosting U.S. forces usually cover a large portion of the basing costs. And if it meant maintaining a major expeditionary capacity, then any savings would again be small, since the Pentagon would still have to pay for the expensive weaponry and equipment required for projecting power abroad. The other side of the cost equation, the price of continued engagement, is also in flux. Although the fat defense budgets of the past decade make an easy target for advocates of retrenchment, such high levels of spending aren't needed to maintain an engaged global posture. Spending skyrocketed after 9/11, but it has already begun to fall back to earth as the United States winds down its two costly wars and trims its base level of nonwar spending. As of the fall of 2012, the Defense Department was planning for cuts of just under $500 billion over the next five years, which it maintains will not compromise national security. These reductions would lower military spending to a little less than three percent of GDP by 2017, from its current level of 4.5 percent. The Pentagon could save even more with no ill effects by reforming its procurement practices and compensation policies. Even without major budget cuts, however, the country can afford the costs of its ambitious grand strategy. The significant increases in military spending proposed by Mitt Romney, the Republican candidate, during the 2012 presidential campaign would still have kept military spending below its current share of GDP, since spending on the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq would still have gone down and Romney s proposed non- war spending levels would not have kept pace with economic growth. Small wonder, then, that the case for pulling back rests more on the nonmonetary costs that the current strategy supposedly incurs. UNBALANCED One such alleged cost of the current grand strategy is that, in the words of the political scientist Barry Posen, it "prompts states to balance against U.S. power however they can." Yet there is **no evidence** that countries have banded together in anti-American alliances or tried to match the **U**nited **S**tates' military capacity on their own-- or that they will do so in the future. Indeed, it's hard to see how the current grand strategy could generate true counterbalancing. Unlike past hegemons, the **U**nited **S**tates is geographically isolated, which means that it is far less threatening to other major states and that it faces no contiguous great-power rivals that could step up to the task of balancing against it. Moreover, any competitor would have a hard time matching the U.S. military. Not only is the United States so far ahead militarily in both quantitative and qualitative terms, but its security guarantees also give it the leverage to prevent allies from giving military technology to potential U.S. rivals. Because the United States dominates the high-end defense industry, it can trade access to its defense market for allies' agreement not to transfer key military technologies to its competitors. The embargo that the United States has convinced the EU to maintain on military sales to China since 1989 is a case in point. If U.S. global leadership were prompting balancing, then one would expect actual examples of pushback--especially during the administration of George W. Bush, who pursued a foreign policy that seemed particularly unilateral. Yet since the Soviet Union collapsed, no major powers have tried to balance against the **U**nited **S**tates by seeking to match its military might or by assembling a formidable alliance; the prospect is simply too daunting. Instead, they have resorted to what scholars call "soft balancing," using international institutions and norms to constrain Washington. Setting aside the fact that soft balancing is a slippery concept and difficult to distinguish from everyday diplomatic competition, it is wrong to say that the practice only harms the United States. Arguably, as the global leader, the **U**nited **S**tates benefits from employing soft-balancing-style leverage more than any other country. After all, today's rules and institutions came about under its auspices and largely reflect its interests, and so they are in fact tailor-made for soft balancing by the United States itself. In 2011, for example, Washington coordinated action with several Southeast Asian states to oppose Beijing's claims in the South China Sea by pointing to established international law and norms. Another argument for retrenchment holds that the **U**nited **S**tates will fall prey to the same fate as past hegemons and accelerate its own decline. In order to keep its ambitious strategy in place, the logic goes, the country will have to divert resources away from more productive purposes--infrastructure, education, scientific research, and so on--that are necessary to keep its economy competitive. Allies, meanwhile, can get away with lower military expenditures and grow faster than they otherwise would. The historical evidence for this phenomenon is thin; for the most part, past superpowers lost their leadership not because they pursued hegemony but because other major powers balanced against them--a prospect that is not in the cards today. (If anything, leading states can use their position to stave off their decline.) A bigger problem with the warnings against "imperial overstretch" is that there is no reason to believe that the pursuit of global leadership saps economic growth. Instead, most studies by economists find no clear relationship between military expenditures and economic decline. To be sure, if the United States were a dramatic outlier and spent around A quarter of its GDP on defense, as the Soviet Union did in its last decades, its growth and competitiveness would suffer. But in 2012, even as it fought a war in Afghanistan and conducted counterterrorism operations around the globe, Washington spent just 4.5 percent of GDP on defense--a relatively small fraction, historically speaking. (From 1950 to 1990, that figure averaged 7.6 percent.) Recent economic difficulties might prompt Washington to reevaluate its defense budgets and international commitments, but that does not mean that those policies caused the downturn. And any money freed up from dropping global commitments would not necessarily be spent in ways that would help the U.S. economy. Likewise, U.S. allies' economic growth rates have nothing to do with any security subsidies they receive from Washington. The contention that lower military expenditures facilitated the rise of Japan, West Germany, and other countries dependent on U.S. defense guarantees may have seemed plausible during the last bout of declinist anxiety, in the 1980s. But these states eventually stopped climbing up the global economic ranks as their per capita wealth approached U.S. levels--just as standard models of economic growth would predict. Over the past 20 years, the United States has maintained its lead in per capita GDP over its European allies and Japan, even as those countries' defense efforts have fallen further behind. Their failure to modernize their militaries has only served to entrench the United States' dominance. LED NOT INTO TEMPTATION The costs of U.S. foreign policy that matter most, of course, are human lives, and critics of an expansive grand strategy worry that the **U**nited **S**tates might get dragged into unnecessary wars. Securing smaller allies, they argue, emboldens those states to take risks they would not otherwise accept, pulling the superpower sponsor into costly conflicts--a classic moral hazard problem. Concerned about the reputational costs of failing to honor the country's alliance commitments, U.S. leaders might go to war even when no national interests are at stake. History shows, however, that great powers anticipate the danger of entrapment and structure their agreements to protect themselves from it. It is **nearly impossible** to find a clear case of a smaller power luring a reluctant great power into war. For decades, World War I served as the canonical example of entangling alliances supposedly drawing great powers into a fight, but an outpouring of new historical research has overturned the conventional wisdom, revealing that the war was more the result of a conscious decision on Germany's part to try to dominate Europe than a case of alliance entrapment. If anything, alliances reduce the risk of getting pulled into a conflict. In **East Asia**, the regional security agreements that Washington struck after World War II were designed, in the words of the political scientist Victor Cha, to "constrain anticommunist allies in the region that might engage in aggressive behavior against adversaries that could entrap the **U**nited **S**tates in an unwanted larger war." The same logic is now at play in the U.S.**Taiwan**ese relationship. After cross-strait tensions flared in the 1990s and the first decade of this century, U.S. officials grew concerned that their ambiguous support for Taiwan might expose them to the risk of entrapment. So the Bush administration adjusted its policy, clarifying that its goal was to not only deter China from an unprovoked attack but also deter Taiwan from unilateral moves toward independence. For many advocates of retrenchment, the problem is that the mere possession of globe-girdling military capabilities supposedly inflates policymakers' conception of the national interest, so much so that every foreign problem begins to look like America's to solve. Critics also argue that the country's military superiority causes it to seek total solutions to security problems, as in Afghanistan and Iraq, that could be dealt with in less costly ways. Only a country that possessed such awesome military power and faced no serious geopolitical rival would fail to be satisfied with partial fixes, such as containment, and instead embark on wild schemes of democracy building, the argument goes. Furthermore, they contend, the United States' outsized military creates a sense of obligation to do something with it even when no U.S. interests are at stake. As Madeleine Albright, then the U.S. ambassador to the UN, famously asked Colin Powell, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, when debating intervention in Bosnia in 1993, "What's the point of having this superb military you're always talking about if we can't use it?" If the U.S. military scrapped its forces and shuttered its bases, then the country would no doubt eliminate the risk of entering needless wars, having tied itself to the mast like Ulysses. But if it instead merely moved its forces over the horizon, as is more commonly proposed by advocates of retrenchment, whatever temptations there were to **intervene** would **not disappear**. The bigger problem with the idea that a forward posture distorts conceptions of the national interest, however, is that it rests on just one case: Iraq. That war is an outlier in terms of both its high costs (it accounts for some two-thirds of the casualties and budget costs of all U.S. wars since 1990) and the degree to which the United States shouldered them alone. In the Persian Gulf War and the interventions in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Libya, U.S. allies bore more of the burden, controlling for the size of their economies and populations. Besides, the Iraq war was not an inevitable consequence of pursuing the United States' existing grand strategy; many scholars and policymakers who prefer an engaged America strongly opposed the war. Likewise, continuing the current grand strategy in no way condemns the **U**nited **S**tates to more wars like it. Consider how the country, after it lost in Vietnam, waged the rest of the Cold War with proxies and highly limited interventions. Iraq has generated a similar reluctance to undertake large expeditionary operations--what the political scientist John Mueller has dubbed "the Iraq syndrome." Those contending that the United States' grand strategy ineluctably leads the country into temptation need to present much more evidence before their case can be convincing. KEEPING THE PEACE Of course, even if it is true that the costs of deep engagement fall far below what advocates of retrenchment claim, they would not be worth bearing unless they yielded greater benefits. In fact, they do. The most obvious benefit of the current strategy is that it reduces the risk of a dangerous conflict. The United States' security commitments deter states with aspirations to regional hegemony from contemplating expansion and dissuade U.S. partners from trying to solve security problems on their own in ways that would end up threatening other states. Skeptics discount this benefit by arguing that U.S. security guarantees aren't necessary to prevent dangerous rivalries from erupting. They maintain that the high costs of territorial conquest and the many tools countries can use to signal their benign intentions are enough to prevent conflict. In other words, major powers could peacefully manage regional multipolarity without the American pacifier. But that outlook is too sanguine. If Washington got out of East Asia, **Japan** and **South Korea** would likely expand their military capabilities and go **nuclear**, which could provoke a **destabilizing reaction from China**. It's worth noting that during the Cold War, both South Korea and Taiwan tried to obtain nuclear weapons; the only thing that stopped them was the **U**nited **S**tates, which used its security commitments to restrain their nuclear temptations. Similarly, were the **U**nited **S**tates to leave the Middle East, the countries currently backed by Washington--notably, **Israel**, **Egypt**, and **Saudi Arabia**--might act in ways that would intensify the region's security dilemmas. There would even be reason to worry about **Europe**. Although it's hard to imagine the return of great-power military competition in a post-American Europe, it's not difficult to foresee governments there refusing to pay the budgetary costs of higher military outlays and the political costs of increasing EU defense cooperation. The result might be a continent incapable of securing itself from threats on its periphery, unable to join foreign interventions on which U.S. leaders might want European help, and vulnerable to the influence of outside rising powers. Given how easily a U.S. withdrawal from key regions could lead to **dangerous competition**, advocates of retrenchment tend to put forth another argument: that such rivalries wouldn't actually hurt the United States. To be sure, few doubt that the United States could survive the return of conflict among powers in Asia or the Middle East--but at what cost? Were states in one or both of these regions to start competing against one another, they would likely boost their military budgets, arm client states, and perhaps even start **regional proxy wars**, all of which should concern the United States, in part because its lead in military capabilities would narrow. Greater regional insecurity could also produce **cascades of nuclear proliferation** as powers such as **Egypt**, **Saudi Arabia**, **Japan**, **South Korea**, and **Taiwan** built nuclear forces of their own. Those countries' regional competitors might then also seek nuclear arsenals. Although nuclear deterrence can promote stability between two states with the kinds of nuclear forces that the Soviet Union and the United States possessed, things get shakier when there are **multiple nuclear rivals** with **less robust arsenals**. As the number of nuclear powers increases, the probability of **illicit transfers**, **irrational decisions**, **accidents**, and **unforeseen crises** goes up. The case for abandoning the United States' global role misses the underlying security logic of the current approach. By reassuring allies and actively managing regional relations, Washington dampens competition in the world s key areas, thereby preventing the emergence of a **hothouse** in which countries would grow new military capabilities. For proof that this strategy is working, one need look no further than the defense budgets of the current great powers: on average, since 1991 they have kept their military expenditures as A percentage of GDP to historic lows, and they have not attempted to match the **U**nited **S**tates' top-end military capabilities. Moreover, all of the world's most modern militaries are U.S. allies, and the United States' military lead over its potential rivals .is by many measures growing. On top of all this, the current grand strategy acts as a hedge against the emergence regional hegemons. Some supporters of retrenchment argue that the U.S. military should keep its forces over the horizon and pass the buck to local powers to do the dangerous work of counterbalancing rising regional powers. Washington, they contend, should deploy forces abroad only when a truly credible contender for regional hegemony arises, as in the cases of Germany and Japan during World War II and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Yet there is already a potential contender for regional hegemony--China--and to balance it, the **U**nited **S**tates will need to maintain its key alliances in Asia and the military capacity to intervene there. The implication is that the **U**nited **S**tates should get out of Afghanistan and Iraq, reduce its military presence in Europe, and pivot to Asia. Yet that is exactly what the Obama administration is doing. MILITARY DOMINANCE, ECONOMIC PREEMINENCE Preoccupied with security issues, critics of the current grand strategy miss one of its most important benefits: sustaining an open global economy and a favorable place for the United States within it. To be sure, the sheer size of its output would guarantee the United States a major role in the global economy whatever grand strategy it adopted. Yet the country's military dominance **undergirds its economic leadership**. In addition to **protecting the world economy from instability**, its military commitments and naval superiority help **secure the sea-lanes** and other **shipping corridors** that **allow trade to flow freely and cheaply**. Were the **U**nited **S**tates to pull back from the world, the task of securing the global commons would get much harder. Washington would have less leverage with which it could convince countries to cooperate on economic matters and less access to the military bases throughout the world needed to keep the seas open. A global role also lets the United States structure the world economy in ways that serve its particular economic interests. During the Cold War, Washington used its overseas security commitments to get allies to embrace the economic policies it preferred--convincing West Germany in the 1960s, for example, to take costly steps to support the U.S. dollar as a reserve currency. U.S. defense agreements work the same way today. For example, when negotiating the 2011 free-trade agreement with South Korea, U.S. officials took advantage of Seoul's desire to use the agreement as a means of tightening its security relations with Washington. As one diplomat explained to us privately, "We asked for changes in labor and environment clauses, in auto clauses, and the Koreans took it all." Why? Because they feared a failed agreement would be "a setback to the political and security relationship." More broadly, the United States wields its security leverage to shape the overall structure of the global economy. Much of what the United States wants from the economic order is more of the same: for instance, it likes the current structure of the World Trade Organization and the International Monetary Fund and prefers that free trade continue. Washington wins when U.S. allies favor this status quo, and one reason they are inclined to support the existing system is because they value their military alliances. Japan, to name one example, has shown interest in the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the Obama administration's most important free-trade initiative in the region, less because its economic interests compel it to do so than because Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda believes that his support will strengthen Japan's security ties with the United States. The United States' geopolitical dominance also helps keep the U.S. dollar in place as the world's reserve currency, which confers enormous benefits on the country, such as a greater ability to borrow money. This is perhaps clearest with Europe: the EU'S dependence on the United States for its security precludes the EU from having the kind of political leverage to support the euro that the United States has with the dollar. As with other aspects of the global economy, the United States does not provide its leadership for free: it extracts disproportionate gains. Shirking that responsibility would place those benefits at risk. CREATING COOPERATION What goes for the global economy goes for other forms of **international cooperation**. Here, too, American leadership benefits many countries but disproportionately helps the **U**nited **S**tates. In order to counter **transnational threats**, such as **terrorism**, **piracy**, **organized crime**, **climate change**, and **pandemics**, states have to work together and take collective action. But cooperation does not come about effortlessly, especially when national interests diverge. The United States' military efforts to promote stability and its broader leadership make it easier for Washington to launch joint initiatives and shape them in ways that reflect U.S. interests. After all, cooperation is hard to come by in regions where chaos reigns, and it flourishes where leaders can anticipate lasting stability. U.S. alliances are about security first, but they also provide the political framework and channels of communication for cooperation on nonmilitary issues. NATO, for example, has spawned new institutions, such as the Atlantic Council, a think tank, that make it easier for Americans and Europeans to talk to one another and do business. Likewise, consultations with allies in East Asia spill over into other policy issues; for example, when American diplomats travel to Seoul to manage the military alliance, they also end up discussing the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Thanks to conduits such as this, the United States can use bargaining chips in one issue area to make progress in others. The benefits of these communication channels are especially pronounced when it comes to fighting the kinds of threats that require new forms of cooperation, such as terrorism and pandemics. With its alliance system in place, the United States is in a stronger position than it would otherwise be to advance cooperation and share burdens. For example, the intelligence-sharing network within NATO, which was originally designed to gather information on the Soviet Union, has been adapted to deal with terrorism. Similarly, after a tsunami in the Indian Ocean devastated surrounding countries in 2004, Washington had a much easier time orchestrating a fast humanitarian response with Australia, India, and Japan, since their militaries were already comfortable working with one another. The operation did wonders for the United States' image in the region. The United States' global role also has the more direct effect of facilitating the bargains among governments that get cooperation going in the first place. As the scholar Joseph Nye has written, "The American military role in deterring threats to allies, or of assuring access to a crucial resource such as oil in the Persian Gulf, means that the provision of protective force can be used in bargaining situations. Sometimes the linkage may be direct; more often it is a factor not mentioned openly but present in the back of statesmen's minds." THE DEVIL WE KNOW Should America come home? For many prominent scholars of international relations, the answer is yes--a view that seems even wiser in the wake of the disaster in Iraq and the Great Recession. Yet their arguments simply don't hold up. There is little evidence that the **U**nited **S**tates would save much money switching to a smaller global posture. Nor is the current strategy self-defeating: it has not provoked the formation of counterbalancing coalitions or caused the country to spend itself into economic decline. Nor will it condemn the **U**nited **S**tates to foolhardy wars in the future. What the strategy does do is help prevent the **outbreak of conflict** in the world's most important regions, keep the **global economy** humming, and make **international cooperation** easier. Charting a different course would threaten all these benefits. This is not to say that the United States' current foreign policy can't be adapted to new circumstances and challenges. Washington does not need to retain every commitment at all costs, and there is nothing wrong with rejiggering its strategy in response to new opportunities or setbacks. That is what the Nixon administration did by winding down the Vietnam War and increasing the United States' reliance on regional partners to contain Soviet power, and it is what the Obama administration has been doing after the Iraq war by pivoting to Asia. These episodes of rebalancing belie the argument that a powerful and internationally engaged America cannot tailor its policies to a changing world. A grand strategy of actively managing global security and promoting the liberal economic order has served the United States exceptionally well for the past six decades, and there is no reason to give it up now. The country's globe-spanning posture is the devil we know, and a world with a disengaged America is the devil we don't know. Were American leaders to choose retrenchment, they would in essence be running a massive experiment to test how the world would work without an engaged and liberal leading power. The results could well be **disastrous**.

**Extinction**

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For if America falters, the world is unlikely to be dominated by a single preeminent successor -- not even China. International uncertainty, **increased tension** among **global competitors**, and even **outright chaos** would be far more likely outcomes. While a sudden, massive crisis of the American system -- for instance, another financial crisis -- would produce a **fast-moving chain reaction** leading to **global political and economic disorder**, a steady drift by America into increasingly pervasive decay or **endlessly widening warfare** with Islam would be unlikely to produce, even by 2025, an effective global successor. No single power will be ready by then to exercise the role that the world, upon the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, expected the United States to play: the leader of a new, globally cooperative world order. More probable would be a protracted phase of rather inconclusive realignments of both global and regional power, with no grand winners and many more losers, in a setting of international uncertainty and even of potentially **fatal risks to global well-being**. Rather than a world where dreams of democracy flourish, a Hobbesian world of enhanced national security based on varying fusions of authoritarianism, nationalism, and religion could ensue. The leaders of the world's second-rank powers, among them India, Japan, Russia, and some European countries, are already assessing the potential impact of U.S. decline on their respective national interests. The Japanese, fearful of an assertive China dominating the Asian mainland, may be thinking of closer links with Europe. Leaders in India and Japan may be considering closer political and even military cooperation in case America falters and China rises. Russia, while perhaps engaging in wishful thinking (even schadenfreude) about America's uncertain prospects, will almost certainly have its eye on the independent states of the former Soviet Union. Europe, not yet cohesive, would likely be pulled in several directions: Germany and Italy toward Russia because of commercial interests, France and insecure Central Europe in favor of a politically tighter European Union, and Britain toward manipulating a balance within the EU while preserving its special relationship with a declining United States. Others may move more rapidly to carve out their own regional spheres: Turkey in the area of the old Ottoman Empire, Brazil in the Southern Hemisphere, and so forth. None of these countries, however, will have the requisite combination of economic, financial, technological, and military power even to consider inheriting America's leading role. China, invariably mentioned as America's prospective successor, has an impressive imperial lineage and a strategic tradition of carefully calibrated patience, both of which have been critical to its overwhelmingly successful, several-thousand-year-long history. China thus prudently accepts the existing international system, even if it does not view the prevailing hierarchy as permanent. It recognizes that success depends not on the system's dramatic collapse but on its evolution toward a gradual redistribution of power. Moreover, the basic reality is that China is not yet ready to assume in full America's role in the world. Beijing's leaders themselves have repeatedly emphasized that on every important measure of development, wealth, and power, China will still be a modernizing and developing state several decades from now, significantly behind not only the United States but also Europe and Japan in the major per capita indices of modernity and national power. Accordingly, Chinese leaders have been restrained in laying any overt claims to global leadership. At some stage, however, a more assertive Chinese nationalism could arise and damage China's international interests. A swaggering, nationalistic Beijing would unintentionally mobilize a powerful regional coalition against itself. None of China's key neighbors -- India, Japan, and Russia -- is ready to acknowledge China's entitlement to America's place on the global totem pole. They might even seek support from a waning America to offset an overly assertive China. The resulting regional scramble could become intense, especially given the similar nationalistic tendencies among China's neighbors. A phase of **acute international tension** in Asia could ensue. Asia of the 21st century could then begin to resemble Europe of the 20th century -- violent and bloodthirsty. At the same time, the security of a number of weaker states located geographically next to major regional powers also depends on the international status quo reinforced by America's global preeminence -- and would be made significantly more vulnerable in proportion to America's decline. The states in that exposed position -- including **Georgia**, **Taiwan**, **South Korea**, **Belarus**, **Ukraine**, **Afghanistan**, **Pakistan**, **Israel**, and the greater **Middle East** -- are today's geopolitical equivalents of nature's most endangered species. Their fates are closely tied to the nature of the international environment left behind by a waning America, be it ordered and restrained or, much more likely, self-serving and expansionist. A faltering **U**nited **S**tates could also find its strategic partnership with Mexico in jeopardy. America's economic resilience and political stability have so far mitigated many of the challenges posed by such sensitive neighborhood issues as economic dependence, immigration, and the narcotics trade. A decline in American power, however, would likely undermine the health and good judgment of the U.S. economic and political systems. A waning United States would likely be more nationalistic, more defensive about its national identity, more paranoid about its homeland security, and less willing to sacrifice resources for the sake of others' development. The worsening of relations between a declining America and an internally troubled Mexico could even give rise to a particularly ominous phenomenon: the emergence, as a major issue in nationalistically aroused Mexican politics, of territorial claims justified by history and ignited by cross-border incidents. Another consequence of American decline could be a corrosion of the generally cooperative management of the global commons -- shared interests such as **sea lanes**, **space**, **cyberspace**, and **the environment**, whose protection is imperative to the long-term **growth of the global economy** and the continuation of basic **geopolitical stability**. In almost every case, the potential absence of a constructive and influential U.S. role would fatally undermine the essential communality of the global commons because the superiority and ubiquity of American power creates order where there would normally be conflict. None of this will necessarily come to pass. Nor is the concern that America's decline would generate **global insecurity**, endanger some vulnerable states, and produce a more troubled North American neighborhood an argument for U.S. global supremacy. In fact, the strategic complexities of the world in the 21st century make such supremacy unattainable. But those dreaming today of America's collapse would probably come to regret it. And as the world after America would be increasingly complicated and chaotic, it is imperative that the United States pursue a new, timely strategic vision for its foreign policy -- or start bracing itself for a dangerous slide into global turmoil.

**Heg---A2: Power Projection Fails**

**Effective power projection stops hotspot escalation to nuclear war**

**O’Hanlon 7** – Frederick Kagan, Resident Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, and Michael O’Hanlon, Senior Fellow and Sydney Stein Jr. Chair in Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution, “The Case for Larger Ground Forces”, Stanley Foundation Report, April, http://stanleyfoundation.org/publications/other/Kagan\_OHanlon\_07.pdf

We live at a time when wars not only rage in nearly every region but threaten to **erupt** in many places where the current relative calm is tenuous. To view this as a strategic military challenge for the United States is not to espouse a specific theory of America’s role in the world or a certain political philosophy. Such an assessment flows directly from the basic bipartisan view of American foreign policy makers since World War II that overseas threats must be countered before they can directly threaten this country’s shores, that the basic stability of the international system is essential to American peace and prosperity, and that no country besides the **U**nited **S**tates is in a position to lead the way in countering major challenges to the **global order**. Let us highlight the threats and their consequences with a few concrete examples, emphasizing those that involve key strategic regions of the world such as the **Persian Gulf** and **East Asia**, or key potential threats to American security, such as the spread of **nuclear weapons** and the strengthening of the global Al Qaeda/jihadist movement. The Iranian government has rejected a series of international demands to halt its efforts at enriching uranium and submit to international inspections. What will happen if the US—or Israeli—government becomes convinced that Tehran is on the verge of fielding a nuclear weapon? **North Korea**, of course, has already done so, and the ripple effects are beginning to spread. Japan’s recent election to supreme power of a leader who has promised to rewrite that country’s constitution to support increased armed forces—and, possibly, even nuclear weapons— may well alter the delicate balance of fear in Northeast Asia fundamentally and rapidly. Also, in the background, at least for now, **Sino- Taiwanese tensions** continue to flare, as do tensions between **India and Pakistan**, Pakistan and Afghanistan, Venezuela and the United States, and so on. Meanwhile, the world’s nonintervention in Darfur troubles consciences from Europe to America’s Bible Belt to its bastions of liberalism, yet with no serious international forces on offer, the bloodletting will probably, tragically, continue unabated. And as bad as things are in **Iraq** today, they could get worse. What would happen if the key Shiite figure, Ali al Sistani, were to die? If another major attack on the scale of the Golden Mosque bombing hit either side (or, perhaps, both sides at the same time)? Such deterioration might convince many Americans that the war there truly was lost—but the costs of reaching such a conclusion would be enormous. Afghanistan is somewhat more stable for the moment, although a major Taliban offensive appears to be in the offing. Sound US grand strategy must proceed from the recognition that, over the next few years and decades, the world is going to be a very unsettled and quite dangerous place, with Al Qaeda and its associated groups as a subset of a much larger set of worries. The only serious response to this international environment is to develop **armed forces** capable of protecting America’s vital interests throughout this dangerous time. Doing so requires a military capable of a wide range of missions—including not only deterrence of **great power conflict** in dealing with potential hotspots in **Korea**, the **Taiwan** Strait, and the Persian **Gulf** but also associated with a variety of Special Forces activities and stabilization operations. For today’s US military, which already excels at high technology and is increasingly focused on re-learning the lost art of counterinsurgency, this is first and foremost a question of finding the resources to field a large-enough standing Army and Marine Corps to handle personnelintensive missions such as the ones now under way in Iraq and Afghanistan. Let us hope there will be no such large-scale missions for a while. But preparing for the possibility, while doing whatever we can at this late hour to relieve the pressure on our soldiers and Marines in ongoing operations, is prudent. At worst, the only potential downside to a major program to strengthen the military is the possibility of spending a bit too much money. Recent history shows no link between having a larger military and its overuse; indeed, Ronald Reagan’s time in office was characterized by higher defense budgets and yet much less use of the military, an outcome for which we can hope in the coming years, but hardly guarantee. While the authors disagree between ourselves about proper increases in the size and cost of the military (with O’Hanlon preferring to hold defense to roughly 4 percent of GDP and seeing ground forces increase by a total of perhaps 100,000, and Kagan willing to devote at least 5 percent of GDP to defense as in the Reagan years and increase the Army by at least 250,000), we agree on the need to start expanding ground force capabilities by at least 25,000 a year immediately. Such a measure is not only prudent, it is also badly overdue.

### Heg---A2: No Nuke War

**Collapse of leadership causes global nuclear war**

**Kagan 11** (Robert, Senior Associate – Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “The Price of Power”, The Weekly Standard, 1-24, http://www.weeklystandard.com/articles/price-power\_533695.html?nopager=1)

Today the international situation is also one of high risk.  • The terrorists who would like to kill Americans on U.S. soil constantly search for safe havens from which to plan and carry out their attacks. American military actions in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Yemen, and elsewhere make it harder for them to strike and are a large part of the reason why for almost a decade there has been no repetition of September 11. To the degree that we limit our ability to deny them safe haven, we increase the chances they will succeed. • American forces deployed in East Asia and the Western Pacific have for decades prevented the outbreak of major war, provided stability, and kept open international trading routes, making possible an unprecedented era of growth and prosperity for Asians and Americans alike. Now the United States faces a new challenge and potential threat from a rising China which seeks eventually to push the U.S. military’s area of operations back to Hawaii and exercise hegemony over the world’s most rapidly growing economies. Meanwhile, a nuclear-armed North Korea threatens war with South Korea and fires ballistic missiles over Japan that will someday be capable of reaching the west coast of the United States. Democratic nations in the region, worried that the United States may be losing influence, turn to Washington for reassurance that the U.S. security guarantee remains firm. If the United States cannot provide that assurance because it is cutting back its military capabilities, they will have to choose between accepting Chinese dominance and striking out on their own, possibly by building nuclear weapons. • In the Middle East, Iran seeks to build its own nuclear arsenal, supports armed radical Islamic groups in Lebanon and Palestine, and has linked up with anti-American dictatorships in the Western Hemisphere. The prospects of new instability in the region grow every day as a decrepit regime in Egypt clings to power, crushes all moderate opposition, and drives the Muslim Brotherhood into the streets. A nuclear-armed Pakistan seems to be ever on the brink of collapse into anarchy and radicalism. Turkey, once an ally, now seems bent on an increasingly anti-American Islamist course. The prospect of war between Hezbollah and Israel grows, and with it the possibility of war between Israel and Syria and possibly Iran. There, too, nations in the region increasingly look to Washington for reassurance, and if they decide the United States cannot be relied upon they will have to decide whether to succumb to Iranian influence or build their own nuclear weapons to resist it. In the 1990s, after the Soviet Union had collapsed and the biggest problem in the world seemed to be ethnic conflict in the Balkans, it was at least plausible to talk about cutting back on American military capabilities. In the present, increasingly dangerous international environment, in which terrorism and great power rivalry vie as the greatest threat to American security and interests, cutting military capacities is simply reckless. Would we increase the risk of strategic failure in an already risky world, despite the near irrelevance of the defense budget to American fiscal health, just so we could tell American voters that their military had suffered its “fair share” of the pain? The nature of the risk becomes plain when one considers the nature of the cuts that would have to be made to have even a marginal effect on the U.S. fiscal crisis. Many are under the illusion, for instance, that if the United States simply withdrew from Iraq and Afghanistan and didn’t intervene anywhere else for a while, this would have a significant impact on future deficits. But, in fact, projections of future massive deficits already assume the winding down of these interventions.Withdrawal from the two wars would scarcely make a dent in the fiscal crisis. Nor can meaningful reductions be achieved by cutting back on waste at the Pentagon—which Secretary of Defense Gates has already begun to do and which has also been factored into deficit projections. If the United States withdrew from Iran and Afghanistan tomorrow, cut all the waste Gates can find, and even eliminated a few weapons programs—all this together would still not produce a 10 percent decrease in overall defense spending.  In fact, the only way to get significant savings from the defense budget—and by “significant,” we are still talking about a tiny fraction of the cuts needed to bring down future deficits—is to cut force structure: fewer troops on the ground; fewer airplanes in the skies; fewer ships in the water; fewer soldiers, pilots, and sailors to feed and clothe and provide benefits for. To cut the size of the force, however, requires reducing or eliminating the missions those forces have been performing. Of course, there are any number of think tank experts who insist U.S. forces can be cut by a quarter or third or even by half and still perform those missions. But this is snake oil. Over the past two decades, the force has already been cut by a third. Yet no administration has reduced the missions that the larger force structures of the past were designed to meet. To fulfill existing security commitments, to remain the “world’s power balancer of choice,” as Leslie Gelb puts it, to act as “the only regional balancer against China in Asia, Russia in eastern Europe, and Iran in the Middle East” requires at least the current force structure, and almost certainly more than current force levels. Those who recommend doing the same with less are only proposing a policy of insufficiency, where the United States makes commitments it cannot meet except at high risk of failure. The only way to find substantial savings in the defense budget, therefore, is to change American strategy fundamentally. The Simpson-Bowles commission suggests as much, by calling for a reexamination of America’s “21st century role,” although it doesn’t begin to define what that new role might be.  Others have. For decades “realist” analysts have called for a strategy of “offshore balancing.” Instead of the United States providing security in East Asia and the Persian Gulf, it would withdraw its forces from Japan, South Korea, and the Middle East and let the nations in those regions balance one another. If the balance broke down and war erupted, the United States would then intervene militarily until balance was restored. In the Middle East and Persian Gulf, for instance, Christopher Layne has long proposed “passing the mantle of regional stabilizer” to a consortium of “Russia, China, Iran, and India.” In East Asia offshore balancing would mean letting China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, and others manage their own problems, without U.S. involvement—again, until the balance broke down and war erupted, at which point the United States would provide assistance to restore the balance and then, if necessary, intervene with its own forces to restore peace and stability.  Before examining whether this would be a wise strategy, it is important to understand that this really is the only genuine alternative to the one the United States has pursued for the past 65 years. To their credit, Layne and others who support the concept of offshore balancing have eschewed halfway measures and airy assurances that we can do more with less, which are likely recipes for disaster. They recognize that either the United States is actively involved in providing security and stability in regions beyond the Western Hemisphere, which means maintaining a robust presence in those regions, or it is not. Layne and others are frank in calling for an end to the global security strategy developed in the aftermath of World War II, perpetuated through the Cold War, and continued by four successive post-Cold War administrations. At the same time, it is not surprising that none of those administrations embraced offshore balancing as a strategy. The idea of relying on Russia, China, and Iran to jointly “stabilize” the Middle East and Persian Gulf will not strike many as an attractive proposition. Nor is U.S. withdrawal from East Asia and the Pacific likely to have a stabilizing effect on that region. The prospects of a war on the Korean Peninsula would increase. Japan and other nations in the region would face the choice of succumbing to Chinese hegemony or taking unilateral steps for self-defense, which in Japan’s case would mean the rapid creation of a formidable nuclear arsenal. Layne and other offshore balancing enthusiasts, like John Mearsheimer, point to two notable occasions when the United States allegedly practiced this strategy. One was the Iran-Iraq war, where the United States supported Iraq for years against Iran in the hope that the two would balance and weaken each other. The other was American policy in the 1920s and 1930s, when the United States allowed the great European powers to balance one another, occasionally providing economic aid, or military aid, as in the Lend-Lease program of assistance to Great Britain once war broke out. Whether this was really American strategy in that era is open for debate—most would argue the United States in this era was trying to stay out of war not as part of a considered strategic judgment but as an end in itself. Even if the United States had been pursuing offshore balancing in the first decades of the 20th century, however, would we really call that strategy a success? The United States wound up intervening with millions of troops, first in Europe, and then in Asia and Europe simultaneously, in the two most dreadful wars in human history.  It was with the memory of those two wars in mind, and in the belief that American strategy in those interwar years had been mistaken, that American statesmen during and after World War II determined on the new global strategy that the United States has pursued ever since. Under Franklin Roosevelt, and then under the leadership of Harry Truman and Dean Acheson, American leaders determined that the safest course was to build “situations of strength” (Acheson’s phrase) in strategic locations around the world, to build a “preponderance of power,” and to create an international system with American power at its center. They left substantial numbers of troops in East Asia and in Europe and built a globe-girdling system of naval and air bases to enable the rapid projection of force to strategically important parts of the world. They did not do this on a lark or out of a yearning for global dominion. They simply rejected the offshore balancing strategy, and they did so because they believed it had led to great, destructive wars in the past and would likely do so again. They believed their new global strategy was more likely to deter major war and therefore be less destructive and less expensive in the long run. Subsequent administrations, from both parties and with often differing perspectives on the proper course in many areas of foreign policy, have all agreed on this core strategic approach.  From the beginning this strategy was assailed as too ambitious and too expensive. At the dawn of the Cold War, Walter Lippmann railed against Truman’s containment strategy as suffering from an unsustainable gap between ends and means that would bankrupt the United States and exhaust its power. Decades later, in the waning years of the Cold War, Paul Kennedy warned of “imperial overstretch,” arguing that American decline was inevitable “if the trends in national indebtedness, low productivity increases, [etc.]” were allowed to continue at the same time as “massive American commitments of men, money and materials are made in different parts of the globe.” Today, we are once again being told that this global strategy needs to give way to a more restrained and modest approach, even though the indebtedness crisis that we face in coming years is not caused by the present, largely successful global strategy. Of course it is precisely the success of that strategy that is taken for granted. The enormous benefits that this strategy has provided, including the financial benefits, somehow never appear on the ledger. They should. We might begin by asking about the global security order that the United States has sustained since Word War II—the prevention of major war, the support of an open trading system, and promotion of the liberal principles of free markets and free government. How much is that order worth? What would be the cost of its collapse or transformation into another type of order? Whatever the nature of the current economic difficulties, the past six decades have seen a greater increase in global prosperity than any time in human history. Hundreds of millions have been lifted out of poverty. Once-backward nations have become economic dynamos. And the American economy, though suffering ups and downs throughout this period, has on the whole benefited immensely from this international order. One price of this success has been maintaining a sufficient military capacity to provide the essential security underpinnings of this order. But has the price not been worth it? In the first half of the 20th century, the United States found itself engaged in two world wars. In the second half, this global American strategy helped produce a peaceful end to the great-power struggle of the Cold War and then 20 more years of great-power peace. Looked at coldly, simply in terms of dollars and cents, the benefits of that strategy far outweigh the costs.  The danger, as always, is that we don’t even realize the benefits our strategic choices have provided. Many assume that the world has simply become more peaceful, that great-power conflict has become impossible, that nations have learned that military force has little utility, that economic power is what counts. This belief in progress and the perfectibility of humankind and the institutions of international order is always alluring to Americans and Europeans and other children of the Enlightenment. It was the prevalent belief in the decade before World War I, in the first years after World War II, and in those heady days after the Cold War when people spoke of the “end of history.” It is always tempting to believe that the international order the United States built and sustained with its power can exist in the absence of that power, or at least with much less of it. This is the hidden assumption of those who call for a change in American strategy: that the United States can stop playing its role and yet all the benefits that came from that role will keep pouring in. This is a great if recurring illusion, the idea that you can pull a leg out from under a table and the table will not fall over.

### Heg---A2: No Transition Wars/Power Vacuum

**Collapse of hegemony causes global nuclear war**

**Müller 8** (Harold, Director – Peace Research Institute and Professor of International Relations – Frankfurt University, “The Future of Nuclear Weapons in an Interdependent World”, Washington Quarterly, Spring, Lexis)

A power transition creates dangerous times. **[9](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=bdd54216370e15df8fa26bde1111b584&docnum=8&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAz&_md5=f6b9321740b257920320c7efec57cfcf&focBudTerms=china%20or%20chinese%21%20or%20beijing%20w/35%20aggress%21%20or%20conflict%21%20or%20war%20or%20creeping%20occupation%20w/20%20south%20china%20sea&focBudSel=all" \l "fnote9" \t "_self)** Most challenges to a hegemon in world history, whether successful or not, have precipitated war or a series of wars. Today's interdependence will surely serve to make great powers cautious about armed conflict, but it cannot completely guarantee such a conflict will not occur. Bones of contention exist, notably between the United States and China: Taiwan, the South China Sea, and the competition for Persian Gulf and Central Asian energy resources. Although there exists a naive belief that great-power war has been eliminated as a possibility in world politics, exaggerated complacency could become extremely dangerous. Interdependence itself and advanced weaponry, nuclear weapons included, would mean that a violent contest among the big powers would be an unmitigated catastrophe. The relationships among those powers must be carefully managed if a clash is to be avoided, and nuclear weapons reductions are an essential contribution to this management.

### Heg---A2: Unipolarity Fails

**Unipolarity is the only safeguard against existential threats**

**Arbatov 7** (Alexei, Member – Russian Academy of Sciences and Editor – Russia in Global Affairs, “Is a New Cold War Imminent?”, Russia in Global Affairs, 5(3), July / September, <http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/numbers/20/1130.html>)

However, the low probability of a new Cold War and the collapse of American unipolarity (as a political doctrine, if not in reality) cannot be a cause for complacency. Multipolarity, existing objectively at various levels and interdependently, holds many difficulties and threats. For example, if the Russia-NATO confrontation persists, it can do much damage to both parties and international security. Or, alternatively, if Kosovo secedes from Serbia, this may provoke similar processes in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transdniestria, and involve Russia in armed conflicts with Georgia and Moldova, two countries that are supported by NATO. Another flash point involves Ukraine. In the event of Kiev’s sudden admission into the North Atlantic Alliance (recently sanctioned by the U.S. Congress), such a move may divide Ukraine and provoke mass disorders there, thus making it difficult for Russia and the West to refrain from interfering. Meanwhile, U.S. plans to build a missile defense system in Central and Eastern Europe may cause Russia to withdraw from the INF Treaty and resume programs for producing intermediate-range missiles. Washington may respond by deploying similar missiles in Europe, which would dramatically increase the vulnerability of Russia’s strategic forces and their control and warning systems. This could make the stage for nuclear confrontation even tenser. Other “centers of power” would immediately derive benefit from the growing Russia-West standoff, using it in their own interests. China would receive an opportunity to occupy even more advantageous positions in its economic and political relations with Russia, the U.S. and Japan, and would consolidate its influence in Central and South Asia and the Persian Gulf region. India, Pakistan, member countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and some exalted regimes in Latin America would hardly miss their chance, either. A multipolar world that is not moving toward nuclear disarmament is a world of an expanding Nuclear Club. While Russia and the West continue to argue with each other, states that are capable of developing nuclear weapons of their own will jump at the opportunity. The probability of nuclear weapons being used in a regional conflict will **increase significantly**. International Islamic extremism and terrorism will increase dramatically; this threat represents the reverse side of globalization. The situation in Afghanistan, Central Asia, the Middle East, and North and East Africa will further destabilize. The wave of militant separatism, trans-border crime and terrorism will also infiltrate Western Europe, Russia, the U.S., and other countries. The surviving disarmament treaties (the **N**on-**P**roliferation **T**reaty, the **C**onventional Armed **F**orces in **E**urope Treaty, and the **C**omprehensive Nuclear **T**est **B**an **T**reaty) will collapse. In a worst-case scenario, there is the chance that an adventuresome regime will initiate a missile launch against territories or space satellites of one or several **great powers** with a view to **triggering** an exchange of **nuclear strikes between them**. Another high probability is the threat of a terrorist act with the use of a nuclear device in one or several major capitals of the world.